Read The World Was Going Our Way Online
Authors: Christopher Andrew
Tags: #Biographies & Memoirs, #True Accounts, #Espionage, #History, #Europe, #Ireland, #Military, #Intelligence & Espionage, #Modern (16th-21st Centuries), #20th Century, #Russia, #World
The World Was Going Our Way (62 page)
In June 1975, doubtless to the delight of Moscow, Mujib transformed Bangladesh into a one-party state whose new ruling party, BAKSAL, incorporated the three parties hitherto secretly subsidized by the KGB (Awami League, National Awami Party and Communist Party) and one other left-wing party.
39
By this time the Dhaka residency had recruited a senior member of Mujib’s secretariat, MITRA, two ministers, SALTAN and KALIF, and two senior intelligence officers, MAKHIR and SHEF. All were used against US targets.
40
39
By this time the Dhaka residency had recruited a senior member of Mujib’s secretariat, MITRA, two ministers, SALTAN and KALIF, and two senior intelligence officers, MAKHIR and SHEF. All were used against US targets.
40
The FCD’s analytical department, Service 1, had forecast after the 1973 elections that the Awami League would retain power for the full five-year term and that the main opposition to it would come from the pro-Chinese left (always a
bête noire
of the KGB). A series of Service A forgeries were used in an attempt to persuade both Mujib and the Bangladeshi media that the Chinese were conspiring with the left-wing opposition.
41
The real threat to Mujib, however, came not from Maoists but from his opponents within the armed forces. On 15 August 1975 a group of army officers murdered both him and much of his family. The KGB immediately began an active-measures campaign, predictably inspiring newspaper articles in a series of countries claiming that the coup was the work of the CIA.
42
Within twenty-four hours of Mujib’s murder, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became the first to recognize the new military regime - deluding himself into believing that Bangladesh might now be willing to form a federation with Pakistan. Bhutto was later to repent of his early enthusiasm as it became clear that Bangladesh’s links with New Delhi would remain far closer than those with Islamabad. It also dawned upon him that the coup in Bangladesh might set a bad example to the Pakistani military - as indeed it did.
43
bête noire
of the KGB). A series of Service A forgeries were used in an attempt to persuade both Mujib and the Bangladeshi media that the Chinese were conspiring with the left-wing opposition.
41
The real threat to Mujib, however, came not from Maoists but from his opponents within the armed forces. On 15 August 1975 a group of army officers murdered both him and much of his family. The KGB immediately began an active-measures campaign, predictably inspiring newspaper articles in a series of countries claiming that the coup was the work of the CIA.
42
Within twenty-four hours of Mujib’s murder, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became the first to recognize the new military regime - deluding himself into believing that Bangladesh might now be willing to form a federation with Pakistan. Bhutto was later to repent of his early enthusiasm as it became clear that Bangladesh’s links with New Delhi would remain far closer than those with Islamabad. It also dawned upon him that the coup in Bangladesh might set a bad example to the Pakistani military - as indeed it did.
43
During the mid-1970s the KGB substantially increased its influence in the Pakistani media. In 1973, according to KGB statistics, it placed thirty-three articles in the Pakistani press - little more than 1 per cent of the number in India.
44
By 1977 the number had risen to 440,
45
and the KGB had acquired direct control of at least one periodical.
46
The main aim of active-measures operations was, once again, to increase Pakistani distrust of the United States. Disinformation fed to Bhutto’s government claimed that the United States considered Pakistan too unreliable an ally to deserve substantial military aid. Washington was, allegedly, increasingly distrustful of Bhutto’s government and regarded the Shah of Iran as its main regional ally. The Shah was said to be determined to become the leader of the Muslim world and to regard Bhutto as a rival. He was also reported to be scornful of Bhutto’s failure to deal with unrest in Baluchistan and to be willing to send in Iranian troops if the situation worsened.
47
44
By 1977 the number had risen to 440,
45
and the KGB had acquired direct control of at least one periodical.
46
The main aim of active-measures operations was, once again, to increase Pakistani distrust of the United States. Disinformation fed to Bhutto’s government claimed that the United States considered Pakistan too unreliable an ally to deserve substantial military aid. Washington was, allegedly, increasingly distrustful of Bhutto’s government and regarded the Shah of Iran as its main regional ally. The Shah was said to be determined to become the leader of the Muslim world and to regard Bhutto as a rival. He was also reported to be scornful of Bhutto’s failure to deal with unrest in Baluchistan and to be willing to send in Iranian troops if the situation worsened.
