The Defence of the Realm (173 page)

3
 Dear and Foot (eds),
Oxford Companion to the Second World War
,
p. 886
.

4
 See above,
p. 200
.

5
 Guy Liddell noted in his diary that Putlitz had been shown the list by ‘a member of the legation staff' (diary, 15 Sept. 1939). In post-war interrogation the head of The Hague Abwehr station at the time, Traugott Protze, revealed that ‘In spite of a specific veto, the German ambassador confronted Putlitz with the facts [list] and Putlitz immediately fled with his servant.' Security Service Archives.

6
 Guy Liddell diary, 15 Sept. 1939.

7
 Security Service Archives.

8
 Security Service Archives.

9
 Bland to Sinclair, 27 Oct. 1939, NMM Sinclair MSS 81/091.

10
 Hankey to Sinclair, 31 Oct. 1939, NMM Sinclair MSS 81/091.

11
 Andrew, ‘Secret Intelligence and British Foreign Policy',
pp. 25
–
6
. On the Venlo affair, see also Jeffery,
Official History of the Secret Intelligence Service
, part IV.

12
 Curry later recalled phoning SIS about the fate of Stevens and ‘his assistant'. Though personally acquainted with Stevens, he may not have known Payne Best's name. Unpublished memoirs (unpaginated) of a former Security Service officer; Security Service Archives.

13
 See above,
p. 242
.

14
 Guy Liddell diary, 12 Nov. 1939. A later scheme to get the head of the Abwehr station in Brussels, Dr Unterberg, to recruit ‘Barton' for operations against Britain, thus allowing her to become a double agent, though getting off to a promising start, came to nothing. Security Service Archives.

15
 Dilks (ed.),
Cadogan Diaries
,
pp. 230
–
33
.

16
 See above,
pp. 200
–
201
.

17
 See above,
pp. 212
–
13
.

18
 Though van Koutrik does not appear to have known the name of either Putlitz or Krüger, he was able to provide identifying details. Security Service Archives.

19
 Though there is no documentary evidence on the reasons for van Koutrik's flight to England, it is inconceivable that his Abwehr case officer, at one or more of their weekly meetings, had not explained what was expected of him if and when the SIS station returned to London. The Abwehr must have been anxious to retain the services of its only penetration agent in the British intelligence community – especially since, within the past year, van Koutrik had successfully identified the leading German agents of both SIS and MI5.

20
 Security Service Archives.

21
 The only operation by van Koutrik for E1c of which record survives was to investigate Dutch fishermen at Fleetwood in January 1941. Security Service Archives.

22
 Security Service Archives.

23
 Security Service Archives.

24
 On the recruitment of Blunt, see below,
p. 269
.

25
 Security Service Archives.

26
 Security Service Archives.

27
 Security Service Archives. In 1943 van Koutrik joined the Dutch navy.

28
 Andrew,
Secret Service
,
pp. 533
–
4
.

29
 Security Service Archives. On the unmasking of Captain King, the Soviet spy in the Foreign Office Communications Department, see below,
pp. 263
–
4
.

30
 Security Service Archives.

31
 The most important information on Hooper's career as a German agent came from Hermann Giskes, former head of the Abwehr in the Netherlands. Security Service Archives. Giskes, who was interrogated at Camp 020 (see below.
p. 250
), struck ‘Tin-eye' Stephens as one of the ablest German intelligence officers he had encountered; Hoare (ed.),
Camp 020
,
p. 356
.

32
 Security Service Archives.

33
 A year before the outbreak of war the Abwehr had sent to Britain ‘a private individual who had very good connections in high British government circles', who was expected to be ‘questioned closely by the British about German policy'. With the personal approval of Canaris, he was supplied with a plausible mixture of information and disinformation likely to deceive the British. ‘Preliminary note on the use by German Intelligence of Deception as an aid to military operations', Security Service Archives. No similar operation was mounted after the outbreak of war.

34
 The continuing ability of German intelligence to run a successful deception operation was demonstrated by the SD Englandspiel in the Netherlands in 1942–3, which completely deceived SOE and cost the lives of fifty-four agents, as well as other Dutch civilians and about fifty RAF personnel. The limitations of German deception policy were shown, however, by the fact that the Englandspiel was not used for strategic deception. Dear and Foot (eds),
Oxford Companion to the Second World War
,
pp. 338
–
40
.

35
 With the assistance of the Special Branch, the Security Service rounded up the entire resident German spy network in Britain as it existed in 1939, when it was far smaller than in August 1914. Karl Burger, Eugen Horsfall Ertz, Arthur Owens, P. W. Rapp, Stanley Scott and William Wishart were arrested on the outbreak of war, My Eriksson was interned shortly afterwards. Surviving MI5 files, however, are incomplete; there may have been other arrests. Security Service Archives. On arrests in August 1914, see above,
pp. 50
–
51
.

36
 See above,
p. 212
. SNOW's ten-volume file is TNA KV 2/444–53.

37
 TNA KV 2/468.

38
 Masterman,
Double-Cross System
,
pp. 40
–
41
.

39
 Ibid.,
p. 41
. B13, ‘Mathilde Caroline Krafft', 2 Dec. 1939, TNA KV 2/701, s. 46a.

40
 ‘Selected papers from the CHARLIE case', TNA KV 2/454. Masterman,
Double-Cross System
,
pp. 40
–
41
.

41
 Smith, ‘Bletchley Park, Double-Cross and D-Day',
pp. 283
–
4
.
Security Service
,
pp. 179
,
207n
. Holt,
Deceivers
,
p. 127
.

