The Grand Alliance (42 page)

But now a new figure sprang upon the world stage – a German warrior who will hold his place in their military annals. Erwin Rommel was born in Heidenheim, in Württemberg, in November, 1891. He was a delicate boy, and was educated at home till, at the age of nine, he joined the local Government school, of which his father was headmaster. In 1910 he was an officer cadet in the Württemberg Regiment. When he did his training at the military school at Danzig his instructors reported that he was physically small, but strong. Mentally he was not remarkable. He fought in the First World War in the Argonne, in Rumania, and in Italy, being twice wounded and awarded the highest classes of the Iron Cross and of the order Pour le Mérite. Between the two wars he served as a regimental officer and on the Staff. On the outbreak of The Grand Alliance

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the Second World War he was appointed commandant of the Fuehrer’s field headquarters in the Polish campaign, and was then given command of the 7th Panzer Division of the Fifteenth Corps. This division, nicknamed “the Phantoms,” formed the spearhead of the German break-through across the Meuse. He narrowly escaped capture when the British counter-attacked at Arras on May 21, 1940. Thereafter he led his division through La Bassée towards Lille. If this thrust had had a little more success, or perhaps not been restrained by orders from the High Command, it might have cut off a large part of the British Army, including the 3d Division, commanded by General Montgomery. His was the spearhead which crossed the Somme and advanced on the Seine in the direction of Rouen, rolling up the French left wing and capturing numerous French and British forces around Saint-Valery.

His division was the first to reach the Channel, and entered Cherbourg just after our final evacuation where Rommel took the surrender of the port and thirty thousand French prisoners.

These many services and distinctions led to his appointment early in 1941 to command the German troops sent to Libya. On February 12 he arrived with his personal staff at Tripoli to campaign with the ally against whom he had formerly won distinction. At that time Italian hopes were limited to holding Tripolitania, and Rommel took charge of the growing German contingent under Italian command. He strove immediately to enforce an offensive campaign.

When early in April the Italian Commander-in-Chief tried to persuade him that the German Afrika Corps should not advance without his permission, Rommel protested that “as a German general he had to issue orders in accordance with what the situation demanded.” Any reservations because of the supply problem were, he declared,

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“unfounded.” He demanded and obtained complete freedom of action.

Throughout the African campaign Rommel proved himself a master in handling mobile formations, especially in regrouping rapidly after an operation and following up success. He was a splendid military gambler, dominating the problems of supply and scornful of opposition. At first the German High Command, having let him loose, were astonished by his successes, and were inclined to hold him back. His ardour and daring inflicted grievous disasters upon us, but he deserves the salute which I made him –

and not without some reproaches from the public – in the House of Commons in January, 1942, when I said of him,

“We have a very daring and skilful opponent against us, and, may I say across the havoc of war, a great general.”

He also deserves our respect because, although a loyal German soldier, he came to hate Hitler and all his works, and took part in the conspiracy of 1944 to rescue Germany by displacing the maniac and tyrant. For this he paid the forfeit of his life. In the sombre wars of modern democracy chivalry finds no place. Dull butcheries on a gigantic scale and mass effects overwhelm all detached sentiment. Still, I do not regret or retract the tribute I paid to Rommel, unfashionable though it was judged.

In London we accepted Wavell’s telegram of March 2, as the basis of our action. The Agheila defile was the kernel of the situation. If the enemy broke through to Agedabia, Benghazi and everything west of Tobruk were imperilled.

They could choose between taking the good coast road to Benghazi and beyond or using the tracks leading straight to Mechili and Tobruk, which cut off the bulge of desert, two The Grand Alliance

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hundred miles long by a hundred miles broad. Taking this latter route in February, we had nipped and captured many thousands of Italians retiring through Benghazi. It should not have been a matter of surprise to us if Rommel also took the desert route to play the same trick on us. However, so long as we held the gateway at Agheila the enemy was denied the opportunity of bemusing us in this fashion.

There are good positions there, but partly owing to the extra strain on transport from Tobruk, through the port of Benghazi not being judged usable, they were not adequately defended.

All this depended upon a knowledge not only of the ground, but of the conditions of desert warfare. So rapid had been our advance, so easy and complete our victories, that these strategic facts were not effectively grasped at this stage.

