Caesar. Life of a Colossus (Adrian Goldsworthy) Yale University Press (48 page)

Politics and War: the Conference of Luca

that this possibility was already in his mind. Up until the meeting at Luca political concerns occupied most of his attention, and afterwards he had the security of an additional five years of command, which meant that he was not pressed for time and so could afford to let the year pass without a grand offensive. Detachments of his army under the command of legates had anyway been active in a number of operations that were too small in scale to require the commander and his main force. In the autumn of 57 BC the
Twelfth
Legion under the command of Sulpicius Galba had attempted to occupy the Great St Bernard Pass, so keeping this route over the Alps secure for military convoys and commerce. The attempt failed and Galba was forced to withdraw. Other parts of the army spent the winter deep in Gallia Comata. Publius Crassus with the
Seventh
Legion was in the west, amongst tribes who had submitted to him late in the previous summer. The tribal leaders had obeyed the standard Roman request for hostages and everything seemed calm.16

At some point in the spring or early summer of 56 BC the mood of these western tribes changed. Roman officers despatched to the tribal centres to arrange for grain to be supplied to the army were seized and a message sent to Crassus saying that they would only be released when their own hostages were returned. It may simply have been that the locals had not at first appreciated that the Romans expected to stay and make continued demands for food, and that realisation swiftly turned to resentment. The first tribe to act were the Veneti, living in what is now southern Brittany. They were a maritime people, deeply involved in trade along the Atlantic coast. Dio claims that they had heard rumours of Caesar’s planned expedition to Britain and feared that this would disrupt their trade with the island, or throw open the markets there to competitors. To Caesar, and doubtless to his Roman audience, this was a rebellion, the tribes breaking the treaty that they had so recently accepted and taking his officers – several of whom were equestrians – as hostages. He gave orders for a fleet to be constructed on the Loire, before hurrying to the area. The rebellion had spread rapidly and he was afraid that other tribes might be tempted to join if they judged that the Romans were weak. This was because the Gauls as a race were ‘inclined to revolution and could readily be stirred to war’. He also acknowledged that like all mankind, they ‘deeply loved freedom and hated slavery’. Therefore he split his army into several independent columns. Labienus was left to watch over the Belgic tribes defeated in the previous year, while Crassus took twelve cohorts – probably the
Seventh
Legion reinforced with some additional troops – into Aquitania. A larger force of three legions under the command of Sabinus was sent to Normandy.17

265

pr oconsul 58–50 BC

Caesar himself led the remainder against the Veneti, striking at what he perceived to be the heart of the rebellion. The tribe was reluctant to form an army and face the legions in the open, so the Romans targeted their towns, many of which were built on coastal promontories. Although several of these were stormed, in each case the inhabitants escaped in ships, along with most of their possessions. The main strength of the tribe was its fleet, numbering some 280 ships according to Caesar, and only when the newly built Roman navy arrived was it possible to confront this. The Gallic vessels were big sailing ships, designed for trade more than war, but they still proved difficult propositions for the oared galleys that the Romans employed. The standard methods of naval fighting in the Mediterranean world were ramming and boarding. The first was ineffective against the thick timbered hulls of the Veneti’s ships, while the second was made extremely difficult by their high sides. The Roman fleet was led by Decimus Brutus, and through ingenuity and good fortune it managed to destroy the enemy navy in a single encounter. Devices similar to those used in sieges were made to cut through and pull down the enemy sails and rigging, but it was a sudden drop in the wind that left the Veneti becalmed and vulnerable, for their ships had no oars. Caesar and the bulk of the army were mere spectators to the action, watching from the shoreline. Without their fleet, and unable to resist Roman assaults on their towns and villages, the Veneti had no choice but to surrender.

