The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (90 page)

¹
Cf. below, 332
^a
20–6.

²
Cf.
Timaeus
51
A
.

³
Cf.
Timaeus
49
D
–50
C
.

⁴
i. e. each of the things that are ‘fashioned of gold’.

⁵
Cf.
Timaeus
53
C
ff.

⁶
Cf.
Timaeus
, e. g. 49
A
, 52
D
.

⁷
Cf.
Physics
i. 6–9.

⁸
i. e. notwithstanding the sketch Aristotle has just given.

⁹
sc
. in this connexion: the tangible qualities are the only qualities which characterize
all
perceptible bodies.

¹⁰
sc
. the other
non-tangible
perceptible contrarieties.

¹¹
‘in contact’ with the vessel which contains it.

¹²
The fine, owing to the subtlety (= the smallness) of its particles, leaves no corner of its containing receptacle unfilled.

¹³
Cf. above, 329
^b
30–2.

¹⁴
sc
. by foreign moisture: Cf. below,
^a
22.

¹⁵
i. e. the ‘dry’ which is contrasted with the damp: the ‘dried’.

¹⁶
i. e. the ‘moist’ which is contrasted with the solidified: the ‘liquefiable’.

¹⁷
The reference is probably neither to 314
^b
15–26 nor to 329
^a
35, but to
de Caelo
304
^b
23 ff.

¹⁸
Aristotle has shown that, by the conversion of a single quality in each case, Fire is transformed into Air, Air into Water, Water into Earth, and Earth into Fire. This is a
cycle
of transformations. Moreover, the ‘elements’ have been taken in their natural consecutive series, according to their order in the Cosmos.

¹⁹
sc
. alternatively.

²⁰
sc
. alternatively.

²¹
If the ‘elements’ are taken in their natural order, Water (e. g.) is ‘consecutive’ to Earth, and Air to Water. Water is moist and cold. It shares its ‘cold’ with Earth and its ‘moist’ with Air: its ‘moist’ is contrary to Earth’s ‘dry’, and its ‘cold’ is contrary to Air’s ‘hot’.

²²
If, e. g., Fire
plus
Air are to be transformed into Water or into Earth, it is not enough that a single quality should be eliminated from each of the generating pair: for this would leave either two ‘hots’ or a ‘dry’ and a ‘moist’ (Cf. 331
^b
26–33). Either Fire’s ‘dry’ or Air’s ‘moist’ must be eliminated: and,
in addition
, the ‘hot’ of one must be eliminated and the ‘hot’ of the other be converted into ‘cold’.

²³
If Air is to ‘alter’ into (e. g.) Fire, we must assume a pair of contrasted differentiating qualities, and assign one to Fire and the other to Air.

²⁴
i. e. Air becoming Fire by being heated.

²⁵
i. e. bare of all qualities.

²⁶
sc
. Earth, Air, Fire, and Water.

²⁷
i. e. all the ‘simple’ bodies there are.

²⁸
Cf.
Timaeus
54 b-d.

²⁹
Cf. above, 331
^a
12–20.

³⁰
Cf. above, 331
^a
22 ff.

³¹
i. e.
mathematically
‘possible.’

³²
Cf. above, II. 2 and 3.

³³
i. e. at either end, or in the middle, of the ‘natural series’ of the ‘elements’.

³⁴
sc
. belonging to AW.

³⁵
Cf. above, 332
^b
12–13.

³⁶
i. e. so that the ‘elements’ are genuinely or irreducibly ‘many’.

³⁷
i. e. we are comparing the
amounts of cooling energy
possessed by one pint of Water and ten pints of Air respectively.

³⁸
i. e.
only
‘similarity’. Empedocles might have said the ‘elements’ were all
analogous
or
similar
without inconsistency: but he asserts that they are
equal
, i. e. quantitatively comparable (and therefore, ultimately, transformable).

³⁹
sc
. as the thing of less amount with which it is being compared.

