Authors: Stephen E. Ambrose
Supreme Commander (16 page)
Eisenhower was growing weary of the debate. After sending his message off to Marshall, he told Butcher that as he engaged in the frequent exchanges of messages he felt as if he was “in a transatlantic essay contest.”
39
The British were willing to give Eisenhower Casablanca if
King would provide the ships, but King would not. Marshall would not accept Algiers without Casablanca, while the British saw no point to the operation without Algiers. Eisenhower tended to side with the British, but without CCS agreement nothing could be done. It was like July and SLEDGEHAMMER versus TORCH all over again, and once again it was necessary for the heads of government to step in.
Churchill returned from Moscow on August 25. Eisenhower and Clark dined with him, and he talked all night. Eisenhower reported to Marshall that the “Former Naval Person feels completely committed to launching TORCH at the earliest possible date, on as grand a scale as possible and with ambitious objectives.”
40
When Churchill felt strongly about something, few could resist him. He was an impressive sight, with his jutting chin, round shoulders, and fat cigar. With his cherubic face and bulldog head he was capable of portraying grumpiness incarnate. He was a great talker, able to switch moods instantly, crying one minute, laughing the next, engaging in a tirade immediately afterward. The Prime Minister was an accomplished actor who enhanced his ability to persuade through his thorough knowledge of the facts of a situation. He also never gave up. When the “Prime” got an idea into his head, he would argue for it until everyone with whom he came into contact was heartily sick of the subject. When his fertile imagination developed a new scheme and his professional subordinates did not immediately embrace it, he could be a most irritating person. He was well versed on military affairs, considered himself to be a military expert, and refused to accept the conclusions of his soldiers. He therefore meddled in every plan and operation of the war. He also would use whatever tools he could find to get his way. He knew that Eisenhower admired and liked him, and he never hesitated to use that knowledge to bring Eisenhower around when they had an argument. On the other hand the BCOS knew how Churchill felt about Eisenhower, so when they could not argue Churchill out of a project they would appeal to Eisenhower for help.
The two men had a number of violent disagreements during the war, but their friendship was never affected. Eisenhower later paid tribute to Churchill’s ability to forget the arguments once a decision had been reached: “… in countless ways he could have made my task a harder one had he been anything less than big, and I shall always owe him an immeasurable debt of gratitude for his unfailing courtesy and zealous support, regardless of his dislike of some important decisions.”
41
Churchill’s hours were strange and all those who served with him had
to adjust. His day began late and ended in the small hours. The evening Eisenhower and Clark dined with him they talked about TORCH, and all the back-and-forth planning that had gone on, well past midnight. Churchill snorted that it was ridiculous to think that Franco would enter the war and said the Americans were making too much of the Spanish threat. Eisenhower agreed with him.
42
Churchill suddenly decided, around 1
A.M
., that he had to talk to Pound and Mountbatten, so he called them in for the conference. When they arrived, rubbing their eyes, he told them to cut down the time element in preparing the British contingent for TORCH so that it could go by mid-October. Shaking his finger at Pound, he said the Royal Navy would have to bring back to England “every available piece of equipment.” Since the U. S. Navy was so heavily engaged in the Pacific, he told Pound, he was perfectly willing to strip the Indian Ocean to give Eisenhower more escort vessels. Turning to Eisenhower, he said that if necessary he would fly to Washington to convince Roosevelt and Marshall of the need to get TORCH moving. He wanted it started by October 15, and wanted Eisenhower to go beyond the August 21 plan and land as far east as Philippeville. The next morning Eisenhower summed up the results of the meeting for Marshall, then added in an understatement, “He is putting his tremendous energies and enthusiasm behind the project.…”
43
Churchill began to take over. He fired off messages to Roosevelt, telling him what he wanted, summoned his service chiefs to his side to tell them what to do, and had Eisenhower join him often for conferences. On Friday, August 28, he had Eisenhower and Clark come to his country estate at Chequers for the weekend. On Saturday morning Churchill told Eisenhower that he was willing to drop the attacks against Bone and Philippeville, but said that the British would “go it alone” at Algiers if necessary.
