Caesar. Life of a Colossus (Adrian Goldsworthy) Yale University Press (45 page)

After addressing
Legio X
, Caesar hurried to the right wing, where he saw his men hard pressed, and the standards [a shorthand term for the units’ formations] of
Legio XII
clustered in one place and the soldiers so crowded together that it impeded their fighting. All the centurions in the fourth cohort had fallen, the
signifer
was dead and his standard captured; in the remaining cohorts nearly every centurion was either dead or wounded, including the
primus pilus
Sextus Julius Baculus, an exceptionally brave man, who was exhausted by his many serious wounds and could no longer stand; the other soldiers were tired and some in the rear, giving up the fight, were withdrawing out of missile range; the enemy were edging closer up the slope in front and pressing 248

‘ The Bravest of the Gaulish Peoples’: The Belgae, 57 bc

hard on both flanks. He saw that the situation was critical and that there was no other reserve available, took a shield from a man in the rear ranks, – he had come without his own – advanced into the front line and called on the centurions by name, encouraged the soldiers, and ordered the line to advance and the units to extend, so that they could employ their swords more easily. His arrival brought hope to the soldiers and refreshed their spirits, every man wanting to do his best in the sight of his general even in such a desperate situation. The enemy’s advance was delayed for a while.25

Roman generals normally led from close behind the fighting line, and were at risk from missiles or the attacks of bold individuals eager to win fame by killing the enemy commander. In this way they shared some of the risks of the soldiers in their armies, and this was an important element in bonding leader and led. This time Caesar went a step further, going right up into the front of the fighting line, and displaying the personal courage that was as fundamental an aspect of aristocratic
virtus
as the higher skills expected of a commander. This willingness to stand and fight, if necessary to die, with his men was the confirmation of the growing trust that had developed between Caesar and his troops. Once there he encouraged the men around him – the centurions as individuals, the ordinary legionaries as

‘fellow-soldiers’ and units – and he improved their deployment. There were a number of stories about Pompey fighting at the front of his men, striking down enemies with sword or spear in heroic fashion. This was how Alexander the Great had fought his battles, and Pompey revelled in comparisons between the two of them. Caesar was also said to be very skilled with his personal weapons, but there is no mention in his own account of his actually fighting. It may be that this was deliberate false modesty, intended to allow his audience to imagine for themselves the heroism of the proconsul, hinted at by the matter of fact comment about borrowing a shield. However, Caesar does not seem to have wanted to emphasise his personal prowess, instead concentrating on his role as a leader and commander. In the end his account acknowledges that the Sambre was a soldier’s battle, ultimately won by the determination and discipline of the legionaries.

During a lull in the fighting Caesar redeployed the
Twelfth
and
Seventh
legions, wheeling them back so that they formed a rough square or circle and were able to defend against attacks from any direction. Such pauses in the fighting were common, contrary to the Hollywood image of frenzied battles 249

pr oconsul 58–50 BC

in which every man rushed forward, intermingled with the enemy and fought individual duels, deciding the battle in a matter of minutes. Battles usually lasted for hours, but hand-to-hand fighting was physically and mentally exhausting and seems usually to have occurred in short furious bursts, before the lines separated by maybe just a few yards, drew breath and tried to build up enough enthusiasm to close again. When Caesar arrived the line had been disintegrating, men from the rear ranks slipping off to escape from danger. Many centurions were dead or wounded and collapse appeared imminent. His example – and doubtless that of the other officers there, for he encouraged the centurions and gave orders for a formation change through the tribunes – stabilised the situation for the moment, but the two legions were still under huge pressure and a collapse was probably only a matter of time.26

