Supreme Commander (28 page)

Eisenhower would never allow himself to be made into the chairman of the corporation, the man who maintained contact with the outside world while letting a board composed of Cunningham, Alexander, and Tedder run the show. The British wanted him to deal with the French and the U. S. War Department, while turning operations over to a committee of British generals and admirals. It would have been easy enough for Eisenhower to accept that role, to spend the war pacifying Giraud and De Gaulle, entertaining visiting dignitaries, holding press conferences, and announcing victories. But he was convinced that the British system was inadequate to the demands of modern war, that whatever decisions had to be made the Supreme Commander should make, freely, “under the principle of unified command.” He promised Marshall, “I will be
constantly on my guard to prevent any important military venture depending for its control and direction upon the ‘committee’ system of command.”

Eisenhower’s personality reinforced his organizational views. As long as he was
supposed
to be the commander, he was determined to
be
the commander. “Manifestly, responsibility … falls directly on me,” he said.
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If the British wanted to change the system, let them do so openly, not through the back door. He, meanwhile, intended to act like a Supreme Commander. The structure that emerged from Casablanca seemed to him adequate and even logical. He would work through the existing structure—always making sure that directives like those of January 20 and 22 were resisted—and through the power of his personality see to it that Cunningham, Tedder, and Alexander recognized him for what he was, the Supreme Commander.

Eisenhower spent only one day at Casablanca. On January 16 he returned to Algiers and the more mundane problems of the battle in Tunisia. The next day Von Arnim launched an attack against the undermanned French sector, near Pichon. After heavy fighting the Germans secured numerous penetrations. On the eighteenth Eisenhower went to his advance command post at Constantine, moved reinforcements into the French sector, and ordered parts of the U. S. 1st and 34th Divisions into the line to relieve the French. He also reviewed with Juin, Fredendall, and Anderson the developments at Casablanca.
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When he returned to Algiers, Eisenhower wrote a memorandum for the AFHQ G-3, covering the results of his talks with the battlefield commanders. He wanted to know when AFHQ could get more tanks to Anderson, how much equipment could be gotten to the French and when, what was being done to improve the line of communication, when a mobile reserve could be established “so that a minor attack by Bosche” would be stopped, what was being done to co-ordinate air and artillery activity, and so on. To his G-3, Eisenhower wrote, “Supplies: Let’s pile them in—dispersed but handy. When we start we want to go to town.” He thought the use of camouflage had been “sadly neglected,” and concluded: “
Alertness
by
ALL
troops: We must
STRESS
this,” and “
TRAINING
—all the time—all the time!!”
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Nothing could be done immediately, and the French continued to reel under German armored blows. On January 21 Eisenhower made another quick trip to Constantine. He decided that with their inadequate equipment the French would never be able to stop the Germans. The only
solution was to phase them out of the line by having Fredendall move north and Anderson south until the British and Americans had a common border. After spelling out the details of the necessary movements, he put Anderson in charge of the whole front.
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On January 24 Marshall, King, and Somervell came to Algiers to see for themselves America’s largest overseas base. Somervell brought with him the best possible news—he had five thousand trucks which he could ship to North Africa if King could provide a convoy for them. King said he could, and the gears began to grind back in the War and Navy Departments in Washington. Within three weeks the first trucks began to arrive. When the last one had been shipped, one of Somervell’s assistants at SOS cabled the news to Eisenhower. In a final sentence that summed up the amount of work involved, he declared, “If you should happen to want the Pentagon shipped over there, please try to give us about a week’s notice.”
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Marshall’s visit went well. He was glad to see and talk with Eisenhower, delighted at getting out of Washington, and anxious to see his men. Marshall had been slaving at building the U. S. Army since 1939, but this was his first opportunity to see it in the field facing the enemy. He flew to the front, then returned to spend the night in Algiers, where he and Eisenhower discussed command arrangements, strategy, and the performance of the American soldier. Marshall asked Eisenhower to have a talk with Clark and see what could be done about toning down Clark’s ambition. He also mentioned that he was putting Eisenhower in for a fourth star. Butcher noted that Marshall’s “whole attitude toward Ike was almost that of father to son.” The Chief told Butcher to see to it that Eisenhower got more rest, had a masseur who would give him a rubdown every evening, and got some horseback riding for exercise. “He may think he has had troubles so far, including Darlan,” Marshall said, “but he will have so many before this war is over that Darlan will be nothing.”
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When Butcher produced a masseur soon after, Eisenhower protested that he had no time for such nonsense. Butcher said he was acting under orders, so Eisenhower, grumbling, submitted to one rubdown. He then fired the masseur. He did let Butcher acquire a villa for him fifteen miles outside Algiers, a secluded place which overlooked the sea and provided access to a wooded area. A British officer obtained three Arab stallions for Eisenhower, and he went riding frequently.
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Shortly after Marshall left, Churchill, Brooke, and entourage arrived. The Prime Minister had been flying all over North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean. He had been to Cairo, then on to Turkey, where he talked with the Turks in an effort to induce them to enter the war (this
will-of-the-wisp continued until 1945, but the Turks’ price, equipment for over forty divisions, was always too high), returned to Cairo and then on to Tripoli, where he reviewed the Eighth Army.