44
While Eisenhower was at Chequers, an aide delivered to him a cable from Marshall. Tearing it open, Eisenhower learned that Roosevelt, as a result of his exchange of views with Churchill, was going to propose that landings be made at Oran and Casablanca only. Eisenhower had Clark put the staff to work on that proposal; Clark commented that “this football team of planners must be dizzy trying to follow all the signals for the play called by the several quarterbacks.”
45
Roosevelt did not send his proposal to Churchill until August 31; upon receiving it the Prime Minister immediately called Eisenhower and Clark to a conference. He told the Americans that it was a mistake to put half the strength of the operation onto a coast where the surf might make
it impossible to land and that he was seriously concerned with the omission of Algiers. As a counter, he was interested in eliminating the Bone and Philippeville attacks, reducing the force at Casablanca, and making the two main American attacks against Algiers and Oran. Roosevelt had insisted that all the initial landings be American; Churchill thought the President was greatly exaggerating the French hostility toward the British but was willing to go along. Eisenhower, who by now was primarily engaged in passing on information, did give the War Department his own opinion, which was that “every possible chance of including Algiers in the first attack should be explored.” He was, however, convinced that this could be done only if the U.S. provided more ships.
46
As the heads of government worked out details and changed objectives and landing sites, Eisenhower confessed to Patton, “I feel like the lady in the circus that has to ride three horses with no very good idea of exactly where any one of the three is going to go.” He was in an irritable mood, he said, “because last night, when I hit the bed, I started thinking about some of these things all over again and at two-thirty I was still thinking.”
47
That evening, August 31, Eisenhower climbed into bed at ten-thirty and went right to sleep. At eleven the phone rang. Churchill’s secretary wanted to know if Eisenhower could come to 10 Downing later “that evening.” Eisenhower said he could and went back to sleep. An hour later the secretary called back, waking Eisenhower again to tell him he did not need to come around until the next morning.
48
On the morning of September 3, Butcher brought a message to Eisenhower, saying that it looked as if the British and Americans were getting together. Eisenhower took the message and grumbled, “There’ll be something impossible in it.”
49
The message was from Marshall. On September 1 Churchill had cabled Roosevelt, suggesting in effect a trade. He would agree to Casablanca if Roosevelt would add Algiers.
50
This set off a flurry of activity in the War Department. On September 2 Marshall cabled Eisenhower to say that the JCS had found that the U.S. could provide all the shipping and escort vessels needed for the Casablanca operation, while U. S. Navy ships already in the Atlantic could be used inside the Mediterranean.
Admiral King, in short, after standing up to Eisenhower, Marshall, Pound, and Churchill, had yielded to Roosevelt’s pressure and found that he could, after all, spare a few ships. This broke the impasse and made three landings possible. Marshall said the President was going to propose to Churchill simultaneous landings at Algiers, Oran, and Casablanca. Churchill received the President’s suggestions that afternoon and called
Eisenhower and Clark to 10 Downing for a conference at 5
P.M
., where they worked out the details.
51
On the morning of September 5 Eisenhower attended a meeting of the BCOS. They agreed to accept Roosevelt’s proposal “without qualification.”
52
Churchill cabled Roosevelt, “We agree to the military layout as you propose it.” Roosevelt responded the same day with a one-word telegram, “Hurrah!” to which Churchill replied, “O.K., full blast.”
53
TORCH was finally settled. There would be three landings, at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers.
