Brothers in Arms (142 page)

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Authors: Odd Arne Westad

Tags: #Political Science, #International Relations, #General, #test

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In the past we never spoke about this openly, because we were taking into account the situation you were in. We only mentioned that the disagreements which have arisen in the past few years in the international Communist movement were provoked by the violation of the Declaration of 1957 by comrades from several fraternal parties. . . . We have always considered and still consider that the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU put forward positions on the issues of war and peace, peaceful coexistence and peaceful transition which went against Marxism-Leninism. Especially serious are two issues: the issue of the so-called peaceful transition and the issue of the full, groundless denunciation of Stalin under the pretext of the so-called straggle with the cult of personality. . . .
Here I want just briefly to say the following: A criticism of some errors by Stalin is necessary; taking off the lid, so to speak, and ending superstition is a good thing. However, this criticism must be correct both from the point of view of principles and from the point of view of methods.
Since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, the facts demonstrate that the full, groundless denunciation of Stalin is a serious step undertaken by the leading comrades from the CPSU with the aim of laying out the path to the revision of Marxism-Leninism on a whole series of issues. . . . After the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, as a consequence of the so-called struggle against the cult of personality and the full, groundless denunciation of Stalin, a wave of anti-Soviet and anti-Communist campaigns was provoked around the whole world. . . . The most prominent events which took place in this period were the events in Poland and Hungary.
We have always considered and still consider that in resolving the issues connected with the events in Poland, the CPSU took a position of great-power chauvinism, trying to exert pressure on the Polish comrades and to subordinate them to itself by means of coercion and even tried to resort to military force. We consider that such a method is not only evidence of great-power chauvinism in relation to fraternal countries and to fraternal parties, but also evidence of adventurism.
Following this, the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Hungary took place. The Hungarian events by their character differ from the events in Poland. In resolving the issues associated with the events in Poland, which were issues of an internal order between fraternal parties and fraternal countries, the comrades in the CPSU resorted to coercive methods, even trying to resort to military force.
And what position did the CPSU take in regard to the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary? The leadership of the CPSU at one time tried to leave socialist Hungary to the mercy of fate. You know that at that time we spoke out against your position on the matter. Such a position was practically tantamount to capitulation. The course and details of these two events are well known to you and to us. I do not want to dwell on them. . . . After the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, beginning in 1956, at meetings of an internal kind, the leading comrades of our party criticized your errors in a moderate form more than once. In his statement Comrade Suslov said that we kept quiet for seven years. There

 

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are no grounds for [saying] that. In fact, both on the issue of Stalin and on the issue of the form of transition, that is, peaceful transition, the leaders of the CCP presented their views more than once to the leaders of the CPSU. And these views are well known to you. Back in April 1956, Comrade Mao Zedong stated our opinion on the issue of Stalin in a discussion with Comrade Mikoyan and also after that, in a discussion with Ambassador Comrade Iudin.
Comrade Mao Zedong emphasized that it is incorrect to think that "Stalin's errors and contributions are divided into equal halves"; "whatever happened, all the same Stalin's contributions are greater than his errors. One must evaluate it as follows, that his contributions make up 70 percent, and his mistakes 30 percent. It is necessary to make a concrete analysis and to give an all-around assessment. . . ." In October 1956, Comrade Zhou Enlai also stated our views about Stalin in a discussion with Comrade Ponomarev,
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who was then a member of the CPSU delegation present at the Eighth Congress of our [CCP] party. In discussion with Comrade Ponomarev, Comrade Zhou Enlai criticized the mistakes by comrades from the CPSU: first, ''no preliminary consultation was carded out with fraternal parties"; second, "an all-around historical analysis was completely lacking" in relation to Stalin; third, the leading comrades from the CPSU "lacked self-criticism." These are the three points which Comrade Zhou Enlai talked about.
On October 23, 1956, Comrade Mao Zedong again talked with Comrade Iudin about the issue of Stalin. Comrade Mao Zedong then said that it was necessary to criticize Stalin, but that in relation to the methods of criticism we hold a different opinion, and [we] also hold a different opinion about some other issues. Comrade Mao Zedong also said that you had completely renounced such a sword as Stalin, and had thrown away that sword. As a result, enemies had seized it in order to kill us. That is the same as if, having picked up a stone, one were to throw it on one's own feet.
On November 30, 1956, Comrade Mao Zedong again received Comrade Iudin and in a conversation with him said that the basic course and line in the period of Stalin's leadership was correct and that one must not treat one's comrade like an enemy.
On January 18, 1957, in Moscow, at the fifth discussion with the government delegation of the Soviet Union, Comrade Zhou Enlai touched on the events in Hungary, noting that the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary was connected, on the one hand, with some mistakes committed by Stalin when resolving issues of mutual relations between fraternal parties and fraternal countries, and, on the other hand, was connected with mistakes committed by the leadership of the CPSU in its criticism of Stalin. In discussion Comrade Zhou Enlai again set out the aforementioned three points on this issue to the
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Boris Ponomarev, head of the International Department of the CC CPSU Secretariat.

