By All Means Necessary (39 page)

27
. Keith Bradsher, “China Restarts Rare Earth Shipments to Japan, ”
New York Times,
November 19, 2010.

28
. As quoted and reported in “Senkaku Islands Dispute Escalates as China Sends out Patrol Ships, ”
Associated Press,
September 11, 2012.

29
. As quoted in Ibid.

30
. As quoted in “China Issues White Paper on Diaoyu Dao, Asserting Indisputable Sovereignty, ”
Xinhua,
September 25, 2012,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/25/c_131872082.htm
.

31
. As described and reported in Chris Buckley, “China Denies Directing Radar at Japanese Naval Vessel and Copter, ”
New York Times
, February 8, 2013.

32
. Ibid. Full remarks from U.S. Department of State, “Daily Press Briefing, ” August 28, 2012,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/08/196986.htm#JAPAN
.

33
. Quote from transcript, U.S. Department of State, “Daily Press Briefing.”

34
. John H. Noer,
Choke Points: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia
, Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996), 31.

35
. Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
(May 2012), 37; and “Territorial Claims in South China Sea, ”
New York Times
, May 31, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/05/31/world/asia/Territorial-Claims-in-South-China-Sea.html
.

36
. Nong Hong,
UNCLOS and Ocean Dispute Settlement: Law and Politics in the South China Sea
(New York: Routledge, 2012), 16.

37
. Noer,
Choke Points
.

38
. As quoted in Ronald O'Rourke, “Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, ” Congressional Research Service, October 22, 2012, 7.

39
. Ibid.

40
. Kirk Spitzer, “New Garrison, Old Troubles in the South China Sea, ”
Time
, July 26, 2012,
http://nation.time.com/2012/07/26/new-garrison-old-troubles-in-the-south-china-seas/
.

41
. The term was not formally defined until 2009, when State Councilor Dai Bingguo stated it at the July 2009 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. “Closing Remarks for U.S.-China Security and Economic Dialogue, ” U.S. Department of State, July 28, 2009,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126599.htm
.

42
. “China Officially Labels Senkakus a ‘Core Interest, '”
Japan Times
, April 27, 2013.

43
. As described in Jane Perlez, “Alarm as China Issues Rules for Disputed Area, ”
New York Times
, December 1, 2012.

44
. Ibid. For an alternative expert interpretation, see M. Taylor Fravel, “Hainan's New Maritime Regulations: An Update, ”
Diplomat,
January 3, 2013.

45
. O'Rourke, “Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone, ” 4.

46
. Jörn Dosch, “The Spratly Islands Dispute: Order-Building on China's Terms?”
Harvard International Review
, August 18, 2011,
http://hir.harvard.edu/the-spratly-islands-dispute-order-building-on-china-s-terms
.

47
. “The South China Sea: A Maritime Hotspot, ” German Marshall Fund of the United States, June 6, 2012,
http://blog.gmfus.org/2012/06/06/the-south-china-sea-a-maritime-hotspot/
.

48
. Richard Bush, “Chinese and Japanese Geo-Strategic Interests in the East China Sea, ” in
Conference Report of CNA Maritime Asia Project Workshop One: The Yellow and East China Seas
, ed. Michael A. McDevitt and Catherine K. Lea (Center for Naval Analysis, May 2012).

49
. Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher Yung, Michael Swaine, and Andrew Nein-Dzu Yang, eds.,
The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles
, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), 61.

50
. J. E. Peterson, “Sovereignty and Boundaries in the Gulf States, ” in
International Politics of the Persian Gulf
, ed. Mehran Kamrava (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 40.

51
. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have both come to their own bilateral agreements with Russia regarding their maritime boundaries. Bernard A. Gelb, “Caspian Oil and Gas: Production and Prospects, ” Congressional Research Service, updated September 8, 2006. Iran and Turkmenistan, however, have resisted agreement. And the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which many would like to use in East Asia, applies only to waters accessible to all nations, not to
the landlocked Caspian. See Ben N. Dunlap, “Divide and Conquer? The Russian Plan for Ownership of the Caspian Sea, ”
Boston College International & Comparative Law Review
27, no. 1 (2004).

52
. As described in “U.N. to Consider Validity of China's Diaoyu Islands Claim, ”
Sina English
, January 25, 2013,
http://english.sina.com/world/2013/0124/553404.html
. According to the UN Committee on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, “The term ‘continental shelf' is used by geologists generally to mean that part of the continental margin which is between the shoreline and the shelf break or, where there is no noticeable slope, between the shoreline and the point where the depth of the superjacent water is approximately between 100 and 200 metres. However, this term is used in article 76 as a juridical term. According to the Convention, the continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the submerged prolongation of the land territory of the coastal State—the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. The continental margin consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise. It does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof.” See
United Nations Oceans and Law of the Sea
, “Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS): The Continental Shelf, ”
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/continental_shelf_description.htm#definition
.

53
. Guo and Katakey, “Disputed Islands.”

54
. As described in “U.N. to Consider Validity.”

55
. Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Annual Report to Congress
(May 2012), 37.

56
. Ibid.

57
. “Statement by Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert del Rosario on the UNCLOS Arbitral Proceedings Against China to Achieve a Peaceful and Durable Solution to the Dispute in the WPS, ”
http://www.gov.ph/2013/01/22/statement-the-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-on-the-unclos-arbitral-proceedings-against-china-january-22-2013/
; and Pia Lee-Brago, “China Rejects UN Arbitration on West Phl Sea, ”
Philippine Star
, February 20, 2013,
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:2o6SHHRXJwsJ:www.philstar.com/headlines/2013/02/20/910910/china-rejects-un-arbitration-west-phl-sea+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a
, accessed September 6, 2013.

