War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa 1941-1942 (34 page)

The Soviets, sensing this weakness, attacked the outside of the Smolensk ring to exploit the vulnerability. The attempts, however, were unco-ordinated and lacked tactical sophistication. But in terms of naked aggression and totally uncompromising resistance, the Panzer divisions were sustaining punishment far beyond that meted out by any foe thus far in the war. Von Bock lamented the appearance of new Russian build-ups, ‘in many places they have tried to go over to the attack’ even as he closed the Smolensk pocket. ‘Astonishing for an opponent who is so beaten,’ he admitted, ‘they must have unbelievable masses of material, for even now the field units still complain about the powerful effect of the enemy artillery.’
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The next day the Smolensk pocket was sealed.

The battle continued for another 14 days. At its height the Wehrmacht fielded elements of 32 divisions consisting of two Panzergruppen with 16 Panzer and motorised (and one cavalry) divisions and 16 infantry divisions. This was 60% of the fighting power of Army Group Centre. Some 50% of its strength had been Bialystok-Minsk encirclement perimeters between 24 June and 8 July. The same troops had then to march further eastward to embrace the even greater Kessel at Smolensk and participate in the battle that raged between 11 July and 10 August. Trapped inside were the Soviet Sixteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Armies. By 8 July OKH calculated it had destroyed 89 of 164 Russian divisions identified.
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At this point Blitzkrieg momentum had petered out. There were no further German formations of appreciable operational size available to continue eastward until this pocket was annihilated. Breathtaking though the victories were, the price was now becoming apparent, even to the highest commanders at the front.

Two days after the closure of the Smolensk pocket, von Bock noted in his diary that ‘powerful Russian attacks are in progress on almost the entire front of Ninth Army’ and that ‘40 batteries [of artillery] have been counted at one place opposite its eastern front’. A Soviet penetration was even reported south of Beloye. ‘The fact is,’ concluded von Bock, ‘that our troops are tired and are also not exhibiting the required steadiness because of heavy officer casualties.’
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The German Army at the end of July was beginning to conclude the vast battles of encirclement that had been designed to destroy Soviet forces in western Russia. Only now was the Pyrrhic nature of this achievement becoming apparent, hidden within sensational Sondermeldungen at home.

On 21 July, 7th Panzer Division reported a strength of 118 tanks, which indicated 166 had been knocked out (although 96 of these were under repair).
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One battalion of Panzer Regiment 25 was temporarily broken up to keep the other two at effective strength. Most of the tank crews survived. It is interesting to compare the lot of Panzers and infantry fighting in the same formation.

Panzer gunner Karl Fuchs was exuberant prior to the battle of Smolensk. ‘Our losses have been minimal and our success great,’ he wrote to his wife Madi. ‘This war will be over soon, because already we are fighting against only fragmented opposition.’
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Six days later he wrote:

‘For the time being I am in a safe spot. If only I had some water to wash myself! The dirt and the dust cause my skin to itch and my beard is growing longer and longer. Wouldn’t you like to kiss me now! I am sure you can see the dirt on the paper on which I write.’

On 15 July he anticipated, ‘I would imagine that within eight to ten days this campaign will be over.’ Soldiers often prefer to offer a sanitised version of experiences writing to their families. They confirm they are alive and in good health and generally like to predict future prospects with some optimism. Karl Fuchs was typical of the soldiers of his generation. Two days later he exuberantly described how:

‘Yesterday I participated in my 12th attack. Some of these attacks were more difficult than others. With 12 attacks under my belt, I have now caught up with the boys who had a head start in France! You can imagine that I’m very proud of this achievement.’
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Fuchs wrote what he thought his wife would expect to read. The rotation of tank crews for rest referred to ‘in a safe spot’ was likely the result of tank casualties and battle fatigue. Diary entries, expressed in private and only selectively released, are often more frank. An infantry officer serving in Fuch’s division wrote more candidly the following week:

