The Grand Alliance (37 page)

The Grand Alliance

226

Simultaneously with this I made the following appeal:
Prime

Minister

to

4 April 41

General Simovic

From every quarter my information shows rapid
heavy concentration and advance towards your country
by German ground and air forces. Large movements of
air forces are reported to us from France by our agents
there. Bombers have even been withdrawn from Tripoli,
according to our African Army Intelligence. I cannot
understand argument that you are gaining time. The
one supreme stroke for victory and safety is to win a
decisive forestalling victory in Albania, and collect the
masses of equipment that would fall into your hands.

When the four German mountain divisions reported by
your General Staff as entraining in the Tyrol reach
Albania, a very different resistance will confront you
than could be offered by rear of the demoralised
Italians. As this is the first time I have had the honour to
address Your Excellency, I send my heartiest good
wishes for the success of your Administration and for
the safety and independence of the brave nation whose
fortunes you guide.

We have now to chronicle the only occasion when a dash of sentiment was allowed to mingle in the calculations of the Kremlin oligarchy.

The national movement in Belgrade had been a spontaneous revolt entirely divorced from the activities of the small illegal but Soviet-sponsored Yugoslav Communist Party. After waiting a week Stalin decided to make a gesture. His officials were negotiating with M. Gavrilovic, the Yugoslav Minister in Moscow, and with a mission sent from Belgrade after the revolution. Little progress had been made. During the night of April 5-6 the Yugoslavs were

The Grand Alliance

227

summoned abruptly to the Kremlin. They were confronted with Stalin in person, who presented them with a pact in draft, ready for signature. The work was speedily done.

Russia agreed to respect “the independence, sovereign rights, and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia,” and in the event of that country being attacked Russia would adopt an attitude of good will “based on friendly relations.” This was at any rate an amicable grimace. Gavrilovic stayed alone till morning discussing with Stalin the question of military supplies. As their conversations came to an end the Germans struck.

On the morning of April 6 German bombers appeared over Belgrade. Flying in relays from occupied airfields in Rumania, they delivered a methodical attack lasting three days upon the Yugoslav capital. From rooftop height, without fear of resistance, they blasted the city without mercy. This was called Operation “Punishment.” When silence came at last on April 8 over seventeen thousand citizens of Belgrade lay dead in the streets or under the debris. Out of the nightmare of smoke and fire came the maddened animals released from their shattered cages in the zoological gardens. A stricken stork hobbled past the main hotel, which was a mass of flames. A bear, dazed and uncomprehending, shuffled through the inferno with slow and awkward gait down towards the Danube. He was not the only bear who did not understand.

Operation “Punishment” had been performed.

The Grand Alliance

228

10

The Japanese Envoy

Disturbing News from the Far East — Question of
Reinforcing Hong Kong — Flutter in the Japanese
Embassy — My Telegrams to President Roosevelt, February
15
and
20 —
A Visit from the
Japanese Ambassador on February
24 —
And on
March
4 —
German Anxiety Lest Japan Should
Embroil Herself with the U.S.A. — Three
Decisions in Tokyo — Matsuoka’s Mission — His
Meeting with Ribbentrop, March
27 —
And with
Hitler — “Moral Communism” — My Letter to
Matsuoka of April
2 —
He Visits Rome — Tarries
in Moscow — A Doom-Balance — Stalin’s
Affability — Prince Konoye’s Desire for an Understanding with the U.S.A. — Matsuoka’s Reply to
My Letter — The Japanese War — Cabinet
Decides on Compromise — Matsuoka Resigns —

Japanese Hopes of a Settlement
—
Three Coldly
Calculating Empires Wrong.

T
HE NEW YEAR had brought disturbing news from the Far East. The Japanese Navy was increasingly active off the coasts of Southern Indo-China. Japanese warships were reported in Saigon Harbor and the Gulf of Siam. On January 31 the Japanese Government negotiated an armistice between the Vichy French and Siam. Rumours spread that this settlement of a frontier dispute in Southeast Asia was to be the prelude to the entry of Japan into the war. The Germans were at the same time bringing

The Grand Alliance

229

increased pressure to bear upon Japan to attack the British at Singapore. “I tried,” said Ribbentrop at his Nuremberg trial, “to induce Japan to attack Singapore because it was impossible to make peace with England, and I did not know what military measures we could take to achieve this end –

in any case, the Fuehrer directed me to do everything I could through diplomatic channels to weaken England’s position and thus achieve peace. We believed that this could best be done through an attack by Japan on England’s strong position in East Asia.”
1

About this time several telegrams arrived from our Commander-in-Chief in the Far East urging the reinforcement of Hong Kong. I did not agree with his views.

Prime

Minister

to

7 Jan. 41

General Ismay

This is all wrong. If Japan goes to war with us there
is not the slightest chance of holding Hong Kong or
relieving it. It is most unwise to increase the loss we
shall suffer there. Instead of increasing the garrison it
ought to be reduced to a symbolical scale. Any trouble
arising there must be dealt with at the Peace
conference after the war. We must avoid frittering away
our resources on untenable positions. Japan will think
long before declaring war on the British Empire, and
whether there are two or six battalions at Hong Kong
will make no difference to her choice. I wish we had
fewer troops there, but to move any would be
noticeable and dangerous.

Later on it will be seen that I allowed myself to be drawn from this position, and that two Canadian battalions were sent as reinforcements.

The Grand Alliance

230

In the second week of February I became conscious of a stir and flutter in the Japanese Embassy and colony in London. They were evidently in a high state of excitement, and they chattered to one another with much indiscretion.

In these days we kept our eyes and ears open. Various reports were laid before me which certainly gave the impression that they had received news from home which required them to pack up without a moment’s delay. This agitation among people usually so reserved made me feel that a sudden act of war upon us by Japan might be imminent, and I thought it well to impart my misgivings to President Roosevelt.

Former

Naval

15 Feb. 41

Person to President

Roosevelt

Many drifting straws seem to indicate Japanese
intention to make war on us or do something that would
force us to make war on them in the next few weeks or
months. I am not myself convinced that this is not a war
of nerves designed to cover Japanese encroachments
in Siam and Indo-China. However, I think I ought to let
you know that the weight of the Japanese Navy, if
thrown against us, would confront us with situations
beyond the scope of our naval resources. I do not
myself think that the Japanese would be likely to send
the large military expedition necessary to lay siege to
Singapore. The Japanese would no doubt occupy
whatever strategic points and oilfields in the Dutch East
Indies and thereabouts they covet, and thus get into a
far better position for a full-scale attack on Singapore
later on. They would also raid Australian and New
Zealand ports and coasts, causing deep anxiety in
those Dominions, which have already sent all their best-trained fighting men to the Middle East. But the attack
which I fear the most would be by raiders, including
The Grand Alliance

231

possibly battle-cruisers, upon our trade routes and
communications across the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

We could by courting disaster elsewhere send a few
strong ships into these vast waters, but all the trade
would have to go into convoy and escorts would be few
and far between. Not only would this be a most
grievous additional restriction and derangement of our
whole war economy, but it would bring altogether to an
end all reinforcements of the armies we had planned to
build up in the Middle East from Australian and Indian
sources. Any threat of a major invasion of Australia or
New Zealand would, of course, force us to withdraw our
Fleet from the Eastern Mediterranean, with disastrous
military possibilities there, and the certainty that Turkey
would have to make some accommodation for reopening of the German trade and oil supplies from the Black
Sea.