⁴⁰
i. e. that they are compounds produced by the consilience of their constituents in a certain proportion.

⁴¹
i. e. according to Empedocles himself.

⁴²
i. e. according to Empedocles’ own statements.

⁴³
i. e. though Strife initiated the disintegration of the Sphere.

⁴⁴
sc
. a first cause of motion in general.

⁴⁵
Cf.
de Anima
, i. 4 and 5.

⁴⁶
sc
. in the only manner which was taken into account in the formulation of the problem at 334
^b
6–7.

⁴⁷
Cf. above, I. 7.

⁴⁸
sc
. these extremes, the completely-hot and the completely-cold.

⁴⁹
i. e. the ‘mean’ is a
stretch
, not a
point
.

⁵⁰
i. e. cold-dry (Earth) and cold-moist (Water).

⁵¹
i. e. hot-moist (Air) and hot-dry (Fire).

⁵²
Plants are nourished
naturally
by water impregnated with earth and
artificially
by water mixed with manure, which is a kind of earth.

⁵³
Cf. Plato,
Phaedo
96
A
–99
C
.

⁵⁴
Cf. Plato,
Phaedo
100
B
–101
E
.

⁵⁵
sc
. than the Forms.

⁵⁶
Cf.
Physics
ii. 3–9.

⁵⁷
Cf. above, 335
^a
32–
^b
7.

⁵⁸
Cf.
Physics
viii. 7–9.

⁵⁹
i. e. the sun, as will appear presently.

⁶⁰
Cf.
Physics
260
^a
26–261
^a
26.

⁶¹
Cf, above, 317
^b
33 ff.

⁶²
Cf.
de Caelo
270
^b
32–271
^a
33.

⁶³
Cf.
de Caelo
288
^a
13–27; Physics 228
^b
15–229
^a
6.

⁶⁴
i. e. the annual movement of the sun in the ecliptic or zodiac circle.

⁶⁵
i. e. the inclination of the ecliptic to the equator of the outermost sphere, which (on Aristotle’s theory) is the equator of the universe and is in the same plane as the terrestrial equator.

⁶⁶
Cf. above, 318
^a
9 ff.

⁶⁷
Cf. e. g.
Metaph
. 1017
^a
7 ff.

⁶⁸
The sun’s annual movement, by which it alternately approaches and retreats, causes the alternate ascent and descent of Water, Air, and Fire. They are thus brought into contact, with the result that their constitutive contrary qualities act and suffer action reciprocally, and the ‘simple’ bodies themselves are transformed.

⁶⁹
Cf. above, 336
^b
12.

⁷⁰
Physics
255
^b
31–260
^a
10. Cf. also
Metaph
. 1072
^a
19–1074
^b
14.

⁷¹
i. e. the supposed continuous movements which,
qua
continuous, must be circular.

⁷²
i. e. time is that which is
numerable
in continuous movement: Cf.
Physics
219
^b
1–8.

⁷³
sc
. at the beginning of Aristotle’s ‘Philosophy of Nature’: cf.
Physics
217
^b
29–224
^a
17.

⁷⁴
Cf. above,
^b
14–15: the coming-to-be of the antecedent was
conditionally
necessary, i. e. necessarily presupposed in the being of the consequent.

⁷⁵
i. e. so that effect
will
succeed effect endlessly.

⁷⁶
i. e. some other
still later
member of the sequence.

⁷⁷
Cf.
Physics
viii. 7–9.

⁷⁸
i. e. in some cycles the same individual eternally recurs: in others the same
species
or
specific form
is eternally represented in the succession of its perishing individual embodiments.

⁷⁹
As, e. g., a follower of Empedocles would maintain.

   
CHAPTER

  
1
. The dignity, usefulness, and difficulty of Psychology.

  
2
. The opinions of early thinkers about the soul.

  
3
. Refutation of the view which assigns movement to the soul.

  
4
. 407
^b
27–408
^a
34. The soul not a harmony.

