The Grand Alliance (43 page)

Some forward posts were overrun yesterday and losses occurred. Losses not serious at present, but the mechanical condition of the armoured brigade is causing Neame much concern, and there seem to be many breakdowns. As I can produce no more armoured units for at least three or four weeks, I have warned him to keep three brigades in being, even if it involves considerable withdrawal, possibly even from Benghazi.

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I was still under the impression, derived from Wavell’s previous estimates, of the enemy’s limited potential strength.

Prime

Minister

to

2 April 41

General Wavell

It seems most desirable to chop the German advance against Cyrenaica. Any rebuff to the Germans
would have far-reaching prestige effects. It would be all
right to give up ground for the purposes of manoeuvre,
but any serious withdrawal from Benghazi would
appear most melancholy. I cannot understand how the
enemy can have developed any considerable force at
the end of this long, waterless coast road, and I cannot
feel that there is at this moment a persistent weight
behind his attack in Cyrenaica. If this blob which has
come forward against you could be cut off you might
have a prolonged easement. Of course, if they succeed
in wandering onward they will gradually destroy the
effect of your victories. Have you got a man like O’Connor or Creagh dealing with this frontier problem?

On April 2 the support group of our 2d Armoured Division was driven out of Agedabia by fifty enemy tanks, and retreated to the Antelat area, thirty-five miles to the northeast. The division was ordered to withdraw to the neighbourhood of Benghazi. Our armoured forces under the German attack became disorganised and there were serious losses. The message ended,
“Orders have been
given for demolitions in Benghazi.”
General Wavell flew to the front on the third, and reported on his return that a large part of the armoured brigade had been overrun and disorganised by superior German armour. This would uncover the left flank of the 9th Australian Division east and northeast of Benghazi.
“Their withdrawal may be
necessary.”
In consequence of the enemy’s strength in Libya he said the 7th Australian Division could not go to

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Greece, but must move to the Western Desert instead. The 6th British Division, still incomplete, must become the reserve.
“This will involve the postponement of the attack
on Rhodes.”
Thus at a single stroke, and almost in a day, the desert flank upon which all our decisions had depended had crumpled and the expedition to Greece, already slender, was heavily reduced. The seizure of Rhodes, which was an essential part of our air plans in the Aegean, became impossible.

The evacuation of Benghazi was ordered. The support group was sent northward to cover the withdrawal of the 9th Australian Division, which began early on April 4. At the same time the 3d Armoured Brigade were to move on Mechili to block any attempt on the part of the enemy to interfere with the withdrawal. To reinforce them there two regiments of the Indian Motorised Cavalry Brigade were ordered up from Tobruk.

I was disturbed by this new and unexpected situation, and cabled the same day to Mr. Eden, who was still in Athens.

Prime Minister to Mr.

3 April 41

Eden

Evacuation Benghazi serious, as Germans, once
established in aerodromes thereabouts, will probably
deny us use of Tobruk. Find out what is strategic and
tactical plan to chop the enemy. Let me know to what
point retirement is ordered. How does 9th Australian
Division get back, and how far? Remember that in his
telegram of March 2, Wavell gave many cogent arguments for believing his western flank secure.

2. Far more important than the loss of ground is the
idea that we cannot face the Germans and that their
appearance is enough to drive us back many scores of

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miles. This may react most evilly throughout Balkans
and Turkey. Pray go back to Cairo and go into all this.

Sooner or later we shall have to fight the Huns. By all
means make the best plan of manoeuvre, but anyhow
fight. Can nothing be done to cut the coastal road by a
seaborne descent behind them, even if it means putting
off Rhodes?

Mr. Eden replied from Cairo:

5 April 41

Dill and I arrived safely this evening, and have had
full discussion with Wavell and Tedder in Longmore’s
absence in the Sudan.

The general conclusion to which we have all come is
that the Italian-German effort in Cyrenaica is a major
diversion well timed to precede the German attack in
the Balkans. This judgment in no way diminishes the
seriousness of the indirect threat to Egypt, for quite
clearly the enemy must be expected to press any
advantage he gains. Unfortunately, his first moves
attained a greater measure of success than had been
expected, and he is following up his initial success….

