The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (98 page)

Carter on cooperation with corruption probes, Memorandum from Robert Lipshutz and Zbigniew Brzezinski, “White House Role in Congressional Investigation of Korean Misdoings,” June 23, 1977, Confidential (declassified 1997).

The Rich quote is from Robert G. Rich Jr.,
U.S. Ground Force Withdrawal from Korea: A Case Study in National Security Decision Making
, Executive Seminar, Foreign Service Institute, June 1982. Carter comment to Brzezinski, Brzezinski interview, March 1, 1994; telephone conversation, March 3, 1994. For Harold Brown on aide’s dilemma, letter to me, July 23, 1996.

For senior aides’ meeting on withdrawal, Zbigniew Brzezinski Memorandum to the President, “Summary of April 11, 1978, Meeting on Korea and China,” Secret (declassified 1996). Carter irritation with Brown, Brown interview, July 12, 1995, and Brzezinski interviews.

The View from Pyongyang
:
North Korea on nepotism, cited in Jae Kyu Park, “North Korean Policy Toward the United States,”
Asian Perspectives
5 (Fall-Winter 1981): 144. The history of North Korean efforts to negotiate with Washington is recounted in Michael Armacost Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Contacts and Communications with North Korea,” February 28, 1977, Secret (declassified 1996); Douglas J. Bennett Jr., Draft Letter to Rep. Lester Wolff, April 28, 1978, Secret (declassified 1996); and Don Oberdorfer, “North Korea Rebuffs Carter’s Bid to Open 3-Country Negotiations,”
WP
, July 15, 1979.

For Kim’s quotes on Carter,
KIS Works
, “Talk to the Delegation of the International Liaison Committee” (June 15, 1978), 33:257; and “Talk with the Chief Editor of the Japanese Political Magazine
Sekai,”
(October 21, 1978), 33:493.

For Kim’s discussion with Honecker, “Transcript of Official Talks Between the Party and State Delegation of the GDR and North Korea in Pyongyang, 12/9–10/77,”
SED Archive
. For CIA economic analysis,
Korea: The Economic Race Between the North and the South
(CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, January 1978), i. On South Korean military spending,
The Military Balance
(International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1976 and 1977). Chinese troops near DPRK border, “Conversation Between Honecker and Kim, 5/31/84,”
SED Archives
. US Command on North Korean infiltration,
USFK Hist. 1977
, 5455, Secret/Noforn (declassified 1995).

End of the Carter Withdrawal
:
The section on Armstrong’s work is based on interviews with Armstrong, July 7 and 20, 1974, Evelyn Colbert, February 14, 1994, and Nathanial Thayer, August 1, 1995, former CIA national intelligence officers for
East Asia; Alan MacDougall, former DIA senior analyst for Korea, August 2, 1995; and an excellent case study, “President Carter’s Troop Withdrawal from Korea,” written for Harvard University in 1990 by Major Joseph Wood. For Vessey’s intelligence request,
USFK Hist. 1978
, 57, Secret (declassified 1995). New North Korean estimate,
USFK Hist. 1980
, 17, Secret (declassified 1995). The Thayer quote is from Thayer interview, August 1, 1995.

On Carter’s suspicion of intelligence, letter to me, March 12, 1994. Quote from new review, Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-15, November 22, 1979, Secret (declassified 1991).

Carter’s plan for meeting of Park and Kim, Nicholas Piatt interview, February 10, 1994; William Gleysteen interview, September 29, 1993. Carter-Deng talks, Jimmy Carter,
Keeping Faith
(Bantam Books, 1982), 205–206. See also
U.S.-PRC Chronology
, 75. Carter on three-way talks, Gleysteen interview.

For Carter-Park bilateral talks, interviews with Piatt, February 10, 1994, and Holbrooke, August 10, 1993. Also White House Memorandum of Conversation, Secret (declassified 1997). For argument in car, interviews with Gleysteen, Vance, Brown, Brzezinski, Holbrooke, Piatt, and Rich as well as Vance,
Hard Choices
(Simon and Schuster, 1993). For Carter proselytizing Park, “Private Meeting with President Park, Seoul, Korea,” 7/1/79, notes by Carter, from Carter Library. Final strength figures from USFK, November 25, 1996. On nuclear weapons, Arkin telephone interview, March 24, 1995.

C
HAPTER
5: A
SSASSINATION AND
A
FTERMATH

On the postassassination situation, see Gleysteen’s first dispatch,
Emb. cable
, “Initial Reflections on Post-Park Chung Hee Situation in Korea,” October 28, 1979, Secret (declassified 1993). Gleysteen’s postmidnight actions, interview, October 12, 1993. On details of the White House meeting, see Chung Chin Suk, “Power Vacuum in Korea,”
Hankook Ilbo
, December 13, 1996, in Korean. On the last days of Park and other late-1970s developments in Korea, I have relied on Koon Woo Nam’s useful book,
South Korean Politics: The Search for Political Consensus and Stability
(University Press of America, 1989).

