Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and Ex-Combatants (Law, Conflict and International Relations) (42 page)

79
 Interview with Aisha Ibrahim.

80
 See generally, Human Rights Council of Sierra Leone, “State of human rights in Sierra Leone—2009” (Freetown: Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone, 2009, on file with author). Off the record, several civil society leaders expressed concern about the lack of transparency of NaCSA, which stopped convening the oversight body, which included civil society representatives, without explanation.

81
 Interview with Heike Niebergall, International Organization for Migration (IOM), by phone, 7 July 2011; interview with Sanusi Savage, Officer in Charge, IOM, Freetown, 12 July 2011; interview with Amadou Bangura, NaCSA Reparations Program Officer, 15 July 2011. United Nations Peacebuilding Fund,
Support to the Implementation of the Reparations Programme as part of the Recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
project document (2008), available at <
www.unpbf.org/sierraleone/sierraleone-projects.shtml
> (accessed 8 August 2011); Mohamad Suma and Cristián Correa, “Report and proposals for the implementation of reparations in Sierra Leone” (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, December 2009).

82
 Interview with anonymous Sierra Leonean official, 13 July 2011.

83
 Interview with Niebergall. Suma and Correa note that the government of Sierra Leone provided US $246,000 to Year One. See “Report and proposals,” op. cit., p. 14.

84
 Interview with Niebergall.

85
 Interview with Bangura.

86
 Interview with Edwin and French, who also suggest the need for a link of best practice between national and international justice processes. James, Simeon Koroma and Tommy made a similar point.

10
Tempering Great Expectations: Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice in Liberia

Rosalind Raddatz

Introduction

Against the odds, Liberia is at peace. In the eight years since the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) was signed, the Liberian government and the international community have made significant progress in peacebuilding, particularly in security sector reform with the restructuring of armed and police forces, the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants (DDR), and the steady (albeit slow) rebuilding of the criminal justice system. Nevertheless, each of these undertakings still faces many challenges. There are few trained lawyers, and rural Liberians have virtually no access to the formal justice system. The reintegration and rehabilitation of adult former belligerents remains problematic, with a chronic lack of employment opportunities and active militias in the regions luring many back to battle in neighboring Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire or into the illegal exploitation of natural resources. The limited capacities of the judicial system means that the prosecutions called for by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) are unlikely to occur any time soon. These caveats do not undermine the very real achievements that have been made so far in peace-building and transitional justice in Liberia, but they do urge a tempering of great expectations.

This chapter addresses the simultaneous peacebuilding and transitional justice activities undertaken in Liberia since 2003, when the civil war ended with a ratified peace agreement. It will argue that, while genuine efforts have been made in both respects, Liberia’s peace remains fragile, and demands for expeditious justice are unlikely to be met in the near future.

There are a variety of mechanisms that aim to address the impact of human rights violations in a post-conflict society. Some, such as security sector reform, as well as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, are deemed to fall under the rubric of peacebuilding, whereas others are considered as belonging to the realm of transitional justice, namely legal accountability, truth and reconciliation commissions, reparation, and memorialization. Each of these has been tried in Liberia, and while major peacebuilding efforts are highlighted, much of the following explores Liberia’s approach to transitional justice to date and what this means for long-term peace and accountability.

Concurrent with institutional peacebuilding, the TRC attempted to provide Liberians with a forum for truth-telling regarding the heinous crimes that took place during the conflict. Beset with ongoing difficulties, including a lack of unanimity among the commissioners, the TRC was innovative in several ways, including its documentation of testimonies from nearly 2,000 Liberian expatriates, its detailing of violations against women and children as well as economic crimes, and its suggestions for customary forms of accountability and truth-telling. Most of the TRC’s recommendations have yet to be implemented, in part because of the political controversy around the call for lustration, but also because the state structure lacks the necessary capacity and resources. As a result, many Liberians are looking to customary justice mechanisms in their pursuit for justice. Previous experience suggests that they should harbor modest hopes, lest they be disappointed.

Peacebuilding: “We’ve Come So Far, But We Know How Far There Is to Go”

When the Liberian war ended with the 2003 Accra CPA, the country was a failed state. The nation’s physical infrastructure, including courts and detention centers, was completely destroyed; there was no provision of public services, widespread corruption within the government, virtually no lawful economy, and no government control over the legitimate use of force. Most legal professionals had left the country. Indeed, the nation’s entire security system was in disarray. Recognizing that the state apparatus was in tatters, the CPA requested the United Nations to deploy a peacekeeping force to support the transitional government with the implementation of the peace agreement. This peacekeeping force, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), was mandated to work with the government to develop and implement a DDR strategy.

UNMIL’s first attempt at DDR, which began two months after the CPA was signed, was an utter failure. Troops were ill-prepared, only one of three containment camps was ready, and there was no guarantee of camp security.
¹
In December 2003, after nine people were killed by riots that began when ex-combatants at a cantonment site near Monrovia did not receive immediate cash for their weapons, the program was suspended. DDR resumed four months later after the program had been overhauled.
²
In addition to catering to former belligerents from all armed groups, the revamped program lowered entry requirements
³
to 150 rounds of ammunition or a weapon. In exchange, ex-combatants received a DDR identification card and two cash payments of US $150, and were entitled to “reintegration programming.”
⁴
Despite the shaky start, by November 2004 DDR was deemed officially complete, with 101,496 combatants disarmed and demobilized, and an estimated 90,000 of these having participated in rehabilitation and reintegration.
⁵

