Authors: Eamonn Gearon
Tags: #Travel, #Sahara, #Desert, #North Africa, #Colonialism, #Art, #Culture, #Literature, #History, #Tunisia, #Berber, #Tuareg
In 1963, after a number of border skirmishes, Moroccan forces invaded Algeria, focusing on the oasis towns and areas around Tindouf and Figuig, thus marking the start of what became known as the Sand War. Pressing a spurious claim to an imagined Greater Morocco - an argument which has also been employed in the on-going dispute over Western Sahara - Moroccan troops hoped to secure their land claims swiftly and without much opposition. They had not, however, reckoned on spirited resistance from the militarily capable Algerian army. After initially being forced into a stalemate, the Moroccans were soon forced back across the border, at which time they renounced all further claims to the area. Even so, the border between Morocco and Algeria remains closed to all traffic, and tensions, sometimes fierce, clearly still exist between the neighbours.
Although Morocco has dropped claims to Tindouf, the town and surrounding area remains important in Morocco’s on-going territorial dispute because Tindouf is a major centre of operations for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro, better known by its Spanish acronym, Polisario, the most prominent organization that continues to press for independence for the Western Sahara.
In 1975, when Spain announced it was going to relinquish control of what was Spanish Sahara, and furthermore was going to do so in something of a hurry, Spanish authorities promised a referendum on the colony’s future before reneging on this decision and signing a tri-partite agreement with Morocco and Mauritania. In this agreement Spain ignored the wishes of the local population by handing the territory - which by the fact of their withdrawal would appear not to be in their gift in the first place - to Morocco and Mauritania, both countries claiming certain historical ties to the region.
Simultaneously, the Hague-based International Court of Justice sent a mission to Western Sahara to investigate the situation. Though they accepted that Morocco and Mauritania had enjoyed historical links to the area, these were not sufficiently strong to overrule the wishes of the local people. Not only did the indigenous Sahrawis have the right to self-determination, but they had also made it absolutely clear that they wanted nothing less than independence. The Moroccan response was to send troops into Western Sahara, followed a few days later by some 350,000 civilians in what they called the Green March. This marked the start of a lengthy, wholly unlawful colonization of Western Sahara with the long-term goal of skewing the local population figures so that in any future referendum the “local” population would overwhelmingly vote in favour of Morocco.
Mauritania abandoned its claims to a portion of the Western Sahara in 1979, after a successful military campaign by the Polisario. Those areas from which Mauritanian forces withdrew were soon filled by Moroccan troops. Today most aid workers and archaeologists who wish to gain access to the unoccupied portion of the Western Sahara tend to do so via Tindouf
Since the start of the conflict, Algeria has sided with the Sahrawis against the Kingdom of Morocco. One aspect of this support, and in spite of Moroccan protests, comes in the form of granting the Polisario the right to operate freely from Tindouf Nervous as the Algerians are of their neighbour becoming too powerful in the region, they view the continuing nuisance caused to Morocco by the Polisario as a useful counterbalance.
Evidence of post-independence wars littering the desert
An uneasy cease-fire has been in place between Polisario and Morocco since 1991, which in part has held because of the presence of a 2000 mile long earthwork
berm
, or earthen-work wall, illegally built and mined by the Moroccans. Morocco had learnt the efficacy of such defences when they employed the same tactics against Algeria in the Sand War. Although this Moroccan Wall, which is said to be patrolled by a greater number of troops than there are Sahrawi people, is maintained at great cost to Morocco’s economy, it also encompasses everything of worth in Western Sahara, not least the mines that have made Morocco the world’s number one exporter of phosphates. The area to the east of the wall covers only one third of the country’s full territorial mass. This area, unoccupied Western Sahara, is a very thinly populated, flat and largely featureless, resource-free desert. Had there been anything of worth there, one can be sure that someone else would have laid claim to it by now.
The French Legacy
The antithesis of the relatively peaceful withdrawal of European nations from their Saharan colonies, dependencies and protectorates was the French departure from Algeria and the story of this long and bloody war continues to haunt its politics today. When Algeria gained its independence from France in 1962, it did so only after an eight-year internecine war that was remarkable for its vicious and fratricidal nature. If the worst excesses of violence occurred primarily in the cities in the country’s north, in the Sahara itself there was more violence after independence during a power struggle in the mid-1960s that saw old allies turn on one another, with the Front of Socialist Forces trying, unsuccessfully, to overthrow the regime of President Ben Bella.
Mass unemployment and a decline in energy prices in the mid-1980s saw a significant rise in support for Algerian Islamist parties, including the founding of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in 1989. Nationwide elections held in December 1991 gave the FIS clear majorities in virtually half of the country’s electoral districts. In January the panicked government declared the elections null and void and dissolved parliament. The Algerian civil war that lasted for the rest of the decade displayed gruesome echoes of the war of independence, with shocking massacres being committed by both pro-government and Islamist factions throughout the country. Approximately 100,000 Algerians were killed before the decade’s end, when Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected president. The official returns showed him receiving seventy per cent of votes cast, in spite of all other candidates pulling out in advance of the election because of claims of widespread fraud.
Tunisia was also forced to fight the French for independence, and although a nationalist movement had been active for decades, the final rush to independence, complete with civil disturbance, was a relatively short two-year affair, which was never stricken with the levels of violence that characterized Algeria’s struggle. The result was warmer post-independence relations with France, as well as enhanced economic growth in Tunisia. Both before and after independence, the limited population that call the Tunisian Sahara home had little or no influence on national politics. In recent years the growth in adventure-style tourism has seen a somewhat larger degree of economic independence for those living in the Saharan south.
