Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (18 page)

Faced with his father’s stern opposition, Tadamitsu had no choice but to give up his plan. But the next day, November 2, he summoned Takechi and told him, in a quick change of decision, that he had decided to kill the rogues that day after all and asked Takechi to get support from the Satsuma, Ch
ō
sh
ū
, and Tosa domains. Takechi respectfully listened to Tadamitsu and then went to the chancellor to warn him that unless Iwakura and the others were banished to some distant place, Tadamitsu would join with men from three domains to carry out “divine punishment.” Two days later, notes were thrown into the houses of three nobles—Iwakura, Chigusa Aribumi, and Koga Takemichi—warning that if they did not leave the city in two days, their heads would be exposed on the riverbed of the Kamo River, and punishment extended to their entire family. The threats, but also the prevailing
j
ō
i
atmosphere in the Court Council, had the desired effect: Iwakura shaved his head and a few weeks later moved to exile in Iwakura Village, north of the capital. This did not end Tadamitsu’s obsession with killing Iwakura, whom he repeatedly blamed for every occurrence that displeased him.

Tadamitsu, braving his father’s disapproval and seemingly indifferent to the likelihood that he would be disowned, continued his wild and precipitous activities even after he had succeeded in getting rid of Iwakura. Tadayasu naturally worried about his wayward son, whose whereabouts were unknown. In April 1863 he petitioned the court to relieve Tadamitsu of his office, stating his fear that extreme concern over the danger to the nation might have driven Tadamitsu out of his senses. He said he would continue to search for his son and, when he found him, would determine whether he was mad.

For a time Tadamitsu took refuge in Ch
ō
sh
ū
, making sudden, disconcerting appearances only to vanish just as suddenly, making him less than a welcome visitor, even though his ties with the imperial family were an asset to the
j
ō
i
cause. A letter sent on May 22, 1863, from Ch
ō
sh
ū
reported that on seeing the foreign ships and weapons that had been bought by the domain, which stood in the forefront of the
j
ō
i
movement, Tadamitsu had been so enraged to think that foreign weapons were being used in the sacred cause that he urged the domain leaders to destroy them. They were unwilling to accept this suggestion, and the indignant Tadamitsu rode off to the port city of Shimonoseki.
²²

In September 1863 the Tench
ū
-gumi (Divine Punishment Group) was organized by Yoshimura Toratar
ō
and others, with Tadamitsu as the central figure. These loyalist fanatics were based in Yamato Province, where at first they enjoyed some success in burning government buildings and killing officials, but their revolt was crushed. Tadamitsu was assassinated in 1864 by a band of killers sent by the Ch
ō
sh
ū
domain.
²³

Prince Mutsuhito was too young to be aware of the details of the
j
ō
i
movement, but he probably knew something of Tadamitsu’s activities and perhaps also of the tenets that inspired him. Almost nothing is known about Meiji’s political views when he ascended the throne at the age of fifteen, but he seems not to have shared his father’s reverence for the institution of the shogunate. Perhaps Tadamitsu helped form the young prince’s conception of what rulership should mean in Japan. Tadamitsu’s behavior was so erratic that one can hardly imagine him systematically imparting to Meiji a political philosophy, but the example of a young noble risking his life in the attempt to overthrow a regime he hated, in the face of his father’s opposition and the weight of tradition, may have stirred the boy who would soon be emperor.

Chapter 9

On June 9, 1863, Tokugawa Iemochi reported to the throne that the foreigners would be expelled on June 24.
¹
Twice before he had set a date, but both times he had had to postpone action. It was doubtless with extreme reluctance that he settled on still another date. He was well aware how woefully inadequate Japanese military preparations would prove if the foreigners resisted eviction. But he had no choice: he was under constant pressure from the court, and he had promised when he was given the hand of Kazunomiya that he would carry out
j
ō
i
.

After learning of the court’s determination to expel the foreigners, the Ch
ō
sh
ū
domain had hastily erected fortifications along the coast. On the day set for
j
ō
i
to commence, the domain demonstrated its eagerness to be the first to put
j
ō
i
into practice by shelling some foreign ships. An American merchant ship anchored off the northern Ky
ū
sh
ū
coast was the first victim. This action was followed a few weeks later by the shelling of a French and a Dutch warship as they passed through the Shimonoseki Straits. When word of these encounters reached the court, the emperor appointed the nobleman
Ō
gimachi Kintada as “supervisor of
j
ō
i
” and sent him to Hagi with gifts for the daimyo of Ch
ō
sh
ū
and his son and a message praising them for their initiative in having led all the other domains in carrying out
j
ō
i
.
²
It was obvious that sooner or later, the foreign powers would retaliate for these attacks, but K
ō
mei had long since been resigned to the possibility of war.
³

The emperor’s confidence of victory in a war with the foreigners seemed confirmed by Satsuma’s successful resistance to the British soon afterward. The British had demanded reparations from both the shogunate and the Satsuma domain for the murder of Charles Richardson at Namamugi. The shogunate paid in May, but Satsuma had failed to respond. The British sent a fleet of seven warships that entered Kagoshima Bay on August 12, 1863, to demand that the daimyo Shimazu Mochihisa execute the men responsible for the Namamugi incident and pay indemnities to the families of those killed and wounded in the incident. The daimyo was given twenty-four hours to reply. The answer from the domain stated that the guilty persons had fled and could not be found. As for the indemnity, the domain could not pay without authorization from the shogunate.

