The Grand Alliance (134 page)

Reviewing these three documents, with which, in the afterlight, and taken as a whole, I am content, it will be seen that they bear a very close correspondence to what was actually done by Britain and the United States during the campaigns The Grand Alliance

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of 1942 and 1943. I eventually obtained the President’s agreement to the expedition to Northwest Africa (Operation

“Torch”), which constituted our first great joint amphibious offensive. It was my earnest desire that the crossing of the Channel and the liberation of France (the operation then called “Roundup,” which was subsequently changed to

“Overlord”) should take place in the summer of 1943.

While however it is vital to plan the future, and sometimes possible to forecast it in certain respects, no one can help the time-table of such mighty events being deranged by the actions and counter-strokes of the enemy. All the objectives in these memoranda were achieved by the British and United States forces in the order here set forth. My hopes that General Auchinleck would clear Libya in February, 1942, were disappointed. He underwent a series of grievous reverses which will presently be described. Hitler, perhaps encouraged by this success, determined upon a large-scale effort to fight for Tunis, and presently moved about two hundred thousand fresh troops thither through Italy and across the Mediterranean. The British and American armies therefore became involved in a larger and longer campaign in North Africa than I had contemplated. A delay of four months was for this reason enforced upon the time-table. The Anglo-American Allies did not obtain control of “the whole of the North and West African possessions of France, and the further control by Britain of the whole North African shore from Tunis to Egypt,” by the end of 1942.
3

We obtained these results only in May, 1943. The supreme plan of crossing the Channel to liberate France, for which I had earnestly hoped and worked, could not therefore be undertaken that summer, and was perforce postponed for one whole year, till the summer of 1944.

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Subsequent reflection and the full knowledge we now possess have convinced me that we were fortunate in our disappointment. The year’s delay in the expedition saved us from what would at that date have been at the best an enterprise of extreme hazard, with the probability of a world-shaking disaster. If Hitler had been wise he would have cut his losses in North Africa and would have met us in France with double the strength he had in 1944, before the newly raised American armies and staffs had reached their full professional maturity and excellence, and long before the enormous armadas of landing-craft and the floating harbours (“Mulberries”) had been specially constructed. I am sure now that even if Operation “Torch” had ended as I hoped in 1942, or even if it had never been tried, the attempt to cross the Channel in 1943 would have led to a bloody defeat of the first magnitude, with measureless reactions upon the result of the war. I became increasingly conscious of this during the whole of 1943, and therefore accepted as inevitable the postponement of “Overlord”

while fully understanding the vexation and anger of our Soviet Ally.

Once it became certain that we could not cross the Channel till 1944 the need of forcing the campaign in the Mediterranean was clear. Only by landing in Sicily and Italy could we engage the enemy on a large scale and tear down the weaker at least of the Axis partners. It was for the express purpose of securing this decision that I obtained the President’s consent for General Marshall to come with me from Washington to Algiers in May, 1943. All this will be recounted in detail as the actual events occur.

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15

Washington and Ottawa

Arrival at the White House — A Hearty Welcome

— A Whirl of Business — Anglo-American Intervention in French North Africa — My Report to the
War Cabinet of Our First Discussion — Design of
the Grand Alliance — Mr. Hull and the Free
French — Mr. Knox and Wake Island — Australian Anxieties — My Report to Mr. Curtin of
December
25 —
Christmas at the White House —

I Address Congress — An Impressive Experience
on Boxing Day
—
The Southwest Pacific Command — General Wavell Appointed — An Un-promising Task — I Prolong My Stay — Journey
to Ottawa — Address to the Canadian Parliament,
December
30 —
Sir Harry Lauder
—
A Forecast of
the War Future — New Year’s Eve in the Train.

I
T HAD BEEN INTENDED that we should steam up the Potomac and motor to the White House, but we were all impatient after nearly ten days at sea to end our journey.

We therefore arranged to fly from Hampton Roads, and landed after dark on December 22 at the Washington airport. There was the President waiting in his car. I clasped his strong hand with comfort and pleasure. We soon reached the White House, which was to be in every sense our home for the next three weeks. Here we were welcomed by Mrs. Roosevelt, who thought of everything that could make our stay agreeable.

