Supreme Commander (22 page)

Smith wired Eisenhower to tell him of the intensely hostile British
reaction. Eisenhower, probably for the first time, began to realize how far out he had stuck his neck. He had made a political blunder. Roosevelt could well disavow him and cancel the deal. Aside from the liberal uproar in the United Kingdom and the United States, there was the question of the Soviets. What would Stalin say? Within hours of its first combat operation of the war, the United States had made a deal with a German collaborator. Stalin might very well conclude that the Americans would do the same with Hitler when the opportunity presented itself, and were not to be trusted. Eisenhower had to convince the President, the Prime Minister, and Stalin that the deal was an absolute military necessity.

“Can well understand some bewilderment in London and Washington with the turn that negotiations with French North Africans have taken,” Eisenhower wired the CCS on the morning of November 14. “The actual state of existing sentiment here does not repeat not agree even remotely with some of prior calculations,” he explained. “The following salient facts are pertinent and it is extremely important that no repeat no precipitate action at home upset such equilibrium as we have been able to establish.”

The first fact about life in North Africa was that “the name of Marshal Pétain is something to conjure with.…” All French officials tried to create the impression that they lived and acted “under the shadow of the Marshal’s figure.” The second fact was that all Frenchmen agreed that only one man had a right “to assume the Marshal’s mantle,” and “That man is Darlan.” The French initially resisted the Allied landings because they believed it to be the marshal’s wish; it ended when Darlan told the troops to stop fighting. The French would follow Darlan “but they are absolutely not repeat not willing to follow anyone else.”

The Allied hope of an early conquest of Tunisia could not possibly be realized unless the governments in London and Washington accepted the Darlan deal. “The Kingpin is now so fully aware of his inability to do anything by himself, even with Allied moral and military support, that he has cheerfully accepted the post of military chief in the Darlan group,” and Giraud agreed that his own name should not be mentioned for several days. If the governments refused to accept the Darlan deal, the Allies would have to undertake a complete military occupation of North Africa. The cost in time and resources “would be tremendous.” In Morocco alone, Patton estimated it would take 60,000 troops to keep the tribes quiet.

Eisenhower assured the CCS that Giraud was “honest and will watch Darlan.” In addition Murphy, “who has done a grand job, will … practically live in Darlan’s pocket.” Eisenhower realized that “there may
be a feeling at home that we have been sold a bill of goods,” but he explained that the deal had been made only “after incessant examination of the important factors and with the determination to get on with military objectives against the Axis.…” Eisenhower said he was not attempting to extend the agreement beyond North Africa, which meant he had made no promises to Darlan about the eventual, post-liberation government of France. He pointed out that Darlan thought he could bring Dakar into the Allied camp and said that, after a talk with Cunningham, Darlan had sent an appeal to the French fleet at Toulon to come to Algiers and join the Allies.

With the assistance of Cunningham, Clark, and Murphy, Eisenhower said, he had made what he considered to be the only possible workable arrangement. “I am certain that anyone who is not repeat not on the ground can have no clear appreciation of the complex currents of feeling and of prejudice that influence the situation.” Eisenhower said that if, after reading his message, the two governments were still dissatisfied, they should send British, American, and even Free French representatives to Algiers “where, in ten minutes, they can be convinced of the soundness of the moves we have made.”
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Upon receipt of Eisenhower’s message, the CCS sent it on to Roosevelt, who was at Hyde Park. Robert Sherwood, playwright and Office of War Information official, who was there, reported, “Roosevelt was deeply impressed by it and, as he read it with the same superb distribution of emphasis that he used in his public speeches, he sounded as if he were making an eloquent plea for Eisenhower before the bar of history.”
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Churchill too was impressed. Eisenhower had won the first round, but neither of the heads of government had yet decided to support him publicly.

