Authors: Christopher Simpson
Chapter Eleven
1 | Fletcher Prouty interview, April 12, 1984. See also Fletcher Prouty, |
2 | Prouty interview, April 12, 1984. For archival documentation on this point, see JIC 634/1, “Joint Intelligence Committee: Vulnerability of Soviet Bloc Armed Forces to Guerrilla Warfare,” September 8, 1953 (top secret), now available on microfilm through University Publications of America, |
3 | “Subject: Evaluation of Effect on Soviet War Effort Resulting from the Strategic Air Offensive,” June 1, 1949 (top secret), Box 9, Tab 67-OSD, Hot Files, RG 319, NA, Washington, D.C., declassified following author's review request. On this point, see also “Dir of Log to Dir of P&O, Subject: JCS 1920/1,” March 1, 1949, P&O 350 06 TS through 381 FLR TS, 1949 Hot File, RG 319, NA, Washington, D.C. |
4 | On Labor Service units, see For data in footnote concerning USSR use of Labor Service units, see Central Intelligence Agency, “Memorandum for Mr. John D Hickerson, Department of State,” November 19, 1947 (secret), 861.20262/11â1947 RG 59, NA, Washington, D.C. For Nazi use of Labor Service groups, see B. Dmytryshyn, “The Nazis and the SS Volunteer Division âGalicia,'” |
On Special Forces secrecy discussed in the text and footnote, see Paddock, op cit., p. 194, n.84, and p. 196ff., n. 13, 14, 17, and 26. See also
Newsweek
January 21, 1952). Paddock also offers an excellent discussion of interservice rivalry over the Special Forces on pp. 131â42. He does not, however, clarify the Special Forces' role in nuclear war planning, perhaps because of lingering security restrictions. On interservice rivalry: Colonel Charles M. Simpson,
Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years
(Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1983), pp. 17, 21, 48, and 53; also Prouty interview, April 12, 1984. On continuum of prewar psychological warfare programs with postnuclear guerrilla operations, see “Comments on Proposal for Establishment of a Guerrilla Warfare Group, Appendix âB,'” pp. 2â4 (top secret), Hot Files, RG 319, NA, sanitized version in collection of author, and NSC 20, loc. cit.
5 | U.S On Zegners, see “Aplilciba 1941 y 20 Augusta,” “Aplilciba 18 Dec. 1941,” and “RIGAER E-G der Sicherheitspolizei den 7 Okt. 1942 Nr.1098,” copies in author's collection, which document Zegners's role in the Latvian security police in Riga. |
6 | The American colonel quoted in the text spoke with the author on the condition he not be identified. |
7 | For record of Busbee's correspondence, see “Item 1, 2 February 1951” and “Item 1, 27 April 1951,” European Command Labor Services Division Classified Decimal File, 1950â51 (secret), now at RG 338, NA, Suitland, Md.; and |
8 | Labor Service History |
9 | On Albanian unit, see |
10 | “Geheimorganisation des Bundes Deutscher Jugend in Hessen Ausgehoben,” |
11 | “âPartisans' in Germany: An Arms Dump in the Odenwald,” |
12 | “German Saboteurs Betray U.S. Trust,” |
13 | “German Socialist Fears Subversion,” |
14 | Thomas Braden interview, September 12, 1984; Meyer, op. cit. |
15 | Select Committee [Church Committee] to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, |
16 | Military Intelligence Division, “History of the Military Intelligence Division, 7 December 1941â1 September 1945,” |
17 | Colonel R. W. Porter to Major General R. C. Lindsay et al., “Psychological Warfare Study for Guidance in Strategic Planning,” with annex, March 11, 1948 (top secret), P&O 091.42 TS (Section I, Cases 1â7), Hot Files, RG 319, NA, Washington, D.C. On this point, see also JIC 634/1, Reel 7, frame 0184ff., particularly Paragraph 5c, “Command of MVD Security Units.” “The command of MVD security troops is extremely centralized,” the JIC recommendation states. “[T]herefore, [MVD] headquarters would be profitable targets. The higher the MVD official that could be removed, the greater the loss of security control, and the greater the intimidation of other officials.” For an intriguing study of the “benefits” of systematic assassination of America's political opponents, see Captain John T. Stark, |
18 | Wisner correspondence with the INS, 1951, as reproduced in John Loftus, |
19 | Church Committee Report |
20 | Prouty interview, April 12, 1984. For information on the “medical experiments” discussed in footnote, see John Marks, |
21 | John S. Guthrie memorandum for the secretary, Security Control Section, JIG, “Subject: Assignment of Code Word,” December 8, 1947 (top secret), (for Hagberry) and November 21, 1947 (for Lithia), both in 1946â1948 Decimal File, P&O 311.5 TS (Section II), 1948, RG 319, NA, Washington, D.C. |
22 | Maris Cakars and Barton Osborn, “Operation Ohio,” |
More recently the CIA has sidestepped objections to its role in the murder of political opponents by defining “assassination” so narrowly as to be meaningless in most circumstances. Although the CIA's use of assassination is barred by a presidential order, in 1985 there came to light a CIA
Psychological Warfare Manual
, prepared for anti-Communist Nicaraguan rebels, in which the agency directs its client soldiers to employ “selective use of violence” to “neutralize” Nicaraguan officials such as local and regional leaders, doctors, judges, and police. The CIA manual also suggests hiring professional criminals to carry out “selective jobs” against local Nicaraguan government officials and sympathizers and advocates murdering other anti-Communist sympathizers in order to create “martyrs.” When U.S. congressional hearings were held on the matter, the former chief of CIA clandestine operations in Latin America, Dewey Claridge, testified that these murders were not “assassinations” and therefore not barred by the presidential order. According to Claridge, “these events don't constitute assassinations because as far as we are concerned assassinations are only those of heads of state.” The (U.S.) National Council of Teachers of English awarded its 1985 “Doublespeak” Awards to both Claridge and the CIA itself as “an appropriate form of recognition” for the agency's “misuse of public language”; see National Council of Teachers of English,
Quarterly Review of Doublespeak
(January 1986), p. 2.
23 | Franklin Lindsay interview, January 25, 1985. |
24 | Church Committee Report For data on Soviet use of assassination discussed in footnote, see, for example, CIA, “Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnapping,” loc. cit., “16 Anti-Communist Leaders Died the Death of Bandera,” |
25 | For biographic material on Pash: Boris Pash interview, February 1985; and Pash, op. cit., for World War II role and photos. For role in Oppenheimer case, see James Reston, “Dr. Oppenheimer Is Barred from Security Clearance, Though âLoyal,' âDiscreet,'” |
26 | For documentation of Pash's role in Bloodstone, see SANACC 395, Document 8 (SANA 6024: Appointment of Committee), April 15, 1948 (secret). On assassination as a designated Bloodstone mission, see Joint Strategic Plans Committee, JSPC 862/3, loc. cit. |
27 | Church Committee Report |
28 | Pash interview, February 1985. |
29 | SANACC 395 Document 8 (SANA 6024: Appointment of Committee), April 15, 1948 (secret), and |
30 | Church Committee Report |
31 | Ibid, p. 130. |
32 | Pentagon document: JSPC 862/2, loc. cit., Appendix “C,” pp. 27, 35. Pash: SANACC 395 Document 8 (SANA 6024: Appointment of Committee), April 15, 1948, and |
33 | Corson, op. cit., p. 361. |