Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (120 page)

A reader today may shudder at the thought of a city so devoid of amenities and so tainted by industrial pollution, but Tetch
ō
undoubtedly believed that his readers would be delighted by a future rich with the progress represented by chimneys belching smoke; he seems to have thought that the more T
ō
ky
ō
resembled London, the greatest of the Western cities, the happier the Japanese would be.

The chamberlain Hinonishi Sukehiro recalled:

Whenever His Majesty made a journey in the Kansai region, a little before the train passed
Ō
saka he would say, “We’re getting close to the smoke capital…. Now we’re in the smoke capital.” Whenever we approached
Ō
saka, he would look out of the window at the landscape. When he saw a great deal of smoke rising, he would be extremely satisfied.
³⁵

For Emperor Meiji, no less than for Suehiro Tetch
ō
, the “smoke capital” was a term of praise; but the copper mines at Ashio served as a grim reminder of the cost to the environment and to human lives of such progress.

Chapter 49

Another cabinet crisis occurred at the end of 1897. The prime minister, Matsukata Masayoshi, who never paid much attention to the political parties’ wishes, tried to push legislation through the Diet without first obtaining the parties’ consent. In response to the president of the Privy Council, Kuroda Kiyotaka, who questioned Matsukata’s tactics, he replied that he was following instructions from the emperor to devote his every effort to matters of state, without worrying about allies or enemies in the political parties or the reactions of the Diet. A motion of no confidence in the cabinet was proposed in the House of Representatives, and Matsukata’s enemies decided to petition for a dissolution of the Diet.
¹
He was defeated, faced with opposition even from members of his own cabinet.

On December 25, 1897, Matsukata dissolved the Diet and, taking responsibility for the cabinet’s disunity, informed the emperor of his wish to resign. The members of his cabinet made the same request. The emperor asked Matsukata to await further orders, at the same time ordering other ministers not to leave T
ō
ky
ō
. Undoubtedly he remembered how often it had happened that ministers were off in the remote countryside just when he needed their advice. Absence from T
ō
ky
ō
was second only to ill health as an excuse for not responding to the emperor’s commands.

The emperor realized that dissolution or at least adjournment of the Diet was unavoidable. He also knew that there was no way to alter Matsukata’s resolve to resign. On the same day, December 25, he sent Tokudaiji Sanetsune to Kuroda Kiyotaka’s house to explain what had happened and to inform him that he wished to discuss the situation. Kuroda replied that he was ill and asked for three or four days’ leave before going to the palace. The emperor seems to have doubted that Kuroda was really ill. Three hours later, Tokudaiji was back at Kuroda’s house with another message, this one asking him to report to the palace immediately: the Diet was about to be dissolved and the prime minister had asked to resign. Kuroda, unperturbed, said he would go to the palace on December 28. Tokudaiji returned on the twenty-sixth to inform Kuroda that the emperor was greatly upset by his failure to appear. Kuroda yielded, but only to the extent of going to the palace on December 27. For all the reiterated declarations of absolute loyalty to the throne, the emperor’s ministers disregarded his wishes when they found them inconvenient.

While disclaiming any desire to intervene in the choosing of a successor, Matsukata suggested that either It
ō
Hirobumi or Yamagata Aritomo would be suitable. This crisis, like most of the other changes in prime ministers and cabinet ministers at this time, is no longer in itself of great interest, but the unspoken assumptions are significant. Matsukata, a Satsuma man, having failed as prime minister, suggested that either It
ō
or Yamagata, both Ch
ō
sh
ū
men, would make appropriate successors. Although the political parties had a role in the Diet, the party favored by his successor was not an important factor in Matsukata’s recommendation. Regardless of It
ō
’s or Yamagata’s political allegiance, his qualifications to become prime minister were recognized ability (though not specifically for the tasks immediately confronting the government) and birth in one of the two domains that alternately supplied the chief officers of the state. Although the prospective prime minister’s political affiliations were not yet a factor, this situation would soon change.

That night, by command of the emperor, Hijikata Hisamoto, the imperial household minister, sent It
ō
a telegram asking him to come to the palace the following day. It
ō
, then in his villa at
Ō
iso, sent back a message saying that he had not kept up with the situation either at home or abroad since he had resigned from office in the preceding year and feared that if the emperor asked his opinions, he might only mislead the holy wisdom. Besides, he had been suffering of late from an eye complaint. He requested a delay in reporting to the palace.
²

On December 28 the emperor sent a chamberlain to Kuroda to inform him of his intention of appointing It
ō
as prime minister. Kuroda was asked to transmit this decision to It
ō
and, by describing the difficult situation that prevailed in the cabinet, to persuade him to accept the appointment. Kuroda went that day to
Ō
iso and urged It
ō
to leave for T
ō
ky
ō
at once and to comfort the emperor by acceding to his wishes. It
ō
, moved by these words, agreed.
³

It
ō
arrived in T
ō
ky
ō
on December 29 and went to the palace. The emperor informed It
ō
why he had been summoned, and It
ō
replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation. He was willing to form a new cabinet.

