The Defence of the Realm (176 page)

92
 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during May, 1944', 3 June 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 41a. Stafford,
Ten Days to D-Day
,
p. 204
.

93
 Masterman,
Double-Cross System
,
p. 154
. ARTIST is believed to have died in the Oranienburg concentration camp. Hinsley and Simkins,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
, vol. 4,
pp. 224
–
5
.

94
 Holt,
Deceivers
,
pp. 565
–
7
.

95
 Ibid.,
p. 577
. Stafford,
Ten Days to D-Day
,
p. 307
.

96
 According to the official history of strategic deception (usually the most authoritative account), GARBO did not get through to Madrid until 6.08 a.m.; Howard,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
, vol. 5,
p. 185
. Some other accounts claim that GARBO did not make contact until 8 a.m.

97
 Stafford,
Ten Days to D-Day
,
pp. 306
–
8
. Eisenhower's appeal to the French not to rise against the German occupiers until ‘the proper time' could also have been interpreted as a veiled reference to the fact that further landings were planned – and for that reason, GARBO told the Abwehr, it was deplored by the PWE Director.

98
 See above,
p. 293
.

99
 Stafford,
Ten Days to D-Day
,
pp. 308
–
9
.

100
 The Abwehr case officer claimed more speciously that, because GARBO's reports had left the high command ‘completely forewarned and prepared', the arrival of his warning that the Allied invasion forces were on their way to the Normandy beaches would have had little greater impact ‘had it arrived three or four hours earlier'. Howard,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
, vol. 5,
p. 185
.

101
 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during June, 1944', 3 July 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 42a.

102
 Holt,
Deceivers
,
p. 581
.

103
 Howard,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
, vol. 5,
pp. 189
–
91
.

104
 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during June, 1944', 3 July 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 42a.

105
 Holt,
Deceivers
,
p. 586
.

106
 Howard,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
, vol. 5,
pp. 193
–
4
.

107
 T. E. Bromley (Foreign Office) to DG/Sec, 13 March 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 30a. For unexplained reasons, the Security Service produced a consolidated report for November 1943, December 1943 and January 1944, issued on 1 February 1944. This was the first report to be sent to Eden. The PUS, Sir Alexander Cadogan, seems to have read them with greater attention than the Foreign Secretary.

108
 Eden had been made minister responsible for MI5 (not a responsibility he appears to have exercised very actively) at the suggestion of Duff Cooper when he gave up his post as chairman of the Security Executive late in 1943.
Security Service
,
p. 400
.

109
 TNA KV 4/87. On D-Day plus 10, 16 June, the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lieutenant General (Sir) Archibald Nye, informed Petrie that there was clear evidence that the timing of the Normandy landings had taken the Germans completely by surprise, and congratulated the Security Service, ‘who contributed so much to the initial success of the operation', for its ‘remarkable achievement'. Nye to Petrie, 16 June 1944, TNA KV 4/130.

110
 TNA KV 4/130.

111
 ‘Summary of the Activities of the Security Service up to September, 1944', 5 Oct. 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 51a. This was the first of the monthly reports to be signed by Petrie. The captured German map is reproduced in Holt,
Deceivers
,
p. 569
.

112
 ‘Summary of the Activities of the Security Service up to September, 1944', 5 Oct. 1944, with minute by Churchill of 7 Oct. 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 51a.

113
 Guy Liddell diary, 21 Dec. 1944.

114
 Howard,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
, vol. 5,
p. 169
.

115
 Dear and Foot (eds),
Oxford Companion to the Second World War
, pp. 1249–53.

116
 Howard,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
, vol. 5,
pp. 171
–
2
.

117
 Ibid.,
p. 174
. B1A followed with some amusement subsequent German wrangles over the award of an Iron Cross to a non-combatant foreigner.

118
 See above,
p. 304
.

119
 T. A. Robertson, ‘TREASURE', 15 June 1944, TNA KV 2/466, s. 367a. Mary Sherer (B1A), ‘TREASURE', 17 June 1944, TNA KV 2/466, s. 368a.

120
 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during June, 1944', 3 July 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 42a.

121
 See above,
p. 288
.

122
 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during June, 1944', 3 July 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 42a. For details of ZIGZAG's return, see Macintyre,
Agent Zigzag
, ch. 25.

123
 Report by Michael Ryde, 26 July 1944, TNA KV 2/460. Macintyre,
Agent Zigzag
,
p. 282
. Most of ZIGZAG's messages to the Abwehr do not survive.

124
 Michael Ryde to Tar Robertson, 13 Sept. 1944, TNA KV 2/460; Macintyre,
Agent Zigzag
,
p. 282
.

125
 Macintyre,
Agent Zigzag
,
p. 282
. Masterman,
Double-Cross System
,
p. 179
.

126
 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during June, 1944', 3 July 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 42a.

127
 Howard,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
, vol. 5,
pp. 176
–
7
.

128
 Ibid.,
p. 177
.

129
 Ibid.,
pp. 180
–
81
.

130
 Guy Liddell diary, vol. 10, 25 Aug. 1944, TNA KV 4/194.

131
 Ibid., 9, 11 Sept. 1944.

132
 Ibid., 15 Sept. 1944.

133
 Masterman,
Double-Cross System
,
p. 181
.

134
 Macintyre,
Agent Zigzag
,
pp. 295
–
6
.

135
 None of the messages transmitted and received by TATE during this period survive. However, later evidence shows that he was central to the V-2 deception. See below,
pp. 314
–
16
.