42
 Masterman,
Double-Cross System
,
pp. 42
–
3
.

43
 Guy Liddell diary, 19 May 1940.

44
 MI5 was never certain where SNOW's real loyalties lay. See below,
p. 258
.

45
 Masterman,
Double-Cross System
,
pp. 43
–
4
.

46
 ‘Mr Dick White's lecture for new RSLO's', 9 Jan. 1943,
p. 5
, TNA KV 4/170, s. 1a.

47
 Security Service Archives.

48
 Obituary, T. A. Robertson,
The Times
, 16 May 1994. On the Invergordon Mutiny, see above,
pp. 162
–
3
.

49
 Wilson, ‘War in the Dark',
p. 126
.

50
 Holt,
Deceivers
,
p. 131
.

51
 Security Service Archives.

52
 Security Service Archives.

53
 Security Service Archives.

54
 
Security Service
,
pp. 232
–
3
.

55
 Masterman,
Double-Cross System
,
p. 49
.

56
 Hinsley and Simkins,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
, vol. 4,
p. 88
.

57
 Security Service Archives.

58
 Hoare (ed.),
Camp 020
,
p. 7
. Macintyre,
Agent Zigzag
,
pp. 113
–
14
.

59
 Hoare (ed.),
Camp 020
,
pp. 16
–
17
.

60
 Ibid.,
pp. 137
–
40
.

61
 Guy Liddell diary, 22 Sept. 1940.

62
 Hoare (ed.),
Camp 020
,
p. 140n
.

63
 Guy Liddell diary, 3 Oct. 1943.

64
 Hoare (ed.),
Camp 020
,
p. 58
.

65
 
Security Service
,
p. 229
.

66
 Hoare (ed.),
Camp 020
,
p. 140
. TATE later gave an alternative explanation for becoming a double agent which made no mention of his fury at SUMMER's ‘betrayal': ‘Nobody ever asked me why I changed my mind,' he said after the war, ‘but the reason was really very straightforward. It was simply a matter of survival. Self-preservation must be the strongest instinct in man.' Andrew,
Secret Service
,
p. 671
.

67
 TNA KV 2/61.

68
 See below,
pp. 300
,
304
,
309
,
316
.

69
 Masterman,
Double-Cross System
,
p. 66
.
Security Service
,
p. 250
. Wilson, ‘War in the Dark'.

70
 While MUTT's deception campaigns were highly successful, his Norwegian colleague Tör Glad (JEFF), who was despatched with MUTT to Britain by the Abwehr, proved to be unreliable and was interned until 1945. Hoare (ed.),
Camp 020
.

71
 Hinsley and Simkins,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
, vol. 4,
p. 89
.

72
 A. G. Denniston (Director GC&CS) to ‘C' (Menzies), 10 Dec. 1941, TNA HW 14. Smith, ‘Bletchley Park, Double-Cross and D-Day',
p. 287
. Hinsley and Simkins,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
, vol. 4,
p. 108
. On the origins of ISOS, see above,
p. 248
.

73
 TNA KV 2/845–66.

74
 Howard,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
, vol. 5,
pp. 18
–
19
. The fullest accounts of GARBO's extraordinary career are: Pujol and West,
GARBO
; and Seaman (ed.),
GARBO
.

75
 Guy Liddell diary, 26 March 1942.

76
 Hinsley and Simkins,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
, vol. 4,
p. 19
.

77
 Complaints about Cowgill from Montagu and the War Office, wrote Dick White, ‘must prevent it being said that the attack upon Section V is due purely to M.I.5 rivalry'. Security Service Archives.

78
 Security Service Archives.

79
 Hinsley and Simkins,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
, vol. 4,
p. 20
.

80
 Howard,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
, vol. 5,
pp. 7
–
8
. ‘Formation of the W. Board in connection with Special [Double] Agents, 1939–1945', TNA KV 4/70.

81
 Minutes in TNA KV 4/63.

82
 Security Service Archives.

83
 Security Service Archives.

84
 In the 1920s Masterman was also reputed to be the best squash player in Oxford University. ‘Times Portrait Gallery: J. C. Masterman',
The Times
, 10 Oct. 1958.

85
 Masterman,
Double-Cross System
,
pp. 90
,
114
.

86
 See below,
p. 298
.

87
 Security Service Archives.

88
 Masterman,
Chariot Wheel
, ch. 21.

89
 Masterman,
Double-Cross System
,
pp. 58
–
9
.

90
 See above,
pp. 245
–
6
.

91
 Masterman,
Double-Cross System
,
p. 51
.

92
 Major Dixon (RSLO Cambridge) to Dick White, 14 Jan. 1941, TNA KV 2/60.

93
 Captain P. E. S. Finney, ‘re Mills' Circus', 9 April 1941, TNA KV 4/211, s. 23a. Hotel details (subsequently amended) in ‘Accommodation Plan', s. 38a.

94
 B2a, ‘Suggestions for dealing with Double Agents in case of invasion', 1 Feb. 1941, TNA KV 4/211, s. 1a.

95
 Masterman,
Double-Cross System
,
pp. 90
–
92
.

96
 B2a, ‘Suggestions for dealing with Double Agents in case of invasion', 1 Feb. 1941, TNA KV 4/211, s. 1a.

97
 TNA KV 2/448.

98
 Unsigned letter to G.W., 12 March 1941, marked ‘Handed to G.W. on 24.3.41 and memorised by him', TNA KV 4/211, s. 4a.

99
 New Scotland Yard to T. A. Robertson, 25 March 1941, TNA KV 4/211, s. 19a.

100
 T. A. Robertson to Major Stephens, 12 March 1941, TNA KV 4/211, s. 10a.

101
 DG, ‘Orders for Mr Atkinson', 3 April 1941, TNA KV 4/211, s. 22a.