47
By 1975 the KGB was confident that active measures were having a direct personal influence on Bhutto.
48
On 16 November the Soviet ambassador informed him that, in view of ‘the friendly and neighbourly relations between our two countries’, he had been instructed to warn him that the Soviet authorities had information that a terrorist group was planning to assassinate him during his forthcoming visit to Baluchistan. Bhutto was profuse in his thanks for the ambassador’s disinformation:
48
On 16 November the Soviet ambassador informed him that, in view of ‘the friendly and neighbourly relations between our two countries’, he had been instructed to warn him that the Soviet authorities had information that a terrorist group was planning to assassinate him during his forthcoming visit to Baluchistan. Bhutto was profuse in his thanks for the ambassador’s disinformation:
I was planning to fly to Baluchistan tonight or tomorrow morning for a few days. I shall now cancel the visit to get to the bottom of this matter in order not to put my life at risk. I am particularly conscious of the genuine and friendly relations between our countries at this difficult stage in the political life of Pakistan which is also difficult for me personally. I am doubly grateful to your country and its leaders.
49
49
The KGB reported that Bhutto had also been successfully deceived by disinformation claiming that Iran was planning to detach Baluchistan from Pakistan and had stated as fact supposed Iranian plans to destabilize Pakistan which, in reality, had been fabricated by Service A.
50
Agent DVIN was reported to have direct access to Bhutto to feed him further fabrications.
51
50
Agent DVIN was reported to have direct access to Bhutto to feed him further fabrications.
51
Despite Bhutto’s susceptibility to Soviet disinformation, however, Moscow continued to regard him as a loose cannon. As one of Bhutto’s ministers and closest advisers, Rafi Raza, later acknowledged, ‘Neither superpower considered him reliable.’ Among the initiatives by Bhutto which annoyed the Kremlin was his campaign for a ‘new economic world order . . . to redress the grave injustice to the poorer nations of the world’. Kept out of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) by what amounted to an Indian veto, Bhutto appeared to challenge its authority. On the eve of the NAM summit in Colombo in August 1976, Bhutto published an article entitled ‘Third World - New Direction’, calling for a Third World summit in Islamabad in the spring of 1976 to discuss global economic reform.
52
The Centre feared that, by bringing in non-NAM members under Bhutto’s chairmanship, such a summit would damage the prestige of the NAM, which it regarded as an important vehicle for KGB active measures. Following a Politburo resolution condemning Bhutto’s proposal,
53
the Centre devised an active-measures operation of almost global dimensions. KGB agents were to inform the current Chair of the NAM, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, and other Sri Lankan politicians that Bhutto’s aim was to undermine her personal authority as well as to divide NAM members and weaken the movement’s commitment to anti-imperialism. Disinformation prepared by Service A designed to discredit Bhutto’s initiative was to be forwarded by the local KGB residencies to the governments of Somalia, Nigeria, Ghana, Cyprus, Yemen, Mexico, Venezuela, Iraq, Afghanistan and Nepal. The Centre was also confident that its active measures would persuade President Boumedienne of Algeria to spread the message that an Islamabad conference would weaken the NAM and diminish the influence of ‘progressive’ leaders in the movement. Delegates attending a NAM planning conference in Delhi were to be given statements by Indian groups prepared under KGB guidance condemning Bhutto’s initiative as a threat to the unity of the NAM.
54
52
The Centre feared that, by bringing in non-NAM members under Bhutto’s chairmanship, such a summit would damage the prestige of the NAM, which it regarded as an important vehicle for KGB active measures. Following a Politburo resolution condemning Bhutto’s proposal,
53
the Centre devised an active-measures operation of almost global dimensions. KGB agents were to inform the current Chair of the NAM, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, and other Sri Lankan politicians that Bhutto’s aim was to undermine her personal authority as well as to divide NAM members and weaken the movement’s commitment to anti-imperialism. Disinformation prepared by Service A designed to discredit Bhutto’s initiative was to be forwarded by the local KGB residencies to the governments of Somalia, Nigeria, Ghana, Cyprus, Yemen, Mexico, Venezuela, Iraq, Afghanistan and Nepal. The Centre was also confident that its active measures would persuade President Boumedienne of Algeria to spread the message that an Islamabad conference would weaken the NAM and diminish the influence of ‘progressive’ leaders in the movement. Delegates attending a NAM planning conference in Delhi were to be given statements by Indian groups prepared under KGB guidance condemning Bhutto’s initiative as a threat to the unity of the NAM.