58
. BP,
BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2012
(London: BP, June 2012), 20; and authors' calculations.

59
. Ibid.; and authors' calculations.

60
. Daniel Yergin,
The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World
(New York: Penguin Group, 2011), 47.

61
. Ibid.

62
. “Statement of Steven R. Mann, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, July 25, 2006 (henceforth Mann, Testimony).” As referenced in Stephen Blank, “U.S. Interests in Central Asia and the Challenges to Them, ” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2007, 3.

63
. Edward C. Chow and Leigh E. Hendrix, “Central Asia's Pipelines: Field of Dreams and Reality, ” National Bureau of Asian Research, September 2010, 34.

64
. Ramakant Dwivedi, “China's Central Asia Policy in Recent Times, ”
China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly
4, no. 4 (2006): 142.

65
. For concerns about spillover, see M. Taylor Fravel,
Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 160.

66
. Niklas Swanstrom, “China and Central Asia: A New Great Game or Traditional Vassal Relations?”
Journal of Contemporary China
14, no. 45 (November 2005): 571–572.

67
. “Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Charter, ”
Xinhua
, June 12, 2006, accessed September 5, 2013,
http://web.archive.org/web/20120414193018/http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/12/content_614628.htm
.

68
. Fravel,
Strong Borders, Secure Nation
.

69
. Ibid.

70
. “China Global Investment Tracker, ” Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/research/projects/china-global-investment-tracker-interactive-map
.

71
. “Update 2-CNPC, KazMunaiGas Buy MangistauMunaiGas for $2.6 bln, ”
Reuters
, November 25, 2009.

72
. Julie Jiang and Jonathan Sinton,
Overseas Investments by Chinese National Oil Companies: Assessing the Drivers and Impacts
, Information Paper (Paris: International Energy Agency, June 2011), 18.

73
. Jiang and Sinton,
Overseas Investments
, 18.

74
. Interview with industry expert, Washington, DC, October 22, 2010; and “Majors Play Waiting Game in Turkmenistan, ”
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly
, December 7, 2009. As attributed in Erica Downs,
Inside China, Inc: China Development Bank's Cross-Border Energy Deals
, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series, no. 3 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2011), 53.

75
. U.S. EIA, “China, ” Country Analysis Briefs, last updated September 4, 2012,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH
; and Marat Gurt, “China Asserts Clout in Central Asia with Huge Turkmen Gas Project,
Reuters
, September 4, 2013.

76
. Erica Downs, “Inside China, Inc: China Development Bank's Cross-Border Energy Deals, ” presentation at the Woodrow Wilson Center, January 13, 2012,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Inside%20China%20Inc-Erica%20Downs.pdf
, 13.

77
. Vladimir Socor, “Beijing Proposes Turkmenistan-China Gas Pipeline Through Northern Afghanistan, ”
Eurasia Daily Monitor
4, June 19, 2012,
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39510
.

78
. U.S. EIA, “Kazakhstan, ” Country Analysis Briefs, last updated September 18, 2012,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Kazakhstan/kazakhstan.pdf
; and BP,
Statistical Review of World Energy 2012
(London: BP, 2012),
www.bp.com/statisticalreview
.

79
. Adam Blinick, “The Kazakh-China Oil Pipeline: ‘A Sign of the Times, '” Working Paper No. 21, Center on China's Transnational Relations, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Working Paper No. 21 (2006); and “Background Information, ” Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLC, accessed August 2, 2013,
http://www.kcp.kz/en/information/
.

80
. “Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline Opens to Commercial Operation, ”
Xinhua
, July 21, 2006,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-07/12/content_639147.htm
; and Maria Golovnina, “Kazakhstan, China Agree on Pipeline from Caspian, ”
Reuters
, August 18, 2007,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/08/18/kazakhstan-china-idUKL1872705320070818
.

81
. U.S. EIA, “Kazakhstan.”

82
. U.S. EIA, “China”; and U.S. EIA, “Kazakhstan.”

83
. U.S. EIA, “China.”

84
. Ibid.

85
. Downs,
Inside China, Inc
, 1–2.

86
. John Roberts, “China, Turkmenistan Ink Loans-for-gas Deals; China to Lend $4 Billion to Ashgabat, to Get 40 Bcm/year of Gas, ” Platts Oilgram News, June 26, 2009. As cited in Downs, “Inside China, Inc.” (2011), 53. Chinese companies have completed other natural gas deals in connection with the CAGP. In 2011, CNPC and Uzebekistan completed an agreement for delivery of more than 1 bcf per day through a line that connects with the CAGP, and in 2010 Kazakhstan and China agreed to form a joint venture to construct another pipeline to join to the CAGP, which will add another 360 bcf per day from Kazakhstan to the CAGP. U.S. EIA, “China.”

87
. Stephen Blank, “China's Water Policies in Central Asia and Leadership Potential, ” CACI Analyst,
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
, November 26, 2009,
http://cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5223
.

88
. Jeremy Allouche, “The Governance of Central Asian Waters: National Interests Versus Regional Cooperation, ”
Disarmament Forum
, 52.

89
. UN Development Programme in Kazakhstan,
Water Resources of Kazakhstan in the New Millennium
, UNDPKAZ 07 (Almaty: LEM Printhouse, 2004), 41; “Aral Sea ‘One of the Planet's Worst Environmental Disasters, '”
Telegraph
, April 5, 2010; Blank, “China's Water Policies”; and Eric Hagt, “China's Water Policies: Implications for Xinjiang and Kazakhstan, ” CACI Analyst, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, July 30, 2003,
http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/8255-analytical-articles-caci-analyst-2003-7-30-art-8255.html
.