Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World (13 page)

The reports to London's Foreign Office from Britain's ambassador to Egypt, Miles Lampson, provided a regular commentary on the interaction of events on the battlefield with German policy and propaganda. Lampson was the most experienced and well-informed Western diplomat observing developments in Egypt and the Arab world.28 His assessments in spring and summer 1941 were sobering. On April 4, the British base in Benghazi, Libya, fell to Rommel's North Africa Corps. On the tenth, Rommel's forces encircled and bypassed Australian forces at Tobruk and reached Sollum in Egypt. On April 19, Lampson wrote, "Recent events have considerably strengthened feeling amongst certain classes of Egyptians that the Germans may be too much for us. We are of course strenuously countering this and I believe not without some effect." The Egyptian prime minister, Hussein Sirri Pasha, continued to "take an admirable line against defeatism in Egypt," and recent Allied military successes in Libya had "allayed panic, at one moment very pronounced, caused by the encirclement of Tobruk and the occupation of Bardia and Sollum."29 A week later he wrote that "pessimism regarding the war continues and seems to have taken a fatalistic tinge." The German victory and occupation of Greece and the resulting stream of refugees accentuated this mood. It was likely that fifth column activities were increasing. The Egyptian authorities had arrested "minor agitators," and "the police seem to have been more active than before in suppressing pamphlets. 1130

In a memo of April 29, Lampson sent Foreign Minister Anthony Eden a review of political developments of the previous three months. He reported on a struggle between the current prime minister, Sirri Pasha, and Ali Maher Pasha, who had been prime minister in 1936 and again in 1939-49, regarding Egypt's stance toward Britain and the war. As part of his offensive against Ali Maher Pasha, Sirri Pasha exiled Hassan al-Banna, the head of the Muslim Brotherhood, to the Egyptian town of Qena and limited the activities of the Young Egypt organization led by Ahmed Hussein. Yet the effect of British reverses in Libya, the Balkans, and Greece had been "profound." Egyptians had a new awareness of Britain's "military limitations in the Middle East," and the public was "now fundamentally pessimistic regarding the outcome of this war.... It is now generally thought that the Germans will be able to cross the seas in sufficient numbers and with sufficient material to make a British defense of Egypt impossible."3' Lampson praised "Sirri Pasha's courage and loyalty" in "the face of such defeatism;" as well as his "measures against enemy agents and defeatists, some of whom he has already interned." Such measures were "exceedingly nec essary at the present moment when the deterioration not only in the upper but in the lower classes in their attitude towards the British and British troops has become apparent." Lampson thought that the course of military events was the crucial determinant on Egyptian thinking. What he called "the pressure of external events" would determine "the extent to which the above mentioned deterioration in the Egyptian attitude constitutes a positive danger to our position in Egypt. 1132

In his view, "the fundamental question for us now is the attitude of the Egyptian population in the trials in which it is likely to be involved by enemy action in the near future-aerial bombardments, parachutists, raids of mobile columns, even massive German advances from the West." More democracy and representative government would help, but unfortunately the majority party, the Wafd, was excluded from sharing political responsibility.33 From "friendly Egyptians" and their own sources, Lampson concluded that "the Fifth Column has greatly increased in Egypt;" and various paramilitary formations constituted "a serious potential danger." Sirri Pasha's "gallant attempts" to counter "defeatist and anti-British tendencies" did not receive enough support in public opinion, which, "where not apathetic, is now deteriorating in an anti-British sense." The ability of the Egyptian prime minister to "stem the tide" would "depend largely on the development of the military situation." If "the German menace" grew, "direct security measures by our British Military Authorities may become necessary." Presumably Lampson meant direct intervention in Egypt comparable to the intervention in Iraq to prevent the emergence of a pro-Axis government in Cairo.34

