Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World (12 page)

Nazi diplomacy continued to balance support for Italy with appeals to the Arabs and Muslims who opposed another European colonial endeavor in the region.' On February 4,1941, Ernst Woermann, then director of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry, noted that Foreign Minister Ribbentrop continued to defer to Italy in Middle Eastern policy, although in "appropriate instances" Germany would "take the initiative." Taking the initiative in this context meant making stronger efforts to court Arab and Muslim collaborators. Along these lines, the foreign minister supported both delivery of arms to the regime in Iraq through any routes other than through the Soviet Union and continued financial contributions to the Muftis The military leadership was also reconsidering the policy of deferring to the Italians. On February 5, 1941, General Wilhelm Keitel, chief of High Command of the Wehrmacht, wrote to the Foreign Ministry and suggested that the policy of giving Italy freedom of action in the Mediterranean be reconsidered because the Italians had expressed no interest in the emergence of independent Arab states. In Keitel's view, the time had come for Germany to take "quick and vigorous action ... to direct the future political activity in the Middle East." Doing so required "our recognition of the independence of Arabia as a war aim of the Axis. We are in a favorable position insofar as we need not promise the Arabs a merely `tolerable' solution of the Jewish question in Palestine but can with a good conscience make the Arabs any concession in this field."6 By February 1942, following Hitler's various decisions of fall 1941 regarding the launching of the Final Solution, and then con veyed to the relevant German officials at the Wannsee Conference in January 1942, Keitel's "good conscience" and willingness to make "any concession" on the Jewish issue actually meant supporting massive violence against Jews in the region. His views reflected the German military leadership's support for Hitler's anti-Jewish policies in Europe, which had been apparent in the conduct of the German occupation in Poland since fall 1939.'

Woermann's "Memorandum on the Arab Question" of March 7 addressed the issue "with reference to our aim of achieving England's defeat." In view of the presence of British forces in the Middle East, "the Islamic idea of [holy war] is impracticable under the present grouping of powers." Therefore "questions touching Islam must be dealt with tactfully."8 Woermann underscored the area's geostrategic importance. The Suez Canal was vital for the British Empire. The region was a land bridge between Africa and India that made it possible to move Indian troops loyal to the British. England and the Soviet Union might join hands there. Of course, oil was an important factor. He concluded that "a decisive blow to the British Empire could be delivered in this area only through operations against Egypt and/or military occupation of the Arabian land bridge." In March 1941, however, except with use of the Luftwaffe, both areas were "beyond the effective range of the Axis powers at the present time."9 Though "certain contacts" in Egypt held out promise, the country was still under British influence. He listed King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, the Iraq government, and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem as potential partners. Expanded propaganda efforts would be "conducted mainly by radio broadcasts in the Arabic language, the exertion of influence on Arab newspapers and periodicals, [and] cultivation of personal relations with individuals." 10 German agents in the region would try to foment sabotage and anti-British uprisings. Woermann supported sending 400 light machine guns, 50 light tanks, to antiaircraft batteries, high explosives, antitank weapons, and 100,000 gas masks to Iraq, as well as an immediate payment of 100,000 reichsmarks for Husseini, who was then in Baghdad. Germany "will take greater initiative making due allowance for Italian sensibilities." Nevertheless, out of consideration to Italy, the Germans would not "at this time" make a public declaration in favor of a Greater Arab Federation.''

A month later, on April 8, State Secretary von Weizsacker replied to the letter of January 20,1941, which Husseini had sent to Hitler from Baghdad. The state secretary wrote that Hitler noted "with great interest and sympathy your statements about the national struggle of the Arabs" and sent "his regards and his thanks and best wishes for the continued success of the Arab cause." Germany had "no territorial aims in the Arab area." The German government recognized that "the Arabs, a people with an old civilization;' had "demonstrated their competence for administrative activity and their military virtue" and were thus "entirely capable of governing themselves." Germany "therefore recognized the complete independence of the Arab states, or where this has not yet been achieved, the claim to win it.... Germany and Arabs have common enemies in the English and the Jews and are united in the struggle against them." The Reich was "glad to cooperate in a friendly manner with the Arabs and, if they are forced to fight England in order to achieve their national aims, to grant them military and financial assistance in so far as is possible."2