On February 5 Churchill came to Algiers. Eisenhower had a luncheon for him, with all the leading French, British, and American personalities in the theater present. In the evening Eisenhower, Cunningham, and Churchill had dinner together. Eisenhower thought that finished his obligation, but to his dismay the Prime Minister announced that he was so pleased with the sunshine and comfortable quarters that he had decided to stay overnight. Rumors of possible assassinations abounded in Algiers, and Eisenhower did not like the responsibility.

Churchill rested and talked the next day. That evening he was supposed to fly to Gibraltar, but when he got to the airport a magneto failed on one of his motors and he had to stay yet another day. One of Eisenhower’s staff officers suspected that Churchill liked quiet, peaceful Algiers so much that he had sent one of his aides out to the airport to remove the magneto wire. On the morning of the seventh, Butcher had wakened Eisenhower to tell him the Prime Minister was still in Algiers; throwing on his clothes, Eisenhower hurried over to Cunningham’s villa to entertain the unwelcome guest. Churchill shut off the storm of protests Eisenhower raised at his remaining in Algiers by filling Eisenhower with praise. He told the general to take care of himself, that he was doing a magnificent job, that there was no one in sight who could possibly replace him except Marshall, and Marshall was needed in Washington.

Eisenhower let him run on for an hour or so. Finally the general exclaimed that, while the Prime Minister was worth two armies to the Allies when he was in London, when he was in Algiers or any other unsafe place he was just a liability. Churchill liked that. He left at noon on a happy note.
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With Churchill’s departure the last of the Casablanca visitors was gone. Eisenhower was pleased with the results. His theater would remain the center of Allied activity. With the inclusion of the Middle Eastern forces, his command would be a large one. He had Cunningham, Tedder, and Alexander under him and was confident he could work out the command structure to his satisfaction. On the Tunisian front, his forces were building. The trucks Somervell was delivering would be a great help. His talks with Marshall, Roosevelt, and Churchill had all gone well and he felt he had solid support at home, the best evidence being Marshall’s promise of a fourth star. At Casablanca De Gaulle and Giraud had taken the first step toward getting together. January had been a good month.

War is many things, but to those who fight it is above all a learning experience. Professional soldiers cannot practice their trade in peacetime and war games are at best a poor substitute for active combat. Many soldiers feel that they can learn or teach more in one week of combat than in months of training. The process was called “blooding” the troops. It sounded harsh, but the officers who used the phrase realized that until their men had been blooded they could not fight the Wehrmacht on equal terms.

The Battle of Kasserine Pass matched veterans against neophytes. Since the German veterans had local numerical superiority, an American defeat was almost inevitable. The real problem, before and during the battle, was whether or not the Americans could prevent a tactical defeat from turning into a strategic disaster. In this they succeeded. The problem after the battle was whether or not they could learn from their mistakes. From the top to the bottom, from Eisenhower to the lowest G.I., they did. The Army—and its leader—that emerged from Kasserine was far superior to the one that went into the battle.

