Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World (41 page)

In October, McBryde in Beirut reported that Nazi Arabic broadcasts continued to denounce Jews, Bolsheviks, British, Americans, and the French. "Moslem Nationalists" were urged, "purge your native lands of the microbe of Communism." Yet McBryde thought that the propaganda was producing "diminishing returns" as the tide of the war continued decisively against Germany. He observed two contradictory factors. On the one hand, there had been a "long-term conditioning of the Arab mind by deliberate German propaganda which has created an ingrained pre-disposition to favor Germany." On the other hand, he was impressed with "the profound degree to which the Arab mentality is impressed by show of force and strength in arms." The first trend nourished "established fears, suspicions and prejudices" to "poison Arab relations with the Allies" so that "intensive post-war educational effort will have to be made to remove many barriers." The second trend, however, produced "diminishing returns" for the Germans because "continued Allied successes and increasing Allied strength are showing the Arab which side his bread is buttered on ... and he is adjusting his thinking accordingly."92

In early December, Joseph Cassoun, another U.S. military intelligence officer working in Beirut, reached similar conclusions. He reported that the "tirades against Jews" continued, but that aside from celebrating the might of secret weapons, the "Germans no longer brag of military might but concentrate on economic and political propaganda." He thought both the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda and the size of its listening audience were declining as Germany's defeats multiplied. The most obvious trend in November had been "the reluctance of the Germans to discuss the military side of the war." Rather than boast about their strength and eventual victory, the German broadcasters were "emphasizing the Jewish threat to Arab unity" and "were trying to make the Arabs believe that the Jews intend (with the help of the Allies) to take over the entire Middle East." Like McBryde, Cassoun observed "a sharp decline in both numbers of listeners and the number of people who take much stock in what the Germans are trying to make them believe." They were less the topic of conversation than in previous months. Allied victories "and the reluctance of the Germans to discuss them is having the effect of debunking everything else that the Germans might say." With the unfortunate use of the singular noun to refer to a multitude of people, Cassoun concluded that "the Arab is like the sand on which he lives. He will follow the strongest wind."93

In World War II Arabs were hardly alone in following "the strongest wind." Themes of de-radicalization and disillusionment after the loss of the battle of Stalingrad figure prominently in historical scholarship about the Nazi regime.94 McBryde's and Cassoun's point about the impact of the course of the war on the degree to which Arabs and Muslims responded positively to Axis propaganda was one that the British and American ambassadors to Egypt, Miles Lampson and Alexander Kirk, had also made, albeit with more nuance and diplomacy. The key point was that the outcome of the battles was a decisive factor in the effectiveness of propaganda efforts of all the warring powers. An Axis victory at El Alamein might have set off an Arab and Muslim revolt against the Allies all over the Middle East at a time when American forces had not yet arrived in force. Yet for the hard core of its supporters in the Middle East, Nazi Germany's propaganda, even in retreat and then defeat, offered a way of thinking about politics and a set of predictions about the consequences of Allied victory that resonated with Arab and Islamic radicalism in the postwar period.

From the beginning of the war, British and then American diplomats in Cairo had their eye on the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin). It was at the center of their concern about pro-Axis fifth column activity. On February 25, the British Political Intelligence Centre Middle East (PICME) issued an extensive report about its goals. The Brotherhood wanted to establish a government based on pure Koranic principles and sought to counter reliance on Western culture, which it regarded as having brought about an "abasement of morals, conduct and character, for having increased the complexity of society and for having exposed the people to poverty and misery." It advocated a view of Islam that did not tolerate domination by people of other religions. It sought to rid Egypt of foreign influence. It also organized social, educational, and charitable work among Muslims in Egypt. The report was uncertain about the size of the membership, estimating it as between ioo,ooo and 500,ooo persons who came mostly from the working class; small towns; educated elements of the lower middle class, "especially schoolteachers" attracted by its ideals and social and educational work; and a small section of the student population.95

The Brotherhood's founder and leader, Hassan al-Banna, had "made a careful study of the Nazi and Fascist organizations. Using them as a model, he has formed organizations of specially trained and trusted men who correspond respectively to the Brown Shirts and Black Shirts (Hitler's bodyguard)." The organization claimed 50o branches in the country with groups of varying levels of commitment.96

