The Grand Alliance (82 page)

In the near future there are no prospects of an offensive being staged from Libya against the Suez Canal. Even if Tobruk should be taken in the autumn, the balance of power would not allow of this. This applies equally to an attack with a limited goal, as every advance towards the east worsens our strained supply position and improves that of the British.

On September 9, 1941, the German Liaison Staff thus reviewed the situation:

Despite constant German and Italian air raids, there is no general change in the situation at Tobruk. So far we have not yet succeeded in putting an effective stop to the fortress’s nightly provision by destroyers and small steamships…. According to statements made by Air Headquarters Africa, the anti-aircraft de fences over Tobruk have become so strong that they are not far behind those of Malta…. The many thrusts, strong and weak, made by the British garrison appear to be made in order to discover the weak spots in the front of encirclement. This is to prepare for a break-out, which

The Grand Alliance

504

is to be expected at the same time as the coming offensive on the southern front….

I have set out the military discussion about the delay in the offensive, and I must record my conviction that General Auchinleck’s four and a half months’ delay in engaging the enemy in the Desert was alike a mistake and a misfortune.

This chapter must also include the account of differences with the Australian Government, whose brave troops played a vital part in the whole defence of Egypt.

Mr. Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, left us in May.

His prolonged visit to England had been most valuable. He had sat through two critical months with the War Cabinet, and had shared many of our most difficult decisions. He had not been satisfied either with the organisation of the Cabinet or with my exercise of such wide powers in the conduct of the war. He raised both points with me on several occasions, and I gave my reasons for not agreeing with him. He desired the formation of an Imperial War Cabinet containing representatives of each of the four self-governing Dominions. On his homeward journey through Canada Mr. Menzies formally submitted his proposals in writing to Mr. Mackenzie King, General Smuts, and Mr.

Eraser. None of them was however in favour of the change, and Mr. Mackenzie King in particular deployed formidable constitutional arguments against Canada’s being committed by her representative to the decisions of a council in London.

The Grand Alliance

505

Prime

Minister

to

19 Aug. 41

Prime

Minister

of

Australia

I need not say that should you be able to pay us
another visit as Prime Minister your presence at our
councils for as long as you are able to stay would be
most welcome. We shall welcome all Dominion Prime
Ministers who will in this way share our responsibilities.

It would not be possible for a Dominion Minister other
than the Prime Minister to sit in the War Cabinet as
representation of all four Dominions would then be
involved resulting in too large a permanent addition to
our members; this in turn would entail far-reaching
structural changes which are not in contemplation. My
inquiries suggest that there would be no chance of the
other Dominions agreeing to a Minister from a single
Dominion representing them in the War Cabinet. I hope
you will bear these points in mind when making your
plans. Kindest regards.

Soon however important changes took place in the Australian Government. As was natural, there were on the morrow of so many misfortunes differences of opinion in the Commonwealth Cabinet about the conduct of the war. The Labour Party in Australia opposed a vote approving Mr.

Menzies’ visit to London. In view of these political manifestations both within and outside the Government, he placed his resignation in the hands of his colleagues and offered to serve in an Australian National Cabinet. On August 25 the Australian Labour Party rejected this proposal and demanded the resignation of the Government. On the 28th Mr. Menzies resigned, and was succeeded by his deputy, Mr. Fadden. The Australian Government, weakened by the loss of its ablest figure, had a majority of only one, and were confronted in this grievous period by a party Opposition thirsting for local power. In spite of the differences which I have mentioned, it was with

The Grand Alliance

506

great regret that I learned of Mr. Menzies’ fall. Although my disagreements with him were serious, our relations had been most friendly. I thought it was a great pity that all the knowledge he had acquired of our affairs and of the war while sitting for four months in the War Cabinet, and the many contacts we had all of us established with him, should be lost. I sent him the following telegram:
Prime Minister to Mr.

28 Aug. 41

Menzies

While I scrupulously abstain from all interference in
Australian politics, I cannot resist telling you with what
sorrow I have learned of your resignation. You have
been at the helm during these two terrible years of
storm, and you were with us here during its most
anxious time for Australia. We are all very grateful to
you for the courage you showed and the help you gave.

I am the gainer by our personal friendship. I went
through a similar experience when I was removed from
the Admiralty at a moment when I could have given the
Anzacs a fair chance of victory at the Dardanelles. It is
always a comfort in such circumstances to feel sure
one has done one’s duty and one’s best. My wife and
family send their regards.

I hastened to put myself in close personal relations with Mr.

Fadden and to submit to him our arguments about the structure of the War Cabinet, and also about the Japanese danger.

Prime

Minister

to

29 Aug. 41

Prime

Minister

of

Australia

Now that you have taken up your great office, I send
you my most cordial good wishes for success, and
assure you that I and my colleagues will do everything
The Grand Alliance

507

in our power to work with you in the same spirit of
comradeship and good-will as we worked with Mr.

Menzies, who, we are so glad to see, is serving under
you as Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence.

I then set forth as my colleagues saw it a full exposition of’

the Imperial and constitutional aspects of the issues which Mr. Menzies had raised. This will be found among the Appendices.
1

Our relations with Mr. Fadden’s Government, and afterwards with Mr. Curtin’s Labour Administration, were not as easy as they had been with their predecessors, and one sharp divergence harmful to our war effort occurred. The new Government, under hard pressure from its opponents, was much concerned about the position of the Australian division in Tobruk. They desired to collect their troops in the Middle East into one force in order to give them an opportunity for refreshment, restoration of discipline and re-equipment, and to satisfy public opinion in Australia. They were also anxious about the “decline in health resistance”

of their troops in the fortress and the danger of a catastrophe resulting from further decline and inability to withstand a determined attack. They therefore demanded their immediate relief by other forces. Auchinleck protested strongly against this change, pointing out the difficulties of the relief and the derangement of his plan for the new offensive. I tried to reassure the General.

Prime

Minister

to

6 Sept. 41

General Auchinleck

I am pretty sure the Australians will play the game if
the facts are put before them squarely. We do not want
either your supply of Tobruk or your other combinations
to be hampered. If meeting their demand would do this,
let me have the facts to put to them. Australia would not

The Grand Alliance

508

tolerate anything shabby. Of course if it does not make
any serious difference we ought to meet their wishes.

I thought it right to furnish the fullest explanations to our sister Government. These also will be found in the Appendices.
2

Upon my representations General Auchinleck had managed to relieve one of the Australian infantry brigade groups in Tobruk and replace it by the Polish Brigade.

Considerable naval risks were involved, as nearly all the ships were attacked by aircraft. The Commander-in-Chief gave at length his reasons for not completing this operation, declaring that it might entail “a further retardation of the offensive in the Western Desert.” “I propose therefore,” he said, “definitely to abandon the idea of a further large-scale relief of Australian personnel in Tobruk, and to reinforce the garrison at once with an ‘I’ tank battalion.” I sent his telegram to Mr. Fadden, with the following appeal:
Prime

Minister

to

11 Sept. 41

Prime

Minister

of

Australia

I send you in its entirety General Auchinleck’s
private telegram to me about relieving the Australian
troops in Tobruk. I do so in complete confidence in your
discretion. General Auchinleck’s telegram is the result
of prolonged consultation with the Naval and Air Commanders in the Middle East.