Embassy on Pusan protests,
Emb. cable
, “Embassy Thoughts on Current Mood Following Declaration of Martial Law in Pusan,” October 20, 1979, Confidential (declassified 1993). US warnings about Kim Young Sam’s expulsion, NSC Memorandum from Piatt to Brzezinski, “Opposition Leader Ousted,” October 4, 1979, Confidential (declassified 1997). Brown-Gleysteen meeting with Park,
Emb
.
cable
, “Meeting with President Park Regarding Domestic Political Crisis,” October 18, 1979, Confidential (declassified 1993).

“Pervasive worry” quote,
Emb. cable
, “Initial Reflections on Post-Park Chung Hee Situation in Korea,” October 28, 1979, Secret (declassified 1993). Extraordinary security measures, William Chapman, “Park’s Legacy: Prosperity and Fear,”
WP
, November 3, 1979. On the absence of grief,
Emb. cable
, “Surprisingly Few Mourn Park Chung Hee,” November 14, 1979, Confidential (declassified 1993). Holbrooke’s quote, Holbrooke interview, August 10, 1993.

Kang Sin Ok quote, interview, November 25, 1994. Gleysteen on noncomplicity,
Emb. cable
, “Charges of Complicity in President Park’s Death,” November 19, 1979, Secret (declassified 1993). Young’s search, James V.Young, manuscript for
Monthly Chosun
(1994). Gleysteen on Kim Jae Kyu, Gleysteen interview, September 9, 1993. Kim Il Sung’s reaction,
KIS Works
, “Let Us Strengthen the People’s Army,” 34:419. On US advice to Choi,
Emb. cable
, “Korea Focus: Meeting with Acting President, November 29,” November 29, 1979, Secret (declassified 1993).

The Coming of Chun Doo Hwan
:
For a report on the events of 12/12 as they emerged from the 1996 trial of Chun and Roh, see “Arrest of Two Ex-Presidents and May 18 Special Law,”
Korea Annual 1996
(Yonhap News Agency, 1996), 46–55. My account of 12/12 is based on interviews with Gleysteen and Wickham and on the written account by James V. Young, who was deputy US military attaché at the time. Gleysteen’s “bad news” cable is
Emb. cable
, “Younger ROK Officers Grab Power Positions,” December 13, 1979, Secret (declassified 1993).

For Chun’s family background, Sanghyun Yoon (Chun’s son-in-law), “South Korea’s
Nordpolitik
with Special Reference to Its Relationship with China,” PhD diss. (George Washington University, 1994), 281. Chun’s stoplight anecdote, Chun Doo Hwan interview, July 22, 1980. For Hana-hoe, see “Army Reforms Sweep Hana-hoe into History,”
Newsreview
, March 9, 1996. Gleysteen on Chun, Gleysteen interview, October 12, 1993. Walker on Chun, Walker interview, February 18, 1995. Gleysteen exchange with academic,
Emb. cable
, “Telegram from Professor Choi and Response,” December 19, 1979.

Gleysteen quote on not reversing coup,
Emb. cable
, “Discussions with the New Army Leadership Group,” January 26, 1979, Secret (declassified 1993). On Gleys-teen-Chun initial meeting,
Emb. cable
, “Korea Focus: Discussion with MG Chon Tu Hwan,” December 15, 1979, Secret (declassified 1993). Carter letter and other details from
U.S. Government Statement on the Events in Kwangju, ROK, in May 1980
, June 19, 1989, supplemented by James V.Young’s memoir written for
Monthly Chosun
in 1994. Gleysteen on US dilemma,
Emb. cable
, “Korea—Ambassador’s Policy Assessment,” January 29, 1980, Secret (declassified 1993).

The Kwangju Uprising
:
Embassy reaction to KCIA appointment, Gleysteen interview, February 10, 1997. Gleysteen on ROK contingency plans,
Emb. cable
, “Korea Focus: Building Tensions and Concern over Student Issue,” May 8, 1980, Secret (declassified 1993). State response,
DOS cable
, “Korea Focus: Tensions in the ROK,” May 8, 1980, Secret (declassified 1993). Chun’s statement, meeting with Wickham,
U.S. Government Statement
, 10.

Intelligence officer’s revelation, Park Hee Chung, “Chun Exaggerates North Korean Threat,”
Hankuk Ilbo
, December 13, 1995, in Korean. The flash cable,
Emb. cable
, “Crackdown in Seoul,” May 17, 1980, Secret (declassified 1993). Contradiction of Chun and Kim Dae Jung,
Emb. cable
, “Yet Another Assessment of ROK Stability and Political Development,” March 12, 1980, Secret (declassified 1993).

