Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (122 page)

On August 22 Ozaki delivered an address at the concluding ceremonies of the Imperial Educational Society Summer Institute. One remark gained undue prominence: he said that although it was unlikely Japan would ever became a republic, if it did, the candidates for president would likely be from Mitsui and Mitsubishi. This probably was his way of implying that the worship of money had become so prevalent that one day wealth (symbolized by the two giant companies) might rule the nation. These lightly delivered words gave Ozaki’s political enemies a golden opportunity for questioning his patriotism. They demanded how the minister of education dared mention the possibility of a republican government in Japan. If this was not intended to destroy the national polity, what was it? The
T
ō
ky
ō
nichinichi shimbun
harshly attacked Ozaki in the language of righteous indignation. Ozaki, upset that the newspaper account had falsified his words, published the stenographic record of his address in order to correct the newspaper article, but his opponents claimed that he had tampered with the record. The accusations grew ever more hysterical, and Ozaki’s speech became a major question both inside and outside the government.
²¹

On August 25 Tokudaiji Sanetsune sent word to Ozaki asking for the manuscript of his address. Not having a copy of his extemporaneous remarks, Ozaki submitted instead a clean copy of the stenographic report.
²²
The chief chamberlain’s request suggests that the emperor, having heard rumors about Ozaki’s offensive remarks, wished to examine the words. The emperor also sent Iwakura Tomosada to
Ō
kuma privately with the message: “Ozaki has delivered a speech about a republic and suchlike matters, arousing public opinion. There is no telling what kind of trouble he may stir up in the future. One cannot trust such a minister. You should get him to resign at once.”

Overcome with awe and trepidation,
Ō
kuma wished to go to the palace and personally explain the situation to the emperor, but Iwakura said, “His Majesty has already made up his mind. There is no point in your speaking to him. If you have anything to say to His Majesty, tell me. I will transmit it for you.”
Ō
kuma asked Iwakura, “Is there no confidence in me either?” Iwakura answered, “It’s not for me to say.” Iwakura returned to the palace where he reported to the emperor his conversation with
Ō
kuma. The emperor said, “The matter I mentioned concerns only the minister of education. It has nothing to do with any other minister. Report this, and inform them all of the situation. And see to it that they get Ozaki to submit his resignation afterward.”
²³

The emperor’s reactions to one unfortunate phrase in Ozaki’s speech is likely to strike modern readers as excessive. Granted that a mention of even the possibility that some day a republic might exist in Japan was repugnant to Meiji as a threat to the unbroken line of emperors, surely it should have been apparent that Ozaki’s ironic comment was directed not against the monarchy but against business interests whose sole consideration was money. Meiji seems to have disliked Ozaki ever since his participation in the 1887 incident. We know of the emperor’s reactions on this occasion because they are preserved in Sasaki Takayuki’s diary. Years earlier, this diary had recorded the emperor’s criticism of various men around him, but he had never before expressed his dislike so openly.

The emperor’s command created problems for a parliamentary government. If he had been the ruler of an absolute monarchy, he could have ordered Ozaki’s head chopped off or banished him without trial to some distant island; but Japan had a constitution and a cabinet that consisted not of sycophants but of members of a political party with a program. Iwakura feared that
Ō
kuma might cite this as a reason for not obeying the emperor’s command to get rid of Ozaki but discovered to his relief that
Ō
kuma was quite ready to obey the emperor.

The emperor secretly sent Iwakura and Tokudaiji to inform Katsura Tar
ō
, the army minister, of his command to
Ō
kuma. Katsura passed the word on to the navy minister, and they debated the next step. If the emperor were to dismiss a minister without waiting for the prime minister’s request, the newspapers would be sure to feature it, and people would wonder what lay behind the dismissal.