On April 1, 1941, Rashid Ali Kilani led a pro-Axis coup that overthrew the Iraqi government of General Taha el-Hashimi. Haj Amin el-Husseini was deeply involved. The coup plotters included Yunis es-Sebawi, who had worked on an Arabic translation of Mein Kampf13 The Baghdad coup took place against the background of Axis military success in the Balkans: by May i German armies had occupied Yugoslavia and Greece. Control of Iraq was important for the outcome of the war in Europe because of the country's oil reserves and also because it was a transit point for troops from Australia, New Zealand, and India to North Africa. The British, aware of the close ties between Kilani and the Axis, landed troops in Basra with the intent of overthrowing his government. Kilani requested large amounts of military assistance from Germany and Italy (50 squadrons of planes, 50 light armored cars, 400 armor-piercing guns with 80,000 cartridges, 6o armor-piercing cannon with 6o,000 rounds, 10,000 hand grenades, 600 light machine guns, 84 Vickers machine guns, and 3 million bullets).' 4 On April 21,1941, Ribbentrop requested that Hitler decide if arms deliveries to the new Iraqi government should be started "if it appears that the Iraq government still has the will to resist" the English.'5

In the last week in April, the Iraqis tried and failed to prevent the landing of British troops in Basra. On May 2, British planes based at the Habbaniya air field began to bomb Iraqi soldiers who had encircled it. The Muslim clergy, urged on by Husseini, declared a jihad against the British. Though the Axis powers were heavily engaged in Europe, on May 3 Hitler agreed to send more aid to Kilani's government. Particularly in view of Italian setbacks in North Africa, success would deepen German ties to Arab nationalists inside and out side Iraq and perhaps encourage revolts against Britain in the region.16 German arms shipments to Iraq began in April and expanded in May. They included 30,000 rifles, 200 light machine guns, 6,000 machine pistols, rifle ammunition, and grenades.17 Hitler's Directive No. 30 of May 23 regarding the interaction of war, diplomacy, and propaganda in the Middle East stated, "The Arab liberation movement in the Middle East is our natural ally against Great Britain." The "rising in Iraq" had "special importance." It strengthened antiEnglish forces outside Iraq and hampered English communications and tied down British troops. Therefore he had decided "to advance developments in the Middle East by giving assistance to Iraq." The question of how England would be defeated "between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf" would be decided "only after Barbarossa," the invasion of the Soviet Union he planned to launch the following month. In the same directive, Hitler also stated that the Foreign Ministry would conduct propaganda in the region in collaboration with the High Command of the Wehrmacht and its propaganda arms. The core idea of German propaganda in the near term would be that an Axis victory would liberate the countries of the Middle East from "the English yoke and thus realize the right of self-determination. Whoever loves liberty will therefore join the front against England." But given the need to sustain Vichy France, propaganda against French positions in Syria "must be avoided." 18

By then, events in Iraq had taken a quite different direction. By mid-May, British planes had destroyed the Iraqi air force. A British motorized force left Haifa on May io and reached Baghdad on the thirtieth. On May 31 the Kilani government surrendered the city without resisting, and its leaders fled to Turkey and Iran.'9 Ambassador Grobba fled as well. The collapse of the Kilani government and Germany's failure to establish a foothold in the region was due in part to the overwhelming priority Hitler had given to the coming attack on the Soviet Union. The Germans lacked the military resources to simultaneously prepare for the invasion of Russia, prevail in Greece and Crete, and defeat the British in Iraq. German military aid in Iraq was too little and too late. The Iraqi military displayed low fighting ability. The initiative and determination of the new British prime minister, Winston Churchill, in ordering the armed intervention caught the Germans off guard. As Hirszowicz put it, "The rapid collapse of the anti-British movement in Iraq was, under the circumstances, an important success for the opponents of Nazism and Fascism everywhere."20 On June 8, the British army and Free French forces entered Syria from Iraq and Palestine, defeated the forces of Vichy France, and maintained a pro-British regime for the rest of the war. As a result of these setbacks, Nazi Germany's hopes for influencing the Arab and Muslim world turned to Rommel's tank forces in North Africa. Without a land base in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, or Iraq, shortwave Arabic-language radio broadcasting from stations in Germany and Italy would be the only way to reach a large, and still mostly illiterate, audience in the region.