Gleysteen on “incendiary arrest,”
Emb. cable
, “May 17 Meeting with Blue House SYG Choi Kwang Soo,” May 17, 1980, Secret (declassified 1993). Warnberg and Huntley eyewitness account from Kwangju from Tim Warnberg, “The Kwangju Uprising: An Inside View,”
Korean Studies
11 (1987). Gleysteen on “massive insurrection,”
Emb. cable
, “The Kwangju Crisis,” May 21, 1980, Secret (declassified 1993). NSC meeting on Kwangju, “Summary of Conclusions,” National Security Council Memorandum, Secret (declassified 1994).

Regarding operational control and the US role, see
U.S. Government Statement
. The troop-movement cable, Defense Intelligence Agency, “ROKG Shifts SF Units,” May 8, 1980, Classified (declassified 1993). Tape recording of Wickham interview courtesy Sam Jameson. See also Sam Jameson, “U.S. Support Claimed for S. Korea’s Chon,”
Los Angeles Times
, August 8, 1980. Choi’s regrets, “Choi Terms Kwangju Incident ‘Mistake,’”
KT
, August 20, 1996.

On US “cool and aloof” policy, Gleysteen interview, October 12, 1993. For US intelligence, Gregg and Aaron comments, Gregg to Brzezinski memo, July 1, 1979, Secret (declassified 1997).

The Fight to Save Kim Dae Jung
:
Lilley on Kim Dae Jung, Lilley interview, June 8, 1993. Gregg on Chun’s “terrific pressure,” Gregg interview, March 12, 1995.
ROK contemporaneous notes of the discussions were published in Kwan Young Ki, “Behind the Scenes: Chun Doo Hwan–Reagan Relationship,”
Monthly Chosun
(August 1992). Chung Ho Young on Kim “card,” Chung interview, April 20, 1994. On Allen’s discussions regarding Kim Dae Jung, Allen interviews, December 27, 1993, and January 14, 1994, plus interviews with Sohn Jang Nae on April 21 and 29, 1994, and with Chung Ho Young, April 20, 1994.

Gleysteen on Chun’s visit to Washington,
Emb. cable
, “Agenda Suggestions for Reagan-Chun Meeting,” January 22, 1981, Secret (declassified 1996). Haig views, Memorandum for the President from Alexander Haig, January 29, 1981, Secret (declassified 1993). The US buildup data are from
USFK Hist
., “Personnel Strength in Korea,” November 25, 1996. F-16 offer,
DOS cable
, “President Chun’s Meeting with President Reagan, February 2, 1981,” February 12, 1981, Secret (declassified 1996). For Carter’s refusal to approve F-16 sale, Memorandum for the President, “Harold Brown’s November Asian Trip: Decision to Proceed with F-16 Sale to Korea,” November 1, 1978, Top Secret (declassified 1997). Reagan’s quote on dissenters, Zbigniew Brzezinski interview, March 1, 1994. See also Jimmy Carter,
Keeping Faith
(Bantam Books, 1982), 578.

C
HAPTER
6: T
ERROR AND
T
ALK

An authoritative account of the fate of KAL 007 is Murray Sayle, “Closing the File on Flight 007,”
New Yorker
, December 12, 1993. On Soviet decisions about trading, Georgi Toloraya interview, May 4, 1994. Details on the Rangoon bombers and the bomb are taken from the official account of the Burmese government, as published in the
Guardian
newspaper, Rangoon; and from the Burmese government report to the UN General Assembly, reprinted in
KH
, October 4, 1984. Koh on the African assassination plot, Koh Yong Hwan interview, October 25, 1993.

On Chun’s amended schedule in Rangoon, Lho Shin Yong interview, May 27, 1993; and Richard L. Walker interview, February 18, 1995. On North Korean plans after Chun’s assassination, see Don Oberdorfer,” N. Korea Reportedly Set Coordinated Offensives After Rangoon Blast,”
WP
, December 2, 1983.

Proposal to bomb North Korea in retaliation, Kang Kyong Shik (who had been minister of finance before Rangoon and was later Blue House chief of staff), conversation in Washington, March 22, 1995. Chun on his talk to ROK commanders, Kim Sung Ik,
Voice Testimony of Chun Doo Hwan
(
Chosun Ilbo
, 1992), in Korean. Chun statements to Walker, Walker interview, March 30, 1995; also Harry Dunlop (former US political counselor, Seoul), interview, January 12, 1994. Reagan’s quotes, “Presidential Visit Meetings in Seoul,” Memorandum from Assistant Secretary Paul Wolfowitz to Secretary Shultz, November 19, 1993, Secret/Nodis (declassified 1995). The censure offer was in Shultz’s bilateral talks with Korean foreign minister Lee Won Kyong.

The Negotiating Track
:
The Kissinger proposal was authorized by President Nixon in National Security Decision Memorandum 25–1, March 29, 1974, Top Secret/Sensitive (declassified 1996), which also involved substitution of a US-ROK Command for the UN Command and negotiation of a nonaggression pact between the two Koreas. It evidently was discussed by Kissinger with the Chinese in March 1974, October 1974, and October 1975. See
US-PRC Chronology
, 40, 45, 54.