The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (51 page)

A more intense and extensive conflagration broke out in December 1994 when Russia launched a full-scale military attack on Chechnya. The leaders of two Orthodox republics, Georgia and Armenia, supported the Russian action, while the Ukrainian president was “diplomatically bland, merely calling for a peaceful settlement of the crisis.” The Russian action was also endorsed by the Orthodox North Ossetian government and 55-60 percent of the North Ossetian people.
[26]
In contrast, Muslims within and without the Russian Federation overwhelmingly sided with the Chechens. The Islamist international immediately contributed fighters from Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, and elsewhere. Muslim states endorsed the Chechen cause, and Turkey and Iran reportedly supplied material help, providing Russia with further incentives to attempt to conciliate Iran. A steady stream of arms for the Chechens began to enter the Russian Federation from Azerbaijan, causing Russia to close its border with that country, thereby also shutting off medical and other supplies to Chechnya.
[27]

Muslims in the Russian Federation rallied behind the Chechens. While calls for a Caucasus-wide Muslim holy war against Russia did not produce that result, the leaders of the six Volga-Ural republics demanded Russia end its military action, and representatives of the Muslim Caucasus republics called for a civil disobedience campaign against Russian rule. The president of the Chuvash republic exempted Chuvash draftees from serving against their follow Muslims. The “strongest protests against the war” occurred in Chechnya’s two neighboring republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan. The Ingush attacked Russian troops on their way to Chechnya, leading the Russian defense minister to declare that the Ingush government “had virtually declared war on Russia,” and attacks on Russian forces also occurred in Dagestan. The Russians responded by shelling Ingush and Dagestani villages.
[28]
The Russian leveling of the village of Pervomaiskoye after the Chechen raid into the city of Kizlyar in January 1996 further aroused Dagestani hostility to the Russians.

The Chechen cause was also helped by the Chechen diaspora, which had in large part been produced by the nineteenth-century Russian aggression against the Caucasus mountain peoples. The diaspora raised funds, procured weapons, and provided volunteers for the Chechen forces. It was particularly numerous in Jordan and Turkey, which led Jordan to take a strong stand against
_p. 278
the Russians and reinforced Turkey’s willingness to assist the Chechens. In January 1996 when the war spread to Turkey, Turkish public opinion sympathized with the seizure of a ferry and Russian hostages by members of the diaspora. With the help of Chechen leaders, the Turkish government negotiated resolution on the crisis in a way which further worsened the already strained relations between Turkey and Russia.

The Chechen incursion into Dagestan, the Russian response, and the ferry seizure at the start of 1996 highlighted the possible expansion of the conflict into a general conflict between the Russians and the mountain peoples, along the lines of the struggle that went on for decades in the nineteenth century. “The North Caucasus is a tinderbox,” Fiona Hill warned in 1995, “where a conflict in one republic has the potential to spark a regional conflagration that will spread beyond its borders into the rest of the Russian Federation, and will invite involvement of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran and their North Caucasian diasporas. As the war in Chechnya demonstrates, conflict in the region is not easily contained. . . . and the fighting has spilled into republics and territories adjacent to Chechnya.” A Russian analyst agreed, arguing that “informal coalitions” were developing along civilizational lines. “Christian Georgia, Armenia, Nagorny-Karabakh and Northern Ossetia are lining up against Moslem Azerbaijan, Abkhazia, Chechnya and Ingushetia.” Already fighting in Tajikistan, Russia was “running the risk of being drawn into a prolonged confrontation with the Moslem world.”
[29]

In another Orthodox-Muslim fault line war, the primary participants were the Armenians of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and the government and people of Azerbaijan, with the former fighting for independence from the latter. The government of Armenia was a secondary participant, and Russia, Turkey, and Iran had tertiary involvements. In addition, a major role was played by the substantial Armenian diaspora in Western Europe and North America. The fighting began in 1988 before the end of the Soviet Union, intensified during 1992-1993, and subsided after negotiation of a cease-fire in 1994. The Turks and other Muslims backed Azerbaijan, while Russia supported the Armenians but then used its influence with them also to contest Turkish influence in Azerbaijan. This war was the latest episode in both the struggle going back centuries to those between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire for control of the Black Sea region and the Caucasus, and the intense antagonism between Armenians and Turks going back to the early-twentieth-century massacres of the former by the latter.

