Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World (14 page)

In spring 1941, the American understanding of the strategic importance of the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East for the outcome of the European war was in its early stages. Alexander C. Kirk, a key figure in that emerging understanding, arrived in Cairo in 1941 after having served two years as the charge d'affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Berlin, and on March 29 he took up his position as the head of the American Legation. With the upgrading of the representation to an embassy, he became the American ambassador to Egypt and served in that capacity until March 29,1944. Kirk took a close interest in Nazi efforts to influence politics in the region. On September 13,1941, he sent one of his first, if not the first, summary of Germany's Arabic-language broadcasts to the office of Secretary of State Cordell Hull in Washington.4s By April 1942, Kirk had organized a staff of native Arabic speakers, stenographers, and American translators whose task was to produce verbatim English transcripts of the Axis Arabic-language radio broadcasts to the Middle East. He sent these dispatches to Hull's office in the State Department in Washington every week until March 1944, and his successor, Pinkney Tuck, continued to do so until spring 1945. The resulting several thousand pages constitute the most complete record in any language of Nazi Germany's and Fascist Italy's broadcast efforts to spread their views to the Middle East during World War II.

In March 1944, Kirk submitted a detailed report summarizing the embassy's activities during the past three years. One of the most important of these was "political reporting." Cairo, he wrote, offered "unique and extensive" opportunities for political reporting on developments in Egypt and in the Near and Middle East in general. "It was," he wrote, "in Cairo that plans were laid for the defense of Egypt, the resistance of Yugoslavia and Greece, the conquest of Ethiopia and Italian East Africa, the occupation of Iran, the quelling of the Iraqi revolution, the rendering of Jibuti, the wresting of Syria from Vichy, the maintenance of order in Palestine; in Cairo centered the administration of occupied enemy territory, the organization of supply for the Middle East area, the planning of political warfare in the Balkans, the centralization of military intelligence, the planning of Allied propaganda and the myriad other functions incidental to modern total war." Cairo was "the cultural fountain head of Islam and the capital of by far the most important state in the Arab world" and thus the place where discussions about "so-called Arab unity" took place.49

Kirk observed that the embassy's political reporting about Axis efforts and local conditions had occurred in two phases. The first occurred "during the dark days when the fate of the vital Near and Middle East, as the bulwark between the European and Asiatic [i.e., Japan] segments of the Axis and the source of supply of vitally needed oil was hanging by a thread so slender that it was felt in many circles, and particularly, we had reason to believe in Washington, that defense was well nigh hopeless and that the sending here of urgently needed supplies would only result in prolonging a lost cause to the detriment of other important areas where the supply question was also critical." Convinced that "the least adverse effect that would result from the loss of this area would be a prolongation, perhaps of years, of the war, the one main objective to which the Legation bent its efforts until the final defeat of Rommel in the autumn of 1942 [actually spring 1943] was to endeavor by every means in its power to emphasize the importance of retaining control of the Near and Middle East and to do everything possible to that end by examining problems in their local aspects and making urgent suggestions and recommendations both to the Department and to American and British authorities." This was a period of "emergency with the accent on action rather than deliberation."

