The Grand Alliance (44 page)

Our message was therefore not sent. Instead:
Prime

Minister

to

10 April 41

General Wavell

We all cordially endorse your decision to hold
Tobruk, and will do all in our power to bring you aid.

The retreat to Tobruk was carried out successfully along the coast road. But inland only the headquarters of the 2d Armoured Division arrived at Mechili, on April 6, having lost all touch with its subordinate formations. On April 7 this headquarters and the two Indian motorised regiments found themselves surrounded. Attacks were repulsed, and two ultimatums to surrender, one signed by Rommel, were The Grand Alliance

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rejected. A number of men fought their way out, bringing in a hundred German prisoners, but the great majority were forced back into the camp, and there surrendered. The missing 3d Armoured Brigade, now reduced to a dozen tanks, moved on Derna, reputedly because of shortage of petrol, and near that place was ambushed and destroyed on the night of April 6. Throughout the operations the German Air Force had had complete air superiority. This contributed in no small degree to the enemy success. On the night of the eighth the Australians reached Tobruk, which had by then been reinforced by sea with a brigade of the 7th Australian Division from Egypt. The enemy, whose forward troops included parts of the 5th (Light) Panzer Division, one Italian armoured and one infantry division, took Bardia on April 12, but made no effort to penetrate the frontier defences of Egypt.

The enemy pushed on very quickly round Tobruk and towards Bardia and Sollum, with heavy armoured cars and motorised infantry. Other troops attacked the Tobruk defences. The garrison, consisting of the 9th Australian Division, one brigade group of the 7th Australian Division, and a small armoured force, beat off two attacks, destroying a number of enemy tanks. In view of the changed situation and loss of the generals, Wavell had to reorganise the system of command as follows: Tobruk fortress, General Morshead; Western Desert, General Beresford-Peirse; troops in Egypt, General Marshall-Cornwall; Palestine, General Godwin-Austen.

If I get time [said the Commander-in-Chief] to put the above organisation into effect we shall be back to something resembling situation of last autumn, with additional excrescence of Tobruk. But we shall be much harder pressed on ground, and shall not escape with ineffective air attack that Italians made last year. I can see no hope of being able to relieve Tobruk for at The Grand Alliance

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least several months…. The possible attitude of Egypt is obviously going to be matter of great anxiety. The next few months will be very difficult, quite apart from what happens in Greece.

Former

Naval

13 April 41

Person to President

Roosevelt

We are, of course, going all out to fight for the Nile
Valley. No other conclusion is physically possible. We
have half a million men there or on the way and mountains of stores. All questions of cutting the loss are
ruled out. Tobruk must be held, not as a defensive
position, but as an invaluable bridgehead on the flank
of any serious by-pass advance on Egypt. Our Air and
Navy must cut or impede enemy communications
across Central Mediterranean. Matter has to be fought
out, and must in any case take some time. Enemy’s
difficulties in land communication, over eight hundred
miles long, must make attack in heavy force a matter of
months. Even if Tobruk had to be evacuated from the
sea, which we command, there are other strong fighting
positions already organised. I personally feel that this
situation is not only manageable, but hopeful. Dill and
Eden, who have just come back, concur.

Good news now arrived from Tobruk, where the audacious and persistent enemy met their first definite rebuff.

General Wavell to

14 April 41

War Office

Libya. Between two hundred and three hundred
German p.o.w., captured at Tobruk morning April 14,
stated they were badly shaken by our artillery fire and
were very short of food and water. These troops wept
when their attack was driven off, and their morale is
definitely low.

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Perhaps it was because their morale and expectations had been so high that they wept!

Prime

Minister

to

14 April 41

General Wavell

Convey heartiest congratulations from War Cabinet
to all engaged in most successful fight. Bravo Tobruk!

We feel it vital that Tobruk should be regarded as sallyport and not, please, as an “excrescence.” Can you not
find good troops who are without transport to help hold
perimeter, thus freeing at least one, if not two, Australian brigade groups to act as General Fortress
Reserve and potential striking force?

After considering the whole situation at this moment when a temporary stabilisation on the Egyptian frontier and at Tobruk seemed to have been achieved, I issued the following to the Chiefs of Staff:

DIRECTIVE BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF

DEFENCE

The War in the Mediterranean

April 14, 1941

If the Germans can continue to nourish their
invasion of Cyrenaica and Egypt through the port of
Tripoli and along the coastal road, they can certainly
bring superior armoured forces to bear upon us, with
consequences of the most serious character. If, on the
other hand, their communications from Italy and Sicily
with Tripoli are cut, and those along the coastal road
between Tripoli and Agheila constantly harassed, there
is no reason why they should not themselves sustain a
major defeat.

