The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (86 page)

1
     We have explained under what conditions ‘combination’, ‘contact’, and ‘action-passion’ are attributable to the things which undergo natural change. Further, we have discussed ‘unqualified’ coming-to-be and passing-away, and explained under what conditions they are predicable, of what subject, and owing to what cause. Similarly,
(30)
we have also discussed ‘alteration’, and explained what ‘altering’ is and how it differs from coming-to-be and passing-away. But we have still to investigate the so-called ‘elements’ of bodies.

For the complex substances whose formation and maintenance are due to natural processes all presuppose the perceptible bodies as the condition of their coming-to-be and passing-away: but philosophers disagree in regard to the matter which underlies these perceptible bodies. Some maintain it is single, supposing it to be, e. g., Air or Fire, or an ‘intermediate’ between these two (but still a body with a separate existence).
(35)
Others, on the contrary, postulate two or more
materials—ascribing to their ‘association’ and ‘dissociation’, or to their ‘alteration’, the coming-to-be and passing-away of things.
[329a]
(Some, for instance, postulate Fire and Earth: some add Air, making three: and some, like Empedocles, reckon Water as well, thus postulating four.)
(5)

Now we may agree that the primary materials, whose change (whether it be ‘association and dissociation’ or a process of another kind) results in coming-to-be and passing-away, are rightly described as ‘originative sources, i. e. elements’. But (i) those thinkers are in error who postulate, beside the bodies we have mentioned,
(10)
a single matter—and that a corporeal and separable matter. For this ‘body’ of theirs cannot possibly exist without a ‘perceptible contrariety’: this ‘Boundless’, which some thinkers identify with the ‘original real’, must be either light or heavy, either cold or hot.
¹
And (ii) what Plato has written in the
Timaeus
is not based on any precisely-articulated conception.
(15)
For he has not stated clearly whether his ‘Omnirecipient’
²
exists in separation from the ‘elements’; nor does he make any use of it. He says, indeed, that it is a
substratum
prior to the so-called ‘elements’—underlying them, as gold underlies the things that are fashioned of gold. (And yet this comparison, if thus expressed,
(20)
is itself open to criticism. Things which come-to-be, and pass-away cannot be called by the name of the material out of which they have come-to-be: it is only the results of ‘alteration’ which retain the name of the
substratum
whose ‘alterations’ they are. However, he actually says
³
that ‘far the truest account is to affirm that each of them
⁴
is “gold” ’.) Nevertheless he carries his analysis of the ‘elements’—solids though they are—back to ‘planes’,
⁵
and it is impossible for ‘the Nurse’
⁶
(i. e. the primary matter) to be identical with the ‘planes’.

Our own doctrine is that although there is a matter of the perceptible bodies (a matter out of which the so-called ’elements come-to-be),
(25)
it has no separate existence, but is always bound up with a contrariety. A more precise account of these presuppositions has been given in another work
⁷
: we must, however, give a detailed explanation of the primary bodies as well,
(30)
since they too are similarly derived from the matter. We must reckon as an ‘originative source’ and as ‘primary’ the matter which underlies, though it is
inseparable from, the contrary qualities: for ‘the hot’ is not matter for ‘the cold’ nor ‘the cold’ for ‘the hot’, but the
substratum
is matter for them both. We therefore have to recognize three ‘originative sources’:
firstly
that which is potentially perceptible body,
secondly
the contrarieties (I mean, e. g., heat and cold), and
thirdly
Fire,
(35)
Water, and the like.
Only
‘thirdly’, however: for these bodies change into one another (they are not immutable as Empedocles and other thinkers assert, since ‘alteration’ would then have been impossible), whereas the contrarieties do not change.
[329b]

Nevertheless, even so
⁸
the question remains: What sorts of contrarieties, and how many of them, are to be accounted ‘originative sources’ of body? For all the other thinkers assume and use them without explaining why they are
these
or why they are just so
many
.
(5)

2
     Since, then, we are looking for ‘originative sources’ of perceptible body; and since ‘perceptible’ is equivalent
⁹
to ‘tangible’, and ‘tangible’ is that of which the perception is touch; it is clear that not all the contrarieties constitute ‘forms’ and ‘originative sources’ of body, but only those which correspond to touch. For it is in accordance with a contrariety—a contrariety,
(10)
moreover, of
tangible
qualities—that the primary bodies are differentiated. That is why neither whiteness (and blackness), nor sweetness (and bitterness), nor (similarly) any quality belonging to the other
¹⁰
perceptible contrarieties either, constitutes an ‘element’. And yet vision is prior to touch, so that its object also is prior to the object of touch. The object of vision,
(15)
however, is a quality of tangible body not
qua
tangible, but
qua
something else—
qua
something which may well be naturally prior to the object of touch.