54
In the event the Islamabad conference failed to materialize and on 5 July 1977 Bhutto was overthrown in a military coup led by the commander-in-chief of the army, General Zia ul-Haq. On 3 September Bhutto was charged with conspiracy to murder the father of a maverick PPP politician. By now, most of the popular enthusiasm which had swept him to power seven years earlier had been dissipated by his autocratic manner and the corruption of his regime. As one of his most fervent supporters noted in December, ‘It was painful to see that while Bhutto stood trial for murder in Lahore, the people of the city were showing greater interest in the Test match being played there.’
55
Bhutto was sentenced to death on 18 March 1978 following a trial of dubious legality and executed on 4 April 1979 after the sentence had been narrowly upheld by the Supreme Court. KGB active measures predictably blamed Bhutto’s overthrow and execution, like that of Mujib, on a CIA conspiracy.
56
55
Bhutto was sentenced to death on 18 March 1978 following a trial of dubious legality and executed on 4 April 1979 after the sentence had been narrowly upheld by the Supreme Court. KGB active measures predictably blamed Bhutto’s overthrow and execution, like that of Mujib, on a CIA conspiracy.
56
Neither General Ziaur Rahman (better known as Zia), who by the end of 1976 had emerged as the dominant figure in Bangladesh (initially as Chief Martial Law Administrator and from 1977 as President), nor Zia ul-Haq (also, confusingly, better known as Zia) was favourably regarded in the Kremlin. Both, in the Centre’s view, were far better disposed to Washington than to Moscow. One of Ziaur Rahman’s first actions was to change the constitution by replacing ‘socialism’ as a principle of state with a vaguer commitment to ‘economic justice and equality’. His economic policy was based on encouraging the private sector and privatizing public enterprise. The increased foreign aid desperately needed by Bangladesh, Zia believed, could only be obtained by moving closer to the West (especially the United States), the Muslim world and China. Moscow was visibly affronted.
Izvestia
complained in 1977 that right-wing and Maoist forces in Bangladesh were conducting a campaign of ‘provocation and vilification against the Soviet Union’ .
57
The KGB claimed the credit for organizing a series of protest demonstrations in September and October 1978 against an agreement signed by the Zia regime with Washington permitting the US Peace Corps to operate in Bangladesh.
58
Izvestia
complained in 1977 that right-wing and Maoist forces in Bangladesh were conducting a campaign of ‘provocation and vilification against the Soviet Union’ .
57
The KGB claimed the credit for organizing a series of protest demonstrations in September and October 1978 against an agreement signed by the Zia regime with Washington permitting the US Peace Corps to operate in Bangladesh.
58
According to KGB statistics, active measures in Bangladesh increased from ninety in 1978 to about 200 in 1979, and involved twenty agents of influence. The KGB claimed that in 1979 it planted 101 articles in the press, organized forty-four meetings to publicize disinformation and on twenty-six occasions arranged for Service A forgeries to reach the Bangladesh authorities.
59
The dominant theme of the forgeries was CIA conspiracy against the Ziaur Rahman regime. Operation ARSENAL in 1978 brought to the attention of the Directorate of National Security the supposed plotting of a CIA officer (real or alleged) named Young with opposition groups.
60
Service A drew some of the inspiration for its forgeries from real plots by the President’s Bangladeshi opponents. During Zia’s five and a half years in power he had to deal with at least seventeen mutinies and attempted coups. In August 1979, for example, a group of officers were arrested in Dhaka and accused of plotting to overthrow him. Two months later Andropov approved an FCD proposal for Service A to fabricate a letter supporting the plotters from Air Vice-Marshal Muhammad Ghulam Tawab, whom Zia had sacked as head of the air force. Other material planted in the Bangladeshi, Indian and Sri Lankan press purported to unmask Tawab as a long-standing CIA agent.