At a glance, DDR in Liberia appears a success, but the high number of disarmed ex-combatants is evidence of one of the program’s significant failings.
⁶
Prior to DDR, the International Crisis Group (ICG) estimated Liberia had
between 48,000 and 58,000 ex-combatants. However, by the time the program ended, more than double the ICG’s initial estimates of purported combatants had been processed. Most troubling was the modest number of arms collected— approximately 27,800 guns and six million rounds of ammunition, or an average of one gun per four ex-combatants.
⁷
The large number of DDR participants was not due to UNMIL’s effectiveness, but because people cheated to access its benefits. Since the program paid for only one weapon or 150 rounds per person, opportunistic ex-combatants possessing multiple firearms applied repeatedly at various collection sites. Numerous non-combatants sought to enroll in DDR programs in order to receive assistance they felt they ought to be entitled to.
⁸
Ultimately, widespread fraud and corruption meant that demands on the system exceeded its capacity.
⁹

Nonetheless, as youths no longer terrorize the country with semi-automatic weapons, few dispute the efficacy of the demobilization of ex-combatants. Nonetheless, with countless young men idle and unemployed, congregating on the streets and in the drinking establishments of Monrovia, there is considerable doubt about the effectiveness of the rehabilitation and, particularly, the reintegration of former soldiers.
¹⁰
The low number of weapons collected during the program leads skeptics to question whether Liberia was truly disarmed. Many Liberians thus question the fragility of their nation’s security.

While some DDR recipients describe the program as “free benefits for the willing,” other deserving individuals were not able to avail themselves due to disability, inability to travel, or disinclination to register.
¹¹
The DDR process largely failed to address the needs of many girls and women who were formally associated with the fighting forces because it did not consider their particular wartime experiences.
¹²
While the total number of female Liberian ex-combatants is unknown, 22,080 women and 2,517 girls officially participated in DDR.
¹³
It was typically easier for girls to access these programs, since former child soldiers could enter without submitting a weapon or ammunition.
¹⁴
The adult program denied access to women not bearing arms; however, many women involved in the war were not exclusively fighters, but also “bush wives” or “camp followers,” and as such they did not all carry or own weapons. According to Specht, the majority of young women (aged 18–24) did not participate in DDR.
¹⁵
Since individuals who did not formally enroll in DDR were ineligible for skills training or formal education reintegration packages, many women were affected and thus had limited prospects for employment.

Women were further disadvantaged in the aftermath of the war since the majority had suffered gender-based violence.
¹⁶
Frequently, girls and women remained in relationships with the men who had sexually assaulted them and, at war’s end when asked about their experiences, many could not say whether their relationships were voluntary or forced.
¹⁷
Numerous young women were unable to receive special care. While former child combatants were assisted by child protection agencies under UNICEF, girls over the age of 18 who were victims of gender-based violence did not receive protective assistance under adult DDR programs.
¹⁸

There were no formal links between DDR and transitional justice processes in Liberia. By the time the Truth and Reconciliation Commission officially began its work in 2008, DDR was long over. According to Jaye and the International Center for Transitional Justice, it was preferable to sequence DDR and transitional justice, with DDR implemented first.
¹⁹

In the aftermath of the CPA, the transitional government’s primary concern was to prevent a return to conflict, which meant that immediate attention went to improving the fledgling state’s security rather than pursuing transitional justice.
²⁰

In addition to DDR, security sector reform sought to address the legacy of corruption and human rights violations that were endemic in the police, the army, and the Special Security Services (SSS) that protect the President. The goal is to vet and train Liberia’s various security forces into respected, reliable, and autonomous institutions that will outlast the UN’s presence. The Liberia National Police (LNP) will become Liberia’s primary security provider, whereas the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) will be a smaller organization providing external defense.
²¹
The challenges are many; the country has little experience with effective and accountable policing. Charles Taylor’s regime co-opted the country’s fragmented police forces to serve its political ends. Consequently, it is not surprising that many Liberians remain skeptical of the LNP’s capacity to ensure security.

Nevertheless, since 2004, members of UN Police (UNPOL) have worked alongside the LNP, trying to restore law and order, while struggling to restructure, retrain, and re-equip the Liberian police service. While it was mandated but not funded to do so, UNMIL has trained over 3,500 new police officers along with the Liberian government.
²²
Some police forces have been deployed in rural areas, but outside of the capital policing remains inadequate and UNPOL continues to be the country’s most visible and reliable police force. In large part, the LNP’s limited effectiveness is due to resource constraints; the force faces challenges in infrastructure, logistics (including basics like office supplies and gas), and budgetary constraints, not simply because the national government is strapped, but because many UNMIL donors have delayed and reneged on promised assistance.

The CPA mandated the USA to reform the AFLand dissolve the old army while vetting and retraining a new one using two private security agencies. Recruitment and training has been prolonged because of a rigorous vetting process to prevent former corrupt and abusive members of the forces to enlist anew.
²³
As of 2011, Liberia’s army numbers approximately 2,000 soldiers, compared with the 9,400 UNMIL military troops and 1,300 police who remain stationed throughout the country.
²⁴
Neither the LNP nor the AFLhas reached their 20 percent target for women, although there has been some progress. In the year after the first all-female UN contingent (comprised of 103 Indian police women) was stationed in Liberia in 2007, the number of female applicants to the LNP tripled.
²⁵
According to UNMIL, as of early 2011 more than 400 women have been recruited and trained for duty in the police force.
²⁶

The nation’s security improved immeasurably in the first several years under UNMIL. Even in the politically charged year of the first post-conflict elections, in
a 2006 survey of 800 Liberians, 90 percent stated that UNMIL had done a good or very good job at implementing the CPA.
²⁷