Accordingly, we must segregate the tangible differences and contrarieties, and distinguish which amongst them are primary. Contrarieties correlative to touch are the following: hot-cold, dry-moist, heavy-light, hard-soft, viscous-brittle, rough-smooth,
(20)
coarse-fine. Of these (i) heavy and light are neither active nor susceptible. Things are not called ‘heavy’ and ‘light’ because they act upon, or suffer action from, other things. But the ‘elements’ must be reciprocally active and susceptible, since they ‘combine’ and are transformed into one another. On the other hand (ii) hot and cold, and dry and moist,
(25)
are terms, of which the first pair implies
power to act
and the second
pair
susceptibility
. ‘Hot’ is that which ‘associates’ things of the same kind (for ‘dissociating’, which people attribute to Fire as its function,
is
‘associating’ things of the same class, since its effect is to eliminate what is foreign),
(30)
while ‘cold’ is that which brings together, i. e. ‘associates’, homogeneous and heterogeneous things alike. And ‘moist’ is that which, being readily adaptable in shape, is not determinable by any limit of its own: while ‘dry’ is that which is readily determinable by its own limit, but not readily adaptable in shape.

From moist and dry are derived (iii) the fine and coarse, viscous and brittle, hard and soft, and the remaining tangible differences.
(35)
For (
a
) since the moist has no determinate shape, but is readily adaptable and follows the outline of that which is in contact with it, it is characteristic of it to be ‘such as to fill up’.
[330a]
Now ‘the fine’ is ‘such as to fill up.’ For ‘the fine’ consists of subtle particles; but that which consists of small particles is ‘such as to fill up’, inasmuch as it is in contact
¹¹
whole with whole—and ‘the fine’ exhibits this character
¹²
in a superlative degree. Hence it is evident that the fine derives from the moist, while the coarse derives from the dry. Again (
b
) ‘the viscous’ derives from the moist:
(5)
for ‘the viscous’ (e. g. oil) is a ‘moist’ modified in a certain way. ‘The brittle’, on the other hand, derives from the dry: for ‘brittle’ is that which is
completely
dry—so completely, that its solidification has actually been due to failure of moisture. Further (
c
) ‘the soft’ derives from the moist. For ‘soft’ is that which yields to pressure by retiring into itself,
(10)
though it does not yield by total displacement as the moist does—which explains why the moist is not ‘soft’, although ‘the soft’ derives from the moist. ‘The hard’, on the other hand, derives from the dry: for ‘hard’ is that which is solidified, and the solidified is dry.

The terms ‘dry’ and ‘moist’ have more senses than one. For ‘the damp’, as well as the moist, is opposed to the dry: and again ‘the solidified’, as well as the dry, is opposed to the moist.
(15)
But all these qualities derive from the dry and moist we mentioned first.
¹³
For (i) the dry is opposed to the damp: i. e. ‘damp’ is that which has foreign moisture on its surface (‘sodden’ being that which is penetrated to its core
¹⁴
), while ‘dry’
¹⁵
is that which has lost foreign moisture. Hence it is evident that the damp will derive from the moist, and ‘the dry’ which is opposed to it will derive from the primary dry.
(20)
Again (ii)
the ‘moist’ and the solidified derive in the same way from the primary pair. For ‘moist’
¹⁶
is that which contains moisture
of its own
deep within it (‘sodden’ being that which is deeply penetrated by
foreign
moisture), whereas ‘solidified’ is that which has lost this inner moisture. Hence these too derive from the primary pair, the ‘solidified’ from the dry and the ‘liquefiable’ from the moist.