61
Service A also forged a letter from a CIA officer in Dhaka to the former Deputy Prime Minister, Moudud Ahmad, assuring him of US support for the right-wing opposition to Zia.
62
In 1981 another disinformation operation purported to show that the Reagan administration was plotting Zia’s overthrow and had established secret contact with Khondakar Mustaque Ahmad, who had briefly become President after the assassination of Mujib and had been imprisoned by Zia from 1976 to 1980.
63
There is no evidence that KGB active measures had any success in undermining the Zia regime. At the 1979 general election, which was generally considered to have been fairly conducted, Zia’s Bangladesh National Party won 207 of the 300 seats. Zia, however, never succeeded in resolving the problems posed by unrest in the armed forces. After several narrow escapes, he was assassinated while on a visit to Chittagong during an attempted coup led by the local army commander on 29 May 1981.
64
59
The dominant theme of the forgeries was CIA conspiracy against the Ziaur Rahman regime. Operation ARSENAL in 1978 brought to the attention of the Directorate of National Security the supposed plotting of a CIA officer (real or alleged) named Young with opposition groups.
60
Service A drew some of the inspiration for its forgeries from real plots by the President’s Bangladeshi opponents. During Zia’s five and a half years in power he had to deal with at least seventeen mutinies and attempted coups. In August 1979, for example, a group of officers were arrested in Dhaka and accused of plotting to overthrow him. Two months later Andropov approved an FCD proposal for Service A to fabricate a letter supporting the plotters from Air Vice-Marshal Muhammad Ghulam Tawab, whom Zia had sacked as head of the air force. Other material planted in the Bangladeshi, Indian and Sri Lankan press purported to unmask Tawab as a long-standing CIA agent.
61
Service A also forged a letter from a CIA officer in Dhaka to the former Deputy Prime Minister, Moudud Ahmad, assuring him of US support for the right-wing opposition to Zia.
62
In 1981 another disinformation operation purported to show that the Reagan administration was plotting Zia’s overthrow and had established secret contact with Khondakar Mustaque Ahmad, who had briefly become President after the assassination of Mujib and had been imprisoned by Zia from 1976 to 1980.
63
There is no evidence that KGB active measures had any success in undermining the Zia regime. At the 1979 general election, which was generally considered to have been fairly conducted, Zia’s Bangladesh National Party won 207 of the 300 seats. Zia, however, never succeeded in resolving the problems posed by unrest in the armed forces. After several narrow escapes, he was assassinated while on a visit to Chittagong during an attempted coup led by the local army commander on 29 May 1981.
64
Whatever successes were achieved by active-measures campaigns in Pakistan and Bangladesh during the late 1970s were more than cancelled out by the hostile reaction in both countries to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the brutal war which followed. Hitherto Zia ul-Haq had been widely underestimated in both West and East. In the summer of 1978
The Economist
had dismissed him as a ‘well-intentioned but increasingly maladroit military ruler’, while the
Guardian
declared that, ‘Zia’s name has a death-rattle sound these days. There’s a feeling he can’t last much longer.’ Once war began in Afghanistan, however, it seemed to Zia ul-Haq’s chief of army staff, General Khalid Mahmud Arif, that:
The Economist
had dismissed him as a ‘well-intentioned but increasingly maladroit military ruler’, while the
Guardian
declared that, ‘Zia’s name has a death-rattle sound these days. There’s a feeling he can’t last much longer.’ Once war began in Afghanistan, however, it seemed to Zia ul-Haq’s chief of army staff, General Khalid Mahmud Arif, that:
All eyes were focused on Pakistan. Would she buckle under pressure and acquiesce in superpower aggression? The Western countries quickly changed their tune. The arch critics of the autocratic military ruler of Pakistan began to woo him. They suddenly discovered Zia’s hitherto unknown ‘sterling qualities’ and the special importance of Pakistan in the changed circumstances.
65
65
Zia began pressing the Carter administration to provide arms and assistance to the
mujahideen
insurgents against the Communist regime in Afghanistan even before the Soviet invasion. The Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) made similar approaches to the CIA. In February 1980 President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, visited Pakistan to agree with Zia US covert assistance to the Afghan
mujahideen
across the Pakistan border.