136
 Hoare (ed.),
Camp 020
,
pp. 217
–
25
.

137
 Macintyre,
Agent Zigzag
, chs 26–8.

138
 Guy Liddell diary, 31 Oct. 1944. Oddly, this episode does not appear in Macintyre's excellent biography,
Agent Zigzag
.

139
 Report by Michael Ryde, 24 Oct. 1944, TNA KV 2/460. Macintyre,
Agent Zigzag
,
p. 305
.

140
 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service, March 1946', 4 April 1946, Security Service Archives. This episode too does not appear in Macintyre's biography.

141
 The Security Service later informed Churchill: ‘In the second half of 1944 there is no known case of the enemy sending an agent with a mission to the United Kingdom.' ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during January, 1945', 19 Feb. 1945, TNA KV 4/83, s. 56a.

142
 Masterman,
Double-Cross System
,
pp. 170
–
71
.

143
 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during January, 1945', 19 Feb. 1945, TNA KV 4/83, s. 56a.

144
 Masterman,
Double-Cross System
,
p. 181
.

145
 TATE's German case officer gave him a week's advance warning of a renewed V-1 attack in March when 275 were fired at British targets. ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during February, 1945', 13 March 1945, TNA KV 4/83, s. 57a.

146
 Dear and Foot (eds),
Oxford Companion to the Second World War
, pp. 1249–53.

147
 Howard,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
, vol. 5,
pp. 182
–
3
.

148
 The device was known to the Americans as ‘snorkel' and to the British as ‘snork'. Dear and Foot (eds),
Oxford Companion to the Second War
,
pp. 981
, 1080.

149
 Howard,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
, vol. 5,
p. 228
.

150
 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during January, 1945', 19 Feb. 1945, TNA KV 4/83, s. 56a.

151
 Howard,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
, vol. 5,
pp. 228
–
30
.

152
 Masterman,
Double-Cross System
,
p. 184
.

153
 Ibid.,
pp. 184
–
5
.

154
 Because of the decline in the B1A case-load, Astor had been earmarked for the Delhi Intelligence Bureau but instead asked for a transfer to SOE in the hope of being transferred to South-East Asia. Recollections of a former Security Service officer.

155
 Guy Liddell diary, 4 May 1945.

156
 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.

157
 Gilbert,
Road to Victory
, ch. 69.

158
 Security Service Archives.

159
 Wilson, ‘War in the Dark',
p. 2
.

160
 LCS (44) 3, TNA CAB 81/78.

161
 ‘Historical Record of Deception in the War against Germany and Italy', TNA CAB 154/100–101.

162
 HC (49) 3, TNA CAB 81/80. The LCS, which had lapsed after the Second World War, was reconstituted early in 1947.

163
 TNA CAB 154/104. Wilson, ‘War in the Dark',
pp. 221
–
6
.

164
 See below,
p. 426
.

SECTION D: THE EARLY COLD WAR

Introduction: The Security Service and its Staff in the Early Cold War

1
 See above,
pp. 148
–
52
.

2
 Recollections of former Security Service officers.

3
 Aldrich,
Hidden Hand
,
pp. 94
–
5
. From 1932 to 1936 Strong had been seconded to the Security Service as DSO first in Malta, then in Gibraltar.

4
 During the 1945 election campaign Churchill had warned, absurdly, of the danger that a Labour victory would result in the introduction of a British Gestapo.

5
 Guy Liddell diary, 17 Dec. 1945, Security Service Archives. In transcribing Liddell's dictated diary, his secretary mistakenly called the DG designate ‘Shillito'. Possibly in an attempt to spare Guy Liddell's feelings, Petrie told him that the Whitehall committee might have passed him over because it preferred him to have his hands ‘free to deal with the intelligence side of things'.

6
 Andrew,
Secret Service
,
pp. 682
–
3
. Charles Butler, Director A (administration), and Reginald Horrocks, head of Registry (with the rank of assistant director), seem to have sided with Sillitoe. Recollections of a former Security Service officer.

7
 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.

8
 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.

9
 Security Service Archives. Recollections of a former Security Service officer.

10
 Security Service Archives.

11
 Report of the Committee appointed to inquire into the Interception of Communications, 1957 (Cmnd 283). Williams,
Not in the Public Interest
,
pp. 134
–
5
.

12
 Security Service Archives.

13
 Security Service Archives.

14
 Guy Liddell diary, 26 Feb. 1946, Security Service Archives.

15
 Security Service Archives.

16
 Guy Liddell diary, 19 Nov 1946, Security Service Archives. Though Liddell's comments apply specifically to his meeting with Attlee on 19 November 1946, he noted: ‘I had the same impression on the other occasions when I spoke to him, and, from what I can gather from others who have seen him, it is his usual form.'

17
 Guy Liddell diary, 4 March 1950, Security Service Archives.

18
 Ibid., 27 July 1950. Brook's initial judgement was perceptive. For the first half of the Cold War, the balance was arguably tilted too far in favour of counter-espionage.

19
 ‘Norman Craven Brook',
Oxford DNB
.