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I must confess that my mind was so occupied with the whirl of events and the personal tasks I had to perform that my memory till refreshed had preserved but a vague impression of these days. The outstanding feature was of course my contacts with the President. We saw each other for several hours every day, and lunched always together, with Harry Hopkins as a third. We talked of nothing but business, and reached a great measure of agreement on many points, both large and small. Dinner was a more social occasion, but equally intimate and friendly. The President punctiliously made the preliminary cocktails himself, and I wheeled him in his chair from the drawing-room to the lift as a mark of respect, and thinking also of Sir Walter Raleigh spreading his cloak before Queen Elizabeth.

I formed a very strong affection, which grew with our years of comradeship, for this formidable politician who had imposed his will for nearly ten years upon the American scene, and whose heart seemed to respond to many of the impulses that stirred my own. As we both, by need or habit, were forced to do much of our work in bed, he visited me in my room whenever he felt inclined, and encouraged me to do the same to him. Hopkins was just across the passage from my bedroom, and next door to him my travelling map room was soon installed. The President was much interested in this institution, which Captain Pim had perfected. He liked to come and study attentively the large maps of all the theatres of war which soon covered the walls, and on which the movement of fleets and armies was so accurately and swiftly recorded. It was not long before he established a map room of his own of the highest efficiency.

The days passed, counted in hours. Quite soon I realised that immediately after Christmas I must address the Congress of the United States, and a few days later the

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Canadian Parliament in Ottawa. These great occasions imposed heavy demands on my life and strength, and were additional to all the daily consultations and mass of current business. In fact, I do not know how I got through it all.

A record has been preserved of our first discussion on the night of the twenty-second. I immediately broached with the President and those he had invited to join us the scheme of Anglo-American intervention in French North Africa. The President had not of course at this time read the papers I had written on board ship, which I could not give him till the next day. But he had evidently thought much about my letter of October 20. Thus we all found ourselves pretty well on the same spot. My report home shows that we cut deeply into business on the night of our arrival.

Prime

Minister

to

23 Dec. 41

War Cabinet and C.

O.S. Committee

The President and I discussed the North African
situation last night [December 22]. Mr. Hull, Mr. Welles,
Mr. Hopkins, Lord Beaverbrook, and Lord Halifax also
took part in the discussion.

2. There was general agreement that if Hitler was
held in Russia he must try something else, and that the
most probable line was Spain and Portugal en route to
North Africa. Our success in Libya and the prospect of
joining hands with French North African territory was
another reason to make Hitler want, if he could, to get
hold of Morocco as quickly as possible. At the same
time reports did not seem to suggest threat was imminent, perhaps because Hitler had enough on hand at
the moment.

3. There was general agreement that it was vital to
forestall the Germans in Northwest Africa and the
Atlantic islands. In addition to all the other reasons, the
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two French battleships, Jean Bart and Richelieu, were
a real prize for whoever got them. Accordingly, the
discussion was not whether, but how.

4. Various suggestions were made:
(a) The United States Government might speak in
very serious and resolute terms to Vichy, saying that
this was final chance for them to reconsider their
positions and come out on the side that was pledged to
restoration of France. As a symbol of this Pétain might
be invited to send Weygand to represent him at an
Allied conference in Washington.

(b) An approach might be made to Weygand in the
light of a North African situation fundamentally changed
by British advance and by United States entering into
war and their willingness to send a force to North Africa.

5. It was suggested, on the other hand, that the
effect of such procedure might be to extract smooth
promises from Pétain and Weygand, the Germans
meanwhile being advised of our intentions, and that,
accordingly, if these approaches were to be made, it
would be desirable to have all plans made for going into
North Africa, with or without invitation.
1
I emphasised
immense psychological effect likely to be produced
both in France and among French troops in North
Africa by association of United States with the undertaking. Mr. Hull suggested that it might well be that a
leader would emerge in North Africa as events developed.

The President said that he was anxious that American land forces should give their support as quickly as
possible wherever they could be most helpful, and
favoured the idea of a plan to move into North Africa
being prepared for either event, i.e., with or without
invitation.

6. It was agreed to remit the study of the project to
Staffs on assumption that it was vital to forestall the
Germans in that area and that the Libyan campaign
had, as it was expected to do, achieved complete
success. It was recognised that the question of
shipping was plainly a most important factor.