On May 22, Lampson informed the Foreign Office of a campaign of death threats to Egyptian newspaper editors who supported Britain. The threats were part of "certain dangerous under-currents which if events go wrong might become serious."35 In response to Lampson's request to do so, the Foreign Office, presumably Eden, wrote to the Egyptian prime minister via Lampson to note "with grave misgiving the growth of defeatism in certain quarters in Egypt, especially over the past few months;" and asserted that "nothing short of firm and resolute action against the principal offenders;" such as Aziz el Misri and Ahmed Hussein of Young Egypt, "will put a stop to it." Eden added that "no improvement" would be possible "until the more influential defeatists are arrested and detained for the duration of the war." The British greatly appreciated the actions Prime Minister Sirri Pasha had already taken and assured him of "their continued and wholehearted support should he find it necessary to take most drastic action now that the enemy is on Egyptian soil."36 On May 26, Lampson reported that the "rain of anti-British pamphlets continues undiminished and I am increasingly uneasy regarding the internal situation." He was particularly concerned about political activities at Al Azhar University, the leading university of Islamic studies in the Arab world. He urged the prime minister to deport "foreign Azharist students guilty of anti-British activities"; make it a penal offense to distribute or read anti-British propaganda; and keep an eye on students at Al Azhar University and have them searched for anti-British propaganda. Sirri replied that he had already deported "five foreign Azhar students," was considering legal restrictions on anti-British propaganda, and noted the suggestion regarding students at Al Azhar. The Egyptian government arrested several people. It found about fifteen pamphlets not yet in print as well as "an elaborately written program of violence and murder" of political figures including Prime Minister Sirri Pasha, Lampson, and "many others."37

At a time when Prime Minister Sirri Pasha was attempting to repress proAxis fifth column activity, Lampson noted the failure of the Egyptian police to arrest important suspects, which led him to suspect that there were "higher placed traitors and defeatists" in Egyptian politics and government.38 On June 7, Lampson wrote that a "further seizure of printing presses and further arrests of minor agitators" had not led "to any extensive exposure of Fifth Column activities." Yet the following week he reported that the "recent repressive measures of the Government against agitators has had good effect and some of the more prominent fifth columnists are at present keeping their mouths shut."39 In September 1941, according to Lampson, the "internal political situation shows signs of serious deterioration." Though Britain was buying Egyptian cotton at above market prices, much of the public, wrongly, "still believe that we are out to profiteer by purchasing cotton at an unreasonably low price." Sirri Pasha was being attacked by the parliamentary opposition as a British servant. Lampson did not want to antagonize the Wafd Party, the standard-bearer of Egyptian nationalism, but the war effort might call for suppressing "anything written or spoken, no matter by whom, which threatens to jeopardize the security and stability of our base in Egypt." Doing so meant supporting Prime Minister Pasha "in any action taken to that end, including possibly, dissolution of Par- liament."40 Given the centrality of Egypt to the British war effort, Lampson wanted to avoid a repetition of the events in Iraq of spring 1941.

In his September 23,1941, review of political developments in Egypt in the previous five months, Lampson expressed concern about anti-British sentiment voiced by the Wafd Party. It had "much increased the anti-British feeling already long fostered by Palace elements and enemy agents."41 Agitation about the price of cotton, the high cost of living, and food shortages; the fear of German air raids; and the agitation for declaring Cairo an open city all "lend themselves to easy exploitation by hostile elements." Although fear of an imminent invasion had declined since the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June, "the majority of Egyptians still remain convinced of German invincibility, and this conviction, suitably strengthened by hostile propaganda, constitutes a permanent encouragement of all anti-British manifestations. As the hardships of the people increase through growing economic difficulties and more intensive air raids, so will the opportunities increase for enemy exploitation of popular feeling against us. The greater then will be the need for governmental action to control both the enemy agents and their dupes."42

