The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (85 page)

10
     But we have still to explain ‘combination’, for that was the third of the subjects we originally
⁹¹
proposed to discuss.
(30)
Our explanation will proceed on the same method as before. We must inquire: What is ‘combination’, and what is that which can ‘combine’? Of what things, and under what conditions, is ‘combination’ a property? And, further, does ‘combination’ exist in fact, or is it false to assert its existence?

For,
(35)
according to some thinkers, it is impossible for one thing to be combined with another. They argue that (i) if
both
the ‘combined’ constituents persist unaltered, they are no more ‘combined’ now than they were before, but are in the same condition: while (ii) if
one
has been destroyed, the constituents have not been ‘combined’—on the contrary, one constituent
is
and the other
is not
, whereas ‘combination’ demands uniformity of condition in them both: and on the same principle (iii) even if
both
the combining constituents have been destroyed as the result of their coalescence,
(5)
they
cannot ‘have been combined’ since
they
have no being at all.
[327b]

What we have in this argument is, it would seem, a demand for the precise distinction of ‘combination’ from coming-to-be and passing-away (for it is obvious that ‘combination’, if it exists, must differ from these processes) and for the precise distinction of the ‘combinable’ from that which is such as to come-to-be and pass-away.
(10)
As soon, therefore, as these distinctions are clear, the difficulties raised by the argument would be solved.

Now (i) we do not speak of the wood as ‘combined’ with the fire, nor of its burning as a ‘combining’ either of its particles with one another or of itself with the fire: what we say is that ‘the fire is coming-to-be, but the wood is passing-away’. Similarly,
(15)
we speak neither (ii) of the food as ‘combining’ with the body, nor (iii) of the shape as ‘combining’ with the wax and thus fashioning the lump. Nor can body ‘combine’ with white, nor (to generalize) ‘properties’ and ‘states’ with ‘things’: for we
see
them persisting unaltered.
⁹²
But again (iv) white and knowledge cannot be ‘combined’ either,
(20)
nor any other of the ‘adjectivals’. (Indeed, this is a blemish in the theory of those who assert that ‘once upon a time all things were together and combined’. For not everything can ‘combine’ with everything. On the contrary, both of the constituents that are combined in the compound must originally have existed in separation: but no property can have separate existence.)

Since, however, some things
are-potentially
while others
are-actually
, the constituents combined in a compound can ‘be’ in a sense
and yet ‘not-be’. The compound may
be-actually
other than the constituents from which it has resulted; nevertheless each of them may still
be-potentially
what it was before they were combined,
(25)
and both of them may survive undestroyed. (For this was the difficulty that emerged in the previous argument: and it is evident that the combining constituents not only coalesce, having formerly existed in separation, but also can again be separated out from the compound.) The constituents, therefore, neither (
a) persist actually
,
(30)
as ‘body’ and ‘white’ persist: nor (
b
) are they
destroyed
(either one of them or both), for their ‘power of action’ is preserved. Hence these difficulties may be dismissed: but the problem immediately connected with them—‘whether combination is something relative to perception’—must be set out and discussed.

When the combining constituents have been divided into parts so small, and have been juxtaposed in such a manner that perception fails to discriminate them one from another, have they then ‘been combined’? Or ought we to say ‘No,
(35)
not until any and every part of one constituent is juxtaposed to a part of the other’? The term, no doubt, is applied in the former sense: we speak, e. g., of wheat having been ‘combined’ with barley when each
grain
of the one is juxtaposed to a
grain
of the other.
[328a]
But every body is divisible and therefore, since body ‘combined’ with body is uniform in texture throughout,
any and every part
of each constituent ought to be juxtaposed to a part of the other.
(5)