In this war, Turkey was a consistent supporter of Azerbaijan and opponent of the Armenians. The first recognition by any country of the independence of a non-Baltic Soviet republic was Turkey’s recognition of Azerbaijan. Throughout the conflict Turkey provided financial and material support to Azerbaijan and trained Azerbaijani soldiers. As violence intensified in 1991-1992 and Armenians advanced into Azerbaijani territory, Turkish public opinion became
_p. 279
aroused, and the Turkish government came under pressure to support its ethnic-religious kinspeople. It also feared that this would highlight the Muslim-Christian divide, produce an outpouring of Western support for Armenia, and antagonize its NATO allies. Turkey thus faced the classic cross-pressures of a secondary participant in a fault line war. The Turkish government, however, found it in its interest to support Azerbaijan and confront Armenia. “[I]t’s impossible not to be affected when your kin are killed,” one Turkish official said, and another added, “We are under pressure. Our newspapers are full of the photos of atrocities. . . . Maybe we should show Armenia that there’s a big Turkey in this region.” President Turgut Özal agreed, saying that Turkey “should scare the Armenians a little bit.” Turkey, along with Iran, warned the Armenians it would not countenance any change in borders. Özal blocked food and other supplies from getting to Armenia through Turkey, as a result of which the population of Armenia was on the verge of famine during the winter of 1992-1993. Also as a result, Russian Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov warned that “If another side [i.e., Turkey] gets involved” in the war, “we will be on the edge of World War III.” A year later Özal was still belligerent. “What can the Armenians do,” he taunted, “if shots happened to be fired. . . . March into Turkey?” Turkey “will show its fangs.”
[30]

In the summer and fall of 1993 the Armenian offensive, which was approaching the Iranian border, produced additional reactions from both Turkey and Iran, who were competing for influence within Azerbaijan and the Central Asian Muslim states. Turkey declared that the offensive threatened Turkey’s security, demanded that the Armenian forces “immediately and unconditionally” withdraw from Azerbaijani territory, and sent reinforcements to its border with Armenia. Russian and Turkish troops reportedly exchanged gunfire across that border. Prime Minister Tansu Ciller of Turkey declared she would ask for a declaration of war if Armenian troops went into the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakhichevan close to Turkey. Iran also moved forces forward and into Azerbaijan, allegedly to establish camps for the refugees from the Armenian offensives. The Iranian action reportedly led the Turks to believe they could take additional measures without stimulating Russian countermoves and also gave them further incentive to compete with Iran in providing protection to Azerbaijan. The crisis was eventually eased by negotiations in Moscow by the leaders of Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, by American pressure on the Armenian government, and by Armenian government pressure on the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians.
[31]

Inhabiting a small, landlocked country with meager resources bordered by hostile Turkic peoples, Armenians have historically looked for protection to their Orthodox kin, Georgia and Russia. Russia, in particular, has been viewed as a big brother. As the Soviet Union was collapsing, however, and the Nagorno-Karabakh
[Nagorono-Karabakh]
Armenians launched their drive for independence, the Gorbachev regime rejected their demands and dispatched troops to the region to
_p. 280
support what was viewed as a loyal communist government in Baku. After the end of the Soviet Union, these considerations gave way to more long-standing historical and cultural ones, with Azerbaijan accusing “the Russian government of turning 180 degrees” and actively supporting Christian Armenia. Russian military assistance to the Armenians actually had begun earlier in the Soviet army, in which Armenians were promoted to higher ranks and assigned to combat units much more frequently than Muslims. After the war began, the 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Russian Army, based in Nagorno-Karabakh, played a leading role in the Armenian attack on the town of Khodjali, in which allegedly up to 1000 Azeris were massacred. Subsequently Russian
spetsnaz
troops also participated in the fighting. During the winter of 1992-1993, when Armenia suffered from the Turkish embargo, it was “rescued from total economic collapse by an infusion of billions of rubles in credits from Russia.” That spring Russian troops joined regular Armenian forces to open a corridor connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. A Russian armored force of forty tanks then reportedly participated in the Karabakh offensive in the summer of 1993.
[32]
Armenia, in turn, as Hill and Jewett observe, had “little option but to ally itself closely with Russia. It is dependent upon Russia for raw materials, energy and food supplies, and defense against historic enemies on its borders such as Azerbaijan and Turkey. Armenia has signed all of the CIS economic and military accords, permitted Russian troops to be stationed on its territory and relinquished all claims to former Soviet assets in Russia’s favor.”
[33]