On May 5, Gerhard Ruble, then director of the Department of Radio Policy in the Foreign Ministry, sent Ribbentrop an assessment of the prospects and tasks of German radio propaganda in the Arab region. Following the British victory in Iraq, opportunities were few there and in Saudi Arabia. In the other Arab countries outside Egypt, there was "sympathy for Germany and the reputation of the Fuhrer is high." Hence it was expected that broadcasting from official German radio would be effective. Given the British presence in Egypt and considerable Egyptian support for the British, Ruhle advocated that radio aimed there should be clandestine, should be presented as coming from an Egyptian station, and should make nationalist appeals for a revolt against the English. He reported that German Arabic-language radio broadcasts were currently going to Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Aden, the Gulf Emirates, and the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) in North Africa. The listening audience of radio owners were members of the "possessing classes," encompassing large landowners, merchants, government civil servants, and intellectuals. But German diplomats, intelligence agents, and "numerous Arabs" reported that German broadcasts "actually reach the whole population because the listeners immediately pass on their content." Broadcasts in Iraq and Syria were "quickly widely known" as a result of "strong interest in Germany and the fanatical admiration for the Fuhrer:' German radio broadcasts in Arabic had contributed to Iraq's resistance to English intervention. Ruble pointed to similar success of radio broadcasts in Palestine and Trans- jordan.2' "The sympathy for Germany in Egypt is smaller as is the resonance of our radio broadcasts. However, it is certain that the content of these broadcasts are generally known in the Egyptian cities.."" Nazi radio was currently broadcasting five shortwave programs from Berlin in Arabic every day, one in the morning and four in the evening, for a total of an hour and forty-five minutes a day.23

German radio broadcasts continued the themes begun in winter 1940-41 and included quotations from the Koran and abundant reports of British setbacks and German successes. Literary and historical topics evoked past Muslim glories and heroes. Ruhle was planning a series of lectures on religious themes "in which through propagating Islam, interest in the broadcasts will be increased." At the same time, "examples from the Koran will be presented to demonstrate the necessity of engagement for the fatherland and for resistance against foreign occupation." Phonograph music to expand interest in the broadcasts would also be used.24 Nazi broadcasts would call for an Arab revolt against the English, attack English "domination" in the Orient, recall England's "broken promises" to the Arabs, offer quotes from the Koran that called for struggle against oppressors, recite nationalist poetry calling for independence from foreign powers, and play nationalistic music. Ruble argued that German broadcasts should focus more on secular struggles for independence from Britain than on a strictly religious appeal. Proclamation of a holy war coming from a German radio broadcast would "have little effect"; despite the religiosity of the Arab lower and middle strata, such an approach would "not set the Arab area into motion." Among Arabs, nationalist goals of independence from British control were primary. Appeals by"outstanding Arab personalities," such as Amin el-Husseini, were "essential" to success of German Propaganda. 15 In reality, in the succeeding years, the line between secular and religious appeals became indistinguishable.

A memo from Hitler's headquarters to Ribbentrop's office of April 18,1941, dealing with Arabic-language clandestine broadcasts to Egypt underscored the link between war, diplomacy, and propaganda. The shortwave broadcasts should address the "young revolutionary Egyptian movement" and state their goal as being an "Egypt for the Egyptians." The target audience was of civil servants, Egyptian army officers, and young people and university students. The key themes should be: increased English influence since the beginning of the war; Egypt's economic "suffering"; domestic problems that were "harmed by the division of the population into different parties"; criticism of Egyptian politicians who support England and entry into the war; and general criticism of English presence in Egypt.26 The memo concluded that prospects for an anti-English revolt in Egypt could "take place only after revolts break out in the other countries and with a further advance of German troops. 1127 Propaganda would achieve its aims only in conjunction with military successes.