66
The meeting between Zia and Brzezinski inaugurated what was in effect a secret US-Pakistani alliance for covert intervention in Afghanistan which lasted for the remainder of the war. The KGB almost certainly deduced, even if they did not obtain detailed intelligence on, the purpose of Brzezinski’s visit. After Brzezinski’s departure from Islamabad, Gromyko declared that Pakistan was putting its own security at risk by acting as a ‘springboard for further aggression against Afghanistan’.
67
mujahideen
insurgents against the Communist regime in Afghanistan even before the Soviet invasion. The Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) made similar approaches to the CIA. In February 1980 President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, visited Pakistan to agree with Zia US covert assistance to the Afghan
mujahideen
across the Pakistan border.
66
The meeting between Zia and Brzezinski inaugurated what was in effect a secret US-Pakistani alliance for covert intervention in Afghanistan which lasted for the remainder of the war. The KGB almost certainly deduced, even if they did not obtain detailed intelligence on, the purpose of Brzezinski’s visit. After Brzezinski’s departure from Islamabad, Gromyko declared that Pakistan was putting its own security at risk by acting as a ‘springboard for further aggression against Afghanistan’.
67
Andropov simultaneously approved an elaborate series of active measures designed to deter Zia from providing, or allowing the Americans or Chinese to provide, assistance to the
mujahideen
. The head of the Pakistani intelligence station in Moscow was to be privately warned that if Pakistan was used as a base for ‘armed struggle against Afghanistan’, the Oriental Institute (then headed by Yevgeni Primakov) would be asked to devise ways of assisting Baluchi and Pushtun separatist movements on the North-West Frontier in order to seal off the Afghan border.
68
The CIA concluded that there was a serious ‘possibility of large-scale Soviet aid to the Baluchi’.
69
KGB active measures also sought to persuade Zia that some of his own senior officers, who opposed his Afghan policy, were plotting against him. Service A prepared leaflets in English and Urdu on Pakistani paper purporting to come from a secret opposition group to Zia within the Pakistani army. On the night of 28 February to 1 March 1980 KGB officers drove round Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Karachi distributing copies of the leaflets from a device attached to their cars. According to a KGB report, the leaflets were taken seriously by Pakistani security, which began an immediate investigation and wrongly incriminated the deputy army chief-of-staff, Lieutenant-General Muhammad Iqbal Khan (remembered by a British diplomat who knew him well as ‘a decent and straightforward man’). The KGB claimed that this investigation provoked an unsuccessful coup by Iqbal Khan on 5 March, which led in turn to the removal or retirement of a series of senior officers and to the expulsion of two members of the US consulate in Lahore who had been in contact with them. On 25 March Andropov was informed that operation SARDAR had led the Zia regime to believe that the United States was conspiring with dissidents in the Pakistani army. Andropov approved the continuation of the operation. Several similar leaflets were distributed over the next year.
70
mujahideen
. The head of the Pakistani intelligence station in Moscow was to be privately warned that if Pakistan was used as a base for ‘armed struggle against Afghanistan’, the Oriental Institute (then headed by Yevgeni Primakov) would be asked to devise ways of assisting Baluchi and Pushtun separatist movements on the North-West Frontier in order to seal off the Afghan border.
68
The CIA concluded that there was a serious ‘possibility of large-scale Soviet aid to the Baluchi’.
69
KGB active measures also sought to persuade Zia that some of his own senior officers, who opposed his Afghan policy, were plotting against him. Service A prepared leaflets in English and Urdu on Pakistani paper purporting to come from a secret opposition group to Zia within the Pakistani army. On the night of 28 February to 1 March 1980 KGB officers drove round Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Karachi distributing copies of the leaflets from a device attached to their cars. According to a KGB report, the leaflets were taken seriously by Pakistani security, which began an immediate investigation and wrongly incriminated the deputy army chief-of-staff, Lieutenant-General Muhammad Iqbal Khan (remembered by a British diplomat who knew him well as ‘a decent and straightforward man’). The KGB claimed that this investigation provoked an unsuccessful coup by Iqbal Khan on 5 March, which led in turn to the removal or retirement of a series of senior officers and to the expulsion of two members of the US consulate in Lahore who had been in contact with them. On 25 March Andropov was informed that operation SARDAR had led the Zia regime to believe that the United States was conspiring with dissidents in the Pakistani army. Andropov approved the continuation of the operation. Several similar leaflets were distributed over the next year.
70
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