The new government in Chad found itself in a situation similar to that of Sudan in 1956, with the country exhibiting a
de facto
division between a largely Muslim Saharan north and a Christian-Animist Sahelian south. Chad’s first president, François Tombalbaye, a southerner, soon betrayed his own prejudice against the north with a series of laws that led directly to the outbreak of a civil war in 1965, billed as pitting the loyalist south against a fractious Saharan north.
The government first called upon French troops to help them fight against the well-organized forces of the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT), which sought to end the southern dominance of the country. Meeting with limited success against FROLINAT, Tombalbaye next allied himself with the Libyan regime of Colonel Gaddafi. Although this initially meant greater success against the rebels, in 1975 Tombalbaye was ousted in a coup, not that his removal from power by any means marked an end to the war.
By the decade’s end, any central authority in Chad had completely disappeared between a dozen independent factions. A 1981 declaration that Chad and Libya would work towards full unification spread anger and despondency in equal measure, even if it also meant a temporary reconciliation between certain rival factions who were able to push Libyan forces back through Bornu and Ennedi, into the far north of the country, where they halted their retreat in the Aouzou Strip, a desolate but mineral rich band of land that runs through the Tibesti Mountains along the length of the Chadian-Libyan border. In early 1987 the last phase of the war took place. It became known as the Toyota War after the French-supplied hundreds of pick-up trucks to the Chadians, which they used to great effect both for swift mobility of military personnel and as carriers for antitank missiles. In spite of a ceasefire agreed later in the year, Libyan forces continued to occupy the Aouzou Strip until1994.
Since then, relations between Chad and Libya have steadily improved. However, since 2005 Chad has instead found itself at war with its eastern neighbour. Chad declared that a state of war existed with Sudan because of that country’s raids into its territory. The root of this conflict is closely linked to the situation in Darfur, which has driven hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees into Chad since 2003.
As part of French West Africa, Niger was controlled during the colonial period from Dakar, more than 1000 miles away. In the fifty years since independence the country has endured a depressingly predictable cycle of corruption and economic mismanagement and one coup after another. At the time of writing, the last coup, in February 2010, saw the establishment of yet another military junta, which like military dictatorships the world over has chosen to adopt a most populist-sounding moniker: Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy. Whether it lives up to this tide remains to be seen.
The discovery of oil in the Tenere desert should have brought some fringe benefits to the country’s large Saharan north: it did not. In response to the almost total lack of development in the north and inequitable treatment of the country’s significant Tuareg population, an armed anti-government insurgency has developed. Fighting a guerrilla war, including the planting of large numbers of land mines, the Mouvement des Nigeriens pour la Justice (MNJ) has been effective in terms of retarding foreign oil and gas investment and almost completely halting Saharan tourism in the country.
Mali declared its independence of the Mali Federation in August 1960. Since then, in common with the model seen in Niger, the country has been unable to demonstrate any meaningful development through a combination of economic woes, military coups and periodic debilitating droughts that have driven people out of both the desert and the Sahel.
When Mauritania gained independence, it is estimated that ninety per cent of the population was nomadic, which made impossible the sort of centralized, one-party control sought by the authoritarian President Moktar Ould Daddah. Daddah’s attempts to impose his will on the country, moving it away from traditional lifestyles, created social tensions that continued even after he was ousted from power in a bloodless coup in 1978. The greater tension, however, was that of colour and culture that seems to afflict the whole of the Sahara, here dividing southern-black and northern-Moorish Mauritanians, with African-Arab prejudices exploited by both sides.
Across the Saharan south, Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania all became independent of France in 1960. During their respective periods of colonial rule, none of these countries was encouraged to look to a future of self-rule, with the result that none of them was ready for the challenges to come. The almost indecent haste with which France retreated meant that the odds were very much against any of these newly independent states becoming viable democracies, at least in the short term. For the Saharan parts of these countries, the challenges were even greater, one might argue insurmountable. As if it were not bad enough that local populations have to live in such a climate without basic amenities like a reliable source of water, the fact that central government only sheds its indifference to their plight when such resources as oil and gas are discovered adds insult to injury. Regrettably, those benefits that one might expect from a country discovering large energy supplies have too often proved to be a curse. Yet this is not to say that the situation is static.
With widespread concerns about future oil and gas supplies, the Sahara is already receiving significant attention from interested parties keen to find suitable sites for the generation of alternative energy. Plans for harnessing solar energy are well advanced, with an estimate by one European consortium, Desertec, suggesting that an area of 6000 square miles of solar panels - roughly the size of Connecticut - would be sufficient to supply the energy needs of both North Africa and Europe. Desertec also reckons that 35,000 square miles of solar panels, roughly one per cent of the Sahara’s surface, could produce the same energy as all power plants operating around the world today, not that plans are in place for such an scheme. Although in the relatively early stages of development, even the most optimistic proponents of such grand schemes recognize that the biggest obstacle to their success is the necessity of cross-border cooperation, especially between nations that are hardly on the best of terms, Morocco and Algeria being the most obvious example. While the power of the sun is the Sahara’s most obvious and readily accessed asset, plans have also been drawn up for the development of large-scale wind farms, primarily in western parts of the desert but also off the coast of Morocco and Western Sahara.