No body, however, can be divided into its ‘least’ parts: and ‘composition’ is not identical with ‘combination’, but other than it. From these premises it clearly follows (i) that so long as the constituents are preserved in small particles, we must not speak of them as ‘combined’. (For this will be a ‘composition’ instead of a ‘blending’ or ‘combination’: nor will every portion of the resultant exhibit the same ratio between its constituents as the whole. But we maintain that,
(10)
if ‘combination’ has taken place, the compound
must
be uniform in texture throughout—any part of such a compound being the same as the whole, just as any part of water is water: whereas, if ‘combination’ is ‘composition of the small particles’, nothing of the kind will happen. On the contrary, the constituents will only be ‘combined’ relatively to perception: and the same thing will be ‘combined’ to one percipient, if his sight is not sharp, (15)
> while to the eye of Lynkeus nothing will be ‘combined’.) It clearly follows (ii) that we must not speak of the constituents as ‘combined’ in virtue of a division such that
any and every part
of each is juxtaposed to a part of the other: for it is impossible for them to be thus
divided. Either, then, there is no ‘combination’, or we have still to explain the manner in which it can take place.

Now, as we maintain,
⁹³
some things are such as to act and others such as to suffer action from them. Moreover, some things—viz.
(20)
those which have the same matter—‘reciprocate’, i. e. are such as to act upon one another and to suffer action from one another; while other things, viz. agents which have not the same matter as their patients, act without themselves suffering action. Such agents cannot ‘combine’—that is why neither the art of healing nor health produces health by ‘combining’ with the bodies of the patients. Amongst those things, however, which are reciprocally active and passive, some are easily-divisible. Now (i) if a great quantity (or a large bulk) of one of these easily-divisible ‘reciprocating’ materials be brought together with a little (or with a small piece) of another,
(25)
the effect produced is not ‘combination’, but increase of the dominant: for the other material is transformed into the dominant. (That is why a drop of wine does not ‘combine’ with ten thousand gallons of water: for its form is dissolved, and it
⁹⁴
is changed so as to merge in the total volume of water.) On the other hand (ii) when there is a certain equilibrium between their ‘powers of action’,
(30)
then each of them changes out of its own nature towards the dominant: yet neither becomes the other, but both become an intermediate with properties common to both.
⁹⁵

Thus it is clear that only those agents are ‘combinable’ which involve a contrariety—for these are such as to suffer action reciprocally. And, further, they combine more freely if small pieces of each of them are juxtaposed. For in that condition they change one another more easily and more quickly; whereas this effect takes a long time when agent and patient are present in bulk.
[328b]
(35)

Hence, amongst the divisible susceptible materials, those whose shape is readily adaptable have a tendency to combine: for they are easily divided into small particles, since that is precisely what ‘being readily adaptable in shape’ implies. For instance, liquids are the most ‘combinable’ of all bodies—because, of all divisible materials, the liquid is most readily adaptable in shape, unless it be viscous. Viscous liquids,
(5)
it is true, produce no effect except to increase the volume and bulk. But when one of the constituents is alone susceptible—or superlatively
susceptible, the other being susceptible in a very slight degree—the compound resulting from their combination is either no greater in volume or only a little greater. This is what happens when tin is combined with bronze. For some things display a hesitating and ambiguous attitude towards one another—showing a slight tendency to combine and also an inclination to behave as ‘receptive matter’ and ‘form’ respectively.
(10)
The behaviour of these metals is a case in point. For the tin almost vanishes, behaving as if it were an immaterial property of the bronze: having been combined, it disappears, leaving no trace except the colour it has imparted to the bronze. The same phenomenon occurs in other instances too.

It is clear, then, from the foregoing account, that ‘combination’ occurs,
(15)
what it is, to what it is due, and what kind of thing is ‘combinable’. The phenomenon depends upon the fact that some things are such as to be (
a
) reciprocally susceptible and (
b
) readily adaptable in shape, i. e. easily divisible. For such things can be ‘combined’ without its being necessary
either
that they should have been destroyed
or
that they should survive absolutely unaltered: and their ‘combination’ need not be a ‘composition’, nor merely ‘relative to perception’. On the contrary: anything is ‘combinable’ which,
(20)
being readily adaptable in shape, is such as to suffer action and to act; and it is ‘combinable with’ another thing similarly characterized (for the ‘combinable’ is relative to the ‘combinable’); and ‘combination’ is unification of the ‘combinables’, resulting from their ‘alteration’.