Wavell had gone to the Desert front with the intention of putting O’Connor in command. That officer, who was not well at the moment, had represented to the Commander-in-Chief that it would be better if he did not actually take over command from Neame in the middle of the battle, but that he should be at hand to help him with his expert local knowledge. Wavell agreed. The arrangement did not work well or last long. On the night of the sixth the retreat from Benghazi was in full progress. The 9th Australian Division was withdrawing eastward along the coastal road, and in order to avoid the traffic General Neame took General O’Connor in his car, and without escort of any kind motored The Grand Alliance

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along a by-road. In the darkness they were suddenly stopped, and the pistols of a German patrol presented through the car windows left them no choice but personal surrender. The loss of these two gallant lieutenant-generals, Neame a V.C., and O’Connor on the whole our most experienced and successful desert commander, was grievous.

In the afternoon of April 6, at a conference in Cairo at which Wavell, Eden, Dill, Longmore, and Cunningham were present, the question of where to make a stand was discussed. Wavell decided to hold Tobruk if possible, and with his usual personal mobility flew thither on the morning of the eighth with the Australian General Laverack, whom he placed in temporary command. Eden and Dill started on their homeward journey, and the War Cabinet anxiously awaited their return with all the knowledge they had gathered in Athens and Cairo.

Wavell reported that the withdrawal of the 9th Australian Division seemed to be proceeding without interference though twenty-four hundred Italian prisoners had to be left at Barce. But later the same day he telegraphed that the position in the Western Desert had greatly deteriorated.

The enemy had moved on Mechili by the desert route, and there were further vehicle losses in the 2d Armoured Division by mechanical breakdowns and air bombing. The 3d Armoured Brigade had little or no fighting value.

Meanwhile I sent the following message to General Wavell:
7 April 41

You should surely be able to hold Tobruk, with its
permanent Italian defences, at least until or unless the
enemy brings up strong artillery forces. It seems difficult
to believe that he can do this for some weeks. He
would run great risks in masking Tobruk and advancing
upon Egypt, observing that we can reinforce from the
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sea and would menace his communications. Tobruk,
therefore, seems to be a place to be held to the death
without thought of retirement. I should be glad to hear
of your intentions.

Wavell flew to Tobruk on April 8 and gave orders for the defence of the fortress. He started back for Cairo as night fell. The engine failed and they made a forced landing in the dark. The aircraft was smashed and they stepped out onto the open desert, they knew not where. The Commander-in-Chief decided to burn his secret papers.

After a long wait the lights of a vehicle were seen.

Fortunately it proved to be a British patrol, who approached in menacing fashion. For six hours the Staff in Cairo were alarmed, not without reason, at Wavell’s disappearance.

On his return to Cairo the Commander-in-Chief replied.

After giving a detailed statement of the troop positions, he said:

Although first enemy effort seems to have exhausted itself, I do not feel we shall have long respite and am still very anxious. Tobruk is not good defensive position; long line of communication behind is hardly protected at all and is unorganised.

As the last sentence of this message seemed to leave the question of Tobruk in doubt, I drafted the following message in conclave with the Chiefs of Staff:
Prime Minister and

10 April 41

Chiefs of Staff to

General Wavell

We await your full appreciation. Meanwhile you
should know how the problem looks to us. From here it
seems unthinkable that the fortress of Tobruk should be
abandoned without offering the most prolonged resistance. We have a secure sealine of communications.

The enemy’s line is long and should be vulnerable,

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provided he is not given time to organise at leisure. So
long as Tobruk is held and its garrison includes even a
few armoured vehicles which can lick out at his communications, nothing but a raid dare go past Tobruk. If you
leave Tobruk and go 260 miles back to Mersa Matruh
may you not find yourself faced with something like the
same problem? We are convinced you should fight it
out at Tobruk.

But before the meeting broke up we learned of Wavell’s final decision to hold Tobruk.

I propose [he said] to hold Tobruk, to place a force in Bardia-Sollum area with as much mobility as possible to protect communications and act against flank or rear of enemy attacking Tobruk, and to build up old plan of defence in Mersa Matruh area. Distribution of force so as to gain time without risking defeat in detail will be difficult calculation. My resources are very limited, especially of mobile and armoured troops and of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. It will be a race against time.