However, a superiority in armour and in quality rather than numbers, and a reasonable parity in the air, would have enabled the better and more lively force to win in a rough-and-tumble in the desert, even if the gateway had been lost. None of these conditions were established by the arrangements which were made. We were inferior in the air; and our armour, for reasons which will be explained later, was utterly inadequate, as was also the training and equipment of the troops west of Tobruk.

On March 17 Generals Wavell and Dill visited Cyrenaica and made a personal inspection. They motored through Antelat to Agheila, and Dill was immediately struck by the difficulty of defending the large stretches of desert between Agheila and Benghazi. In a telegram on March 18 from Cairo to his deputy at home he said that the outstanding fact was that between the salt-pans east of Agheila and Benghazi the desert was so open and so suitable for armoured vehicles that, other things being equal, the stronger fleet would win. There were no infantry positions

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on which to fight. Of course, the maintenance problem over these vast distances of desert remained and entirely favoured defence. Wavell, he said, had this difficult defence problem well in hand.

In a conversation with the Australian Staff of General Morshead, whom he met on the way, the C.I.G.S. is said to have expressed the opinion that the force looked like getting “a bloody nose” in the near future, adding, “This will not be the only place either.”
1
This latter opinion was not in harmony with any statement he made to us.

There had been during March increasing evidence of the arrival of German troops from Tripoli towards Agheila, and on March 20 Wavell reported that an attack on a limited scale seemed to be in preparation and that the situation on the Cyrenaica frontier was causing him some anxiety. If our advanced troops were driven from their present positions there would be no good blocking points south of Benghazi, as the country was dead-level plain. Administrative problems should, however, preclude anything but a limited advance by the enemy.

I telegraphed:

Prime Minister to

26 March 41

General Wavell

We are naturally concerned at rapid German advance to Agheila. It is their habit to push on whenever
they are not resisted. I presume you are only waiting for
the tortoise to stick his head out far enough before
chopping it off. It seems extremely important to give
them an early taste of our quality. What is the state and
location of 7th Armoured Division? Pray give me your
appreciation. I cordially approve your request to
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General Smuts for a brigade of 1st South African
Division. Everything must be done to accelerate movement of 2d South African Division. The 50th British
Division starts twenty-second….

Wavell replied to this at once as follows:
27 March 41

No evidence yet that there are many Germans at
Agheila; probably mainly Italian, with small stiffening of
Germans.

2. I have to admit to having taken considerable risk
in Cyrenaica after capture of Benghazi in order to
provide maximum support for Greece. My estimate at
that time was that Italians in Tripolitania could be
disregarded and that Germans were unlikely to accept
the risk of sending large bodies of armoured troops to
Africa in view of the inefficiency of the Italian Navy. I,
therefore, made arrangements to leave only small
armoured force and one partly trained Australian
division in Cyrenaica.

3. After we had accepted Greek liability evidence
began to accumulate of German reinforcements to
Tripoli, which were coupled with attacks on Malta which
prevented bombing of Tripoli from there, on which I had
counted. German air attacks on Benghazi, which
prevented supply ships using harbour, also increased
our difficulties.

4. Result is I am weak in Cyrenaica at present and
no reinforcements of armoured troops, which are chief
requirement, are at present available. I have one
brigade of 2d Armoured Division in Cyrenaica, one in
Greece. The 7th Armoured Division is returning [to
Cairo], and as no reserve tanks were available is
dependent on repair, which takes time. Next month or
two will be anxious, but enemy has extremely difficult
problem and am sure his numbers have been much
exaggerated. I cannot, however, at present afford to
use my small armoured force as boldly as I should like.

Steps to reinforce Cyrenaica are in hand…. My own
chief difficulty is transport.

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He added what may well remind us of his many cares: Have just come back from Keren front. Capture was very fine achievement by Indian divisions, and their tails are high in spite of fairly heavy casualties. Platt will push on towards Asmara as quickly as he can, and I have authorised Cunningham to continue towards Addis Ababa from Harrar, which surrendered yesterday.

Rommel’s attack upon Agheila began on March 31.

General Neame had been ordered, if pressed, to fight a delaying action back to near Benghazi, and to cover that port as long as possible. He was given permission to evacuate it if necessary after making demolitions. Our armoured division at Agheila, which had in fact only one armoured brigade and its support group, therefore, withdrew slowly during the next two days. In the air the enemy proved greatly superior. The Italian Air Force still counted for little, but there were about a hundred German fighters and a hundred bombers and dive-bombers. On April 2 General Wavell reported that the forward troops in Cyrenaica were being attacked by a German colonial armoured division.