¹
i. e. as well as Anaxagoras: Cf. above, 314
^a
13–15.

²
i. e. as well as ordinary people: Cf.
^b
13 ff.

³
i. e. according to Empedocles.

⁴
i. e. at the period when Empedocles himself appears to recognize that his ‘elements’ come-to-be.

⁵
i. e. the motion of dissociation initiated by Strife.

⁶
i. e. if we still wish to maintain that coming-to-be (though it actually occurs and is distinct from ‘alteration’) is not ‘association’.

⁷
Cf. e. g.
de Caelo
299
^a
6–11.

⁸
i. e. by progressive bisection
ad infinitum.

⁹
i. e. ‘through and through’ division.

¹⁰
i. e. the sum of the now separated parts.

¹¹
i. e. all the points into which the body has been dissolved by the ‘through and through’ division.

¹²
Cf. above, 316
^a
24–5.

¹³
i. e. points-of-division and quality.

¹⁴
Cf.
Physics
231
^a
21 ff.;
de Caelo
303
^a
3 ff.

¹⁵
i. e. every perceptible body: Cf. above, 316
^b
21.

¹⁶
i. e. all change ‘in what is continuous’.

¹⁷
i. e. a ‘formal’ factor.

¹⁸
Cf. 328
^a
23 ff.

¹⁹
The second main topic of investigation is formulated below, 317
^b
34–5.

²⁰
Physics
i. 6–9.

²¹
Cf. above, 317
^b
10–11.

²²
‘Unqualified coming-to-be’ = substantial change.

²³
‘Partial’ = ‘qualified’ coming-to-be, i. e. change of quality, quantity, or place.

²⁴
Physics
viii. 3 ff., especially 258
^b
10 ff.

²⁵
Cf. below, II. 10.

²⁶
i. e. the material cause.

²⁷
i. e. not merely
‘this
is passing-away and
that
is coming-to-be.’

²⁸
The theory is put forward by Parmenides as the prevalent, but erroneous, view.

²⁹
sc.
as the things into which the unqualified changes take place.

³⁰
i. e. one will be ‘a positive real’ and the other ‘a negative something’.

³¹
sc.
between the
unqualified
and the
qualified
changes.

³²
‘In truth’, i. e. according to Aristotle’s own view which he has just stated (above, 318
^b
14–18).

³³
sc.
without qualification.

³⁴
i. e. without qualification.

³⁵
i. e. in the Column containing the positive terms: Cf. above, 318
^b
14–18.

³⁶
Cf. above, 318
^a
13–23.

³⁷
A ‘not-being’ in the popular sense of the term, i. e. an ‘imperceptible’. The imperceptibility of the material is irrelevant to the question of its reality.

³⁸
‘what is not’ = what is imperceptible.

³⁹
Cf. below, II. 1–3.

⁴⁰
Aristotle is not saying that water and air are in fact ‘cold’, but is only quoting a common view in illustration.

⁴¹
Cf. above, 315
^a
26–28.

⁴²
i. e. the supposed incorporeal and sizeless matter.

⁴³
It is clear from what follows that the incorporeal and sizeless matter is assumed to be ‘separate’—to be real independently of body—under both alternatives.

⁴⁴
i. e. the supposed incorporeal and sizeless matter.

⁴⁵
i. e. either as itself occupying a place, or as contained within a body which itself occupies a place.

⁴⁶
‘inseparable’ from the actual body in which it is contained.

⁴⁷
Cf.
Physics
i. 7;
Metaph.
1032
^a
12 ff.

⁴⁸
The efficient cause of the coming-to-be of a hard thing (e. g. of ice or terracotta) is something cold or hot (a freezing wind or a baking fire). Such efficient causes are only generically, not specifically, identical with their effects.

⁴⁹
An ‘actuality’ or ‘form’: Cf.
Metaph.
1032
^a
25 ff.

⁵⁰
i. e. unless Qualities or Adjectivals are separable from Substances.

⁵¹
Cf. above, 320
^a
27–
^b
12.

