War Stories III (11 page)

 

Ships bombed at Pearl Harbor.

Hours before the U.S. declaration on 8 December, Churchill's government in London and the rest of the British Commonwealth, already at war with Germany and Italy, decided for war against Tokyo. Then, on 11 December, Hitler and Mussolini declared war on the United States—to which Congress reciprocated that afternoon. Churchill's great hope—that the U.S. and Britain would become “co-belligerents against Fascism”—was finally realized.

But in the days immediately after the Japanese surprise attack, it became apparent that despite all the warnings, America's military was still woefully unprepared for war on a global scale. The Selective Service Act had narrowly passed in 1940, but it wasn't until 12 August 1941 that Congress extended the term of service beyond twelve months and authorized the movement of U.S. personnel overseas. The bill passed the House of Representatives by a single vote.

Though building larger, more effective U.S. fighting forces languished while war consumed Europe, America did begin to expand and improve its
intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities. Unconstrained by restrictions that isolationists in Congress imposed on the military, FBI director J. Edgar Hoover began a quiet expansion of “the Bureau” shortly after Hitler invaded Poland in September 1939.

 

U.S. tanker struck by German U-boat.

Hoover had read with alarm the reports of espionage and sabotage operations being conducted in Europe by Hitler's
Abwehr
, the intelligence department of the German Armed Forces. He correctly assumed that if war came, Hitler would attempt similar operations in the United States and Latin America—and he wanted the FBI to be ready. Hoover set out to recruit as many bright new field agents as he could squeeze into his budget. One of those “early hires” was Ken Crosby, a young lawyer in Atlanta. Crosby would help crack one of the biggest German spy rings of World War II.

Crosby's assessment about the sentence that Duquesne and his cohorts would have received is correct. On 13 June 1942, eight German saboteurs were apprehended after being put ashore by U-boat—four on Long Island and four more on the coast of Florida. At Hoover's insistence, and with the support of Attorney General Biddle, all were tried in secret military tribunals and in August—just two months later—six of the eight were executed. The remaining two—named as “cooperating witnesses” in the trials—were sentenced to life in prison. The trials would set a precedent for dealing with non-military enemy combatants that would be used throughout the war for prosecuting spies and saboteurs and is still cited today for dealing with terrorists.

This new process for dealing with spies reflected other changes in U.S. counter-espionage, intelligence collection, and “special operations” capabilities precipitated by America's entry into the war. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Hoover reorganized the FBI, creating a permanent office for counter-intelligence and counter-espionage. U.S. “offensive intelligence” capabilities were also transformed following the declaration of war.

On 27 May 1941, concerned about Japanese moves in the Pacific, President Roosevelt had declared a “State of Emergency” in an effort to accelerate preparations for hostilities. Using his emergency powers, FDR appointed Brigadier General William Donovan—a World War I hero—as
the Coordinator of Intelligence on 11 July. Donovan's appointment created immediate friction—within the War and Navy Departments as well as with the FBI—and slowed his plans for building U.S. covert action capabilities.

In June 1942, Donovan's organization was renamed the “Office of Strategic Services”—the OSS. The following month, the War Department activated the First Special Service Force, and placed it at Donovan's disposal to conduct “espionage, sabotage, intelligence collection, and support for internal resistance” behind enemy lines. The OSS—often in cooperation with the British Special Operations Executive—would go on to conduct some remarkably successful espionage and intelligence operations.

The transformation in U.S. counter-espionage and intelligence capabilities brought about by our entry into the war reflected the changes taking place in every other part of American life. The expansion of industrial production—ships, planes, tanks, weapons, and ammunition—that had begun as a consequence of “Lend-Lease” now accelerated dramatically. Unemployment, which had hovered near 10 percent through most of 1941, now dropped dramatically as millions of men responded to calls for military volunteers and draft notices. American women—who had never thought of joining the labor force—now found opportunities in the Armed Forces, government service, war production plants, and shipyards.

American mobilization couldn't happen overnight, however. Britain, Russia, and China may have gained a powerful new ally against the Axis Powers—but the immediate effects were hardly positive. In the closing days of 1941 and the opening months of 1942, the Allies were subjected to a series of disasters. On Christmas Eve 1941, after a heroic fight, the U.S. Navy and Marine garrison on Wake Island finally succumbed to the Japanese. The following day, Hong Kong fell. And on 15 February 1942, Singapore was captured—along with 135,000 British, Indian, and Australian troops.

On 8 March Rangoon, Burma, was seized by the Japanese and the next day the Dutch government in exile surrendered the entire Netherlands East Indies. On 9 April, 80,000 U.S. and Filipino soldiers surrendered to the Japanese on Bataan and on 6 May 1942, the island fortress of Corregidor in Manila Bay was captured—ending all but guerilla resistance in the Philippines.