On August 15 at dawn, the British warships suddenly seized three steamships belonging to the domain. At noon the Satsuma batteries opened fire on the British fleet, and it was returned. The firing lasted until late in the afternoon. Many houses and temples in Kagoshima were destroyed by fire, and there were numerous casualties among the Satsuma forces; but the British also suffered considerable damage, and the fleet left without scoring a decisive victory. When Shimazu Mochihisa informed the court of his battle with the British, the emperor sent a message of congratulations.
⁴

The court responded enthusiastically to the news, and in anticipation of armed conflict with the foreigners, members of the imperial family and the nobility were commanded to wear swords when entering or leaving the palace precincts. This was a novel experience for them, for it had been centuries since members of the court took themselves seriously as potential combatants. The chancellor, Takatsukasa Sukehiro, asked the daimyos residing in Ky
ō
to their opinions concerning the advisability of a
j
ō
i
campaign personally led by the emperor. The daimyo of Tottori, Ikeda Yoshinori (1837–77), replied, “Yes, personal leadership by His Majesty would be desirable. But if His Majesty and the nobles have not the slightest knowledge of military matters, how can they possibly be successful? The daimyo of Aizu, Matsudaira Katamori, is now in Ky
ō
to serving as the military governor, and there are other daimyos in Ky
ō
to with their troops. They should be asked to drill their troops [in the vicinity of the palace], so that the nobles’ eyes will become familiar with the sight of soldiers and their ears with the roar of cannons. Only then will it be fitting to discuss personal command by His Majesty.”
⁵

Emperor K
ō
mei accordingly asked Matsudaira Katamori to have his soldiers drill outside the Kenshun Gate. It rained that day, but the emperor nevertheless watched the drill from an observation post at the gate. He was accompanied by the empress and the crown prince, as well as by many ladies of the court, nobles, and daimyos. Katamori personally led more than 3,000 troops in his command. The drill began about four in the afternoon. All the soldiers wore helmets and armor, but some units carried guns, while others brandished spears, bows, and other traditional arms. The soldiers blew conch horns, banged bells and drums, waved swords and spears, fired guns and bows, and occasionally emitted war cries. There was little suggestion of modern warfare.

Another drill was held at the Kenshun Gate on September 17. This time, troops not only from Aizu but also the Tottori, Tokushima, Yonezawa, and Okayama domains participated. Once again Prince Mutsuhito observed. Troops of the Yonezawa domain armed with Western-style guns staged maneuvers. The chronicle of Meiji’s reign states,

The roar of guns echoed to the heavens, and powder smoke obscured the sky. Boys and girls among the spectators turned pale with fright, but the prince tranquilly gazed on throughout with no change of expression. There had been no instance in modern times of an emperor personally watching the maneuvers, and it was absolutely unheard of for a prince of his tender years to accompany the emperor at such a time. Among the courtiers were those who said that it was a violation of time-honored custom for armed men to run about within the nine gates, even granting it was a drill, and that to play with weapons in the vicinity of the imperial sanctuary was a profanation of divine authority. Such were attitudes at the time.
⁶

On September 25 K
ō
mei announced his plan to visit the tomb of Emperor Jimmu and the Kasuga Shrine to pray for
j
ō
i
. He planned also to go on to the Great Shrine of Ise for the same purpose. He revealed that he was considering taking personal command of the
j
ō
i
forces. The
j
ō
i
faction among the nobles, believing this would provide a good opportunity for a campaign against the shogunate, conferred with Ch
ō
sh
ū
samurai and
shishi
. Guessing this would happen, the
k
ō
bu gattai
faction became highly disturbed and appealed to Prince Nakagawa for help in getting the emperor’s proposed journey to Yamato canceled. Prince Nakagawa went to the palace at dawn on the twenty-eighth to ask the emperor why he had decided to take the serious step of assuming personal command. Taken aback by this unexpected question, the emperor answered that he had not yet decided whether to assume personal command. He had long desired to worship at the tomb of Emperor Jimmu, but the rest of his statement had been intended to mollify Sanj
ō
Sanetomi’s faction.
⁷
It was clear to Prince Nakagawa that the emperor was being manipulated by advocates of
j
ō
i
.

That night, by command of the emperor, Prince Nakagawa conferred with the former chancellor Konoe Tadahiro and others of the
k
ō
bu gattai
faction. They decided they would have to expel the nobles who had been plotting to “alter” the court, meaning by “alter” to disrupt the court’s traditional relations with the shogunate. Before dawn on the morning of the thirtieth, a meeting of the Court Council was held, attended by nobles and also the Ky
ō
to military governor and the Ky
ō
to deputy (
shoshidai
). The nine gates to the Gosho were bolted shut, and no one was allowed to enter except by personal command of the emperor. Soldiers of various domains were ordered to guard the gates. At four in the morning, blank shots were fired by cannons to signify that martial law had been put into effect. Hearing the noise, nobles of the
j
ō
i
faction came rushing to the palace, but the gates were tightly shut and they were unable to get in.

At this point Prince Nakagawa, in the presence of the emperor, read a message from the throne: “Ever since this spring it has not infrequently happened that the court spokesmen [
gis
ō
] and other officials have conspired with the Ch
ō
sh
ū
domain to misrepresent my commands. The matter of my taking personal command is the worst such instance. From now on Sanetomi and the rest are to cease attending court and to remain in seclusion in their homes.”
⁸