The Black World of UFOs: Exempt from Disclosure (10 page)

     Since its inception in 1947, the CIA was engaged in advancing the art of reconnaissance especially over the old
Soviet Union and UFOs (Chapters 1 and 2).

     In the same breath, the CIA was busy debunking the many “flying saucer” reports being reported to the USAF. Informed speculation had circulated among upper air intelligence officers that some foreign power must have operated them, but suspicions were always diverted away from the CIA. However, according to a 1975 FOIA release, Walter B. Smith (3) who was the DCI before Dulles, had such an intense interest in the UFO subject, he went so far as asking for cooperation between all the military services, the Research and Development Board of the DOD, the Psychological Strategy Board and other government agencies as appropriate (4).
We can only surmise from chapters 1 and 2 that this interest never waned even up to today, and it’s not too difficult to say that roughly 90 percent of all things done by the CIA are done covertly.

     The covertness of the CIA was keenly brought to the surface by the then new CIA Director Porter J. Goss who in 2003, before the 9-11 Commission, said that the classification policy was “dysfunctional.” “There’s a lot of gratuitous classification going on,” he said at a May 23, 2003 hearing of the Commission. “We over-classify very badly.”

     In 1962, John McCone, DCI, who had replaced Allen Dulles the year before, selected Helms as the DDP, Deputy Directorate of Plans, which proved to be important symbolically and substantively. It quieted many of the rumblings from the clandestine service careerists after the Bissell and Dulles ousters, and allayed their fears that McCone, a shipping and construction tycoon, was bent on running the agency like a big business. Helms’ promotion also signaled a shift in emphasis from covert action to espionage—a reorientation with which he wholeheartedly agreed.

     After McCone resigned in 1965 and was replaced by Adm. William Raborn, President Lyndon Johnson appointed Helms Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) to give him more Washington seasoning before elevating him to the top job. When that occurred a year later, LBJ handled it in his inimitable way by announcing it at a press conference without asking Helms first; the DCI-designate heard about the fait accompli from an administration official only a short time before President Johnson told the media.

Helm’s Style

Urbane, cool, shrewd, sure-footed, tight-lipped (kept all the little dirty secrets) controlled, discreet—such adjectives appear frequently in colleagues and friends’ recollections of Helms. On the job, he was serious and demanding. An efficient worker and delegator, he left his desk clear at the end of the day (almost always before 7 p.m.), feeling assured that the trustworthy subordinates he had carefully chosen could pick up the details and handle any problems. According to a colleague, “Helms was a fellow who by and large gave the people who worked with him his confidence . . . his instinct was to trust them. . . .”

     Sometimes, however, Helms’ hands-off style and deference to deputies worked against him. In the area of covert action, for example, more “proactive” management on his part might have averted the near-collapse of the CIA’s political action capabilities after the agency’s network of international organizations, propaganda outlets, proprieties, foundations, and trusts were exposed in a 1967 Ramparts’ magazine article. Similarly, in the area of counter-intelligence, Helms accorded (as mentioned before) the chief of the CI Staff DD/CI James Angleton, much leeway in vetting assets, dealing with defectors and suspected double agents, and searching for “moles” inside the Agency—despite the costs of disrupting legitimate operations and tarnishing officers’ careers (5).

     Helms declined a presidential request to submit his resignation after the 1972 elections, not wanting to set a precedent that he thought would politicize the position of DCI. After he was forced out in 1973— he believed that Nixon was very angry at him for refusing to use the CIA in the Watergate cover up—Helms spent several years coping with controversies ensuing in part from some of his acts of omission and commission while at the agency.

     He became a lightning rod for criticism of the CIA during its “time of troubles” in the mid-1970s. He was called back many times from his ambassadorial post in Tehran to testify before investigative bodies about assassination plots, domestic operations, drug testing, the destruction of records, and other activities of dubious legality and ethicality known collectively as the “Family Jewels.” He responded to inquiries about them cautiously, sometimes testily, as he tried to walk the increasingly fuzzy line between discretion and disclosure. Everything was kept, “in the family” and the black subject of UFOs was part of those family secrets.

     Helms ran into legal troubles resulting from his judgment about when and when not to reveal secrets. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee just after leaving the agency, he firmly denied that the CIA had tried to influence the outcome of the Chilean presidential election in 1970. Helms described his quandary this way: “If I was to live up to my oath and fulfill my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, I could not reveal covert operations to people unauthorized to learn about them.” He eventually pleaded no contest to charges of not testifying “fully, completely and accurately” to the committee.

