Supreme Commander (21 page)

French officers in Tunisia did not know what to do, but the Germans soon took away their freedom of action. As early as November 9 the Axis had men and planes in Bizerte and Mateur. The only troops Eisenhower had in the area were the floating reserve of the Eastern Task Force, part of the British 78th Division. On November 11 he sent it ashore at Bougie, about a hundred miles east of Algiers. He might have taken a long shot and thrown everything he had into Bizerte, but the risk—especially after the fighting at Oran and Casablanca—seemed too great. Meanwhile Clark and Darlan did everything they could to encourage the French in Tunisia, but the Army commander there, General Georges Barre, threw up his hands in despair and took the easy way out, withdrawing his forces westward into the mountains, refusing either to fight the Axis or to follow Vichy orders and collaborate with them.

The French naval commander in Tunis, Admiral Jean Pierre Esteva, was an old friend of Cunningham’s, and Cunningham sent him an appeal in Eisenhower’s name to “use his forces to throw out the German.” Cunningham said that if Esteva would act, Eisenhower would “rush every type of support to his assistance without delay.” But German troops
were arriving daily by air and the first sea-borne convoy was on its way. Esteva contrasted the German reality with Eisenhower’s promises and decided to do nothing.
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By November 11 Eisenhower was afraid that the chance of TORCH being a strategic success had already vanished. The Allies were ashore and were getting ready to push east, but they were going to have to fight for Tunisia and it would probably be a long campaign. There was still a slim possibility of getting Tunis cheaply, but it depended upon the French, especially Esteva. If he “would only see reason at this moment, we could avoid many weeks of later fighting and have exactly what we will then gain at the cost of many lives and resources,” Eisenhower said, but he guessed that the French had “been brow-beaten too long—they are not thinking in terms of a cause but of individual fortunes and opportunities.”

Esteva had the equivalent of three divisions available. It would take the Germans two weeks to get even one division into Tunisia. If Esteva would act he “could cut the throat of every German and Italian in the area” and Eisenhower could afford to rush every fighter airplane he had into Tunisia. “A situation such as this creates in me so much fury,” he told Smith, “that I sometimes wish I could do a little throat-cutting myself!”
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The morning of November 12 Eisenhower tried to get to Algiers, where he wanted to put more pressure on Darlan so that Darlan would put more pressure on Esteva and the fleet. The weather prevented him from flying. Clark, meanwhile, had managed to conclude a tentative agreement with the French. As a matter of principle the U.S. had decided that the French colonies were not to be treated as conquered provinces but as friendly territories and Roosevelt had explicitly promised Giraud that the U.S. would not interfere in domestic affairs in North Africa. Murphy said that without the experienced French administrators the area would be chaos and Eisenhower did not have the organization or the personnel to establish a military government. Clark was happy to make a deal with Darlan, the only requirement being that Giraud have an important position—which showed a rather astonishing loyalty to Giraud in view of his lack of effectiveness. On November 13 Darlan took on the title of High Commissioner and assumed the civil powers in North Africa. Giraud became commander in chief of French forces, with Juin as his deputy in charge of ground troops. Darlan explained that he had new secret orders from Pétain ratifying the arrangement and absolving all officers of their personal oath of fidelity to Pétain.
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On November 12 Eisenhower sent a note to Clark saying that he approved of everything Clark had done and including instructions for the organization of the area. He wanted Clark to hire all the labor he could, paying at least ten per cent more than the prevailing wage. He also warned Clark not to create any dissension among the Arab tribes “or encourage them to break away from existing methods of control.” The Allies would have to use the existing French officials to keep the area under control and Eisenhower did not want “any internal unrest or trouble.”