After dictating his message to the CCS, Eisenhower sent one to Churchill. “Please be assured,” he told the Prime Minister, “that I have too often listened to your sage advice to be completely handcuffed and blindfolded by all of the slickers with which this part of the world is so thickly populated.”
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Eisenhower then sent another letter to Smith, asking him to impress upon the British the fact that the Allies were very weak in North Africa. Without French help, the situation would be impossible. Allied strength was building up, but “it will be a long time before we can get up on our high horse and tell everybody in the world to go to the devil!” He asked Smith to make sure that the “bosses” understood this.
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Reaction to the deal, meanwhile, grew in intensity. Neither Roosevelt nor Churchill had made any public statements in support of Eisenhower.
Under the circumstances, radio and newspaper commentators felt free to criticize. The most important of these was Edward R. Murrow, the CBS newsman based in London and perhaps the most respected commentator in the United States. Murrow blasted the deal. What the hell was this all about? he asked. Were we fighting Nazis or sleeping with them? Why this play with traitors? Didn’t we see that we could lose this war in winning it? De Gaulle’s supporters in New York were adding fuel to the flame. Wendell Willkie, Republican nominee for the presidency in 1940, denounced Darlan, and press comments became increasingly critical.
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Correspondents were beginning to filter into Morocco and Algeria and what they saw there did not make them likely to praise the deal. The vast population of underprivileged natives had no political rights, and Frenchmen continued to beat Arabs at the slightest provocation. The Jews were still persecuted. Communists, Jews, Spanish Republicans, and anti-Vichy political prisoners filled prisons and concentration camps. Fascist organizations were effectively bullying the population and carrying on their petty graft while all the Vichy-appointed officials, who had allowed this system to flourish for two years while they got rich, were still in office.
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The British found it difficult to reconcile themselves to the deal. On November 17 Churchill wired Roosevelt, “I ought to let you know that very deep currents of feeling are stirred by the arrangement with Darlan,” and said he was convinced it could “only be a temporary expedient justifiable solely by the stress of battle.”
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The same day the Foreign Office told the British Embassy in Washington that it might “well be that Darlan’s collaboration is indispensable for military reasons as an interim measure,” but his record was so odious that he could not be considered for the permanent head of the North African administration. “There is above all our own moral position,” the message concluded. “We are fighting for international decency and Darlan is the antithesis of this.”
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As the criticism of Eisenhower mounted,
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his friends began to rally to his defense. Admiral William D. Leahy, former ambassador to Vichy
and now the President’s Chief of Staff, told Roosevelt that it was necessary to give Eisenhower a free hand in the matter.
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The State Department had proposed that Roosevelt send Eisenhower a telegram ordering him not to retain Vichy officials “to whom well-founded objections might be taken.” Marshall realized that this was aimed at Darlan, and the Chief of Staff rushed to stop the cable. He pointed out to State that Darlan was “the man to whom General Eisenhower must look for immediate results in the Tunisian operation and the matter of the French fleet,” and asked that the message be withdrawn. State reluctantly agreed.
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Secretary Stimson did more. He barged into the White House and told Roosevelt that he, as President, absolutely had to speak out in Eisenhower’s defense. Roosevelt’s tendency was to say nothing—he had never publicly defended his Vichy policy, despite intense criticism, and saw no reason to act now. He tried to joke his way out of the mess by telling Hull that his idea of a solution would be to put Darlan, Giraud, and De Gaulle in one room by themselves “and then give the government … to the man who came out.”
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But Marshall joined Stimson in demanding action and so did two of the President’s close advisers, Samuel I. Rosenman and Harry Hopkins. Even Churchill added his voice.

