The Grand Alliance (68 page)

The Grand Alliance

414

offered, General Dentz and other highly placed officers were taken into custody as hostages. This had the desired effect, and our men were returned.

The successful campaign in Syria greatly improved our strategical position in the Middle East. It closed the door to any further attempt at enemy penetration eastward from the Mediterranean, moved our defence of the Suez Canal northward by two hundred and fifty miles, and relieved Turkey of anxiety for her southern frontier. She could now be assured of aid from a friendly Power if she were attacked. Although, for the sake of the narrative, it has been necessary to divide the four sets of operations in Iraq, Crete, Syria, and the Western Desert from one another, it The Grand Alliance

415

must not be forgotten that they were all running together, and reacted upon each other to produce a sensation of crisis and complexity combined. Nevertheless, it may be claimed that the final result constituted in effect, though not in appearance, an undoubted and important victory for the British and Imperial armies in the Middle East, the credit of which may be shared between our authorities in London and Cairo.

The battle in Crete, which cost us so dear, ruined the striking power of the German airborne corps. The Iraq revolt was finally crushed, and with pitifully small and improvised forces we regained mastery of the wide regions involved. The occupation and conquest of Syria, which was undertaken to meet a desperate need, ended, as it proved for ever, the German advance towards the Persian Gulf and India. If under all the temptations of prudence, the War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff had not made every post a winning-post, and imposed their will on all commanders, we should have been left only with the losses sustained in Crete, without gathering the rewards which followed from the hard and glorious fighting there. If General Wavell, though exhausted, had broken under the intense strain to which he was subjected by events and by our orders, the whole future of the war and of Turkey might have been fatefully altered. There is always much to be said for not attempting more than you can do and for making a certainty of what you try. But this principle, like others in life and war, has its exceptions.

One more operation, the battle in the Western Desert, which ranked first with me and the Chiefs of Staff, has still to be described. And this, though denied success, brought Rommel to a standstill for nearly five months.

The Grand Alliance

416

19

General Wavell’s Final Effort:

“Battleaxe”

The Need to Defeat Rommel — Wavell’s Determination — The Attack on Sollum and Capuzzo, May
15–16
— A Limited Success — “Tiger Cubs’”

Teething Troubles — Arrival of the Fifteenth
Panzer Division — Halfaya Lost, May
26
—

Preparations for “Battleaxe” — Enemy Strength
Underestimated — Our Attack Starts, June
15
—

All Goes Wrong, June
17
— Rommel Does Not
Pursue — The Willing Horse — My Telegrams of
June
21
— General Auchinleck Relieves General
Wavell — Need for Devolution at Cairo — An
Intendant-General — A Telegram — Captain
Oliver Lyttelton — His Appointment as Minister of
State in the Middle East — My Telegram to
President Roosevelt of July
4
.

A
LL OUR HEARTS AT HOME had throughout been set on beating Rommel in the Western Desert. There was no difference of any kind between us, soldiers or civilians, in the supreme consequence we assigned to this. The tragedy of the evacuation of Greece, the distractions in Iraq and Syria, the dire struggle in Crete, all paled before the gleam of hope which we attached, and rightly, to victory in the Western Desert. One did not have to argue this matter in London.

Wavell, of course, had all the other troubles leaping upon him from day to day. He was, however, firmly with us in The Grand Alliance

417

thought that the crushing of Rommel’s venturous offensive and the consequent relief of Tobruk would make amends for all. Moreover, he realised what risks we had run to give him back the armour which he had lost when the desert flank crumpled. He had loyalty to Operation “Tiger.” He knew what this effort of sending nearly three hundred tanks to him through the Mediterranean had meant. His spirit was buoyant, and he did not overlook the broad principle that in war as in life everything is relative. Our united strategic conception may be claimed to be correct. At this time we had a spy in close touch with Rommel’s headquarters, who gave us accurate information of the fearful difficulties of Rommel’s assertive but precarious position. We knew how narrow was the margin on which he hoped to maintain himself, and also the strong and strict injunctions of the German High Command that he was not to cast away his victories by asking too much of fortune.