It had been a long time coming, and it left everybody a little shaken. No one seemed to trust anyone else, except at the very top. Later in the war the CCS would give Eisenhower as theater commander a directive that set an objective for him, then let him work out plans as he saw fit. In the spring of 1943, for example, they gave him the task of knocking Italy out of the war, leaving the decision on how to accomplish this (to invade Italy or not) up to Eisenhower. But that kind of confidence came only after the Chiefs had learned to trust him and, equally important, each other. During the essay contest the Chiefs had, for the second time in six weeks, reached an impasse. As with the decision for TORCH, they had been forced to throw up their hands and turn to the heads of government for solution. The CCS-theater commander system still was not working. The Allies had much to learn about making global war, but with the inside-outside debate finished, Eisenhower could go to work and begin the process of fighting Germans.
*
At the end of the war, when Eisenhower’s deputy, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, was going to Berlin, he needed a piece of information from Smith. Tedder sent an aide to get it. The aide found Smith in a conference with the British and American ambassadors to France but barged right in since Tedder was in a hurry. “What the hell do you want?” Smith shouted. The aide explained. Smith told him to clear out. The aide refused and said he must have the information. “You’re under arrest!” Smith yelled. The aide came to full and stiff attention and said that in any case he had to have the information. Smith relented, made a telephone call, got the information, and repeated it to the aide. He then returned to his conversation with the ambassadors, who had watched the exchange openmouthed. Looking up a few moments later, Smith noticed Tedder’s aide still standing at attention. “What the hell are you doing?” “I haven’t been released from arrest, sir.” “Get the hell out of here,” Smith bellowed. Interview with Eisenhower, December 7, 1965.
*
The daily planning sessions revealed more and more difficulties; one evening in the apartment Eisenhower told Butcher he wished someone would give him some good news. Among other things, the constant work meant a definite end to the social front. On August 10 Lady Astor phoned to invite Eisenhower to dinner. Her prize guest was to be George Bernard Shaw, and Butcher wanted very much to go. “To hell with it,” Eisenhower growled. “I’ve work to do.” Butcher,
My Three Years
, p.48.
Preparing the TORCH
“I liked him at once. He struck me as being completely sincere, straightforward and very modest. In those early days I rather had the impression that he was not very sure of himself; but who could wonder at that? He was in supreme command of one of the greatest amphibious operations of all time, and was working in a strange country with an Ally whose methods were largely unfamiliar. But as time went on Eisenhower grew quickly in stature and it was not long before one recognized him as the really great man he is—forceful, able, direct and far-seeing, with great charm of manner, and always with a rather naive wonder at attaining the high position in which he found himself.”
A
DMIRAL
C
UNNINGHAM
1
Dwight Eisenhower thought of himself as an apolitical being. He felt that he knew nothing about politics, did not like either the subject or its practitioners, had no political ambitions, and based all his decisions on military necessity. He was a straight-from-the-shoulder, single-minded soldier who especially abhorred the subtle niceties of international diplomacy and intrigue. Unfortunately for his personal desires, he would spend a large part of the war engaged in political and diplomatic activities and would be forced to make many political decisions. By 1945 he was as adept at politics as any professional diplomat, but he never learned to like it.
The diplomatic education of the soldier began with TORCH. The United States was preparing to invade the territory of a neutral nation without a declaration of war, and that was only the beginning of the complications. The Western Allies wanted what amounted to transit
rights in Algeria and Tunisia. They had no desire for territorial gain and did not want to make war against Vichy. Ideally, they would have preferred to take Pétain’s government into their confidence and make an alliance, but it was impossible for Vichy to join their cause because the Germans lived on Vichy’s doorstep. The Allies could hope for Pétain’s surreptitious support but nothing more.
Vichy was no ordinary government. Spawned in defeat, it lived at the sufferance of the Germans and had little popular support. It was Fascist in orientation by choice. Most of France’s colonial administrators and soldiers had remained loyal to it, but their commitment was less than complete. The Allies counted on being able to shake the colonies loose. To do that, they needed to produce a man around whom the French colonial army could rally. Here there were two alternatives—the British and Americans could support a high Vichy official who would defect to their side, or they could find a leading figure in France not associated with Vichy.