No tribe allied to Rome seems to have come forward to plead their case and Caesar decided that his punishment would be harsh. Their entire ruling council – probably numbering several hundred – were beheaded, and the rest of the population of the tribe sold as slaves. It is doubtful that the entire region was depopulated, and the sheer practicalities of rounding up large numbers of people make it unlikely that all were found and dealt with in this way. It may only have been those men of military age who had been captured or surrendered who were sold. Nevertheless, it was clearly an appalling blow to the Veneti, removing all of their leaders and elders, along with a substantial chunk of the rest of the tribe. This can only have caused massive social and political dislocation. Caesar justified this terrible punishment by claiming that it was necessary to show that representatives or ambassadors ought to be accorded proper respect. Some scholars have rightly pointed out that officers sent to collect grain would not normally be classed as ambassadors. Yet Caesar’s attitude would have probably been shared by most contemporary Romans. His officers had been seized while visiting peoples who were supposed to be allied to Rome – he makes no mention of the men’s fate and 266

Politics and War: the Conference of Luca

whether or not any or all of them were recovered. The severe punishment meted out to the Veneti was a warning that no Romans – particularly senior officers and equestrians – could be mistreated without risking appalling consequences. Taking hostages from the tribes was an important way for Caesar to retain their loyalty, which was something demanded both of the communities who welcomed Rome and those who were defeated. The attempt to overturn the system by taking Roman prisoners could not be allowed to succeed. Therefore the punishment of the Veneti was deliberately appalling as a warning to others. The Roman attitude to such brutal measures was entirely pragmatic. Cruelty for its own sake was condemned, but atrocities that brought practical advantage to Rome’s position – and were inflicted on foreigners – were acceptable. An extreme example had been Crassus’ mass crucifixion of Spartacus’ followers in 71 BC. Whenever he felt that it was in his interest, Caesar was utterly ruthless.18

Labienus’ presence had ensured that there was no attempt to renew the war in that area. Both Crassus and Sabinus won victories in Aquitania and Normandy respectively. At the end of the summer Caesar personally led a force against the Menapii and Morini who lived along the coast of what is now the Pas de Calais and Belgium. The attack was prompted because they had never sent envoys to Caesar and acknowledged his and Rome’s power by seeking his friendship. Both tribes were believed to have contributed warriors to the great Belgic army that had taken the field in the previous year. They had no large towns and lived in scattered settlements. Even these were abandoned when the Romans advanced, and the population took their cattle, flocks and movable possessions and hid in the deep woodland and marshy areas of their country. It was difficult terrain for the Romans to operate in, and the legions had no fixed target to fight. They burned the villages and farms that they found, but this did not make the enemy give in. Then the legionaries began clearing areas of woodland and managed to capture some parties of the enemy along with their animals, but they also suffered losses in ambushes. It was a different type of warfare to the campaigns waged up to this point and little was achieved in the few weeks left of the campaigning season. As the weather closed in, Caesar withdrew leaving both tribes still undefeated. It was a failure, but not a major or irredeemable one. On balance the year had gone reasonably well, both in Gaul and especially with the resolution of affairs in Rome. Secure in his command, Caesar was free to plan major enterprises for the next summer. This was another reason for his harsh treatment of the Veneti. He may well already have selected Britain as his 267

pr oconsul 58–50 BC

next target, but it is possible that he once again had pondered turning his attentions to the Illyricum frontier. Either way, he needed to ensure that warfare would not erupt in Gaul while he and the bulk of the army were elsewhere. The savage punishment of a single rebellious tribe was a reminder that Caesar’s wrath was to be feared.19

268

XIII

‘Over the waters’:

The British and German

Expeditions, 55–54
BC

‘On the 24th October letters came through from my brother Quintus and from Caesar, dated 25th September and sent from the nearest place on the coast of Britain. Britain is subdued, hostages have been handed over, no plunder, but a tribute of money imposed, and they are bringing the army back over from Britain.’ –
Cicero, late October 54 BC
.1

‘The divine Julius was the first of the Romans to cross to Britain with an army. He cowed the inhabitants by winning a battle and got control of the coast. Yet it is fair to say that he did no more than show the island to his descendants, but did not bequeath it to them.’ –
Tacitus, c. AD 98
.2