The Roman right flank held out, but the battle was won elsewhere. The two legions marching at the rear of the column to protect the baggage came into the view of those Belgians who had bypassed the Roman right and gone up the hill to attack the camp itself. The arrival of fresh Roman forces dismayed the Belgians and encouraged those Romans able to see them. Labienus was in charge of the victorious Roman left, and on his own initiative sent the
Tenth
back across the river again to aid the rest of the army. This legion, realising that things were not going well, hurried forward and struck the Nervii in the rear. The Roman right was now able to advance, and drive off the warriors facing it. In the meantime even the slaves accompanying the baggage had joined the rallied cavalry and light troops and repulsed the Belgians around the camp. The Nervii did not give way quickly, many fighting on for a long time. Caesar claims that some warriors even stood on the mounds of their own dead to keep on fighting. This was doubtless an exaggeration, but testified to the ferocity of a combat that he had seen from particularly close quarters. His claims for the number of casualties inflicted on the tribe – that only 500 warriors survived out of 60,000, and just three tribal leaders out of 600 – were clearly also greatly inflated, and are in fact disproved by his own comments in a later book of the
Commentaries
. Nevertheless, the losses were high, and the will of the Nervii and their allies to continue the struggle was utterly broken. Envoys came and surrendered to the proconsul, who ordered them to remain in future inside their own borders and not to attack anyone else. He also sent instructions to the neighbouring tribes not to raid the Nervii in their currently vulnerable state.27

250

‘ The Bravest of the Gaulish Peoples’: The Belgae, 57 bc

Mopping up

The Atuatuci had not rendezvoused with the other tribes before the battle was fought. Learning of the defeat they returned to their homeland, but showed no inclination to submit to Rome and prepared for a desperate defence. Bringing the people in from other communities, they decided to occupy a single walled town that lay in a strong natural position on a craggy hilltop. Food supplies had been gathered to support them if Caesar attempted a blockade. The defenders were confident, and showed this by their willingness to sally out and attack the Roman army, which had arrived and camped outside the town. Caesar ordered the legions to build a ditch and rampart surrounding the hilltop, strengthening it with forts at short intervals to form a line of circumvallation. Altogether, it stretched for some 430 yards, which gives some indication of the comparatively small size of the stronghold. The forts probably contained light artillery of the sort used before by the Aisne, which soon deterred the defenders from venturing outside their walls. The Atuatuci could not get out, but at first they despised the ramp and siege tower that the Romans laboured to make. Caesar tells of how they mocked the ‘pygmy Romans’ and adds that the whole population of Gaul was disdainful of the smaller stature of the Italian legionaries. A siege tower was an unknown device, and there was dismay when the Romans began to wheel it up the ramp and towards the wall. Now in a state of despair, the defenders sent out delegates who offered to surrender and asked only that they be allowed to keep their weapons lest their neighbours decide to raid them. Caesar rejected this plea, saying that he would defend them as he would defend the Nervii, placing them under Rome’s protection and ordering the nearby tribes to refrain from any acts of hostility. The defenders began to hurl down their weapons from the ramparts, creating a mound that eventually almost equalled the wall in height.28

Although the gates of the town were left open, only a small number of Caesar’s troops were allowed inside. As night fell, he ordered even these to return to their camp, for he was not confident that their discipline would hold when they were out of view of their officers in the dark streets. Army pay was low, the career attractive only to the poor and the failures of society, and it is probable that most legions contained their share of petty criminals and others, who could readily get out of hand. Caesar was to repeat the same precaution on other occasions. He had the gates closed to protect the tribesmen who had surrendered themselves to Roman faith. However, some of these tribesmen either regretted or had never shared in the decision to 251

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surrender, and once night fell began to equip themselves with hidden arms and hastily improvised shields. In the small hours they charged out to attack what they judged to be the weakest part of Caesar’s fortified line. The Romans were alert, and sentries lit the prepared fires, which were the agreed signal to stand the army to. Reinforcements moved to the threatened point and the attackers were greeted with a barrage of missiles. All were killed or driven back to the town. The next day Caesar held the entire population responsible for this breach of the peace. His men battered down the gates and arrested everyone inside. It is doubtful that there was any question of keeping the legionaries under tight discipline. Everyone inside – 53,000

