The Grand Alliance (179 page)

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say they must have some additional desert practice,
which seems reasonable.

3. But if these one hundred and fifty tanks only
cleared arrival on October 14 and then there is a three
weeks’ period to make them desert-worthy, this would
carry us to November 7. What then happens to the
necessary month, or perhaps somewhat shorter period,
for them to be practised in the hands of troops and
work in the Desert with their commanders? The story
we have been told, as now pieced together, does not
hold water, even on the revised programme. We have
got to find out (1) what has been or is being done
mechanically and what is the existing state of each of
the hundred and fifty tanks; (2) what changes will be
made in their treatment as a result of the War Office
telegram about the axles, and will any shortening-up of
the date be possible; (3) what about the desert training
period of the 22d Armoured Brigade?

Have this all cleaned up and the necessary telegram
drafted for my consideration tonight.

Prime Minister to General

24.XI.41.

Ismay

Let me have your full report about the remainder of
the 1st Armoured Division. When did they arrive, and
what is the condition of their tanks? How far are they
desert-worthy? What about their axles? How far are
they trained? Can anything be done to speed them up
or to speed up their unloading?

[I print these details to show how difficult it is to get
things done even with much power, realised need, and
willing helpers.]

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Appendix G, Book Two

NAVAL DIRECTIVES AND MINUTES

March–December,
1941

N
AVAL
B
UILDING
P
ROGRAMMES

The gun-power of our new battleships had always interested me deeply. In Volume I, I have summarised my discussions with the Admiralty in 1937, when the design of the
King George V
class was under review.

38
These five ships were in my view gravely under-gunned. The four ships of the
Lion
class which were to follow them were intended to mount the sixteen-inch gun, and the first two had been actually laid down before the outbreak of war, but all work on them had been stopped in October, 1939. I reverted to this subject in my directive of March 27, 1941, where I stated my general views on our future naval building programme, in the light of the many other pressing commitments which clamoured for attention.

N
AVAL
P
ROGRAMME, 1941

Directive by the Minister of Defence
27.111.41.

Naval programmes have been continuous throughout the war, all slips being filled as vacated. It is nevertheless convenient at this time of year that the
Admiralty should present their present needs of new
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construction in a general list and obtain Cabinet sanction for their policy.

2. No one can doubt that the construction of small
craft for anti-U-boat warfare, for minesweeping, for
combating the E-boats, and for assault landings should
proceed to the full extent of our resources. It is
essential however that simplicity of design, speed of
construction, and the largest possible numbers should
govern the whole of this small-craft programme. The
construction of destroyers should in no case exceed
fifteen months. I understand from the Controller that,
apart from enemy action or strikes, he can guarantee
this in respect of the forty now projected.

3. We cannot at the present time contemplate any
construction of heavy ships that cannot be completed in
1942. This rules out further progress upon the Lion and
Temeraire and the laying-down of Conqueror and
Thunderer. It also makes it impossible to begin the four
heavy cruisers contemplated in the programme of
1940. Work will therefore be limited to completing the
three remaining battleships of the KingGeorge V class
and to building the three light cruisers of the 1941

programme, all of which, it is understood, can be
completed before the end of 1942. An additional
monitor, for which the guns are already available, can
also be completed before the end of 1942.

4. The need of concentrating labour on merchant
repairs and on repairs to the fighting fleet makes it
impossible to begin any new aircraft-carriers after
Victorious, Indomitable, and Indefatigable have been
completed. Such new aircraft-carriers could not in any
case be ready until 1944.

5. The requirements of the Navy in armour-plate can
on the above basis be adjusted to meet the needs of
the Army tank programme, and can be limited to 16,500

tons in 1941 and 25,000 tons in 1942. No new armour-plate plant need be erected at present.

6. The one exception to the above principles is the
Vanguard, which can be completed in 1943 and is the
only capital ship we can by any means obtain before
1945. As we have the guns and turrets for the Vanguard, it is eminently desirable that this vessel should
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be pressed forward, provided that this can be done
within the limits of the armour-plate provision in paragraph 5.

7. Nothing in the above should hinder the work on
the drawings and designs of any of the postponed
vessels, including especially the new aircraft-carrier.

