Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (126 page)

The China crisis was at an end.

Chapter 51

Once the Boxer Rebellion had been suppressed, Yamagata Aritomo again asked the emperor’s permission to resign the post of prime minister.
¹
Meiji, no longer able to insist that Yamagata was urgently needed to deal with an emergency, resigned himself to losing Yamagata’s services. The obvious successor was It
ō
Hirobumi, but he had earlier refused, and he was also occupied with the formation of a new political party. It
ō
believed that political parties were necessary to a constitutional monarchy and that a cabinet lacking a party base was likely to have its legislation blocked by factions in the Diet. There were in fact several established parties, but they were moribund and incapable of exercising leadership. It
ō
believed that an entirely new party, to be headed by himself, was needed to correct long-standing abuses in the government. He informed Yamagata of his intention and asked the imperial household minister to report it to the emperor.

The emperor not only granted It
ō
permission to form a new party but on September 14 sent Iwakura Tomosada to It
ō
’s residence with a gift of 10,000 yen and a roll each of red and white silk crepe. He also sent a message conveying his trust in It
ō
’s devotion and his abiding eagerness to benefit by It
ō
’s frank advice.
²

On September 15, 1900, the formation of a new party was announced. It was called the Rikken seiy
ū
kai,
³
and It
ō
was its president. At this point the members of the Kensei-t
ō
declared their party’s dissolution and their intention of joining the new party and forming its nucleus. Some cynics remarked that in view of It
ō
’s having obtained palace authorization before organizing the Seiy
ū
kai, he really should have called it the Imperially Sanctioned Party.
⁴

On September 24 the emperor sent for Matsukata Masayoshi and Inoue Kaoru and asked them to persuade It
ō
to succeed Yamagata. The two men visited It
ō
separately, but both received a firm refusal. Yamagata somehow learned that Inoue had gone to see It
ō
, which may have precipitated his submission on September 26 of a memorial to the emperor, asking to resign. He alleged that his health made it impossible for him to continue performing the exhausting duties of his office. The decision of the Kensei-t
ō
, no longer willing to cooperate with Yamagata, to join forces with It
ō
’s party may also have spurred Yamagata’s decision, for his cabinet was now completely lacking in party support.

Matsukata also attempted to persuade It
ō
to become prime minister, only for It
ō
to urge Matsukata to take the post himself. Finally, the emperor, realizing that intermediaries would not succeed, summoned It
ō
to court and commanded him to accept the post. It
ō
still would not yield. He had his hands full organizing the Seiy
ū
kai, and he was suffering from a debilitating cold. The imperial command could not have come at a worse moment. Matsukata made one last attempt on October 6. This time It
ō
agreed, having by then reached the conclusion that neither the domestic nor the foreign situation permitted further delay. On the following day in the presence of the emperor, It
ō
formally accepted the command to form a cabinet.

It
ō
was invested as prime minister in a ceremony at the palace on October 19. From the outset, there were clashes among the members of the new cabinet. On October 20 Army Minister Katsura Tar
ō
(a holdover from the previous cabinet) asked to resign for reasons of health. The emperor refused, saying that at a time of great tension, the office of army minister must not be vacant for even a single day.
⁵

On November 15 the emperor, resuming his practice of earlier days, traveled to Ibaraki Prefecture to observe maneuvers, spending the night in an elementary school. The weather the next day was terrible—unremitting rain and wind with occasional snow flurries—and it was bitingly cold. The roads over which the emperor’s carriage passed were supposed to have been repaired, but days of rain and the heavy traffic of soldiers and horses had turned them into deep mud. At a place called Nagakata the emperor left his carriage and walked to a height from which he could observe the mock battle between the two armies. He remained there for more than an hour, buffeted by rain and wind that grew steadily more intense, until the maneuvers had ended. He probably considered that as emperor, he was obliged to set an example of fortitude for the troops.

The emperor did not suffer ill effects from his prolonged exposure to the elements, but toward the end of the year he contracted an illness that confined him to his bed until January 13, 1901. As a result, he did not participate in any of the traditional observances at New Year. The emperor was now fifty years old by Japanese count.

On January 23 Japan received word of Queen Victoria’s death. England, at the zenith of its power, had long been the greatest obstacle to recognition of Japan as an equal to the major powers of Europe, but the Japanese court, showing not the slightest sign of resentment, went into three weeks of mourning. Hayashi Tadasu, the minister to Great Britain, was designated as special ambassador to the funeral. He would figure prominently in the negotiations later in this year for an alliance between Japan and England, the extraordinary resolution of the often tense relationship between the two countries.

Having formed a political party, as he had long hoped, It
ō
organized a cabinet that consisted entirely of Seiy
ū
kai members. The House of Peers was vociferous in its denunciation of party government, but It
ō
ignored the complaints, exacerbating the mutual feelings of hostility. The problems facing It
ō
were manifold. The government was faced with the urgent need to pay the expenses incurred in quelling the Boxer Rebellion. The House of Representatives attempted to raise funds by imposing taxes on saké and sugar and increasing customs duties. Greater revenues were also expected from the tobacco monopoly. However, the House of Peers opposed any raise in taxes and seemed certain to vote against the bill. On February 27 the emperor (at It
ō
’s request) suspended the Diet for ten days.

It
ō
hoped that during these ten days he would be able to induce the House of Peers to compromise, but it remained adamant in its demand for full debate over the revenue bill. It
ō
expected Yamagata, who had influence in the House of Peers, to mediate, but he was in Ky
ō
to, and when he and Matsukata met, they decided against mediation. It
ō
, in exasperation, asked the emperor to summon the two men back to T
ō
ky
ō
. A chamberlain sent telegrams to Yamagata and Matsukata, who left for T
ō
ky
ō
the following day.

At an audience on March 5 It
ō
explained to the emperor the gravity of the situation caused by the refusal of the House of Peers to cooperate in raising money needed to pay national debts. He feared severe repercussions in the world of finance and suggested that the emperor ask advice from four
genr
ō
—Yamagata Aritomo, Saig
ō
Tsugumichi, Matsukata Masayoshi, and Inoue Kaoru. The emperor received Yamagata and Matsukata shortly afterward, and messages were sent to Saig
ō
and Inoue asking them to join in finding a solution to the crisis.
⁶

Yamagata and Matsukata reported the failure of their efforts to mediate. The suspension of the Diet would soon end, and It
ō
could not restrain his impatience. He drew up a plan that he passed on to the imperial household minister, requesting that the emperor issue a rescript to the House of Peers reproving its obstruction. The emperor, complying with this request, on March 12 summoned Konoe Atsumaro, the president of the House of Peers, and told him, “I was recently informed that the House of Peers has expressed unwillingness to pass the tax increase and has clashed with the government on the matter. I find this most deplorable. I ordered Yamagata and others to mediate, but their efforts were unfortunately not successful. The government has further informed me that it cannot accede to the proposals of the House of Peers. I am deeply disturbed, as you will see from the enclosed note. I ask you to show it to all members of the House, and to discuss ways of restoring harmony as soon as possible.”

The emperor’s note left no doubt as to his position:

“I am deeply distressed by the difficult situation both at home and abroad. It is essential at this time for the nation to pay the necessary war expenses and to establish plans for putting its finances on a sound basis.

“As I indicated when not long ago I opened the Diet, these are my wishes. Moreover, the various measures to increase taxes, which I commanded the government to submit, have already been passed by the House of Representatives.

“I believe that the members of the House of Peers, being loyal to the throne, surely must share my unremitting concern. I hope that they will speedily approve these plans made by the court and not give the nation cause for regret in the future.”
⁷

Konoe had foreseen the possibility that matters might develop in this way, but he was greatly upset by the emperor’s reprimand. He called on Iwakura Tomosada, supposing that Iwakura, who deplored It
ō
’s habit of asking the emperor to issue a rescript whenever he was in a tight situation, would know what had occasioned this one. Iwakura, however, had heard nothing. When Konoe showed him the rescript, Iwakura was astonished to see that it neither had the emperor’s signature or seal nor had been countersigned by a minister. This was highly irregular. That night, Iwakura sent a copy of the rescript to It
ō
and asked if members of the cabinet were already familiar with its contents.

The following day, It
ō
called on Konoe at the House of Peers and related in detail his own efforts ever since the suspension of the Diet to open negotiations with the House of Peers and how the emperor had commanded Yamagata to mediate. It seemed as if the emperor, disappointed at the failure of mediation efforts and extremely worried about the situation, had taken things into his own hands. It
ō
added that no one in the cabinet had known in advance of the rescript, but regardless of whether anyone knew, as the head of the cabinet he bore the heavy duty of advising the emperor, and it was natural that this responsibility should extend to advising the emperor with respect to politics.
⁸

It
ō
’s words implied that although no one in the cabinet had prior knowledge of the rescript, his own advice may have influenced the emperor to write in these terms. The absence of a signature or countersignature suggested that the emperor may have acted on his own, perhaps on the spur of the moment.

Konoe presented the rescript to the House of Peers on March 24. The emperor’s admonition caused an immediate change in the members’ attitudes, and the revenue bill was passed without modification.
⁹

Later that month, the emperor displayed his authority in quite a different area. On March 27 the minister of justice, Kaneko Kentar
ō
, asked the emperor’s authorization to dismiss sixteen judges and public prosecutors who had asked permission to resign their offices. The cause of their action was the decision by the House of Representatives not to grant salary increases to members of the judiciary, even though there were good reasons to do so. The annual budget was consequently passed without a provision for a salary increase. The disappointed judges and prosecutors started a campaign against the bill. Some provincial magistrates left their posts to participate in strike actions in the capital.

Kaneko issued frequent warnings to the strikers, reminding them they must not violate official discipline, but his warnings had no effect. The ringleaders called for a general resignation, and soon letters of resignation were streaming into T
ō
ky
ō
by mail and telegraph. Kaneko, determined to maintain the dignity of the judiciary, decided that rather than yield to the strikers’ demands for higher pay, he would accept their resignations. He forwarded to It
ō
the letters of resignation, with the request that they be submitted to the emperor.