men, women, and children according to Caesar – was bought at a single price by a company of merchants who would then sell them on as slaves. It would have been quite normal for the era if most of the women were raped by the soldiers before this occurred. A share of the purchase price would also have gone to all of the legionaries, with larger shares to the centurions and tribunes. The sale of war captives was one source of profit. Another was plunder, though this is rarely mentioned in the
Commentaries
. Caesar says that the Gauls had many sacred sites where gold and precious objects had been dedicated to the gods and left piled up in public view. All the tribes respected these sacred sites and no one dared to steal from them. According to Suetonius, Caesar was unimpressed by such taboos and never failed to loot them. The wealth he was gaining restored his own finances, but as ever his main interest in money was to use it to buy friends and popularity, both with his army and back in Italy.29

The defeat of the Belgic tribes was another massive victory, following on from those of the previous year. If the suggestion that a book of
Commentaries
was published each winter is correct, people in Rome were already aware of the humbling of the Helvetii and Ariovistus. Now news came to Rome of the fresh success and was greeted with great enthusiasm. As Caesar proudly reports, the Senate voted him a public thanksgiving of fifteen days, a longer period than that ever awarded to any general, including Pompey. This official celebration vindicated his actions, making it difficult for those enemies who tried to deny the legality of his appointment. Yet not everything at Rome was going as Caesar would have wished. Pompey may have been a little unhappy at the success and fame of his son-in-law, and Dio claims that he had began to talk about recalling Caesar before his five-year term of office had expired. The triumvirate seemed about to collapse. The next danger Caesar was to face would not come from foreign enemies.30

252

XII

Politics and War:

the Conference of Luca

‘Pompey replied to him in vehement terms, and made an unsubtle hint in Crassus’ direction, saying openly that he would be much better prepared to guard his own life than Africanus had been, who was murdered by C. Carbo.. . . Caius Cato is being supported by Crassus; Clodius is also being funded, and the pair encouraged by Crassus.’ –
Cicero, 15 February 56 BC
.1

‘I am in agreement with you, chosen fathers of the Senate . . . while you did not approve, then I was also not of one mind with him; yet now that his achievements have made you alter your opinion and feelings, then you see me not only sharing this view but praising it’ –
Cicero, May 56 BC
.2

Caesar had already been away for two years, and the time had not passed quietly in Rome. His consulship had been controversial, but in many ways was mild in comparison with the turbulent months that followed, when orchestrated mob violence became a regular feature of public life. In politics few things last forever, and this was especially true in the Roman Republic. Individual senators gained or lost influence, broke with old allies and found new ones, occasionally made up old quarrels, but more often gained new ones, and discovered that it was now in their interest to alter their views on certain issues. In 59 BC Cicero had openly criticised the triumvirate, prompting them to make his personal enemy Clodius a plebian and open his path to the tribunate. Two years later, Caesar’s public thanksgiving was awarded by a Senate voting on a motion that Cicero himself had proposed. In the intervening months the orator had been exiled – if not necessarily with Caesar’s actual co-operation, then certainly with his acceptance – and some time later recalled, this time only after Caesar had acquiesced. Although of huge personal importance, and recorded in emotional detail in his 253

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published correspondence, Cicero’s expulsion from Rome was a relatively minor episode in the political struggles of these years, when virtually nothing and no one seemed secure from attack. Caesar’s role in most of this was as an observer, but a deeply interested one, since although he could not himself go to Rome he could be deeply affected by events there. At best he hoped to influence the key players in the political game, for he certainly could not control them. There was no inevitability about the course events took, or how they were eventually resolved. In the end, his position was strengthened, at least for the moment, but this might not have happened, and it was for a while quite possible that his work as consul would be undermined, and his extraordinary command in Gaul prematurely terminated. That this did not happen owed something to the skill with which he used his connections and influence, as well as his imagination. As great, or even greater a role, was played by luck, and in Rome as on the battlefield, the goddess Fortuna continued to smile on Caesar.