‘The faces of the youngsters exude the same image as First World War veterans. Long beards and the filth of these days make many of them look older than is the case in reality. Despite the pleasure at sudden Russian withdrawals, one notices this change in the faces of the soldiers. Even after washing again and shaving the chin – something difficult to describe is from now on different! The first days at Yartsevo have certainly left an impression.’
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Panzer Regiment 7 was deployed at the eastern end of the Smolensk pocket, directly in the path of Russian divisions attempting to escape. General Halder caustically commented in his diary:

‘Four [
German
] divisions are advancing eastward from the west, pushing the enemy against the eastern block formed by only four battalions of the 7th Panzer Division which is also being attacked by the enemy from the east. We need hardly be surprised if 7th Panzer Division eventually gets badly hurt.’
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The Panzergrenadier Regiment ‘Grossdeutschland’ was under similar pressure. Repeated surprise encounters in confused situations caused a steady drain of casualties. Commanders had to react to swift situation changes with no clear information about the enemy. It produced a cumulative toll.

‘No one could say during the advance whether one would see heavy fighting within the next hour, or whether Russian troops would be on the roads during the hours of darkness. This constant tension strained men’s nerves to breaking point. The resulting over-exertion left them somewhat indifferent, almost resigned to accept everything as it arose. It also explains the losses among officers and NCOs, which were dreadfully high at the outset of the campaign.’
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It was to get worse. From 23 July the Ist Battalion ‘Grossdeutsch-land’ Regiment fought defensive battles near Yelnya and Smolensk along the Kruglowka railway embankment. For five days the unit was attacked by masses of Russian infantry desperate to flee the pocket. ‘GD’ grenadiers were generally paired to each foxhole. The official historian relates how ‘many spent the day next to a dead comrade. No one could help the wounded while it was still daylight.’ At night the dead were laid out behind a shack wall to the rear of the position.

‘They had all died from head or chest wounds. That meant all were standing in their holes and firing at the enemy when they were hit. In so doing they had to expose their upper torsos or at least their heads. They knew the likely consequence of this. Can a man do more, or be stronger?’

At night they heard calls, shouts and the clatter of vehicles as the enemy manoeuvred in preparation for fresh assaults. During the fourth night of the defence the battalion was informed it could not be relieved. They had to hold on for longer, because infantry units earmarked to relieve them were needed elsewhere.

‘Now what were we going to do? Several Grenadiers overheard the message. Their reaction was “Man, that’s totally impossible.” The tension mounted. It spread through the position like poison. Several men wept, others immediately fell asleep. Most sat still in their holes. Our eyes were red from the heat, smoke and lack of sleep.’

The relief delay resulted in a number of Russian penetrations during the heavy fighting that continued in all company sectors. Russians shared holes with dead grenadiers in trenches often only 20m away from the surviving German outposts. Eventually during the night of 26/27 July, after five days of uninterrupted fighting, the remnants of the battalion were withdrawn behind a German machine gun battalion that set up a new line 1,000m behind them. One company, the second, lost 16 dead and 24 wounded. Elements from three Russian divisions had been attacking in their sector. Despite this temporary reprieve the regiment was kept in the line a further 23 days.

On 5 August 1941 Generalfeldmarschall von Bock announced the conclusion of the battle at the Dnieper, Dvina and Smolensk. The trapped Russian divisions were destroyed. Booty, he announced, included 309,110 prisoners, 3,205 captured or destroyed tanks, 3,000 guns and 341 aircraft, and the count was still going on.
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The announcement was of scant interest to the remaining soldiers of the ‘Grossdeutschland’, finally pulled out of the line for a much needed, albeit brief, rest.

‘We lay in the meadow dozing in sunshine and relishing every breath… Within eight days we would be in a hole again in combat and perhaps in 14 days already dead. But nobody was crippled by such thoughts. Instead we lived life more consciously, also more simply. We just lived. In contrast, in peacetime one merely passed the days.’
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For the German infantry, these weeks and days were becoming increasingly short.