As leader of the Brotherhood, al-Banna was in contact with the Egyptian political leader Ali Maher and with King Farouk and his palace advisers "almost from its inception." Farouk gave the organization "protection and financial help." An uneasy truce persisted during the war between the secular nationalist Wafd Party and al-Banna and the Brotherhood. In 1942, al-Banna declared loyalty to the government and the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. However, the PICME analysts thought that "his sincerity to either has yet to be proved.... The militant and xenophobic character of the Ikhwan and the fact that there are throughout Egypt a large number of arms that could be brought into use should feeling be sufficiently aroused make the Ikhwan a potential danger that cannot be discounted." Its weakness lay in the fact that Hassan al-Banna was both its only undisputed leader and "its only outstanding personality." Were he to be removed, the Ikhwan "in the absence of any successor of comparable driving force and inspiration, might easily crumble away. 1197

Two months later, J. E. Jacobs, the charge d'affaires of the American Embassy in Cairo, sent a report to Washington, "Fanatical Moslem Society: Ikhwan al-Muslemin (Moslem Brotherhood)," occasioned by a letter from al-Banna to the embassy protesting the American policy in Palestine. In his report, Jacobs noted that al-Banna was a graduate of Al-Azhar University and that the Brotherhood had politically prominent persons in Egypt who gave it protection and money, making low membership dues possible. He estimated membership at 75,000. Prominent members were associated with Al-Azhar University. Its danger lay in part in its "fanatical principles;" its aspiration to govern Egypt by Koranic law, and its antagonism to non-Muslim persons and culture. It also organized semimilitary groups; received training by retired army officers; and deployed an array of uniforms, green banners, and political songs that were reminiscent of the politics of mass mobilization in Europe. It had also opened branches in Sudan, in Nablus and Jaffa in Palestine, as well as in Damascus and Beirut. Its fundamental tendency was Pan-Islamic rather than pan-Arab. It opposed cooperation with Christians or Jews. The organization, Jacobs concluded, could become dangerous "in view of its fanatical religious character."98

American diplomats and intelligence officers, of course, also paid close attention to the views of political elites. Few reports were more stunning than one sent by Nils E. Lind, the attache of the American Legation in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, on October 30,1944. Its subject was "King Abdul Azis al Saud's Remarks about Jews," delivered two days earlier after a dinner in the king's palace in Riyadh. The king expressed appreciation for British and American help, hoped that his friendship with these "two strong friends" would continue, and thought Christianity and Islam had a great deal in common. It was a different story regarding the Jews. Lind reported that the king then said the following.

And now let me tell you a truth: it is the Jews who have always stirred up the religious differences between us. Where there was no difference the Jews created one. They are a dangerous and hostile race, making trouble wherever they exist. Why do you British and Americans love them and always take their side? I assure you that they are not your friends, but they are using you to further their own selfish aims. Wherever they go they make trouble and sow dissension and we Moslems are aware of their machinations and we hate them from the depths of our being. Our hatred of this sinful and evil race is growing day by day until our one ambition is to slay them all. Where we see them encroaching on us we Moslems will fight them and butcher them until we have driven them from our lands. Allah be praised we have no Jews in our kingdom and never shall we allow one Jew to enter it. Do you Americans and British think that if Hitler should offer the Jews terms that they would not rush to him? And if they believed Germany and Japan would win the war, that they would not leave you and join them?

Yes, I say, they have no love for you except as they can gain some advantage. That is why all we Arabs hate the Jews with loathing and we shall foster this hate in every Arab breast. I shall give you a parable that truthfully expresses the Jews.

Once, they say, all the animals could talk. A lion was chasing a snake and as the snake ran it shouted for help. A king on horseback happened to be riding by and the snake ran to him and cried out to be saved from the lion at its tail. "Save me, 0 king," it cried, "for I am weak against this beast." The king took the snake and put it in his bosom. "Please," the snake pleaded, "I am not safe in your bosom, put me in your mouth." So the king put the snake in his mouth. Then the snake asked, "Is my enemy gone and are you sure the lion cannot harm me now?" "He is gone and you are perfectly safe," the king replied. "Ha, ha," laughed the snake; "did you remember that you and I are deadly enemies? Now where do you wish me to sting you, on the roof of your mouth or below your tongue?" Do you get my point? King Abdul Azis asked us. There is no salvation for any of us unless we learn to hate this race as we ought. We have the experience of the ages and we are fools if we do not take warning. You may tell your government what I said, and may Allah grant that you will believe me before it is too late.