For Eisenhower, there was an element of frustration about the battle, for he could sense it coming and foresaw some of the results, but he could do little or nothing about it. While Rommel was moving into Tunisia, Montgomery was pausing at Tripoli to repair the port. He was a week or so behind the Germans and in the pursuit from El Alamein had failed to hurt Rommel significantly. With a prepared position waiting for him at the Mareth Line, Rommel could afford to combine his forces with Von Arnim in Tunis and strike out against Eisenhower’s forces.

“I anticipate that the enemy will continue to make a series of limited attacks in Tunisia,” Eisenhower told the CCS in early February. The
Germans’ aim was to widen the bridgehead. Eisenhower ordered Anderson to concentrate his mobile forces in the south so that he could “counter any enemy move immediately,” but this was difficult because of the lack of transportation, both to get the troops near the front and to support them once there.
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On February 2 Eisenhower flew to one of his small forward airfields to have a conference with Anderson. Both men were worried because the line was thin everywhere. The major immediate threat was that the Germans would break through the passes of the Eastern Dorsal and get into the rear of the British and American forces. Eastern Tunisia is divided into two parts by the Eastern and Western Dorsals of the Atlas Mountains, which form an inverted “V” running southwest from Tunis. Eisenhower’s forces were along the line of the Eastern Dorsal; in the plain between the two dorsals the Allies had supply bases and forward airfields. If the Germans could push through the passes of the Eastern Dorsal they could raise havoc in the central plain. If they could then move through the passes of the Western Dorsal, of which Kasserine was one, they could conceivably continue right on to Bône or even Algiers itself, cutting off the entire British First Army.

Von Arnim was not thinking in such ambitious terms. His attacks against the French, which had gained him the Eastern Dorsal passes at Fondouk and Faid, were designed to gain room, not to destroy the enemy. He only wanted to make sure that the Allies could not use the passes to descend on his flank or to break through to the Gulf of Gabès or Sousse and cut him off from Rommel. With Rommel moving into Tunisia, however, the Germans might be tempted to try something bigger than limited, spoiling attacks against the French.

Eisenhower was also fearful that Fredendall would strike out against the enemy and get himself and his men into a tenuous position. On February 4 Eisenhower cautioned him not to get too involved with the Germans, especially since he was not sure the American troops could handle the Wehrmacht yet. “I particularly would like to avoid, during the coming weeks, the joining of battle on terms that will result in a bitter and indecisive fight,” Eisenhower said. “My motto is to take a regiment to whip a squad, if you can get the regiment together.”

Although Eisenhower had told Marshall that he was generally satisfied with Fredendall, certain characteristics about the general bothered him. Fredendall had made some pointed cracks about the British, something Eisenhower would never stand for in his command. He warned Fredendall that “our Allies have got to be partners and not people that we view
with suspicion and doubt” and reminded him that so far the Americans had done nothing to brag about. He asked Fredendall to so conduct II Corps operations “as to enhance the reputation of the American Army with the British … and create in them a confidence in our armed forces that will have a beneficial effect throughout the remainder of the war.”
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Another disturbing feature about Fredendall’s behavior was his excessive concern with the safety of his command post. American doctrine was to place command posts near crossroads and close enough to the front so that visits back and forth would be convenient. Near Tebessa, however, Fredendall had placed his command post miles to the rear and far up a canyon in a gulch that could be entered only by a narrow, twisting road constructed by his corps engineers. Down between towering mountains he had dug or blasted underground shelters for himself and his staff. Two hundred engineers worked at the project for three weeks. “Most American officers who saw this command post for the first time,” an observer later wrote, “were somewhat embarrassed, and their comments were usually caustic.”
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Fredendall rarely left it. When Eisenhower paid a visit he asked an engineer who was working on a tunnel if he had first assisted in preparing front-line defenses. A young II Corps staff officer accompanying Eisenhower spoke up: “Oh, the divisions have their own engineers for that!”
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