A second phase began in 1943 after the Axis military threat had passed and political activity of the prewar type returned. The embassy staff examined local political developments, Arab nationalism, developments in Sudan and in Palestine, Egypt's postwar ambitions, refugee problems, the status of foreigners in Egypt, Egyptian foreign relations, British policy in the Middle East as well as the "nature and effectiveness of Axis propaganda, particularly as carried on by broadcasts in Arabic."50 By late summer and fall 1941, Axis Arabic radio broadcasts had come to the attention of officials in the Bureau of Overseas Intelligence in the Overseas Branch of the United States Office of War Information (OWI).51 In a report of September 29,1941, Anne Fuller, an OWI analyst, wrote that German propaganda in Arabic was "mainly concerned with creating an atmosphere of distrust in regard to the British promises to the Arab world." It "constantly" voiced the view that "only a German victory" in the war would lead to Arab independence.S2 It attacked pro-Allied Arabs, such as Emir Abdullah of Transjordan and pro-Allied politicians in Egypt, as traitors to their countries and the Arab cause while celebrating "pro-Nazi Arabs, such as Rashid Ali al Gailani [sic]" as "heroes and patriots to the cause of Arab freedom." Furthermore, "Interwoven into every program is the `Jewish menace: The Zionist question provides the basic theme." Axis radio claimed that Jewish aims went beyond Palestine and that the Allies had promised Syria, Transjordan, and Iraq to the Zionists, that the "Jews of Iraq wish to control the entire country," and that "world Jewry" was "in league with Great Britain in instigating unrest [and] war in the Near East."53 However, "the strength of the Nazi broadcasts to the Near East lies as much in their announcer as in their subject matter. Unis [sic] Bahri, a young Iraqi, is the Arab Lord Haw-Haw. He has understood the Arabs' love for local information and the personal items. The programs are interspersed with reference to leaders, to contemporary writers, particularly to poets. The BBC itself admits the success of Bahri's technique and of late has been making definite attempts to imitate and if possible to outshine him."54

In this and other memos of fall 1941, Fuller discussed how the United States should respond to Nazi broadcasts. "The Zionist problem," she concluded, presented "the most difficulties in broadcasting to the Arab world." The Axis broadcasts focused on the Zionist issue and continually reported that the British planned to extend the boundaries of the Jewish national home and favored the Jews at the expense of the Arabs. The BBC, on the other hand, did not address the issue of Zionism; it left "the Axis powers with an important weapon with which to stir up discontent within the Arab world." Fuller advised that the United States should follow the BBC's policy and "make no mention of the thorny subject. Admittedly this is far from satisfactory. But until the precarious future of the Near and Middle East is better defined there seems no other course." 55 In another report, Fuller argued that American broadcasts stress growing American strength, concern with the welfare of countries in the Middle East, and confidence that the democracies would win the war. Further, Americans "must admit our own limitations. We do not have any great wealth of firsthand and fresh information of a local character in regard to the Near East." Hence American broadcasts should focus on American activities in the Middle East.56 Yet however reticent American or British officials may have been about discussing Zionism, Axis radio did all it could to identify the Allies with the Jews and with Zionist aspirations. Indeed, in her report of October 25,1941, on "Anti-American Propaganda in the Near East;" Fuller noted a trend to more anti-Americanism in Axis broadcasts. "For the most part," she wrote, "this propaganda is based on American support of Zionism; but more recently it has begun to condemn American missionary enterprise within the area."57 In fact, throughout the war, no matter how much or how little British or American leaders spoke about the extermination of the Jews in Europe or about a Jewish state in Palestine, Axis propaganda constantly identified them with the Jews.

In his weekly dispatch of September 13,1941, Kirk summarized themes from the broadcasts of August 18 to September 7,1941. His observations accurately captured the strategic guidelines being established in the Foreign Ministry in Berlin. The broadcasts celebrated German victories in Russia and reported on alleged food scarcities in Egypt and other areas under British occupation. Further, "well worn anti-Jewish themes are maintained, among them the assertion that Britain plans to unite Palestine and Syria and make them into a Jewish center." Fascist Italy's broadcasts from "Bari in Arabic," also focused on events in Iran, specifically alleged Soviet efforts "to establish a Soviet-Iranian Republic." Kirk noted that the German broadcasts asserted that had it not been for American help, Britain would already have lost the war and that "the British would have been beaten by the Germans in North Africa had it not been for American assistance. "58 Already in these early reports, Kirk observed that Axis radio's anti-Semitism went hand in hand with attacks on Britain and the United States. Broadcasts of the week ending September 21,1941, about "British exploitation of Egypt," alleged that "Jews control American finance and commerce and are influencing the President to pursue an aggressive policy." Kirk reported that Radio Bari claimed that the United States had "a direct interest in encouraging aggression in the Middle East because of American `interest in oil fields and even more so in the Jews in Palestine."' It asserted that as a result of Roosevelt's "`Jewish advisers of the Brain Trust,"' the Arabs had "`a new antagonist in the person of Roosevelt. -159 Axis radio presented Britain as a firm supporter of "Jewish exploitation in Palestine and Syria" and as planning to "separate Lebanon from Syria and unite it with Palestine as an area for Jewish exploitation." It appealed to Muslims-not only Arabs-noting that "Ramadan comes this year with sadness as the whole Moslem world is under the tyranny of the British."60