  
5
. 409
^b
19–411
^a
7. The soul not composed of elements.

  
1
. First definition of soul.

  
2
. Second definition of soul.

  
3
. The faculties of the soul.

  
4
. The nutritive faculty.

  
5
. Sense-perception.

  
6
. The different kinds of sensible object.

  
7
. Sight and its object.

  
8
. Hearing and its object.

  
9
. Smell and its object.

10
. Taste and its object.

11
. Touch and its object.

12
. General characteristics of the external senses.

  
1–2
. 426
^b
7. The number of the external senses.

  
2
. 426
^b
8–427
^a
16. Common sense.

  
3
. 427
^a
17–427
^b
26. Thinking, perceiving, and imagining distinguished.

  
4
. Passive mind.

  
5
. Active mind.

  
6
. The double operation of mind.

  
7
. The practical mind, and the difference between it and the contemplative.

  
8
. Comparison of mind with sense and with imagination.

  
9
. Problems about the motive faculty.

10
,
11
. The cause of the movement of living things.

12
,
13
. The mutual relations of the faculties of soul, and their fitness for the conditions of life.

1
     
[402a]
Holding as we do that, while knowledge of any kind is a thing to be honoured and prized, one kind of it may, either by reason of its greater exactness or of a higher dignity and greater wonderfulness in its objects, be more honourable and precious than another, on both accounts we should naturally be led to place in the front rank the study of the soul. The knowledge of the soul admittedly contributes greatly to the advance of truth in general, and, above all,
(5)
to our understanding of Nature, for the soul is in some sense the principle of animal life. Our aim is to grasp and understand, first its essential nature, and secondly its properties; of these some are thought to be affections proper to the soul itself, while others are considered to attach to the animal
¹
owing to the presence within it of soul.

To attain any assured knowledge about the soul is one of the most difficult things in the world.
(10)
As the form of question which here presents itself, viz. the question ‘What is it?’, recurs in other fields, it might be supposed that there was some single method of inquiry applicable to all objects whose essential nature we are endeavouring to ascertain (as there
is
for derived properties the single method of demonstration); in that case what we should have to seek for would be this unique method.
(15)
But if there is no such single and general method for solving the question of essence, our task becomes still more difficult; in the case of each different subject we shall have to determine the appropriate process of investigation. If to this there be a clear answer, e. g. that the process is demonstration or division, or some other known method,
(20)
difficulties and hesitations still beset us—with what facts shall we begin the inquiry? For the facts which form the starting-points in different subjects must be different, as e. g. in the case of numbers and surfaces.

First, no doubt, it is necessary to determine in which of the
summa genera
soul lies, what it
is
; is it ‘a this-somewhat’, a substance,
or is it a quale or a quantum, or some other of the remaining kinds of predicates which we have distinguished? Further,
(25)
does soul belong to the class of potential existents, or is it not rather an actuality? Our answer to this question is of the greatest importance.

[402b]
We must consider also whether soul is divisible or is without parts, and whether it is everywhere homogeneous or not; and if not homogeneous, whether its various forms are different specifically or generically: up to the present time those who have discussed and investigated soul seem to have confined themselves to the human soul.
(5)
We must be careful not to ignore the question whether soul can be defined in a single unambiguous formula, as is the case with animal, or whether we must not give a separate formula for each sort of it, as we do for horse, dog, man, god (in the latter case the ‘universal’ animal—and so too every other ‘common predicate’—being treated either as nothing at all or as a later product
²
). Further, if what exists is not a plurality of souls, but a plurality of parts of one soul,
(10)
which ought we to investigate first, the whole soul or its parts? (It is also a difficult problem to decide which of these parts are in nature distinct from one another.) Again, which ought we to investigate first, these parts or their functions, mind or thinking, the faculty or the act of sensation, and so on? If the investigation of the functions precedes that of the parts, the further question suggests itself: ought we not before either to consider the correlative objects,
(15)
e. g. of sense or thought? It seems not only useful for the discovery of the causes of the derived properties of substances to be acquainted with the essential nature of those substances (as in mathematics it is useful for the understanding of the property of the equality of the interior angles of a triangle to two right angles to know the essential nature of the straight and the curved or of the line and the plane) but also conversely,
(20)
for the knowledge of the essential nature of a substance is largely promoted by an acquaintance with its properties: for, when we are able to give an account conformable to experience of all or most of the properties of a substance, we shall be in the most favourable position to say something worth saying about the essential nature of that subject; in all demonstration a definition of the essence is required as a starting-point,
(25)
so that definitions which do not enable us to discover the derived properties, or which fail to facilitate even a conjecture about them, must obviously, one and all, be dialectical and futile.
[403a]