Russian support for the Armenians enhanced Russian influence with Azerbaijan. In June 1993 the Azerbaijani nationalist leader Abulfez Elchibey was ousted in a coup and replaced by the former communist and presumably pro-Russian Gaider Aliyev. Aliyev recognized the need to propitiate Russia in order to restrain Armenia. He reversed Azerbaijan’s refusals to join the Commonwealth of Independent States and to allow Russian troops to be stationed on its territory. He also opened the way to Russian participation in an international consortium to develop Azerbaijan’s oil. In return, Russia began to train Azerbaijani troops and pressured Armenia to end its support of the Karabakh forces and to induce them to withdraw from Azerbaijan territory. By shifting its weight from one side to the other, Russia was able also to produce results for Azerbaijan and counter Iranian and Turkish influence in that country. Russian support for Armenia thus not only strengthened its closest ally in the Caucasus but also weakened its principal Muslim rivals in that region.

Apart from Russia, Armenia’s major source of support was its large, wealthy and influential diaspora in Western Europe and North America, including roughly 1 million Armenians in the United States and 450,000 in France. These provided money and supplies to help Armenia survive the Turkish blockade, officials for the Armenian government, and volunteers for the Armenian armed forces. Contributions to Armenian relief from the American community amounted to $50 million to $75 million a year in the mid-1990s. The diaspo
_p. 281
rans also exercised considerable political influence with their host governments. The largest Armenian communities in the United States are in key states like California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. As a result, Congress prohibited any foreign aid to Azerbaijan and made Armenia the third largest per capita recipient of U.S. assistance. This backing from abroad was essential to Armenia’s survival and appropriately earned it the sobriquet of “the Israel of the Caucasus.”
[34]
Just as the nineteenth-century Russian attacks on the North Caucasians generated the diaspora that helped the Chechens to resist the Russians, the early-twentieth-century Turkish massacres of Armenians produced a diaspora that enabled Armenia to resist Turkey and defeat Azerbaijan.

The former Yugoslavia was the site of the most complex, confused, and complete set of fault line wars of the early 1990s. At the primary level, in Croatia the Croatian government and Croats fought the Croatian Serbs, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina the Bosnian government fought the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, who also fought each other. At the secondary level, the Serbian government promoted a “Greater Serbia” by helping Bosnian and Croatian Serbs, and the Croatian government aspired to a “Greater Croatia” and supported the Bosnian Croats. At the tertiary level, massive civilization rallying included: Germany, Austria, the Vatican, other European Catholic countries and groups, and, later, the United States on behalf of Croatia; Russia, Greece, and other Orthodox countries and groups behind the Serbs; and Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Libya, the Islamist international, and Islamic countries generally on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims. The latter also received help from the United States, a noncivilization anomaly in the otherwise universal pattern of kin backing kin. The Croatian diaspora in Germany and the Bosnian diaspora in Turkey came to the support of their homelands. Churches and religious groups were active on all three sides. The actions of at least the German, Turkish, Russian, and American governments were significantly influenced by pressure groups and public opinion in their societies.

The support provided by secondary and tertiary parties was essential to the conduct of the war and the constraints they imposed essential to halting it. The Croatian and Serbian governments supplied weapons, supplies, funding, sanctuary, and at times military forces to their people fighting in other republics. Serbs, Croats, and Muslims all received substantial help from civilizational kin outside the former Yugoslavia in the form of money, weapons, supplies, volunteers, military training, and political and diplomatic support. The nongovernmental primary level Serbs and Croats were generally most extreme in their nationalism, unrelenting in their demands, and militant in pursuing their goals. The second level Croatian and Serbian governments initially vigorously supported their primary level kin but their own more diversified interests then led them to play more mediating and containing roles. In parallel fashion, the third level Russian, German, and American governments pushed the second level governments they had been backing toward restraint and compromise.