Around midday on November 12 Eisenhower received a cable from Smith that shocked him. The commander in chief had been only mildly satisfied with results so far and was deeply upset at the failure to get any force into Tunisia, where the German build-up continued. Although Eisenhower was far from thinking of himself as a hero or TORCH as a great success, Smith told him that the CCS were so enthusiastic with Eisenhower’s quick victories and the agreements that had been reached with the French that they were broaching the idea of broadening operations in the Mediterranean. Smith said the Chiefs wanted Eisenhower to consider the possibility of invading Sardinia. They questioned the necessity of building up TORCH to the strength originally contemplated and felt Eisenhower should return to London for a general strategy conference.
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The CCS position sounded for all the world like Giraud’s demand that Eisenhower invade southern France. He immediately set out to straighten out their thinking. “I am unalterably opposed to any suggestion at this time for reducing contemplated TORCH strength,” Eisenhower told Smith. The situation had not crystallized. In Tunisia it was “touch and go,” the port of Oran was blockaded with sunken ships, and the country was not completely pacified. “Moreover, every effort to secure organized and effective French cooperation runs into a maze of political and personal intrigue and the definite impression exists that neither Kingpin nor any of the others really wants to fight nor to cooperate wholeheartedly.” Without local co-operation, the Allies would have “a tremendous job on our hands in this sprawling country.” Eisenhower wanted to move ahead in an orderly fashion “but for God’s sake let’s get one job done at a time.” Instead of talking about reduction of forces, the CCS should be contemplating building up TORCH so that Eisenhower could do something effective in Tunisia.

Eisenhower was more upset at the apparent lack of understanding in London by the CCS than he was at the actual suggestions they had made.
He could not understand how they could be so ignorant about the situation. “I am not crying wolf nor am I growing fearful of shadows,” he explained, but he had to insist that “if our beginning looks hopeful, then this is the time to push rather than to slacken our efforts.” This certainly was no time for him to come to London, but he wanted Smith to dispel the “apparently bland assumption that this job is finished.” If one of the Chiefs would spend just five minutes on the ground, he would lose his illusions.
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After dictating the message to Smith, Eisenhower decided to eliminate the middleman and sent a nearly identical cable to the Chiefs themselves. In a note he dictated to Smith later in the day, Eisenhower said, “Don’t let anybody get any screwy ideas that we’ve got the job done already.”
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By D-Day plus five Eisenhower had pressures on him from his front and rear. In Algiers, despite their agreement, Darlan and Giraud were still bickering. Clark had gotten about as much out of the French as he was capable of getting, and so far that had not included co-operation at Tunisia or the French fleet. In London, the CCS were displaying a disturbing lack of understanding. But in London Eisenhower had Smith, who could handle things there. He decided to go to Algiers and see what could be done. On the morning of November 13 he climbed into a B-17 and set out for Algiers and a meeting with Darlan.

Eisenhower went to Algiers to ratify the deal that Clark and Murphy had made with Darlan, to try to get Darlan to save the French fleet, and to see what could be done in Tunisia. The deal was a simple military pact written to suit the convenience of the conqueror. It confirmed Darlan as the chief administrative officer in North Africa but denied him the status of political recognition.

All Eisenhower had to do was say no and the deal was dissolved. American and British troops now held the key points in Algiers, Oran, and Casablanca. Darlan could have complained about a double-cross, but with his record as a collaborationist and former member of the Nazi New Order he would not have received a sympathetic hearing. There were plenty of experienced colonial administrators among the Gaullists in London who would have been delighted to come to Algiers and take up the reins of government.

Eisenhower, however, probably never even considered dumping Darlan. Murphy and Clark felt that the admiral was a man you could do business with, and there was still the French fleet at Toulon to consider. Roosevelt wanted Eisenhower to get the French port of Dakar in French West Africa, which De Gaulle had unsuccessfully assaulted earlier in the war. Darlan was the man who could deliver it. Murphy insisted that only Darlan and the Vichy-appointed officials in Algiers could keep order among the Arabs, and Eisenhower had to have a secure rear for his drive on Tunis. Most important of all, Eisenhower had no real sense of what the political reaction in the United States and the United Kingdom would be to a deal with Darlan. He expected some complaints but thought that as long as Darlan delivered the goods the deal would
be accepted on the grounds of military necessity.
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Murphy agreed. The basic factor in the Darlan deal was political naïveté. Eisenhower could not comprehend the depth of feeling against men like Darlan, just as he was incapable of understanding the motives of French Army officers.