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2. It becomes the prime duty of the British Mediterranean Fleet under Admiral Cunningham to stop all
seaborne traffic between Italy and Africa by the fullest
use of surface craft, aided so far as possible by aircraft
and submarines. For this all-important objective heavy
losses in battleships, cruisers, and destroyers must if
necessary be accepted. The harbour at Tripoli must be
rendered unusable by recurrent bombardment, and/or
by blocking and mining, care being taken that the
mining does not impede the blocking or bombardments.

Enemy convoys passing to and from Africa must be
attacked by our cruisers, destroyers, and submarines,
aided by the Fleet Air Arm and the Royal Air Force.

Every convoy which gets through must be considered a
serious naval failure. The reputation of the Royal Navy
is engaged in stopping this traffic.

3. Admiral Cunningham’s fleet must be strengthened
for the above purposes to whatever extent is necessary. The Nelson and Rodney, with their heavily armoured decks, are especially suitable for resisting
attacks from the German dive-bombers, of which undue
fears must not be entertained. Other reinforcements of
cruisers, minelayers, and destroyers must be sent from
the west as opportunity serves. The use of the Centurion as a blockship should be studied, but the effectual
blocking of Tripoli Harbour would be well worth a
battleship upon the active list.

4. When Admiral Cunningham’s fleet has been
reinforced he should be able to form two bombarding
squadrons, which may in turn at intervals bombard the
port of Tripoli, especially when shipping or convoys are
known to be in the harbour.

5. In order to control the sea communications across
the Mediterranean, sufficient suitable naval forces must
be based on Malta, and protection must be afforded to
these naval forces by the air force at Malta, which must
be kept at the highest strength in fighters of the latest
and best quality that the Malta aerodromes can contain.

The duty of affording fighter protection to the naval
forces holding Malta should have priority over the use
of the aerodromes by bombers engaged in attacking
Tripoli.

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6. Every endeavour should be made to defend Malta
Harbour by the U.P. weapon [rockets] in its various
developments, especially by the F.A.M. [Fast Aerial
Mine], fired by the improved naval method.

7. Next in importance after the port at Tripoli comes
the 400-mile coastal road between Tripoli and Agheila.

This road should be subjected to continuous harassing
attacks by forces landed from the Glen ships in the
special landing-craft. The commandos and other forces
gathered in Egypt should be freely used for this purpose. The seizure of particular points from the sea
should be studied, and the best ones chosen for
prompt action. Here again losses must be faced, but
small forces may be used in this harassing warfare,
being withdrawn, if possible, after a while. If even a few
light or medium tanks could be landed, these could rip
along the road, destroying very quickly convoys far
exceeding their own value. Every feasible method of
harassing constantly this section of the route is to be
attempted, the necessary losses being faced.

8. In all the above paragraphs the urgency is extreme, because the enemy will grow continually
stronger in the air than he is now, especially should his
attack on Greece and Yugoslavia be successful, as
may be apprehended. Admiral Cunningham should not,
therefore, await the arrival of battleship reinforcements,
nor should the use of the Glen ships be withheld for the
sake of Rhodes.

9. It has been decided that Tobruk is to be defended
with all possible strength. But [holding] Tobruk must not
be regarded as a defensive operation, but rather as an
invaluable bridgehead or sally-port on the communications of the enemy. It should be reinforced as may be
necessary both with infantry and by armoured fighting
vehicles, to enable active and continuous raiding of the
enemy’s flanks and rear. If part of the defences of the
perimeter can be taken over by troops unprovided with
transport, this should permit the organisation of a
mobile force both for the fortress reserve and for
striking at the enemy. It would be a great advantage
should the enemy be drawn into anything like a siege of

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Tobruk and compelled to transport and feed the heavy
artillery forces for that purpose.

10. It is above all necessary that General Wavell
should regain unit ascendancy over the enemy and
destroy his small raiding parties, instead of our being
harassed and hunted by them. Enemy patrols must be
attacked on every occasion, and our own patrols should
be used with audacity. Small British parties in armoured
cars, or mounted on motor-cycles, or, if occasion offers,
infantry, should not hesitate to attack individual tanks
with bombs and bombards, as is planned for the
defence of Britain. It is important to engage the enemy
even in small affairs in order to make him fire off his
gun ammunition, of which the supply must be very
difficult.