The President gave in. He asked an OWI official who happened to be the Allied commander in chief’s younger brother, Milton Eisenhower, to draft a statement. Roosevelt changed the draft extensively—to Milton Eisenhower’s disgust, he used the word “temporary” to the point of redundancy
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—and issued it at his regular press conference on November 18. Roosevelt said he had accepted Eisenhower’s political assignments in North Africa but that he did so only as “a temporary expedient, justified solely by the stress of battle.” The purpose of the “temporary assignment” was to save American, British, and French lives and to provide time by making unneccessary a mopping-up period in Algeria. The United Nations, Roosevelt insisted, would never make a “permanent arrangement” with Darlan. He then stated his basic French policy. “The future French Government will be established, not by any individual in Metropolitan France or overseas, but by the French people themselves after they have been set free by the victory of the United Nations.”
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The most immediate result of Roosevelt’s statement was a note from Darlan to Clark. The tiny admiral was hurt. Mustering what dignity he could, he declared, “Information coming from various parts tends to give credit to the opinion that ‘I am but a lemon which the Americans will
drop after it is crushed.’ ” Darlan explained that he had acted “neither through pride, nor ambition nor intrigue, but because the place I held in my country made it my duty to act.” He claimed that only around his name could French North Africa rally and said it would be better for the Americans if they did not create the impression that his authority was temporary.
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Marshall continued to smooth things over in the United States. In order to give some positive weight to the claim that the deal was a military necessity, Marshall asked Eisenhower for permission to release the casualty figures for the assault. Eisenhower agreed. The Americans had lost 1800 men. Planning estimates had declared that the loss might go as high as 18,000, so the Darlan deal had the theoretical advantage of saving 16,200 American casualties, and Marshall emphasized this to the press. He also called a press conference, and, according to one reporter who was there and who had attended a number of Marshall’s conferences, “I have never seen him so concerned as he was on this occasion.” Marshall told the press they were incredibly stupid if they did not see what the outcome of their expression of shock and amazement at the deal would be. Press criticism would play into the hands of the British, who would demand Eisenhower’s replacement by a Britisher, and American leadership of an Allied expedition would have such a black eye that there would be great difficulty in getting an American into such an enviable position again. So, Marshall concluded, the press was criticizing American leadership which, if successful, would put the United States into a position of world prestige beyond anything the country had previously enjoyed. As a result of the conference a number of American newspapers refused to print critical statements coming from De Gaulle and from his Washington representatives.
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The political turmoil was beginning to wear Eisenhower down. He confessed to Marshall that he was feeling the strain and had an acute urge to play hooky for a couple of days.
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A little later, after a trip in an armored Cadillac to the front to check with Anderson on the offensive, Eisenhower got a miserable cold complicated by severe diarrhea. He spent a day in bed, reading messages and dictating replies.

Dictating messages was, in fact, practically his sole occupation. He received directives, advice, and queries from Marshall, the CCS, Roosevelt, and Churchill, and had to answer them all. Since Roosevelt chose to ignore the State Department, Eisenhower became in effect the ambassador to French North Africa and had to handle all the responsibilities involved. He also had to communicate with Churchill and
the BCOS. Smith’s presence in London was a great help, for Eisenhower could send candid messages to his chief of staff and let Smith then explain the position to the British, but frequently Smith’s statements were not enough to satisfy the Prime Minister and Eisenhower had to communicate directly with him. In addition, Eisenhower sent Marshall two, sometimes more, messages a day. The result of all this was an enormous volume of correspondence.

Most of it concerned the Darlan deal. “I regret that I must use so much of my own time to keep explaining these matters,” Eisenhower told Smith. He was also irritated at the seemingly rampant attitude that he was a naïve soldier who was being taken in by shrewd politicians like Darlan. He said he could not understand how anyone could think he was being used by Darlan “or why it should be thought I fail to realize crookedness or intense unpopularity of Darlan.”
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In a later message to Smith the same day, November 18, Eisenhower said he was now turning his entire attention to the military campaign for Tunisia. When he had captured it, he said, Churchill “can kick me in the pants and put in a politician here who is as big a crook as the chief local skunk.”
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Eisenhower’s hopes of concentrating on soldiering, however, could not be realized. When he arose the next morning he found a message from Marshall. The State Department wanted to know exactly what Darlan’s position was and Eisenhower had to send another lengthy cable to Washington.
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