The King spoke these fiery words before all that crowd of fanatical Wahabi bedouin and his voice was loud and clear.99

American diplomats in the region and in the State Department in Washington now had compelling evidence of the depth of the king's hatred of the Jews. Franklin Roosevelt's famous meeting with Ibn Saud took place the following February. He too would have been informed about the king's charming fable about the lion, the snake, and king as well as about his "one ambition" to slay all the Jews. Unfortunately, this provincial, reactionary bigot was sitting on top of oil that the Allies needed to win the war and keep the world economy functioning in the postwar years. The Roosevelt administration, including the president himself, understood that a man like Ibn Saud was not one whose views of the Jews would be changed by a slap on the back or a heart-to-heart conversation with the president of the United States. TheAllies concluded that if they wanted the support or at least neutrality of men like Ibn Saud, it was best to say nothing about the Jews and certainly nothing in defense of what the monarch of Saudi Arabia called that "sinful and evil race."

In Washington, because of pressure from the State and War departments and the White House, the resolutions to lift restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine stalled in both the House and the Senate. In the summer of 1944, however, the Democratic and Republican parties both included similar resolutions in their party platforms in preparation for the fall elections. The Arab governments continued to inform American diplomats of their intense opposition to such a resolution. Roosevelt balanced the arguments of his diplomats with those coming from domestic politics. In a letter to Senator Wagner of October 15, the president wrote, "Efforts will be made to find appropriate ways and means of effectuating this policy," that is, lifting restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine, "as soon as practicable." He wrote that if reelected he "shall help to bring about" the realization of "Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth."' 00 This was far more than Wallace Murray, the director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs in the State Department, wanted to see. In a memo of October 27 to Undersecretary of State Edward R. Stet- tinius, he wrote that it was "difficult to see how recent developments," that is, the pressures in American politics to lift restrictions on Jewish immigration and support establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, could "be taken by the Arab countries as showing anything but a lack of good faith and an intention on the part of this Government not to carry out its previous commitments when political expedience dictates otherwise. Such an impression, if not speedily and completely counteracted, would seriously prejudice our ability to afford adequate protection to American interests in the Near East." American prestige had been declining in the region "as a result of recent pro-Zionist manifestations in this country" and would reach a new low if these efforts gathered steam. The American long-term economic interest in Saudi Arabia would "be seriously threatened or possibly jeopardized."101

On December 13, Edward R. Stettinius, the newly appointed secretary of state, wrote the president that pro-Zionist activity in the United States had given "rise to a wave of shocked disillusionment and protest in the Near East." If this domestic pressure continued, it would "seriously prejudice our ability to afford protection to American interests, economic and commercial, cultural and philanthropic, throughout the area." It would also weaken the American position in the region compared to that of Britain and the Soviet Union. Stet- tinius noted that Averill Harriman, the American ambassador in Moscow, was reporting that "Soviet Russia definitely opposes a Jewish state and is actively cultivating the goodwill of the fifty million Arabs."102 On December 23, Stet- tinius recommended that the president not take any action, namely, not voice support for establishment of a state because doing so "would endanger the war effort and jeopardize American interests in the area." Rather, the United States should not take a firm position about the future of Palestine before the war was over without consulting both Arabs and Jews.103 The State Department Arab experts understood correctly that opposition to increased Jewish immigration and to the establishment of a Jewish state was a widely and strongly held view among the leaders of Arab governments and that this sentiment extended well beyond those who supported the Axis. German propaganda was effective in part because it agreed with this much broader Arabic and Muslim consensus, to which it had made important contributions. American diplomats in the region articulated the views of this consensus as voiced by the leaders of the governments of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Syria. To the extent to which they either supported the Allied war effort or remained neutral, they did so in spite of American expressions of sympathy for Europe's persecuted Jews and Roosevelt's hints that he would support Zionist aims when the war was over. While anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism served as Nazism's points of entry to some Arab and Muslim hearts and minds, leading American diplomats from the region, as well as decision makers in Washington, were convinced that support for Jewish aspirations was a barrier to, not an entry point for, the Allied and American case.