The Grand Alliance (83 page)

2. You will see from his telegram that if you insist
upon the relief of the Australians in Tobruk it is physically impossible for it to be completed in time for you to
make the statement you desire to the Commonwealth
Parliament by the middle of this month. In fact only half
could be removed during the moonless period of
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509

September, and the other half would have to be removed during the latter half of October, which is the
very time when all preparations for the offensive will be
intense, and when the preparatory work of the air force
will demand their complete concentration on the enemy’s rear areas, dumps, and airfields. In no case

[moreover] could you make any statement to the
Commonwealth Parliament, because any suggestion in
public that the reliefs were to take place might lead to
heavy air attacks on Tobruk Harbour and along the
coast at the time when your troops would be withdrawing. If however you insist that the Australian troops
must be withdrawn, orders will be issued accordingly
irrespective of the cost entailed and the injury to future
prospects. I trust that you will weigh very carefully the
immense responsibility which you would assume before
history by depriving Australia of the glory of holding
Tobruk till victory was won, which otherwise, by God’s
help, will be theirs for ever.

3. I feel bound again to impress upon you the vital
importance of maintaining absolute secrecy about
future operations or movements of troops which the
question of relief of your forces has compelled the
Commander-in-Chief to reveal to us.

This proved vain, and I had no choice but to reply:
Prime

Minister

to

15 Sept. 41

Mr. Fadden

Orders will at once be given in accordance with your
decision. The maintenance of secrecy for the present is
of the highest consequence to all.

To Auchinleck I telegraphed:

Prime

Minister

to

17 Sept. 41

General Auchinleck

I am grieved at Australian attitude, but I have long
feared the dangerous reactions on Australian and world
opinion of our seeming to fight all our battles in the
Middle East only with Dominions troops. For this
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510

reason, apart from desire to reinforce you, I have
constantly pressed sending out some British infantry
divisions. Your decision to put 50th British Division in
Cyprus was, as you know, painful to us. I know that
when you put it there you thought Cyprus was a place
of special danger, but the situation has been changed
by Russian war, and I am sure you will continue to
review employment of this British division in what looks
like a safe defensive rôle….

I trust the Australian withdrawal will not further delay

[your] offensive. The situation has already worsened.

The enemy are far better supplied with petrol. Afrikan
Panzer Corps is now called Afrikan Panzer Gruppe. By
waiting until you have an extra brigade you may well
find you have to face an extra division. Your movements of transport and formation of dumps must be
noted by the enemy. The whole future of the campaign
of 1942 in the Middle East and our relations with Turkey
and Russia are involved.

General Auchinleck for his part was so deeply affronted by the Fadden Government’s persistence in their demand that he wished to tender his resignation, on the ground that he did not command the confidence of the Australian Government. This would at this moment have been harmful from every point of view.

I enlisted the good offices of Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, Minister of State, now installed in Cairo.

Prime

Minister

to

18 Sept. 41

Minister of State

Impossible that Auchinleck should suppose we do
not agree with him [about the Australians in Tobruk].

My whole series of telegrams, including especially mine
of September 11 to Fadden, which was repeated to
Auchinleck and is now repeated to you here with,
shows how strongly we deprecate Australian resolve to
quit the line at this juncture. Moreover, I particularly
stimulated Auchinleck when he was at home not to
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prejudice defence of Tobruk by making a needless
relief.

2. I was astounded at Australian Government’s
decision, being sure it would be repudiated by Australia
if the facts could be made known. Allowances must be
made for a Government with a majority only of one
faced by a bitter Opposition, parts of which at least are
isolationist in outlook.

3. It is imperative that no public dispute should arise
between Great Britain and Australia. All personal
feelings must therefore be subordinated to appearance
of unity. Trouble has largely arisen through our not
having any British infantry divisions in the various
actions, thus leading the world and Australia to
suppose that we are fighting our battles with Dominions
troops only.

4. I am telegraphing to Auchinleck to assure him of
Chiefs of Staff’s full agreement with his military views.

Thus the personal difficulty was smoothed over for the moment, but the actual operation of removing the last of the Australians in October still hung over us.

Prime

Minister

to

29 Sept. 41

General Auchinleck

All now depends upon the battle. It may well be that
you will be granted by the enemy the time you have
asked. But every day’s delay is dearly purchased in the
wider sphere. The prize is Turkey, whose action may
well be determined by victory in Cyrenaica.

I hope to persuade the Australian Government not to
hamper you by pulling out their last two brigades from
Tobruk in the October moonless period.

I now reported the whole position to Mr. Fadden, making another strong appeal. The reply was obdurate, but at this moment Mr. Fadden’s Government was defeated in a division on the Budget, and an Australian Labour Government with a similar majority of one was formed

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512

under Mr. Curtin. I hastened to put myself in friendly touch with the new Prime Minister, who had cabled me.

Prime

Minister

to

8 Oct. 41

Prime

Minister

of

Australia

I thank you for your telegram on assuming the
direction of Commonwealth affairs, and cordially
reciprocate the good wishes it contains. You may be
sure we shall work with you on a basis of most intimate
confidence and comradeship.

But the new Government was equally opposed to our request, and it will be well to complete the account of this unhappy episode. On October 5 I telegraphed to General Auchinleck:

Prime

Minister

to

5 Oct. 41

General Auchinleck

I am sorry I could get no helpful response from the
late Australian Government about avoiding a further

“Supercharge” [relief of Australians in Tobruk], and I
have not yet made any contact with the new Government. I trust however there will be no postponement of

“Crusader.”

After a suitable interval I addressed Mr. Curtin on the question of Tobruk.

Prime

Minister

to

14 Oct. 41

Prime

Minister

of

Australia

I feel it right to ask you to reconsider once again the
issue raised in my telegram to your predecessor. I have
heard again from General Auchinleck that he would be
very greatly helped and convenienced if the remaining

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513

Australian [troops] could stay in Tobruk until the result
of the approaching battle is decided. I will not repeat
the arguments which I have already used, but I will only
add that if you felt able to consent it would not expose
your troops to any undue or invidious risks, and would
at the same time be taken very kindly as an act of
comradeship in the present struggle.

Prime

Minister

to

14 Oct. 41

General Auchinleck

In view of your statement that it would be a great
help to you if the relief of the remaining Australians
could be postponed until after “Crusader,” I sent this
morning the attached [above] telegram to the Australian
Government. It may be that the new Government will
be willing to give you the easement you desire. I should
be glad for the sake of Australia and history if they
would do this. In a day or two I shall hear what they
decide and will advise you.

2. The Russian news is increasingly grave. All now
hinges on you.

Mr. Curtin’s Government adhered to the decision of their predecessors, and I was forced to inform General Auchinleck that the relief must proceed.

Throughout its siege Tobruk was sustained by the Navy, despite a constant and increasing scale of air attack.

Moreover, no fighter protection could be given over the harbour, as our airfields were now too far east. The route by sea from Egypt soon became impossible for ordinary merchant ships, and all had to be carried in destroyers and smaller vessels during moonless nights. From July onward this Tobruk Ferry was greatly aided by the addition of the two fast minelayers
Abdiel
and
Latona.
Apart from maintaining supplies of ammunition and stores, mass