 

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leadership of the CPSU: the lack of an all-around analysis, the lack of self-criticism, and the lack of consultation with the fraternal countries.
Both Comrade Mao Zedong on the October 29, 1957, on the eve of his departure for Moscow, in a conversation with Comrade Iudin, and Comrade Zhou Enlai during the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU in 1961, in a conversation with Comrade Khrushchev, stated our opinion on the issue of Stalin.
It should be further noted that when the events in Poland arose, Comrade Liu Shaoqi, heading the delegation of the CCP, arrived in Moscow for negotiations, during which he also talked about the issue of Stalin and criticized comrades from the CPSU for committing the same mistakes during the events in Poland, [those] mistakes of great-power chauvinism which took place during Stalin's leadership as well. . . . From that very time, you, considering that your internal problems have already been resolved, started to direct the cutting edge of your action against Marxism-Leninism against fraternal parties defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism and began to engage in activities directed against the CCP, against the PRC, and these activities are of a serious character.
What has been done by you over this period? Let us cite some of the facts, so as to make things clear.
From April to July of 1958 the CPSU put to China the issue of the creation of a long-wave radar station and a joint fleet, trying thereby to bring China under its military control. But we guessed your intentions and you were not able to attain your goals.
Following that you started both in statements and in actions to carry out anti-Chinese activities in an intensified manner. You continually spoke out attacking the internal policies of the CCP, in particular on the People's Communes. By way of example one can refer to the conversation by Comrade Khrushchev with the American Congressman [Hubert] Humphrey in December 1958 and to the speech by Comrade Khrushchev in a Polish agricultural cooperative in July 1959.
In June 1959 you unilaterally annulled the agreement on rendering help to China in developing a nuclear industry and in producing atom bombs.
Following this, on September 9, 1959, TASS made an announcement about the incident on the Chinese-Indian border and displayed bias in favor of the Indian reaction, making the disagreements between China and the Soviet Union clear to the whole world for the first time.
In November of that year Comrade Khrushchev openly accused China of having acted "stupidly" and "regrettably" in a conversation with a correspondent of the Indian daily
New Age.
At the last meeting at Camp David which was held in September 1959, Comrade Khrushchev began to preach to the whole world about a "world without arms, without armies, without wars," made the leader of American imperialism (look good in all sorts of different ways), considered peaceful coexistence the task of all tasks, and propagan-

 

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dized the idea that, supposedly, the American-Soviet friendship decides the fate of humanity.
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All of this practically signified a sermon to the effect that the nature of imperialism had already changed, that Marxism-Leninism was already obsolete.
During this very period you started to propagandize the so-called "spirit of Camp David" everywhere. Incidentally, [President Dwight D.] Eisenhower did not recognize the existence of any "spirit of Camp David."
During this very period you, counting on some "spirit of Camp David," clutched at the straw extended by Eisenhower and began mounting attacks upon China in your statements without restraint.
On September 30, 1959, in his speech at a banquet held by us on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the creation of the PRC, Comrade Khrushchev stated that one must not test the firmness of a capitalist power with force.
On October 6, 1959, in his speech in Vladivostok, Comrade Khrushchev stated that allegedly we were looking for war, like cocks for a fight.
On October 31, 1959, in his report to the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Comrade Khrushchev said that some, similarly to Trotsky, want "neither war nor peace."
On December 1, 1959, in his speech at the Seventh Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, Comrade Khrushchev demanded "a checking of watches." In that same speech he stated that "if the leadership of this or that country becomes conceited, then that can play into the hands of the enemy."
In February 1960 during the meeting of the Political Consultative Council of the participating countries of the Warsaw Pact, Comrade Khrushchev spoke rudely using an expression like "old galoshes." Meanwhile, the CC CPSU in its oral presentation to the CC CCP accused China of committing such mistakes as a "narrowly nationalist approach" and of acting on "narrowly nationalist interests,'' in relation to the issues of the Indian-Chinese border.
The meaning of all these statements and speeches is understood by you and by us, and also by our enemies. . . . In such circumstances we could not remain silent any longer. We published three articles "Long Live Leninism!" and others, in which we defended Marxism-Leninism and the Moscow Declaration, and exposed some revisionist and opportunist views to criticism. But in these three articles, we as before directed the brunt of our struggle for the most part against imperialism and Yugoslav revisionism without open criticism of comrades from the CPSU. Following this, such events occurred as the intrusion of the American "U-2" plane into USSR air space, the collapse of the meeting of the heads of government of the four powers in Paris, and the collapse
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Khrushchev and Eisenhower met at the U.S. president's country retreat (Camp David) during the Soviet leader's visit.

 

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