The Grand Alliance (121 page)

On November 20 Japan forwarded to Washington her “final word.” Although it was clear from these proposals that Japan was in effect attempting merely to obtain the fruits of victory without war, the United States Government felt obliged to make one last diplomatic offer. We were informed of the Japanese Note and were asked for our views. On November 23 I wrote in a minute to the Foreign Secretary:

Prime

Minister

to

23 Nov. 41

Foreign Secretary

Our major interest is: no further encroachments and
no war, as we have already enough of this latter. The
United States will not throw over the Chinese cause,
and we may safely follow them in this part of the
subject. We could not of course agree to an arrangement whereby Japan was free to attack Russia in
Siberia. I doubt myself whether this is likely at the
present time. I remember that President Roosevelt at
the Atlantic Conference himself wrote in, “There must
be no further encroachment in the North.” I should think
this could be agreed [with the Americans]. The formal
denunciation of the Axis Pact by Japan is not, in my
opinion, necessary. Their stopping out of the war is in
itself a great disappointment and injury to the Germans.

We ought not to agree to any veto on American or

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British help to China. But we shall not be asked to by
the United States.

Subject to the above, it would be worth while to
ease up upon Japan economically sufficiently for them
to live from hand to mouth – even if we only got another
three months. These however are only first impressions.

I must say I should feel pleased if I read that an
American-Japanese agreement had been made by
which we were to be no worse off three months hence
in the Far East than we are now.

On November 25 the President cabled to me an account of the negotiations. The Japanese Government had proposed to evacuate Southern Indo-China, pending a general settlement with China, or a general restoration of peace in the Pacific, when Japan would be prepared to withdraw altogether from Indo-China. In return the United States was to supply Japan with petroleum, to refrain from interfering with Japan’s efforts to restore peace in China, to help Japan to obtain the products of the Netherlands East Indies, and to place commercial relations between Japan and the United States on a normal basis. Both sides were to agree to make no “armed advancement” in Northeast Asia and the Southern Pacific.

The American Government, in its turn, was proposing to make a counter-offer, accepting in general the terms of the Japanese Note, while outlining specific conditions to be attached to the Japanese withdrawal from Southern Indo-China and making no mention of the position in China. The United States was prepared to accept a limited economic arrangement modifying the original freezing order. For instance, petroleum could be shipped on a monthly basis for civilian needs only. This American proposal would be The Grand Alliance

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valid for three months on the understanding that during this period a general settlement covering the whole Pacific area would be discussed.

When I read the draft reply, which was, and is still, called the “modus vivendi,” I thought it inadequate. This impression was shared by the Dutch and Australian Governments, and above all by Chiang Kai-shek, who sent a frantic protest to Washington. I was however deeply sensitive of the limits which we must observe in commenting on United States policy on an issue where decisive action lay with them alone. I understood the dangers attending the thought, “The British are trying to drag us into war.” I therefore placed the issue where it belonged, namely, in the President’s hands, and, mentioning only the Chinese aspect, sent him the following cable:

Former

Naval

26 Nov. 41

Person to President

Roosevelt

Your message about Japan received tonight. Also
full accounts from Lord Halifax of discussions and your
counter-project to Japan. … Of course it is for you to
handle this business, and we certainly do not want an
additional war. There is only one point that disquiets us.

What about Chiang Kai-shek? Is he not having a very
thin diet? Our anxiety is about China. If they collapse
our joint dangers would enormously increase. We are
sure that the regard of the United States for the
Chinese cause will govern your action. We feel that the
Japanese are most unsure of themselves.

This message of course arrived in Washington at dawn of the same day it was dated.

Mr. Hull says in his
Memoirs:

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During the night a cable came in for the President from Mr. Churchill commenting on our modus vivendi.

Obviously influenced by Chiang Kai-shek’s cable to him, the Prime Minister wondered whether the Generalissimo was not getting “rather meagre rations” under the modus vivendi. China, he said, was the cause of his being anxious, and the Chinese collapse would hugely augment our common danger. After talking this over again with the Far Eastern experts of the State Department I came to the conclusion that we should cancel out the modus vivendi. Instead we should present to the Japanese solely the ten-point proposal for a general settlement, to which orginally the modus vivendi would have been in the nature of an introduction. Although the modus vivendi proposals contained only a little “chicken feed” in the shape of cotton, oil, and a few other commodities in very limited quantities as compared with the unlimited quantities the Japanese demanded, it was manifest that there would be widespread opposition from American public opinion to supplying Japan even limited quantities of oil. The Chinese were violently opposed, the other interested Governments either unfavourable or lukewarm…. The slight prospect of Japan’s agreeing to the modus vivendi therefore did not warrant assuming the risks involved in proceeding with it, especially the risk of collapse of Chinese morale and resistance, and even of disintegration.
2

We had not heard up to this moment of the “Ten-Point Note,” which not only met our wishes and those of the associated Governments, but indeed went beyond anything for which we had ventured to ask. On this same 26th Mr.

Hull received the Japanese envoys at the State Department. He did not even mention to them the modus vivendi about which the President had telegraphed to me The Grand Alliance

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on the 23d. On the contrary, he handed them the “Ten-Point Note.” Two points of this were as follows: The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air, and police forces from China and Indo-China.

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support – militarily, politically, economically – any Government or régime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China, with capital temporarily at Chungk-ing.

The envoys were “dumbfounded,” and retired in the greatest distress. This may well have been sincere. They had been chosen largely on account of their reputation as peace-seeking and moderate men who would lull the United States into a sense of security till all was decided and all was ready. They knew little of the whole mind of their Government. They did not dream that Mr. Hull was far better informed on this than they were. From the end of 1940 the Americans had pierced the vital Japanese ciphers, and were decoding large numbers of their military and diplomatic telegrams. In the secret American circles these were referred to as “Magics.” The “Magics” were repeated to us, but there was an inevitable delay –

sometimes of two or three days – before we got them. We did not know therefore at any given moment all that the President or Mr. Hull knew. I make no complaint of this.

That same afternoon the President sent the following message to the High Commissioner of the Philippines:
Preparations are becoming apparent … for an early
aggressive movement of some character, although as
yet there are no clear indications as to its strength or
whether it will be directed against the Burma Road,
Thailand, Malay Peninsula, Netherlands East Indies, or
the Philippines. Advance against Thailand seems the
most probable. I consider it possible that this next

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Japanese aggression might cause an outbreak of
hostilities between the United States and Japan….

When on November 29 our Ambassador, Lord Halifax, visited the State Department, Mr. Hull said to him that the danger from Japan “hung just over our heads.”

The diplomatic part in our relations with Japan is now virtually over. The matter will now go to the officials of the Army and Navy, with whom I have talked…. Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of surprise…. My theory is that the Japanese recognise that their course of unlimited conquest, now renewed all along the line, probably is a desperate gamble and requires the utmost boldness and risk. [He added:] When Churchill received Chiang’s loud protest about the modus vivendi it would have been better if he had sent Chiang a strong cable to brace up and fight with the same zeal as the Japanese and Americans were displaying. Instead he passed the protest on to us without objection on his part….

I did not know that the die had already been cast by Japan or how far the President’s resolves had gone.

Former

Naval

30 Nov. 41

Person to President

Roosevelt

It seems to me that one important method remains
unused in averting war between Japan and our two
countries, namely, a plain declaration, secret or public
as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest
consequences. I realise your constitutional difficulties,
but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into war by encroachment without having before her fairly and squarely the dire character of a further aggressive step. I beg
you to consider whether, at the moment, which you