Blowback (54 page)

11
.

Interview with Benjamin Ferencz, July 20, 1984.

On postwar work with Augsburg and Hirschfield incident, see “Special Interrogation Report No. 65,” File CI-SIR/66, subject: Barbie, Klaus (top secret), p. 4, Tab 29 of Ryan,
Barbie Exhibits
. East German claims against Six can be found in Albert Norden,
Brown Book, War and Nazi Criminals in West Germany
(DDR Documentation Center of State Archives Administration, Verlag Zeit im Bild, German Democratic Republic), pp. 79–80.

12
.

On need for specific approval by Clemency Board, see Charles Thayer, “Inquiries Concerning War Criminals,” p. 6 (n.d.) in Thayer Papers, at Truman Library. On Six's clemency by McCloy, see
New York Times
, October 4, 1952.

On Six's defense testimony on behalf of Eichmann mentioned in footnote, see
New York Times
, May 3, 1961, p. 14; May 15, 1961, p. 16.

On Six's work for Porsche: Hilberg, op. cit., p. 713. Eichmann's work for Daimler-Benz:
Eichmann Interrogated
, loc. cit., p. 283.

13
.

Dr. Emil Augsburg: For “Jew-baiting,” see Augsburg's records at the Berlin Document Center, SS No. 307925, NSDAP No. 5,518, 743. On “special tasks,” see Augsburg, “Beforderungsvorichlag: Hauptsturmführer Dr. Emil Augsburg,” July 10, 1941, Document No. 23009–23010. See also interrogation of Six and Mahnke, loc. cit.

14
.

On Augsburg's work for SS General Bernau and other employers, see “Subject: Merk, Kurt,” November 16, 1948, HQ CIC Region IV to HQ 7970th CIC Group, EUCOM, p. 2 (secret), Tab 33, Ryan,
Barbie Exhibits
. On Barbie connection, “Dr. Althaus” alias, etc., see Tabs 9, 18, 29, and 33 of Ryan,
Barbie Exhibits
. A sanitized version of Augsburg's CIC dossier is available through the FOIA at U.S. Army INSCOM; see File No. XE004390 16B036, Augsburg, Emil (secret). On wartime activities, including role in killing squads, see source note 13, above. Allan Ryan has told the author that he believes Augsburg also worked for British intelligence during 1947.

On Wannsee director Dr. Mikhail Akhmeteli, discussed in footnote: Akhmeteli's NSDAP Card No. 5360858, as well as some captured correspondence with SS General Berger, is available through the Berlin Document Center. On Akhmeteli's wartime role, see interrogation of Six and Mahnke, loc. cit.; interrogation of Schellenberg, loc. cit. (Schellenberg's testimony offers the physical description of Akhmeteli.) Secondary sources include: Alwin Ramme,
Der Sicherheitsdienst der SS
(Berlin: Deutscher Militarverlag, 1969?), pp. 95–97; Peter Kleist,
Zwischen Hitler und Stalin
(Bonn: Athenaum Verlag, 1950), pp. 134–35; and (in English) Dallin,
German Rule
, loc. cit., pp. 170n, 323n., and 357. On race theory, see Armstrong, op. cit., p. 574. On early life, see Höhne and Zolling, op. cit., pp. 368–69. On relationship with Gehlen, see Cookridge, op. cit., pp. 242 and 311.

15
.

On Augsburg's work for Gehlen: Hohne and Zolling, op. cit., p. 199; Cookridge, op. cit., pp. 194 and 242.

1
.

Arthur Macy Cox interview, June 7, 1984.

2
.

Cookridge, op. cit., pp. 158 and 161. Dulles quote: Höhne and Zolling, op. cit., p. xv.

3
.

Rositzke comments: For “virtually empty,” see Harry A. Rositzke,
The CIA's Secret Operations
(New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977), p. 20. For “primary role” comment: Harry Rositzke interview, January 16, 1985.

4
.

W. Park Armstrong interview, June 17, 1983. On “retyping reports,” see Cookridge, op. cit., p. 201. Höhne comment: Höhne and Zolling, op. cit., p. 107, or see original
Spiegel
series in spring and summer 1971.

