War Stories III (12 page)

The Japanese juggernaut continued unabated for more than four months until their first defeat in a dramatic engagement, 3–6 June 1942, off the tiny island of Midway. Though American morale was raised by the lopsided victory—the U.S. lost 307 men, 150 planes, and one carrier while the Japanese lost 3,500 men, 325 aircraft, and
four
carriers—it did nothing to improve the situation in the European theater.

By the summer of 1942, as the Wehrmacht renewed its offensive against Russia, German U-boats were operating with impunity off the east coast of the United States—jeopardizing the delivery of war materiel, food, fuel, and clothing that were essential for keeping Britain and the Soviet Union in the fight against Hitler. During June and July 1942—the worst months of losses in the North Atlantic—U-boats sank more than a million tons of Allied and neutral shipping.

These losses prompted American planners to quietly reassess the “Europe First” war strategy that Roosevelt and Churchill had secretly decided at their conference at sea off Argentia, Newfoundland, in August 1941. Without the assurance that massive numbers of troops and huge quantities of supplies could be
safely
moved across the Atlantic, a “Second Front”—so desperately wanted by Stalin—would be too costly.

German U-boat successes in the Atlantic had climbed significantly after they established “home ports” on the Bay of Biscay, following the fall of France in June 1940. But improvements in British radar, sonar, and convoy procedures had diminished losses of Allied ships and cargo in the months immediately prior to Pearl Harbor. On 4 September 1941—three months before the U.S. and Germany were at war with each other—a U.S. destroyer, the USS
Greer,
alerted by a British patrol plane out of Bermuda, had attacked a German submarine off the U.S. east coast, prompting FDR to declare an expanded U.S. “neutrality region” and announce that U.S. ships were authorized to “shoot first” at Axis warships inside the zone. Then, while escorting a convoy to Newfoundland on 17 October—still six weeks before the U.S. declaration of war—the USS
Kearny
was hit by a German torpedo. The U.S. Navy destroyer, with eleven dead sailors aboard, managed to make it back into port—but the action created a firestorm in the

American press. To avoid further provocation, Hitler ordered Admiral Karl Dönitz to move his “wolf packs” of submarines further away from the U.S. coastline.

But once the United States was in the war, all restrictions on U-boat activity were lifted. When the U.S. moved crucial naval forces to the Pacific and geared up for war on two fronts, German U-boats moved in—hugging the east coast and operating with impunity in the Gulf of Mexico.

For eight months after the attack on Pearl Harbor—until the assault on Guadalcanal in August 1942—the U.S. “played defense” against the Axis powers. After the fall of the Philippines, the U.S. Navy had to carry most of the burden. One of the participants, Philadelphia native Charles Calhoun, was aboard the USS
Sterett,
helping shoulder the load.

The USS
Sterett's
dramatic entry into World War II—and subsequent service in two theaters of the conflict—may not have been altogether typical, but Charles Calhoun's experience demonstrates the remarkable transformation the U.S. Navy made, once war was thrust upon us. The same thing happened in the U.S. Army. One who was there when it happened was another son of Philadelphia, Charles Hangsterfer. Like Calhoun, he too had “signed up” before the attack on Pearl Harbor.