Supreme Commander (25 page)

On December 7, however, Marshall cabled Eisenhower to report that there was a “real desire” in Washington and London to withdraw the anti-Semitic decrees. Marshall added that Roosevelt was aware of the Jew-Moslem problem and wanted Eisenhower’s approval before moving. Eisenhower talked to Darlan, who said he was ready to issue a public announcement that would place him on “the side of liberal government,” opposed to the Axis and all they stood for. Eisenhower drew up a statement for Darlan to make to the press, which finally went out on December 15. The next day Darlan disclaimed any postwar ambitions
and said the French people should elect their own government. There was, however, no change in the anti-Semitic laws.
¹⁷

With the conclusion of what most hoped would be the final phase of the Darlan deal, Marshall told Eisenhower that he had “not only my confidence but my deep sympathy” in having to fight a battle, organize one sixth of a continent, and carry on “probably the most complicated and highly supervised negotiations in history,” all at the same time. Marshall said Eisenhower’s judgment had been sound and his actions completely justified. Eisenhower, deeply touched, replied, “No other person’s complete understanding of this complicated situation and commendation for its handling to date could possibly mean so much to me as yours.”
¹⁸

Marshall’s praise helped put things in perspective. The criticism of the Darlan deal, the maddening delays in getting the offensive going again, and the political problems were all irritating, but “through all this,” Eisenhower declared in a note he dictated on December 10, “I am learning many things.” The first was that waiting for other people to produce “is one of the hardest things a commander has to do.” The second was that, in a modern armed force, organizational experience and “an orderly, logical mind are absolutely essential to success.” The flashy, ambitious soldier or sailor “can’t deliver the goods in high command.” On the other hand, neither could the slow, methodical, ritualistic officer. There had to be a fine balance, which was difficult to find.

Most of all, a successful commander had to have “an inexhaustible fund of nervous energy,” since he was called upon day and night “to absorb the disappointments, the discouragements and the doubts of his subordinates.… The odd thing about it is that most of these subordinates don’t even realize that they are simply pouring their burdens upon” their superior.
¹⁹

Despite his remarks, Eisenhower was finding it increasingly hard to keep up an attitude of optimism and cheerfulness. After the war his staff officers and subordinate commanders remembered him as a constantly smiling, considerate, and encouraging commander, but they forgot what December 1942 in North Africa was like. The dripping heavens and depressing poverty of Algeria and Tunisia were a fitting background to the general mood. Criticism of the Darlan deal continued. Anderson was unable to make any progress. The air forces remained snarled and accomplished nothing. The French fought among themselves and with everyone else. The Americans and British fought with each other and snapped at thè French. Jacob later recalled that everyone he talked to
agreed that things would be better if the others were not there. Each of the three Allies disliked the other two.
²⁰
The only man who could hold them together was Eisenhower, and he was beginning to succumb to the atmosphere around him.

The tone in the office was bad. Morale had dropped measurably. Smith had come in a week earlier and taken up his duties as chief of staff, but his ulcer was acting up and he blistered anyone who came within range. He was supposed to handle the problems of dealing with the French but was not and they ended up on Eisenhower’s desk. Butcher complained that, despite Smith’s reputation, “he’s just a neurotic with an aching ulcer.” More disturbing was Eisenhower’s habit at lunch of ending a discussion by saying, “Anyone who wants the job of Allied Commander-in-Chief can have it.” The saying began as a joke, but it seemed that he was beginning to mean it.
²¹

But, as Eisenhower realized, he was learning as he went along, getting better at the job each day. Perhaps the best example was his ability to deal with the French. In mid-December Giraud demanded permission to move some French colonial troops into the front lines. Eisenhower was unwilling to comply, since the units had no anti-aircraft and would be a burden on the supply lines. He realized, however, that “blunt refusal might cause repercussions in the region his light forces are covering for us,” and explained to Churchill that this was typical of the political-military problems he had to deal with. “These people are poor and have suffered much humiliation,” Eisenhower pointed out, “and are therefore excessively proud.” The matter “cannot be handled on a straight military basis.” The commander in chief had learned much since November 8, when he regarded all Frenchmen who would not immediately do his bidding as Frogs. Now he was beginning to be able to see things from their point of view and to act accordingly.
²²

Relations with the French were improving, but unfortunately at the front they were not. On December 22 Eisenhower started for the front, where he wanted to see conditions for himself. Traveling incessantly, stopping only to talk to troops he saw by the side of the road, he reached Anderson’s headquarters early on December 24. He and Anderson together then visited the units in the field. It had been raining all across North Africa when Eisenhower left Algiers and continued to do so. The entire countryside was a vast quagmire. To test it, Eisenhower had armored commanders send tanks or half-tracks over the ground. At no point was it possible to maneuver any type of vehicle off the
roads. Coming upon a group of men trying to extricate a motorcycle from the mud thirty feet off the road, Eisenhower had his driver stop and watched for a few minutes. The soldiers pushed and pulled, sweated and swore, but only managed to get the motorcycle more deeply bogged down. When they finally gave up they needed help themselves in getting out.

Eisenhower decided to call off the attack. He told the CCS he would reorganize and try later to mount an offensive south of Tebessa, where the terrain was firmer.
²³

The last hope of getting Tunis before winter really set in was gone and TORCH had failed of complete success. In calling off the attack, Eisenhower was agreeing to engage the Germans in a logistical marathon and fight a battle of attrition. It was a bitter decision that he hated to make, but he was sure that to mount the offensive under the current conditions was to court disaster.

As darkness fell on Christmas Eve, Eisenhower returned to the farmhouse that served as V Corps headquarters. He reported to the CCS, concluding with the confession that “the abandonment for the time being of our plan for a full-out effort has been the severest disappointment I have suffered to date.”
²⁴
It was a cautious but courageous decision—many commanders would have found it easier to attack, and hang the losses. Eisenhower was certainly right in deciding it was too late to put the necessary energy into the offensive.

After reporting to the CCS, he sat down at the mess table to eat his Christmas Eve dinner. A messenger rushed in from the communications tent. Darlan had just been assassinated. Mumbling to himself, Eisenhower got into his car. After thirty hours of non-stop driving through rain, snow, and sleet, he got back to Algiers.
²⁵

His first act was to write a letter expressing his sympathy to Madame Darlan. He then had the staff brief him on what had happened. The story was simple enough. Fernand Bonnier de la Chapelle was a member of a conspiracy of five young Frenchmen of anti-Nazi royalist inclination that a Free French organizer had formed in Algiers. The group had drawn lots to decide which of them would have the honor of killing the admiral, De la Chapelle won, and he walked up to Darlan and shot him dead. He expected to become a national hero, but much to his surprise Giraud had him tried and executed within forty-eight hours.
²⁶

Darlan’s death was, taking it all in all, the best possible thing that could have happened. Eisenhower was leery by now of all Frenchmen
and said that while Darlan’s removal solved one problem, he feared it would create many more. It did, but the Allies were now over the big hurdle. The embarrassment of dealing with Darlan was finished. Eisenhower saw to it that Giraud replaced him at the head of the Imperial Council,
²⁷
and Giraud had none of the tar from the Vichy brush on him. It pleased Roosevelt to have Giraud finally on top and it delighted the British, for they had always been more sensitive to the moral stigma of dealing with Darlan. Besides, De Gaulle had hated Darlan but was only contemptuous of Giraud and could work with him. French unity was now possible, which in turn could mean a unified Anglo-American policy with regard to the French.

As Clark put it, “Admiral Darlan’s death was, to me, an act of Providence.… His removal from the scene was like the lancing of a troublesome boil. He had served his purpose, and his death solved what could have been the very difficult problem of what to do with him in the future.”
²⁸

Spirits at AFHQ immediately rose. With Darlan gone, a new start could be made. The tension disappeared, too, for Eisenhower was no longer living under the constant pressure of trying to get an offensive started. The decision to call it off meant that he and his staff could now settle down to manageable tasks—building up the force, creating a reserve, constructing a line of communications, and straightening out the command situation, which was almost hopelessly confused because of the mixture of American, British, and even some French units in Anderson’s First Army.

On December 22 Marshall had told Eisenhower to “delegate your international diplomatic problems to your subordinates and give your complete attention to the battle in Tunisia.…”
²⁹
With Darlan gone, Eisenhower felt he could now afford to do just that. Although the failure to get Tunis and Bizerte hurt, he had much to be proud of, especially in diplomacy. He had brought Dakar into the Allied camp, arranged matters so that Frenchmen were once again fighting on the Allied side, and most of all commanded the largest amphibious operation history had ever seen. Despite setbacks that put a strain on the alliance, he had held together the largest allied force that ever operated under one man’s command. He himself was gaining experience and learning to command men in battle. He could look forward with confidence.

Part III
OPENING THE MEDITERRANEAN
[
January 1943–July 1943
]

A
S 1943 opened, the initiative everywhere lay with the Allies. A year earlier Germany, Japan, and Italy had decided where and when to fight. The United States, Russia, and Great Britain had reacted to their thrusts. By January 1, 1943, the situation was reversed. This was due primarily to the courage, fortitude, and effort of the British and Russian people, for the United States was not yet totally mobilized and had less than one field army in contact with the enemy throughout the world. But at Stalingrad, El Alamein, Tunisia, and Midway the Allies had stemmed the flow of the Axis advance. Now the Allies could decide the time and the location of the battles, and the Americans were almost ready to play their full role.

The first month of 1943 was devoted to preparation. In Tunisia, both sides worked to build up their force, with Eisenhower additionally struggling to improve the quality of the American troops in the theater. On a higher level the CCS and heads of government met to plan a strategy for 1943 and to create an organization that could implement it. By the end of the month the tasks were almost complete and the Allies were nearly ready to resume the offensive.

The day of Darlan’s death Eisenhower had decided to abandon all hope of getting Bizerte and Tunis before spring, but he did not intend to fall back. He feared the psychological effects of a retreat and he wanted to keep the troops in place on a line that would cover the forward airfields at Thélepte, Youks-les-Bains, and Souk-el-Arba. With the airfields, Eisenhower could send air attacks against the Germans in Bizerte and Tunis, while remaining in position on the ground for a final offensive when Allied strength and the weather permitted. These positive advantages seemed to him to be greater than anything that could be gained by falling back toward the supply bases at Oran and Algiers.

From the forward line, Eisenhower told his commanders to engage the enemy with probing attacks, especially on the right (to the south), where the flank was in the air. He planned to concentrate the U. S. 1st Armored Division in the Tebessa area and give it a tentative objective of Sfax. If it captured that port on the Gulf of Gabès, small detachments might push south toward Gabès while the main force struck north toward Sousse. This operation, if successful, would secure Eisenhower’s right flank and, more important, interpose 1st Armored between
Rommel’s forces retreating from Libya and Generaloberst Juergen von Arnim, who succeeded Nehring in Tunisia.