In 56 BC the pace of operations in Gaul had slackened, but now Caesar was determined to regain the momentum of his first two years there. During the winter months he seems finally to have decided that Britain was to be his next target, if he had not in fact already done so. He claimed that this was a necessary task because the tribes of that island had sent military aid to the Gauls fighting against him. There were certainly close trading links between the coastal tribes of northern Gaul and the peoples on the other side of the Channel. In the past there may also have been political connections, but in his account of the defeat of the Veneti and other coastal tribes Caesar makes no mention of large-scale participation by the Britons. However, it was common amongst the tribes of northern Europe for individual warriors to seek employment with the famous chieftains of other tribes, and it may well be that some Britons had fought against Caesar’s legions in this way. Ultimately, the suggestion that the British tribes were a military threat to Rome’s interests in Gaul was no more than a pretext and Britain attracted 269

pr oconsul 58–50 BC

Caesar’s attention for other reasons. There were rumours of rich natural resources, which offered the prospect of a lucrative war. Suetonius claims that Caesar’s personal fondness for pearls was an additional incentive, for he believed – falsely as it turned out – that particularly fine examples were to be found on the British coasts. More important than the possibility of riches was the glory that always came to the man who was the first to lead a Roman army into previously unexplored countries. With Britain there was an added glamour because it lay across the sea, on the edge of the vast ocean that was believed to encircle the habitable lands of the globe. No Greek or Roman knew much about Britain and its peoples, and in the absence of facts wild stories of strange creatures and weird customs flourished, resembling in many ways the tales of the New World in the age of European exploration. A success in Britain was bound to grab the attention of Romans of all classes.3

Treachery and Massacre

As usual Caesar spent the winter in Cisalpine Gaul, and he was still there when news reached him of a new migration. Two Germanic tribes, the Usipetes and the Tencteri, had left their homes east of the Rhine and crossed the river into Gaul. Caesar claims that 430,000 people were on the move, which on the same proportion as the Helvetii of one warrior to three women, children or other dependants, would give a total force of over 100,000 fighting men. As always we should be very cautious about accepting such a number as meaning anything more precise than that ‘a substantial body of’ people were on the move. Most probably, like the Helvetii, the tribes moved not in a single massive column, but in many parties spread over a wide area. Once again, the cause of the migration was warfare and raiding, but in this case the two tribes were fleeing from the regular depredations of their larger and more powerful neighbours, the Suebi. This broad group of related tribes seems to have formed a loose confederation and was consistently depicted by Caesar as more ferocious – and therefore more dangerous – even than the other Germanic peoples. He claims that the tribes maintained vast numbers of warriors, half of whom were available for war every year. German tribes took pride in the amount of land around their boundaries that they kept free from settlement as a sign of their martial power and as a deterrent to any raiders. The
Commentaries
repeat a rumour, which Caesar does not bother to confirm or deny, that on one side of their land no other people dared to live within 600 miles of the Suebi. Yet although unable to cope with the 270

The British and Germ an E xpeditions, 55–54 bc

onslaught of their larger neighbours, the Usipetes and Tencteri remained warlike people, and were only briefly blocked by the Belgic Menapii, who held the river crossings against them. The Germans pretended to retire, marching eastwards for three days, but then sent their cavalry hastening back under cover of darkness to launch a surprise attack. The Menapii were fooled by the trick and dispersed, so that they were unable to mount any concerted resistance. Their boats were captured and used to ferry the migrants across the river. The two German tribes were able to subsist throughout the rest of the winter on the food they had seized from the Menapii, sheltering in the villages they had overrun.4

Caesar decided to rejoin the army earlier than usual. Before he arrived, the migrants had begun to move again, pushing south into the lands of the Eburones and Condrusi. The ensuing campaign very quickly became a source of controversy, with Caesar’s actions being publicly attacked in the Senate by Cato, who accused him of serious misconduct. Therefore, even more than usual, the account presented in the
Commentaries
was intended to defend his every move and show that he had behaved reasonably and honourably, as well as with his accustomed calm efficiency. Yet even his sternest critic would have conceded that the arrival of the two German tribes threatened Roman interests. In the last three years Caesar had spread Roman power throughout Gaul. The region was not as yet formally annexed as a province and the tribes continued to govern themselves, but virtually all openly or tacitly acknowledged Rome’s dominance. The Menapii were one of the few exceptions, and had yet to submit and give hostages to Caesar, but the Eburones and Condrusi had almost certainly done so in 57 BC. From the beginning the proconsul had emphasised his readiness to protect allied peoples from any enemy, making clear in each campaign both the advantages offered by alliance with Rome and the terrible punishment awaiting any who opposed its legions.