On the morning of November 13, when Eisenhower and Cunningham flew to Algiers, Clark met them at the airport and took them to his headquarters at the Hotel St. Georges. Eisenhower immediately went into session with Clark and his staff. Murphy arrived “somewhat breathless,” carrying a copy of the Clark-Darlan agreement. It was a conqueror’s dictate, giving the Allies control and command of airports, harbor and port defenses, fortifications, and so on, with wide emergency powers in case the internal situation threatened disorder. But there was much in it for Darlan. The French armed forces would remain intact under French command, and the Vichy administration remained. Nothing in the agreement even hinted that the French would be required to expunge the Fascist elements in the governmental structure. The Americans agreed to distribute food supplies in Algeria.

The agreement would not go into effect until Eisenhower gave it his approval. He looked to Murphy for political guidance, but all Murphy could say was, “The whole matter has now become a military one. You will have to give the final answer.” Years later Eisenhower remembered, “While we were reaching a final decision he stepped entirely aside except to act upon occasion as interpreter. It was squarely up to me.…”

As Eisenhower saw it, the local French officials who would retain their offices were still members of a neutral country and unless the United States and U.K. chose to declare war on France “we have no legal or other right arbitrarily to establish … a puppet government of our own choosing.”
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This after-the-fact reasoning, however, did not coincide with the Allies’ attitude less than a week earlier, when Eisenhower had been quite willing to impose Giraud on the French administration, nor with Roosevelt’s intentions.

One of the things that Clark and Murphy impressed upon Eisenhower was the need to keep order in Algeria. Only the established officials could do that, they insisted. Like American Southerns dealing with Negroes, they argued that only French colonial officers knew how to
“handle” the Arabs. The Allies had hoped to use men like Mast and Béthouart, but the French Army would not co-operate with them because they had been “traitors” and helped the Americans ashore. Mast was in hiding, afraid of being shot, while Noguès had thrown Béthouart in jail. Eisenhower could not consider using De Gaulle’s followers because Roosevelt would not have allowed it. It had to be Darlan.

At 2
P.M
. Darlan, Giraud, Noguès, and Juin came to the St. Georges to meet with Eisenhower. Through his interpreter, Colonel Holmes, Eisenhower told them that he accepted the Clark-Darlan agreement and would “acknowledge” Darlan as the chief civil official in North Africa. He emphasized that he was representing Great Britain and the United States. Eisenhower demanded one thing: signing the agreement meant that the French would attack the Germans. Darlan replied, saying he accepted the agreement and would respect it “scrupulously.” He “heartily” agreed with the objective of beating Germany, but offered an additional objective—the reconstruction of France. Eisenhower endorsed the objective but reminded the French that they would have to “get in and pitch.”
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The diplomatic niceties over, the gentlemen repaired to lunch. The Darlan deal had been made.

After lunch Eisenhower flew back to Gibraltar, arriving around 7
P.M
. He sent a message to Smith, asking him to tell the CCS that he had reached an agreement incorporating Darlan, Kingpin, Noguès, and others but warning Smith to caution the Chiefs to release no publicity on the agreement. The reason was that Giraud’s name had to be withheld. It turned out that he was so unpopular among the French officers that it would be unwise to let them know that Giraud was their new commander.
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Eisenhower’s report raised the first storm over the Darlan deal. The British were thunderstruck. Darlan represented everything they had been struggling against for three years, and in many cases even longer. Darlan epitomized the spirit of Munich and stood first among the Frenchmen who had deserted the British in 1940. “Is this then what we are fighting for?” Churchill’s friends, those who had stood with him at the time of Munich and after, asked him.
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Beyond the moral question, the deal raised practical questions for the British. They had agreed to ignore De Gaulle in TORCH, but only with Giraud, who had no Vichy connections, as the French leader. Churchill felt he could sell Giraud to De Gaulle but knew he could never get De Gaulle to co-operate with Darlan, who had even outdone Pétain in denouncing the Free French leader.
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