Lampson worried about Egypt's King Farouk and the advisers around him. "So long," he wrote, "as every anti-British movement is believed to radiate from, or be supported by, the Palace we cannot expect to have a favorable atmosphere at our Middle Eastern base. Sooner or later we may, in all probability, have to bring King Farouk to heel or remove him from the Throne.... It is not a pleasant situation in which we find ourselves-backing a minority though entirely friendly government against a hostile majority.... But as I see it at present, there is every indication of stormy times ahead with the probable corollary of more forceful action by us-on the guiding principle that anything emanating from whatever quarter that threatens to prejudice the safety of our military base in Egypt must be put a stop to."43 Lampson believed that antiBritish sentiment was far broader than pro-Nazi and pro-fascist circles. Yet the consequence of such sentiments was the same, namely, to help the Germans by working to end the British presence in Egypt. Lampson supported parliamentary institutions in Egypt, but he was open to the possibility of direct political intervention if it proved necessary to prevent a pro-Axis government. Yet such an intervention would likely intensify nationalist sentiment against Britain. Egyptian nationalists motivated by a desire to end British presence could "objectively" serve Axis interests in the war's zero-sum game. In Berlin, the military and diplomatic policy makers were well aware of the dilemma of the British position in Egypt. Both the Germans and the British understood the close con nection between the battles raging in the North African desert and the political situation in the Arab countries.

In the aftermath of the setback in Iraq, German diplomats acted quickly to contact Kilani and Husseini. On June i, Weizsacker advised the German Embassy in Iran to get in touch with them as Germany would not "drop friends as soon as they have experienced a failure." The Foreign Ministry wanted to know about Kilani's possible "further political activity" and was particularly interested in convincing Husseini that "we will continue to support him and the Arab fight for freedom. He can likewise be promised further financial sup- port."44 On June 6, Woermann thought it advisable that both leaders come to Berlin as they "are of value for us and for the Arab movement only if they are in a position to participate actively."45 Faced with the absence of a political base in the Middle East, the only possible locale for active engagement by pro-Axis Arabs was in Rome and Berlin.

German diplomats, such as as Rudolf Rahn (1900-1975), then active in Syria, could offer distinctly frank and sober assessments of Germany's prospects in the region. Rahn had an elite biography typical of members of the Foreign Ministry. After five months of military service at the end of World War I, he studied sociology, political philosophy, and sociology of religion at the universities in Tubingen, Berlin, and Heidelberg. He received his doctorate from Heidelberg in 1923. He entered the diplomatic corps in 1928 and was posted to Ankara in 1931. He joined the Nazi Party on June 1, 1933. In Berlin he worked in the Orient Office on economic affairs and cultural affairs. During the invasion of France, he worked with the military to coordinate propaganda efforts. In 1941, he purchased arms in Syria for the Kilani government.46 In 1941 he served on Ribbentrop's staff. In 1942 and 1943 he worked in the German Consulate in Tunis, where he worked closely with the German army in Africa. In 1943 he became German ambassador to Rome. His "Report on the German Mission in Syria from May 9 to July 11,1941," submitted on July 30,1941, offered a most unromantic view of the political situation there.

After a brief stayin Syria, I found to my astonishment that there was, at all events, no Arab movement there. True nationalist sentiment is unknown to the Syrian tribes, a wild and for the most part unlovely mixture of races and religions, spoiled by greed, intrigue, and jealousy, accustomed from olden time to bribery by rival powers. What Beirut wants, is opposed by Damascus. What Damascus advocates, is considered treason in Aleppo, Horns, or Hama. Independence is the pretext for unbridled speculation-freedom, the shield for unrestrained exploitation of the worker by the ruling class. Even the best racial part, the Bedouins, have succumbed to the general corruption and follow whichever power is the strongest, as the jackal follows the beast of prey. All of them demand arms-in order to plunder the neighboring tribe; all demand money-in order to extort still greater sums from the enemy power.... I found nothing in Syria that would have been capable of militant action. At the moment of danger, the swaggering leaders of the Arab freedom movement all failed. In undisguised anxiety, they asked for assistance in fleeing abroad, if they had not already preferred "as a precaution" to make contact with the French .17

In Rahn's view the Arabs then could have only a modest impact on the outcome of World War II. He did not think an Arab or Muslim revolt would emerge unless Axis forces were victorious in the region. Axis victories enhanced the chances that propaganda would strike a chord among an active minority. Compared to the vast wartime expenditures on arms, radio and print propaganda were inexpensive ways of planting seeds of possible collaboration and shared hatreds that might pay dividends should the tide of battle turn in favor of Germany and the Axis powers in general. The cost and expectations were modest, but the payoff was possibly significant.