Soon there were rumors that Ozaki had been denounced by the chamberlains and others close to the emperor. Sasaki Takayuki bluntly asked Tokudaiji if this was true. The latter replied that although he had been greatly upset by Ozaki’s address, he had discreetly refrained from mentioning it to the emperor. However, the interior minister, Itagaki Taisuke, had been so shocked by the impropriety of Ozaki’s words that he had demanded
Ō
kuma take action against him.

An editorial appeared in the reformist newspaper
Yorozu ch
ō
h
ō
denouncing fake royalists and fake loyal ministers, in this way referring to the “patriots” who had attacked Ozaki. Takada Sanae, an officer of the Ministry of Education, also delivered a speech along the lines of the
Yorozu ch
ō
h
ō
’s editorial. People guessed that Ozaki was behind the speech, and Itagaki ordered the Metropolitan Police Office to investigate. Although the police were unlikely to find positive proof of collusion, Itagaki was convinced that the
Yorozu ch
ō
h
ō
’s editorial and Takada’s speech stemmed ultimately from Ozaki, and he pressed
Ō
kuma to punish him.

Itagaki, not obtaining satisfaction from
Ō
kuma, denounced Ozaki to the emperor, which led to the emperor’s command that
Ō
kuma get rid of Ozaki. When Sasaki asked Tanaka Mitsuaki, the imperial household minister, if it was true that Ozaki was dismissed because he had been denounced to the emperor by a chamberlain, he answered that the direct cause was Itagaki’s denunciation, and behind Itagaki were Katsura Tar
ō
, the minister of the army, and Kawakami S
ō
roku, the chief of the general staff. Tanaka added that he had frequently been approached by Katsura and Kawakami to do something about Ozaki, but he always refused, saying that he did not think this was proper for someone in his position.

Everyone whom Sasaki questioned agreed that it was Itagaki who had denounced Ozaki to the emperor.
²⁴
He had been incited by the military, whose aim was not simply the dismissal of Ozaki but the replacement of the
Ō
kuma cabinet by one headed by Yamagata. Katsura, the army minister, intimidated cabinet members by declaring (without presenting any evidence) that Ozaki’s “republic speech” had caused a disquieting atmosphere to spread among the armed forces throughout the country. Itagaki, the interior minister, sent out false reports of popular unrest.
²⁵

Katsura recalled in his memoirs that he had urged
Ō
kuma to persuade Ozaki to make an abject apology to the emperor as soon as possible. He was sure that the emperor, in his magnanimity, would not hold a grudge against Ozaki. He also warned that any delay in apologizing might implicate the prime minister in the responsibility.
Ō
kuma told this to Ozaki, who went at once to the palace and apologized profusely for his crime. He made the mistake, however, of attempting to explain what had led him to speak as he had, sounding as if he were trying to justify his comments. This did not please the emperor. Ozaki finally resigned. Katsura wrote that he regretted not having been able to apologize for Ozaki. But this is unlikely, considering that it was Katsura who had deliberately inflated the scandal so as to get Ozaki dismissed.
²⁶

Once Ozaki was out of the way, the next step was to appoint a successor as education minister. The two factions of the Kensei-t
ō
could not agree. Itagaki proposed the educator Ebara Soroku, with the proviso that if
Ō
kuma did not favor Ebara, he could appoint anyone else he liked as education minister but, in return, would resign as foreign minister and give the position to Hoshi T
ō
ru.
Ō
kuma brushed aside these suggestions. He went to the palace to report his choice of education minister, Inukai Tsuyoshi. The emperor approved, and Inukai was inducted on October 27.
Ō
kuma showed no sign of resigning as foreign minister.

Itagaki, predictably, was furious. At an audience with the emperor, he denounced
Ō
kuma’s bad faith. He declared that in view of Inukai’s appointment as education minister, he and two other members of the cabinet had no choice but to resign. On October 29 at a mass meeting of the former Jiy
ū
-t
ō
, members voted to dissolve the existing Kensei-t
ō
and to form a new party with the same name, from which members of the Shimpo-t
ō
would be excluded.
²⁷
A memorial was submitted to the emperor detailing Itagaki’s grievances.