It is clear, then, that all the other differences reduce to the first four,
(25)
but that these admit of no further reduction. For the hot is not
essentially
moist or dry, nor the moist
essentially
hot or cold: nor are the cold and the dry derivative forms, either of one another or of the hot and the moist. Hence these must be four.

3
     The elementary qualities are four, and any four terms can be combined in six couples.
(30)
Contraries, however, refuse to be coupled: for it is impossible for the same thing to be hot and cold, or moist and dry. Hence it is evident that the ‘couplings’ of the elementary qualities will be four: hot with dry and moist with hot, and again cold with dry and cold with moist.
[330b]
And these four couples have attached themselves to the
apparently
‘simple’ bodies (Fire, Air, Water, and Earth) in a manner consonant with theory. For Fire is hot and dry, whereas Air is hot and moist (Air being a sort of aqueous vapour); and Water is cold and moist,
(5)
while Earth is cold and dry. Thus the differences are reasonably distributed among the primary bodies, and the number of the latter is consonant with theory. For all who make the simple bodies ‘elements’ postulate either one, or two, or three, or four. Now (i) those who assert there is
one
only,
(10)
and then generate everything else by condensation and rarefaction, are in effect making their ‘originative sources’ two, viz. the rare and the dense, or rather the hot and the cold: for it is these which are the moulding forces, while the ‘one’ underlies them as a ‘matter’. But (ii) those who postulate
two
from the start—as Parmenides postulated Fire and Earth—make the intermediates (e. g. Air and Water) blends of these.
(15)
The same course is followed (iii) by those who advocate
three
. (We may compare what Plato does in ‘The Divisions’: for he makes ‘the middle’ a blend.) Indeed, there is practically no difference between those who postulate
two
and those who postulate
three
, except that the former split the middle ‘element’ into two, while the latter treat it as only one. But (iv) some advocate
four
from the start,
(20)
e. g. Empedocles: yet he too draws them together so as to reduce them to
the two
, for he opposes all the others to Fire.

In fact, however, fire and air, and each of the bodies we have mentioned, are not simple, but blended. The ‘simple’ bodies are indeed similar in nature to them, but not identical with them. Thus the ‘simple’ body corresponding to fire is ‘such-as-fire’,
(25)
not fire: that which corresponds to air is ‘such-as-air’: and so on with the rest of them. But fire is an excess of heat, just as ice is an excess of cold. For freezing and boiling are excesses of heat and cold respectively. Assuming, therefore, that ice is a freezing of moist and cold, fire analogously will be a boiling of dry and hot: a fact, by the way,
(30)
which explains why nothing comes-to-be either out of ice or out of fire.

The ‘simple’ bodies, since they are four, fall into two pairs which belong to the two regions, each to each: for Fire and Air are forms of the body moving towards the ‘limit’, while Earth and Water are forms of the body which moves towards the ‘centre’.
[331a]
Fire and Earth, moreover, are extremes and purest: Water and Air, on the contrary, are intermediates and more like blends. And, further, the members of either pair are contrary to those of the other, Water being contrary to Fire and Earth to Air; for the qualities constituting Water and Earth are contrary to those that constitute Fire and Air. Nevertheless, since they are four, each of them is characterized
par excellence
by a single quality: Earth by dry rather than by cold,
(5)
Water by cold rather than by moist, Air by moist rather than by hot, and Fire by hot rather than by dry.

4
     It has been established before
¹⁷
that the coming-to-be of the ‘simple’ bodies is reciprocal. At the same time, it is manifest, even on the evidence of perception, that they
do
come-to-be: for otherwise there would not have been ‘alteration’,
(10)
since ‘alteration’ is change in respect to the qualities of the objects of touch. Consequently, we must explain (i) what is the manner of their reciprocal transformation, and (ii) whether every one of them can come-to-be out of every one—or whether some can do so, but not others.