5
.

Marchetti interview, June 7, 1984.

6
.

Cox comments, December 15, 1983.

7
.

The author is indebted to Matthew A. Evangelista's study, “Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised,”
International Security
(Winter 1982–1983), p. 110ff., from which a number of pertinent points in this section have been drawn. On railroads, see Evangelista, op. cit, pp. 120–23; on Soviet dependence on horse-drawn transport discussed in footnote, see ibid., p. 121; E. O'Ballance,
The Red Army
(London: Faber & Faber, 1964), p. 192; and Dr. Allen F. Chew, “Fighting the Russians in Winter, Three Case Studies,” U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,
Leavenworth Papers
, December 1981, pp. 35–41. On 1946 estimates, see JWPC 432/7, “Tentative Over-all Strategic Concept and Estimate of Initial Operations—Pincher,” June 18, 1946 (top secret), cited in Evangelista's study.

8
.

On MIS/OSS rivalry see, for example, Anthony Cave Brown,
The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan
(New York: Vintage, 1982), pp. 305–07.

9
.

For “opportunist” quote, see “Memorandum For: Chief of Staff, United States Army, Subject: Grombach, John V.,” from James L. Collins, Acting Deputy AC of S for Intelligence, July 5, 1967 (confidential), in Grombach Dossier, No. 81177870, U.S. Army INSCOM, Fort Meade, Md.

For an overview of Grombach's career, including his accomplishments in sports, see Grombach's obituary in the West Point alumni magazine
Assembly
(June 1983), p. 132. NB: Grombach, who was born of French parents, was christened Jean Valentin Grombach. In his adult life, however, he generally preferred to use the form “John Valentine Grombach,” which is what is used in this text.

10
.

INSCOM Dossier No. 81177870 is the best single source of documentation on Grombach's professional career. See particularly “Summary of Information (SR 380–320-10)” reports for the following dates and subjects: “G-2 SPS Grombach, John Valentine,” June 1, 1955 (top secret); “N. V. Philips Co.,” June 1, 1955 (top secret); “Grombach, John V.,” September 23, 1958 (confidential); and memo from Brigadier General Richard Collins, director of plans, programs, and security to ASCoSI, Subject: Grombach, John Valentine, September 30, 1958 (secret). On Philips's role, see Grombach letter to Colonel George F. Smith, April 12, 1950, and Collins report of September 5, 1958 (secret). For quote on “pro-Marxist personnel,” the purges of OSS R&A, and the Grombach-OSS R&A conflict generally, see “G-2 SPS Grombach, John Valentine,” June 1, 1955 (top secret), and the April 12, 1950, Grombach letter to Colonel George F. Smith. On Katyn Forest massacre dispute, see Brigadier General Richard Collins memo of September 30, 1958.

On Duran case, see David Oshinsky,
A Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy
(New York: Free Press-Macmillan, 1983), p. 126, and David Caute,
The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), pp. 331–38. Grombach later claimed it had been he who first discovered the “Communist connections” of Carl Marzani, Alger Hiss, John Stewart Service, and several other well-known targets of 1940s security investigations.

For Grombach's comments discussed in footnote, see John V. Grombach,
The Great Liquidator
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1980), p. xvii. The aim of this book, Grombach writes, was to “convince the U.S. public that subversion and clandestine espionage activities cannot be controlled by normal,
legal, and proper methods. The current limitations placed on both the CIA and FBI,” he continues, “would more properly fit a Boy Scout organization” (p. xviii).

11
.

On Project 1641, ibid., pp. xvii-xviii, 109, and 114; Lyman Kirkpatrick interview, April 11, 1984; and “G-2 SPS Grombach, John Valentine,” June 1, 1955 (top secret), and the April 12, 1950, Grombach letter to Colonel George F. Smith.

12
.

On resignation of McCormack and its significance, see William R. Corson,
The Armies of Ignorance
(New York: Dial/James Wade, 1977), p. 272; and Smith,
OSS
, pp. 364–66.