The emperor was distressed by this development. Reluctant to lose Itagaki from the cabinet, he sent Chamberlain Iwakura Tomosada to ask Itagaki to remain. Unfortunately, the emperor’s usual adviser, It
ō
Hirobumi, was in China. Yamagata and Inoue also were out of T
ō
ky
ō
. For want of better advice, he turned to Kuroda and Matsukata for help in dealing with the split in the Kensei-t
ō
. He feared that if the three Jiy
ū
-t
ō
cabinet members who had resigned were replaced with Shimpo-t
ō
men, the Jiy
ū
-t
ō
would create trouble. The question was, should a new cabinet be formed with both parties represented? Or would it be better to accept resignations from the entire cabinet and organize an new one?

Ō
kuma, unwilling to resign, wanted the cabinet to continue in power with replacements from the Shimpo-t
ō
for the three Jiy
ū
-t
ō
men who had resigned. On October 29 he asked for an audience with the emperor to explain his views. The emperor did not approve of
Ō
kuma’s plan, favoring instead Katsura Tar
ō
’s suggestion that Itagaki be persuaded to remain. Kuroda, however, wanted to end the party cabinet, and was delighted that Ozaki’s speech had afforded an opportunity. When Itagaki announced his resignation, Kuroda opposed allowing
Ō
kuma to remain as prime minister. He enlisted the help of the ministers of the army and the navy and finally succeeded in making
Ō
kuma resign on the thirty-first, citing (as usual) illness. His resignation was followed by that of all cabinet members belonging to the Shimpo-t
ō
. Only the nonparty army and navy ministers were left. The emperor, accepting the resignations, asked the assistance of Kuroda, Matsukata, and
Ō
yama Iwao in planning future policy.
²⁸
The first party cabinet had failed.

On November 1 Yamagata returned to T
ō
ky
ō
and, on the following day, was summoned to the palace along with Kuroda, Saig
ō
, Matsukata, and
Ō
yama to consider forming a new cabinet. The emperor posed several questions: Should a nonparty cabinet be formed and attempt, as in the past, to get the Diet to pass its legislation without depending on party assistance? Would passing legislation be easier if a new cabinet were formed of a combination of men from the strongest political party and elder statesmen? Not directly responding to the questions, Yamagata replied that he thought that everything depended on the emperor’s choice of a man to form a cabinet.

When faced with difficult decisions, the emperor had often turned for advice to It
ō
, and this time was no exception. An urgent telegram was sent to It
ō
in China asking him to return immediately. Kuroda, afraid that when It
ō
got back, he might again advise appointing
Ō
kuma as the prime minister, persuaded Yamagata to join in recommending—without waiting for It
ō
’s return—that
Ō
kuma be dismissed immediately and a new prime minister appointed. The emperor finally agreed, with the understanding that Yamagata and Kuroda would inform It
ō
what had transpired.

Yamagata was asked to form a cabinet on November 5, even though
Ō
kuma had not yet formally resigned. Still hoping for It
ō
’s support,
Ō
kuma sent urgent telegrams to China. Kuroda and Yamagata, on the other hand, recommended all possible haste in appointing a new cabinet in order that it would be functioning when the next session of the Diet began; they emphasized the need to have a cabinet that was above party lines. Believing that the old Jiy
ū
-t
ō
consisted essentially of uncomplicated, well-meaning men who could easily be manipulated, they hoped that members, now
Ō
kuma’s enemies, would support the new cabinet.
²⁹
On November 8 Yamagata informed the emperor of his choice of cabinet members. They included Aoki Sh
ū
z
ō
as foreign minister, Matsukata Masayoshi as finance minister, and Saig
ō
Tsugumichi as interior minister.
Ō
kuma, along with his cabinet (except Katsura Tar
ō
), resigned the same day.