Now it is evident that all of them are by nature such as to change into one another: for coming-to-be is a change into contraries and out of contraries,
(15)
and the ‘elements’ all involve a contrariety in their mutual relations because their distinctive qualities are contrary. For in some of them
both
qualities are contrary—e. g. in Fire and Water, the first of these being dry and hot, and the second moist and cold: while in others
one
of the qualities (though only one) is contrary—e. g. in Air and Water, the first being moist and hot, and
the second moist and cold. It is evident, therefore, if we consider them in general,
(20)
that every one is by nature such as to come-to-be out of every one; and when we come to consider them severally, it is not difficult to see the manner in which their transformation is effected. For, though all will result from all, both the speed and the facility of their conversion will differ in degree.

Thus (i) the process of conversion will be quick between those which have interchangeable ‘complementary factors’,
(25)
but slow between those which have none. The reason is that it is easier for a single thing to change than for many. Air, e. g., will result from Fire if a single quality changes: for Fire, as we saw, is hot and dry while Air is hot and moist, so that there will be Air if the dry be overcome by the moist. Again, Water will result from Air if the hot be overcome by the cold: for Air,
(30)
as we saw, is hot and moist while Water is cold and moist, so that, if the hot changes, there will be Water. So too, in the same manner, Earth will result from Water and Fire from Earth, since the two ‘elements’ in both these couples have interchangeable ‘complementary factors’. For Water is moist and cold while Earth is cold and dry—so that, if the moist be overcome,
(35)
there will be Earth: and again, since Fire is dry and hot while Earth is cold and dry, Fire will result from Earth, if the cold pass-away.
[331b]

It is evident, therefore, that the coming-to-be of the ‘simple’ bodies will be cyclical; and that this cyclical method of transformation is the easiest, because the
consecutive
‘elements’ contain interchangeable ‘complementary factors’.
¹⁸
On the other hand (ii) the transformation of Fire into Water and of Air into Earth, and again of Water and Earth into Fire and Air respectively,
(5)
though possible, is more difficult because it involves the change of more qualities. For if Fire is to result from Water, both the cold and the moist must pass-away: and again, both the cold and the dry must pass-away if Air is to result from Earth. So, too, if Water and Earth are to result from Fire and Air respectively—both qualities must change.
(10)

This second method of coming-to-be, then, takes a longer time. But (iii) if one quality in each of two ‘elements’ pass-away, the transformation, though easier, is not reciprocal. Still, from Fire
plus
Water there will result Earth and
¹⁹
Air, and from Air
plus
Earth, Fire and
²⁰
Water. For there will be Air, when the cold of the
Water and the dry of the Fire have passed-away (since the hot of the latter and the moist of the former are left): whereas,
(15)
when the hot of the Fire and the moist of the Water have passed-away, there will be Earth, owing to the survival of the dry of the Fire and the cold of the Water. So, too in the same way, Fire and Water will result from Air
plus
Earth.
(20)
For there will be Water, when the hot of the Air and the dry of the Earth have passed-away (since the moist of the former and the cold of the latter are left): whereas, when the moist of the Air and the cold of the Earth have passed-away, there will be Fire, owing to the survival of the hot of the Air and the dry of the Earth—qualities essentially constitutive of Fire. Moreover,
(25)
this mode of Fire’s coming-to-be is confirmed by perception. For flame is
par excellence
Fire: but flame is burning smoke, and smoke consists of Air and Earth.

No transformation, however, into any of the ‘simple’ bodies can result from the passing-away of one elementary quality in each of two ‘elements’ when they are taken in their consecutive order,
(30)
because either
identical
or
contrary
qualities are left in the pair: but no ‘simple’ body can be formed either out of identical, or out of contrary, qualities. Thus no ‘simple’ body would result, if the dry of Fire and the moist of Air were to pass-away: for the hot is left in both. On the other hand, if the hot pass-away out of both, the contraries—dry and moist—are left. A similar result will occur in all the others too: for all the
consecutive
‘elements’ contain one identical, and one contrary,
(35)
quality.
²¹
Hence, too, it clearly follows that, when one of the
consecutive
‘elements’ is transformed into one, the coming-to-be is effected by the passing-away of a single quality: whereas, when two of them are transformed into a third, more than one quality must have passed-away.
²²

[332a]
We have stated that all the ‘elements’ come-to-be out of any one of them; and we have explained the manner in which their mutual conversion takes place.