⁵²
Cf.
Physics
iv. 6–9.

⁵³
Cf. above, 320
^a
27–
^b
25.

⁵⁴
viz. the third characteristic—that the growing thing ‘persists’.

⁵⁵
i. e. has ‘grown’.

⁵⁶
i. e. the substance of the shin.

⁵⁷
And therefore it is these which are said to grow or to be ‘altered’.

⁵⁸
i. e. by an expansion of all parts of the ‘form’.

⁵⁹
i. e. ‘been modified’ so as to be transformed into flesh.

⁶⁰
i. e. ‘lays hold’ of it and converts it into fire.

⁶¹
i. e. ‘must be together with’ it when this conversion takes place.

⁶²
i. e. an independent coming-to-be of flesh, not a growth of the already existing tissue.

⁶³
i. e. what comes-to-be in growth is so-much flesh or bone, or a hand or arm of such and such a size: not ‘quantum-in-general’, but a ‘quantified-something’.

⁶⁴
i. e. the form which grows in every part of itself: Cf. above, 321
^b
22–34.

⁶⁵
i. e. this form or power immersed in matter.

⁶⁶
i. e. a diminution of the size of the tissue whose form it is.

⁶⁷
i. e. are transformations of a single
substratum,
or ‘derived from one thing’ as Diogenes maintained.

⁶⁸
Cf.
Physics
226
^b
21–23.

⁶⁹
i. e. if A and B are in reciprocal contact,
either
A must be heavy and B light, or A light and B heavy:
or
A and B must both be heavy, or both be light.

⁷⁰
i. e. a kind, of which the two opposed things are contrasted species.

⁷¹
i. e. like ‘health’.

⁷²
The reference is to Parmenides, Melissus, and (probably) Zeno.

⁷³
i. e. for rendering intelligible the being of a ‘many’.

⁷⁴
This appears to be the view of Empedocles, as Aristotle here expresses it: Cf. below, 325
^b
5–10.

⁷⁵
This appears to be the view of the Pythagoreans: Cf.
Physics
213
^b
22–7.

⁷⁶
i. e. the existence of motion is just as impossible on the hypothesis of Empedocles as on that of the Pythagoreans.

⁷⁷
These words seem to be intended to suggest ‘The Way of Truth’ in the poem of Parmenides.

⁷⁸
i. e. as well as the composite bodies.

⁷⁹
Cf.
Timaeus
53
C
ff.

⁸⁰
Cf.
de Caelo
iii, 1, especially 298
^b
33 ff., iii. 7 and iv. 2.

⁸¹
The uniformity of the substance or ‘stuff’ of the atoms was a fundamental doctrine in the theory.

⁸²
i. e. in its single, indivisible, undifferentiated identity.

⁸³
i. e. these qualitatively-distinct sets of atoms.

⁸⁴
For the doctrine implied in this argument, Cf.
Physics
190
^b
24, 192
^a
1 ff.

⁸⁵
sc
. having pores, all of which are ‘full’.

⁸⁶
i. e. the body will still be impenetrable, even if the pores as such (as channels) are distinguished in thought from what fills them. For
in fact
the pores are always ‘full’ and the body is a
plenum
throughout—though perhaps not a ‘uniform’
plenum
.

⁸⁷
‘Big’ is a relative term and may include a void in any degree bigger than the infinitesimal.

⁸⁸
viz. to express such lines of greater susceptibility.

⁸⁹
Cf. above, 316
^a
14–317
^a
17.

⁹⁰
i. e. if this potentiality be realized: Cf. 316
^a
19.

⁹¹
Cf. above, 322
^b
5 ff.

⁹²
sc
. in the resulting complex (e. g. ‘white-body’ or ‘learned-man’).

⁹³
Cf. above, I. 7.

⁹⁴
sc
. the drop of wine.

⁹⁵
Each of the constituents,
qua
acting on the other, is
relatively
‘dominant’. Neither of them is
absolutely
‘dominant’, for each ‘suffers action’ from the other. Hence each meets the other half-way, and the resultant is a compromise between them.