13
.

Interview with retired officer of the Office of National Estimates (ONE), June 30, 1986.

14
.

Lukacs comments: John Lukacs, “The Soviet State at 65,”
Foreign Affairs
(Fall 1986), pp. 27–29. Hohne on “alarm signal”: Höhne and Zolling, op. cit., pp. 100, 106–07.

15
.

Cable “.340: The Berlin Situation” (top secret),
Clay Papers
, vol. II, pp. 568–69. On Czech spring crisis, see Daniel Yergin,
Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), pp. 343–54.

16
.

Clay Papers
, pp. 568–69. See also Lucius Clay,
Decision in Germany
(Garden City; N.Y.: Doubleday, 1950), pp. 345–55.

17
.

On effects of Clay's (and Gehlen's) “alarm”:
Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 2d Session, 1976, hereinafter cited as
Church Committee Report
, book IV, p. 29; Yergin, op. cit., pp. 351–54; and interview with retired officer of the Office of National Estimates, June 30, 1986. The key role of these warnings in the political events that followed is also noted in Steven L. Rearden,
The Formative Years
, vol. 1 of
History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
, ed. Alfred Goldberg (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, OSD, Department of Defense, 1984), p. 281ff.

On supposed Soviet military superiority in early postwar Europe, see, for example (on “mobile spearhead” and estimate of divisions), Evangelista, op. cit., pp. 114–16; and JIC Report, December 2, 1948, p. 2, noted in Evangelista. Also Marchetti interview, June 7, 1984. For document quoted in footnote, see “Memorandum for Chief of Staff US Army, Subject: Soviet Intentions and Capabilities 1949–1956/57,” January 4, 1949 (top secret), in Hot Files, Box 9, Tab 70, RG 319, NA, Washington, D.C.

18
.

Evangelista, op. cit., pp. 112 and 115. For
U.S. News
quote, see “Russia's Edge in Men and Arms,”
U.S. News & World Report
(April 2, 1948), pp. 23–25.

19
.

Paul Nitze, “NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered,”
International Security
(Spring 1980), pp. 170–76, noted in Evangelista, op. cit., p. 112.

20
.

Marchetti interview, June 7, 1984.

For role of “human sources” discussed in text, see
EUCOM Annual Report 1954
, pp. 128–32, 145, 148, and 485–88 (secret), Adjutant General's Office Command Report Files 1949–1954, RG 407, NA, Suitland, Md. For popular summaries on intelligence gathering using these methods, including some statistics, see James P. O'Donnell, “They Tell Us Stalin's Secrets,”
Saturday
Evening Post
(May 3, 1952), p. 32; same author and magazine, “These Russians Are on Our Side” (June 6, 1953); also Höhne and Zolling, op. cit., pp. 94 and 107–08; and Cookridge, op. cit., p. 201. For Richard Bissell comment on the ineffectiveness of human source intelligence in totalitarian societies, see Leonard Mosley,
Dulles
(New York: Dial Press, 1978), p. 374.

On missile gap discussed in footnote: Marchetti interview, June 7, 1984. Rositzke disagrees with Marchetti on this point, arguing that German intelligence on Soviet rocket programs was generally good; see Rositzke, op. cit., p. 20. H. A. R. (“Kim”) Philby, a Soviet double agent who penetrated the British Secret Intelligence Service, expressed his opinion of Gehlen's effectiveness after Philby had defected to the USSR. “I knew about the Gehlen unit from the summer of 1943 onwards …” he commented in 1977. “It seemed to be no better than the other sections of the
Abwehr
, which means it was very bad indeed. No exaggeration, no joke.' So I was undismayed when CIA took it over.” See Philby's April 7, 1977, letter to author Leonard Mosley published in Mosley, op. cit., pp. 493–96.

Dornberger's role in the missile gap affair is noted in John Prados,
The Soviet Estimate
(New York: Dial, 1982), p. 61, which offers a consistently valuable presentation of the intelligence estimation process.

21
.

Marchetti interview, June 7, 1984.