     To the end, Richard Helms was “at the table.” He remained privately engaged in public affairs for so many years after leaving Langley that it is easy to forget how long ago he entered the secret world and how far he traveled within it as Rick Doty will testify to in the next chapter. His now published memoir, “A Look Over My Shoulder, A Life in the CIA,” will enable us to accompany him on that journey, but there were never any public statements by him on the subject of UFOs as everything was done covertly except for personal “leaks” to friends (6). Perhaps we can better understand the man publicly, but not privately, who declared at the depths of the agency’s travail in the mid-1970s, “I was and remain proud of my work there. I believed in the importance to the nation of the function that the Agency served. I still do without regrets, without qualms, without apology.” If he could speak to us now, he would say the same—and probably add, “Let’s get on with it,” and so we shall with Rick Doty in Chapter 4.

References/Footnotes

(1) Remember that Allen Dulles had spent over 40 years in the cult of intelligence and was one of the original architects of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Act of 1947.

(2) Tim Cooper writes that on
the 26th of March 2000 James Angleton, Jr. said that the piece this author wrote on his grandfather was “accurate and interesting (Chapter 1).”

     We had a 45-minute chat on the telephone in which he stated that Mangold (Cold Warrior) did terrible coverage on the CIA’s CI staff and irritated his family for years. He is holding his granddad’s papers which his father gave him for safekeeping, and some Dulles files which Angleton took from CIA headquarters.

     According to JA Jr. Angleton helped establish MJ MAJESTIC-12 CI operations BEFORE he was appointed DD of CI. He said that NSA runs the show pretty much now, but the CIA and DIA still have COMINT channels and sources. He wants to see my carbon copy of the (1960s) CIA/MJ-12 directive as I’m using it as a bargaining chip to see some of his holdings.

(3) In 1950, President Harry Truman appointed Army Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, a tough and respected military officer-diplomat with impressive credentials as the new Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). During Bedell Smith’s years, Angleton (Chapter 1) continued as chief of Staff “A” (foreign intelligence operations), one of four advisory staffs inside the CIA’s clandestine arm.

(4) Walter B. Smith declassified CIA 1952 draft memos, Figures 2a, b, which mention UFOs. ER stands for Executive Registry.

Figure 2a

Figure 2b

(5) Next to Allen Dulles, Angleton’s most important and longest serving patron was Richard Helms, the legendary and consummate intelligence professional who served as DDO in 1962-’65 and DCI in 1966-’73. By the time he met Angleton, Helms had been a journalist and a clandestine intelligence officer in the
OSS and in the interim postwar American intelligence organizations. After joining the CIA, he rose quickly, ending up near the top of the agency’s clandestine directorate by the early 1950s.

     Angleton’s longstanding friendships with Dulles and Helms were to become the most important factors in giving him freedom of movement within the CIA. He was extended such trust by his superiors that there was often a significant failure of executive control over his activities. The result was that his subsequent actions were performed without bureaucratic interference.

     The simple fact was that if Angleton wanted something done, it was done. He had the experience, the patronage, and the clout.

     In the ‘60s the Counterintelligence Staff, for example, had its very own secret slush fund, which Angleton tightly controlled. This fund gave him easy access to a large amount of money that was never audited (as other such funds were). Angleton argued that he would have to be trusted without outside accountability because it had been difficult to allow mere clerks to go through his accounts if only because sources would have to be revealed. The DCIs (including Helms) agreed to this unusual arrangement, which gave Angleton unique authority to run his own little operation without undue supervision. From Cold Warrior by Tom Mangold, 1991 page 52.

(6) This information reportedly came from Mr. R (Richard Helms) in March of 1999, EBEs 1, 2, and 3. This is in source’s own words.

“While Ebe #1 was alive, there was apparently a failure to communicate between Ebe #1 and our military. They failed to ask Ebe #1 about the CR device or any other items aboard Ebe’s spacecraft except one. Ebe explained their communication device. It was a small (12" x 9" x 2") device. It contained several small holes, two 4" antennas and two black inlayed “chips”. Of course we didn’t know the black items were a form of computer chips back then but we know that today. The communication device also had a series of lights that would alternate from left to right when an incoming signal was received. The lights would alternate from right to left when an out going signal was sent. What was interesting was how this device was powered. It was later learned that the communication device was connected to the CR [Crystal Rectangle, see Section 3 Chapter 3 for CR] by a small glass tube (fiber optics?). There were no wires within this glass tube [more like a crystal type material].