A further problem presented by the affections of soul is this: are they all affections of the complex of body and soul, or is there any one
among them peculiar to the soul by itself? To determine this is indispensable but difficult. If we consider the majority of them,
(5)
there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body; e. g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation generally. Thinking seems the most probable exception; but if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence.
(10)
If there is any way of acting or being acted upon proper to soul, soul will be capable of separate existence; if there is none, its separate existence is impossible. In the latter case, it will be like what is straight, which has many properties arising from the straightness in it, e. g. that of touching a bronze sphere at a point, though straightness divorced from the other constituents of the straight thing cannot touch it in this way; it cannot be so divorced at all, since it is always found in a body.
(15)
It therefore seems that all the affections of soul involve a body—passion, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, and hating; in all these there is a concurrent affection of the body. In support of this we may point to the fact that, while sometimes on the occasion of violent and striking occurrences there is no excitement or fear felt,
(20)
on others faint and feeble stimulations produce these emotions, viz. when the body is already in a state of tension resembling its condition when we are angry. Here is a still clearer case: in the absence of any external cause of terror we find ourselves experiencing the feelings of a man in terror. From all this it is obvious that the affections of soul are enmattered formulable essences.

Consequently their definitions ought to correspond,
(25)
e. g. anger should be defined as a certain mode of movement of such and such a body (or part or faculty of a body) by this or that cause and for this or that end. That is precisely why the study of the soul must fall within the science of Nature, at least so far as in its affections it manifests this double character. Hence a physicist would define an affection of soul differently from a dialectician; the latter would define e. g.
(30)
anger as the appetite for returning pain for pain, or something like that, while the former would define it as a boiling of the blood or warm substance surrounding the heart.
[403b]
The latter assigns the material conditions, the former the form or formulable essence; for what he states is the formulable essence of the fact, though for its actual existence there must be embodiment of it in a material such as is described by the other. Thus the essence of a house is assigned in such a formula as ‘a shelter against destruction by wind, rain,
(5)
and heat’; the physicist would describe it as ‘stones, bricks, and timbers’; but there is a third possible description which would say that it was
that form in that material with that purpose or end. Which, then, among these is entitled to be regarded as the genuine physicist? The one who confines himself to the material, or the one who restricts himself to the formulable essence alone? Is it not rather the one who combines both in a single formula? If this is so, how are we to characterize the other two? Must we not say that there is no type of thinker who concerns himself with those qualities or attributes of the material which are in fact inseparable from the material,
(10)
and without attempting even in thought to separate them? The physicist is he who concerns himself with all the properties active and passive of bodies or materials thus or thus defined; attributes not considered as being of this character he leaves to others, in certain cases it may be to a specialist, e. g. a carpenter or a physician, in others (
a
) where they are inseparable in fact,
(15)
but are separable from any particular kind of body by an effort of abstraction, to the mathematician, (
b
) where they are separate both in fact and in thought from body altogether, to the First Philosopher or metaphysician. But we must return from this digression, and repeat that the affections of soul are inseparable from the material substratum of animal life, to which we have seen that such affections, e. g. passion and fear, attach, and have not the same mode of being as a line or a plane.