In late September and early October, German and Italian radio were pleased to report Axis military successes, especially those on the Eastern Front in Europe, where "all objectives" had been reached in a battle that was "near its end." Although there were signs of "widespread revolt against the British throughout the entire Middle East;' the British continued to issue permits for Jews to enter Syria and Lebanon. The Italian navywas successful in the Mediterranean while the United States and Britain were unable to effectively aid Russia. Radio broadcasts also reported that a "Jewish army of 50,000" was "being built up for eventual use against the Arabs."61 In mid-October, Radio Berlin announced that Germany had given "striking demonstration of its invincible power" in Russia and that "Jewish criminals are being released from prison in Palestine on condition that they join the army."62 In the realm of complete fabrications, Radio Berlin in late October reported that four million Muslims had been murdered by the Soviet government. It was "the duty of Moslems the world over to come to their relief by collaborating with the Germans who are dedicated not only to the destruction of Bolshevism but also to that of Islam's other two great enemies, the British and the Jews."63 That is, according to Radio Berlin, in 1941 Muslims were being exterminated at the same time that a large Jewish army was emerging. That both claims were false did not prevent their repetition on the air. In his dispatch covering the period of October 27 to November 2, Kirk reported that Radio Berlin stated that Charles de Gaulle had communicated to Chaim Weizmann, the president of the World Zionist Organization, a promise to support the Jews at the expense of the Arabs in Syria. During that same week, Radio Bari declared that "the Mufti," that is, Haj Amin el-Husseini, was "universally regarded as the leader of the Arabs in their struggle for independence," and "his escape to Italy is a source of rejoicing to all Arabs and Moslems." It further reported that President Roosevelt had stated that "the United States considers the problem of the Jews in Palestine as an American problem and any menace to them as a threat to the United States."64

Husseini and Kilani, with assistance from the Germans and Italians, had fled Baghdad in spring 1941, traveling to Tehran, Ankara, Rome, and then to Berlin. Nazi Germany's Arabic broadcasts received an important boost with their arrival in the Axis capitals. Husseini arrived in Rome on October 13, and the Italians immediately recognized his utility for Arabic propaganda.65 On November 5, Husseini, Mussolini, and Foreign Minister Ciano agreed on the wording of a proposed joint Axis declaration about the Arabs' fight against "British domination and oppression." The draft stated that the Axis were prepared to recognize the "full sovereignty and complete independence of the Arab countries in the Near East which are now occupied or controlled by the English" and were prepared "to give their consent to the elimination of the Jewish national home in Palestine."66 The following day, Husseini arrived in Berlin, where he was greeted by Wilhelm Melchers and Fritz Grobba in the Foreign Ministry's Political Department. Grobba reported that Husseini looked forward to meeting Hitler, an event he hoped would "have a great propaganda effect on the entire Arab world and, beyond that, the Islamic world. 1167

On November 13, Ribbentrop wrote to Hitler, asking that he meet with Husseini. He argued that Germany's policy in the Middle East "must first and foremost be guided by military needs and therefore must serve the purpose of defeating England. Political propaganda measures must pave the way for permanently eliminating England from these areas. All utterances by Arab leaders indicate that the alpha and omega for the Arab world is a new political declaration of the Axis Powers on independence for the Arab countries. The German declaration broadcast by radio on October 21,1940, is judged by the Arab world in general as inadequate." Hence a statement by Germany and Italy in favor of the Arab world appeared "absolutely indispensable" because its absence had become an obstacle to "loyal cooperation with the Arabs. '168 Ribbentrop viewed the text proposed by Husseini and Mussolini as "acceptable ... with minor changes." He further informed Hitler that radio broadcasting was "by far the most effective weapon" for propaganda aimed at the Middle East and that broadcasts in Arabic were being made "daily from Berlin."69