Prime

Minister

to

7 May 41

General Wavell

You and your generals alone can judge the tactical
possibilities whether at Sollum or Tobruk. But if “Tiger”

comes through it will be a moment to do and dare. I am
asking for a rapid transfer from Malta of Hurricanes to
your command once the “Tiger’s” tail is clear. Those
Hun people are far less dangerous once they lose the
initiative. All our thoughts are with you,
Wavell, who had all our information, tried on his own initiative, even in the imminent advent of Crete, to claw down Rommel before the dreaded 15th Panzer Division arrived in full strength over the long road from Tripoli, and before Benghazi was effectively opened as a short cut for enemy supply He, therefore, wished to strike at Rommel’s force even before the tanks delivered by “Tiger” – “Tiger Cubs,” as Wavell and I called them in our correspondence The Grand Alliance

418

– could be brought into action. The armoured force in the Western Desert at the beginning of May consisted of only two squadrons of cruisers and two squadrons of infantry tanks, stationed southeast of Matruh. Wavell hoped to build this up into an adequate striking force by early June. He thought he saw an opportunity for a blow before the Tiger Cubs could be ready. He hoped to catch the enemy unawares before they could be reinforced by the 15th Panzer Division.

General

Wavell

to

9 May 41

Prime Minister

I have ordered all available tanks to be placed at
disposal of Gott’s force for offensive action in Sollum
area. This is now in active preparation and should take
place soon. I shall only cancel it if complete disaster
overtakes “Tiger.” …

General

Wavell

to

13 May 41

Prime Minister

Without waiting for “Tiger” I ordered available tanks
to join Gott’s force to attack enemy Sollum area. Action
should take place in next day or two, and I think Gott
should be able to deal with forward enemy troops. If
successful, will consider immediate combined action by
Gott’s force and Tobruk garrison to drive enemy west of
Tobruk. It may be necessary to wait for some of “Tiger”

to do this, but am anxious to act as quickly as possible
before enemy can be reinforced.

I had full and active agreement from the Chiefs of Staff.

What a relief it was to have no differences at home!

Chief of the Air Staff

14 May 41

to Air Marshal Tedder

After Chiefs of Staff had today expressed general
agreement with your appreciation the Prime Minister
discussed it fully with me. He was much pleased with

The Grand Alliance

419

the general lay-out, and felt glad that you had the
handling of the important and complicated air
operations impending.

2. Following general observations on time-table and
relative emphasis may assist without fettering your
freedom of action.

3. Victory in Libya comes first in time and importance. Results would dominate Iraq situation in German
and Iraqi minds.

4. Our object in Iraq is to get back a friendly Government in Baghdad, and you should do all you can to
help in this, but nothing must prejudice victory in
Western Desert.

5. From here it seems probable that “Scorcher” [the
attack on Crete] will happen after smaller operations in
Libya, and before larger, which depend on “Tiger
Cubs.” You should allow for, but not rely on, “Colorado” [Crete] being attacked later than expected owing
to complexity of operations.

6. One clear-cut result is worth a dozen wise precautions. Longer views about Iraq, Syria, and preparations
in Palestine can be taken later. Prime importance of
Desert operations would justify accepting necessary
risks elsewhere.

A force under General Gott, consisting of the 7th Armoured Brigade, mustering about fifty-five tanks, and the 22d Guards Brigade, now advanced northwestward along the top of the escarpment, and on May 15 captured Sollum and Capuzzo, the armoured brigade on the left moving on to Sidi Azeiz. The enemy were quick to counter-attack, and retook Capuzzo the same afternoon, inflicting heavy casualties on the Durham Light Infantry, who had taken it.

This enforced the withdrawal of the 7th Armoured Brigade from Sidi Azeiz. The enemy, employing about seventy tanks, showed greater strength than had been expected.

The Grand Alliance

420

Although we still held Sollum that night, it was decided to withdraw the whole force next day, the 16th, leaving garrisons on the pass over the escarpment at Halfaya and at Sidi Suleiman.

Wavell’s report of this action was not sanguine. He said that after a preliminary advance which cleared the enemy from the Sollum-Bardia area, an enemy counter-attack with tanks had forced our troops back to Halfaya. We were able to maintain forward posts in Sollum, and a sortie by the Tobruk garrison achieved a local success. We had inflicted significant casualties. At home we were pleased.

Prime

Minister

to

17 May 41

General Wavell

Results of action seem to us satisfactory. Without
using Tiger Cubs, you have taken the offensive, have
advanced thirty miles, have captured Halfaya and
Sollum, have taken five hundred Ger man prisoners,
and inflicted heavy losses in men and tanks upon the
enemy. For this twenty “I” tanks and one thousand or
one thousand five hundred casualties do not seem to
be at all too heavy a cost.

2. News from Tobruk is also good, especially as
enemy’s loss is greater than ours. Enemy is certainly
anxious about Tobruk, and reports with apparent
satisfaction when it is quiet. It seems of the utmost
importance to keep on fighting at Tobruk.

3. Enemy is bringing up reinforcements and is
seeking to reestablish the situation. We should surely
welcome this, as he may not be in a condition to stand
severe continuous fighting. Dill and I both feel confident
of good results of sustained pressure, because the
extremely worried state of the enemy is known to us.