8. In view of the need to concentrate on repairs, the
output of new merchant ships may be reduced from
1,250,000 tons, which is the present target, to
1,100,000 tons in 1942, and we should not at the
present time proceed with any merchant vessels which
cannot be completed by the end of 1941. It is to the
United States building that we must look for relief in
1942.

9. The whole of our heavy ship construction will be
reviewed on September 1, 1941, in the light of (a) the
Battle of the Atlantic, and (b) the relation of the United
States to the war.

Prime Minister to First Lord,

16.VIII.41.

First Sea Lord and

Controller

I am greatly interested in the proposed design of the
Lion and Teme-raire. Let me know the exact point
which has been reached in the general construction
and in the drawings.

2. It is most important not to reproduce in these two
ships the faults which are apparent in the five K.G.V’s;
namely: (a) The retrogression to the fourteen-inch gun
from our well-tried fifteen-inch type; and (b) the marring
of the structure by the provision of the aerodrome
amidships. Merely for the sake of having a couple of
low quality aircraft, the whole principle of the citadel so
well exemplified in the Nelson and the Rodney has
been cast aside.

The space of about forty feet amidships entails a
degree of heavy armouring in this vital area, which is
improvident having regard to the needs for carrying a
lesser protection as far forward and aft as possible. It
may well be that one thousand or fifteen hundred tons
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of armour are misplaced through the opening of this
hiatus in the citadel of the ship.

3. I understand, and hope, that the Lion and
Temeraire will carry nine sixteen-inch guns in three
triple turrets, with six guns firing directly ahead, and the
rear turret on the most forward bearing possible. These
three turrets should be grouped together as closely as
possible to form the central citadel, comprising funnels
and director tower, and covering with the turret and
heaviest armour the magazines and vital machinery
spaces. If this were done it should be possible to give a
six-inch turtle [underwater] deck carried very far
forward, if possible to the bow, thus protecting the
speed of the ship from bow damage.

4. Although it looked very progressive to be able to
fly two aeroplanes off a battleship, the price paid in the
rest of the design was altogether excessive. It might
however be possible in a ship with a citadel outlined
above to arrange to flip off one or two aircraft from the
quarterdeck, but no serious sacrifice of design must be
made for this. A capital ship of the consequence of the
Lion or Temeraire must depend upon having an aircraft-carrier working with her, or at the very least a cruiser
capable of flying off an aircraft. She should on no
account be spoiled for the sake of carrying aircraft.

5. I should very much like to see these two ships
pressed forward beyond what is at present approved.

Before however any final decision is taken upon the
design there ought to be a conference of a number of
sea officers, including the late and present Commanders-in-Chief, who have served in the King George V or
Prince of Wales. The successful design of the Arethusa
was evolved from a conference of Admirals convened,
at my direction, in the winter of 1911.

Pray let me have your views.

The First Sea Lord confirmed that these ships would
mount nine sixteen-inch guns in three triple turrets and
that the Commanders-in-chief had been consulted
about the design. He maintained that the aircraft
hangars in the King George Vclass did not weaken the
citadel. This had to include protection for the machinery
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spaces, which were enormously increased in these
ships as compared with the Nelsons.

[The resumption of work on the Lion and Temeraire
was closely considered, but we decided against it for
the following reasons: (a) The building of turrets would
interfere with the production of A.A. equipment and
coast-defence gun mountings. (b) The requirements for
armour would conflict with tank production. (c) The
demands which these ships would make on our shipyard labour force.

What finally clinched the matter was the fact that
there could be no reasonable chance of completing
these vessels during the war. They were therefore
cancelled.

I was anxious to know how our King George V class
compared with contemporary American ships.]

Prime Minister to First Sea

1.IX.41.

Lord

I cannot help grieving that we have not got the three
triple sixteen-inch turrets for the five K.G.V’s. The
matter is academic and irretrievable. None the less, as
my thought has dwelt on these matters for the last thirty
years, I should like to know what is known at the
Admiralty about the American ships contemporary to K.

G.V.Admiral Stark told me that they were three triple
turrets of sixteen-inch. When I asked him whether he
had not overrun the 35,000-ton limit he said, “No, but
they had given up the five hundred tons they used to
keep to veer and haul upon.”

Please let me have the legend of these American
ships as far as you have knowledge of them at the
Admiralty.