‘A terrible misfortune has befallen this country,’ announced Ina Konstantinova to her diary in mid-July. ‘The Germans are already so near… They are bombing Leningrad and Mozhaisk. They are advancing toward Moscow.’ A sense of foreboding was now beginning to erode the initial popular emotion and outraged patriotism that had accompanied the invasion. ‘How troubled our life has become!’ wrote Konstantinova. Aircraft were constantly taking-off from the nearby Kashin airfield north-east of Moscow. Military detachments of tanks and anti-aircraft guns were observed moving through the streets. Things were different. ‘Even the atmosphere has changed somehow,’ she lamented. ‘What does the future hold in store for us?’
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Her concern was echoed by Soviet staff officer Ivan Krylov:

‘Smolensk! Smolensk in danger. The way to Moscow, the great highway followed by the army of Napoleon, was once again the invasion artery. But it was only 10 July, hardly three weeks from the beginning of hostilities. I began to think that the fighting abilities of our forces must be lower than… imagined.’
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Russian units were retreating in front of an apparently inexorable German advance. Common to any examination of Soviet military staff documents covering this early period is recognition of the stultifying impact of Luftwaffe air attacks, a dearth of knowledge of the actual limit of German advances and confusion following on from a total breakdown of communications with alarming reports of appalling losses. Commander Fourth Army reported to the commander of the Western Front as early as 30 June that:

‘All my resources are exhausted. I ordered to hold to the last, but there is no certainty that the line will be held.’

As his XXXXVIIth Rifle Corps attempted to withdraw to the River Ola, the general declared 10 hours later:

‘The only means of fighting is the medium tank detachment. Manpower has lost its meaning on the given route. We have no means of support at our disposal… It is necessary to cover the Mogilev, Bobruisk Highway using front forces, since there are no units at all on this direction.’
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In by far the worst situation were hapless Soviet units cut off in ever-shrinking pockets. Kesselschlacht – the German term for pocket fighting – was apt. A Kessel (cauldron) was quite literally boiled until life within was extinguished. It was a methodical, slow operation causing terrible casualties to both sides. Tank soldier Alexander Golikow wrote to his wife, while he was engaged in fighting around Rowno against German Army Group North units:

‘
‘Dear Tonetschka!

I don’t know whether you will be able to read these lines, but I do know, for certain, this will be my last letter to you. A bitter and deadly battle is being fought at this very moment. Our tank has been knocked out and all around us are the Fascists. We have tried to beat off their attacks the whole day. The road to Ostrov is covered with bodies in green uniforms… Two of us – Pawel Abramow and I, remain. You will know him, I have written about him. We do not expect to be rescued. We are soldiers and have no fear of dying for our homeland.’
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Once the initial Panzer screen was thrown around an intended pocket, Soviet units would march and counter-march within, attempting to get out. Lack of intelligence and nothing to brief to soldiers made this phase seem particularly aimless to those trapped inside. J. Jewtuchewitsch’s unit was moved from Leningrad to engage the German Army Group North advance in July.

‘They put us on lorries and propelled us in a completely different direction… We have been moving for a few days now from place to place. Sometimes we look for the battalion, they on occasion us… During one such move we covered a 94km stretch.’

Uncertainty was all-pervasive. Jewtuchewitsch remembered driving through the streets of Leningrad with civilians dolefully following their passage, ‘uncertainty in all eyes, unease about us and we also about ourselves’.
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Major Jurij Krymov serving on the Soviet West Front confessed similar reservations to his wife. ‘It is now 19 days since I have heard anything from you or the others’. Newspapers were unavailable, only radio. He had no idea how his wife was living in Moscow and was not optimistic. ‘Due to the war and the need for women to work (because here there seem to be a lot) I am beginning to be concerned for your welfare,’ he wrote. Conditions inside cut-off pockets quickly deteriorated. Alexander Golikow continued the letter to his wife: