Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (125 page)

The Boxers’ hatred of Christian converts seems to have stemmed from the ruthlessness with which the latter, carried away by their religion, had smashed “idols” and erected churches, sometimes on the sites of shrines worshiped by the majority of the villagers.
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The division between Christians and non-Christians had altered the structure of village life, and resentment of the changes had led to the violence directed against the “foreign devils” and Chinese converts to Christianity.
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The violence in Shantung Province began in 1897 with the murder of two German missionaries. The German government profited by this incident to force the Chinese in 1898 to grant them a ninety-nine-year lease on Tsingtao and an area around Kiaochow Bay. In 1898 the British, benefiting by the concession to Germany, took over Weihaiwei on the northern coast of Shantung from the Japanese, who had been holding it since the end of the Sino-Japanese War as security against payment of the indemnity agreed on at Shimonoseki. These developments provoked all the greater antiforeign activity, which spread from Shantung to neighboring Hopei.

In the villages, people formed bands intended to protect the local shrines from attacks by Christians. It was expected that the gods would in return protect the villagers, and altars were erected where the worshipers might receive mysterious powers from the gods. Those who were thus endowed were supremely confident of victory, sure that the foreigners’ weapons would be powerless to harm them.
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As preparation for the forthcoming struggle, they threw themselves into boxing and other martial sports but scorned using foreign guns.

The Boxer leaders resembled members of the Shinp
ū
ren and similar groups in Japan who had been committed to destroying foreign influence. Some recent historians have expressed admiration for the Boxers’ courage in resisting foreigners who threatened the traditional Chinese way of life. Xenophobia, however, is not a virtue, and it should not be forgotten that most of the Boxers’ victims were Chinese peasants.

On May 30, 1900, the foreign minister, Aoki Sh
ū
z
ō
, presented to the emperor a report on the activities of the “bandits” in North China. Aoki had been informed earlier that month by the American secretary of state of the murder of the German missionaries by the Boxers.
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Aoki’s report (not mentioned in his memoirs) described how once China’s weakness had been exposed by defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, the European powers, demanding concessions, had leased territories that soon developed into strategic bases. Although there had formerly been a strong progressive faction in the Chinese government, aggressive actions by the foreigners had enabled the conservative faction, which demanded expulsion of the foreigners, to seize control of the government under the reactionary empress dowager, Tz’u-hsi; the powerless emperor was confined to his palace.

Manifestations of hatred, whether on the level of insults to foreigners encountered in the street or actual violence, became frequent. The government was reportedly planning to close the ports and drive out the barbarians. It may have seemed to the Japanese like a reenactment of their own past of forty years earlier; and just as the loyalists had joined in the cry
sonn
ō
j
ō
i
, the Boxers cried “Save the Ch’ing and destroy the foreigners.” This apparent profession of devotion to the Manchu monarchy pleased the government,
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but when the Boxers cried “Save the Ch’ing,” they were urging the rescue not of the Manchu dynasty but of China itself from the hated foreigners.
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On June 6 Aoki received from Tei Nagayasu, the Japanese consul in Tientsin,
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a description of the rebellion’s mounting intensity. The Chinese government, doing nothing to calm the situation, gradually began to express its support of the rebels. Reports reached Japan of Russian troops heading to China from Siberia and of German troops about to arrive from Tsingtao. A member of the Japanese legation was killed by the rebels, and the Japanese felt that they could not merely stand by. The cabinet, meeting on June 15, decided to send infantry, artillery, cavalry, and engineering troops to protect the lives of Japanese citizens in China. The emperor at once approved.
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Ships of the “allies”
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had by this time assembled off Taku, the port of Tientsin. On June 17 the allied fleet opened fire on the Chinese batteries. The ostensible purpose of this (and subsequent military actions) was to save the lives of nationals trapped in Peking, but the Chinese were infuriated, and the government decided to use the Boxers to drive out the foreigners and Chinese Christians.

On June 19 Japanese ships under the command of Vice Admiral T
ō
g
ō
Heihachir
ō
, in cooperation with the other allies, occupied the batteries at Taku. The Chinese Foreign Ministry at once sent messages to the ministers of all countries represented in Peking, ordering them to leave the city in twenty-four hours; they would be escorted to Tientsin by Chinese troops. On the following day the German minister was assaulted and killed by Chinese soldiers while on his way to the Foreign Ministry. This made the foreigners (who had earlier agreed to leave for Tientsin) doubt the protection promised by the Chinese government. They decided to withdraw to their legations and defend themselves until reinforcements arrived.
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On June 21 the emperor of China issued a rescript opening hostilities with the allies. The emperor declared that although China had always treated the foreigners well, the foreigners had responded by occupying Chinese territory and menacing and robbing Chinese citizens. Their wanton actions had caused patriots to burn churches and kill Christians. The government had done its utmost to protect the foreigners despite their outrageous behavior, but not showing the slightest gratitude, they had used force to compel the Chinese to abandon the forts at Taku. The emperor declared he had vowed, swallowing his tears, that rather than live and endure such humiliation, he would use all the strength available to him in fighting a war with the foreigners. He hoped that patriots would join in the war or at least provide the expenses.
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On June 29 the emperor issued a completely contradictory rescript calling for suppression of the rebels and the resumption of friendly relations with foreign countries. It was said that the earlier rescript had been dictated by Prince Tuan and that the emperor’s real sentiments were in the later rescript.
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But the second rescript seems to have been ignored: the fighting continued, and the siege of the legations lasted for about two months until Peking was relieved by the allies.
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In the meantime, Boxer forces, admitted to Peking by command of the empress dowager, went on a rampage, burning churches and foreigners’ houses and searching for Christian converts and others who had associated with foreigners, slaughtering all they found. The legations were under constant attack, and some of the buildings were burned, but the foreigners did not capitulate.

On July 3 the emperor of China sent a telegram to Emperor Meiji asking him to intercede in order to restore order. The opening salutation revealed that he appealed to Meiji as his equal, and he cited the mutual dependence “as close as lips and teeth” that joined China and Japan. He expressed profound grief that a member of the Japanese legation had been killed, but he added that even while the Chinese authorities were in the process of apprehending and punishing the guilty persons, the foreign powers had attacked and seized the Taku forts. He warned of a confrontation between East and West and asked if the emperor thought that the covetous, “tiger-like” glares of the Western countries were directed only at China. If by some chance China proved unable to withstand the foreigners’ aggression, it would be difficult for Japan to stand alone. He urged that Japan and China halt the fighting and, putting aside their petty differences, join in maintaining stability. He assured the Japanese emperor that Chinese troops would be unremitting in disposing of the bandits.
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Meiji did not respond to the Chinese emperor’s proposal. Instead, he declared that if the Chinese government succeeded in suppressing the revolt—in this way making it clear that it did not desire war with foreign countries—Japan would be glad to resume its traditional friendship. He insisted that the Chinese government lift the siege of Peking and that if it failed to do so, Japan would have no choice but to send troops to pacify the rebels and rescue its citizens.
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Just at this time the chief chamberlain, Tokudaiji Sanetsune, submitted a request to the emperor that he be permitted to resign his post. The emperor, enraged, replied, “Any member of the nobility who serves at the court must be resolved to perform his duties faithfully, regardless of the sacrifices this may involve. Anyone who seeks to resign his office without good reason, merely in order to enjoy a life of ease, is truly hateful. No matter how many times you may try to resign your post, I will unconditionally refuse. Most present-day officials who come from the samurai class are self-indulgent and undisciplined. They tend to use resignation as a means of evading some temporary crisis and ensuring their personal safety. I always find this reprehensible. But for someone from the nobility to imitate them and cause me distress—that is the worst possible example of disloyalty.”
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Meiji himself, earlier in his reign, had been rebuked by It
ō
Hirobumi and others for neglecting his work, but now he seems to have been entirely absorbed in state business. He had come to think of being the emperor as a responsibility and not a privilege, and it was also incumbent on a noble like Tokudaiji to show a greater sense of responsibility than a member of the samurai class. The concept of duty had come to dominate his thought, and he regarded each instance of resignation “for reasons of health” as a betrayal.

A major battle was fought on July 9 in the vicinity of the Tientsin racetrack between the allied army and the Chinese. Japanese troops, which formed the vanguard, did most of the fighting that day, dislodging the Chinese defenders, who consisted of 2,000 elite troops and some 500 Boxers. The Chinese general was killed, and after suffering heavy losses, his troops were put to flight. Allied casualties consisted of thirty or so Japanese and eight British soldiers. The bravery and skill displayed by the Japanese infantry earned the admiration and praise of the other countries.

The allied attack on Tientsin itself began on July 13. Japanese, British, American, and French troops attacked from the south; Russian and German troops, from the northeast. The Chinese forces consisted of about 14,000 regulars and about 10,000 Boxers; the allies, about 8,000 men. The city was surrounded by steep walls about twenty-six feet high. The fighting on the thirteenth was inconclusive, but at three in the morning of July 14, Engineer Lieutenant Inoue Kenkichi, who had been ordered to blow up the southern gate of the walls, crept up with six men. They laid explosives by the gate, but the electrically operated fuse was cut by enemy gunfire. Inoue and his men, compelled to ignite the explosives manually, were very nearly killed, but the gate was pulverized. The allied forces, led by Japanese troops shouting war cries, rushed through, only to be confronted by an inner wall with enemy soldiers on top. Not fazed by this difficult situation, First Class Private Masuda Sentar
ō
climbed over the wall and opened the gate from the inside. Japanese troops poured into the city, followed by French, British, and American soldiers. The Chinese left 400 dead. More than 860 allied troops were killed or wounded, 400 of them Japanese.
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On August 8 Kaiser Wilhelm II sent a cable to Emperor Meiji requesting that General Alfred Waldersee be appointed as commander of the allied forces. Although Germans constituted a much smaller part of the allied forces than the Japanese, the emperor immediately consented, perhaps because of the murder of the German minister. The emperor was probably not aware that late in July, when the German Expeditionary Force was about to set sail for China, the kaiser had delivered an address to the officers and men commanding them to show no mercy and take no prisoners, in this way ensuring that the Chinese would never again dare to look down on Germans.
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The kaiser’s address was much criticized by the allies when it became known abroad. Hearing that a German had been appointed to head the allied force, Makino Nobuaki, the minister to Austria, objected on the grounds that the kaiser’s speech had aroused strong opposition.
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But Meiji had already sent a telegram agreeing to the kaiser’s request. Without realizing it, the emperor was cooperating with a monarch obsessed with a hatred of the “Yellow Peril.”

As it happened, however, the allied advance on Peking was so rapid that the German general did not have time to assume the post of commanding officer. Instead, in keeping with a Japanese proposal supported by other allies, a Russian general was chosen as the commander. On August 14 Peking fell to the allies; the siege of Peking was lifted; and the foreign nationals were rescued. The Chinese emperor and empress dowager fled to the northwest. Japanese and American troops secured the imperial palace, but elsewhere in the city, the allies engaged in unbridled looting.
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