The year 1898 opened as usual with New Year rituals being performed not by the emperor but by a surrogate. Learning that It
ō
was suffering from a cold, the emperor sent a chamberlain to inquire after his health and to express the hope that he would render ever greater services to the nation. He sent It
ō
what was now his standard gift, a dozen bottles of wine together with ten ducks.

Yamagata called on It
ō
and urged him to display his mettle by forming a cabinet. In his reply, sent the next day, It
ō
confessed to Yamagata that by nature he was given to going from one extreme to another. He mentioned also that Inoue Kaoru was highly emotional and had a tendency to break down in tears. He feared that these deficiencies might wreck any cabinet he might form. In contrast, when Yamagata served as prime minister, he had displayed his unique ability to balance lenience with stringency. He asked Yamagata’s assistance.
⁴

On January 8 It
ō
requested a meeting in the presence of the emperor to discuss the formation of a cabinet. He would, of course, count on Yamagata and Saig
ō
Tsugumichi to continue serving as ministers of the army and navy. He had planned to invite
Ō
kuma Shigenobu, the leader of the Shimpo-t
ō
, to join the cabinet in order that relations with the political parties be cemented. But at the end of 1897, when he discussed with
Ō
kuma the possibility of his joining the cabinet,
Ō
kuma had not readily consented. His price was the post of interior minister, and he asked that three other members of the Shimpo-t
ō
be appointed to major cabinet posts. It
ō
was unable to accept these demands.
⁵

It
ō
tried next to establish relations with the Jiy
ū
-t
ō
. He approached Itagaki Taisuke, only for him also to demand the post of interior minister in return for his cooperation. It
ō
rejected this condition, believing that if the head of a political party became interior minister, this would skew the coming election. He accordingly reported to the emperor on January 8 his failure to shore up the new cabinet with party support. Despite this failure, the tense situation in East Asia and many other problems, both domestic and foreign, permitted no delay in forming a government. It
ō
therefore urged the emperor to summon the
genr
ō
and have them discuss the situation. It
ō
would present his views at this meeting.

The meeting took place on January 10. It
ō
presented a gloomy appraisal of the situation in East Asia. Russia was exerting pressure on China from Siberia and had occupied Liaotung, Dairen, and Port Arthur. France had occupied the Yunnan region in the south of China. Britain controlled the mouth of the Yangtse. Germany had taken possession of Kiang-chou Bay and the Shantung area. British warships were threatening Inch’on. If a quarrel should arise between Britain and Russia, with which country should Japan side? In his opinion, in view of Japan’s military unpreparedness and the uncertain state of its finances, the best course would be to remain neutral and preserve its safety.

Yamagata and the other
genr
ō
supported this conclusion, and the emperor agreed. In the past, the emperor had generally remained silent during discussions conducted in his presence, but he was now outspoken in expressing his views. The
genr
ō
unanimously recommended that It
ō
, the only person capable of handling the present crisis, form a new cabinet. They favored retaining from the previous cabinet only the navy and foreign ministers and proposed Inoue Kaoru as finance minister, Katsura Tar
ō
as army minister, Saionji Kinmochi as education minister, and Yoshikawa Akimasa as interior minister. It
ō
had at last formed a cabinet, and Matsukata resigned on January 12.

In preparation for the general election of the House of Representatives on March 15, the home minister invited prefectural governors to the Interior Ministry to explain to them the importance of the elections. He cited abuses in election procedures and the need to control them in order to enable voters to elect the candidates of their choice. It was all too apparent that previous elections had not been conducted fairly. Votes had been purchased with money, gifts in kind, promissory notes, or property. Voters had been subjected to violence or threats, and there had been disturbances at polling places and at election meetings. All these activities were strictly prohibited, but the abuses had grown increasingly flagrant. Elections were coming up in a month, and the government must see to it that they were properly conducted. Candidates should not have to spend money in order to be elected, nor should voters be subjected to violence or threats.
⁶
Emergency orders were issued on February 8 prohibiting persons engaged in election activities from carrying guns, spears, or clubs.

The elections resulted in the Jiy
ū
-t
ō
winning 98 seats; the Shimpo-t
ō
, 91 seats; and the Yamashita Club, 48 seats.
⁷
Sixty-three seats were won by minor parties and independents. The cooperation between the government and the Jiy
ū
-t
ō
, initiated by the appointment of Itagaki as interior minister in the second It
ō
cabinet, had not yet ended, even though It
ō
refused to include Itagaki in his new cabinet. After the election the Jiy
ū
-t
ō
demanded Itagaki’s inclusion in the cabinet, threatening otherwise to create difficulties in the Diet. But the cabinet threatened to resign if any of its members were dismissed in order to make room for Itagaki. On April 15 It
ō
sent a letter to the Jiy
ū
-t
ō
refusing to appoint Itagaki and indicating that there would be no further cooperation with his party.
⁸

The Diet was convened on May 19. On the twenty-sixth, the government offered a bill to increase taxes on land, income, and saké. Faced with a serious shortage in the balance of payments with foreign countries, the Matsukata cabinet had earlier introduced a bill increasing the taxes on land and saké, but the Diet had been dissolved without the bill’s being put to a vote. When the bill was again submitted, this time by the It
ō
cabinet, it was rejected on June 20 by a crushing margin of 247 to 27, followed by It
ō
’s dissolution of the Diet.
⁹