The Grand Alliance (176 page)

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The strain on shipping in supplying these forces largely
round the Cape, and the time taken in the turn-round of
available ships, should be explained, if necessary, in
detail.

6. For the defence of the British Isles we have an
army of slightly over 2,000,000 men, backed by about
1,500,000 Home Guard. We possess only about
3,500,000 rifles, and can only get 100,000 more or so
in the next year. Of this army of 2,000,000 men,
900,000 constitute the field force, comprising twenty
mobile infantry divisions, nine less mobile county or
beach divisions, and six armoured divisions, three of
which are only partly formed, together with five Army
tank brigades, of which only one is as yet complete.

Nearly 1,000,000 men will be required for the enormous
air force we are creating; 750,000 are already enrolled.

The Navy already absorbs half a million sailors and
Marines. When to this is added the shipbuilding, aircraft
production, and munitions industries, and the need of
food production at home and other domestic civilian
industries, all cut to a minimum, it will be seen that the
man-power and available woman-power of a population
of 44,000,000 is, or will soon be, engaged to the limit.

7. Out of the 1,100,000 men behind the field army at
home, the air defence of Great Britain, the coastal
defence, the garrison of Northern Ireland, the draft-producing units and training schools, the defence of
aerodromes and vulnerable points, leave only a small
margin.

8. It will not be possible to increase the field army at
home beyond the number of divisions – less than forty

– already mentioned, and great efforts will be needed
to maintain the existing strength at home while supplying the drafts for the Middle East, India, and other
garrisons abroad – e.g., Iceland, Gibraltar, Malta, Aden,
Singapore, Hong Kong.

9. We could not allow the force needed in Great
Britain to repel invasion to fall below twenty-five infantry
and four or five armoured divisions. It must be noted
that troops can be transferred by the enemy across the
main lateral railways of Europe incomparably quicker
than any of our divisions could be recalled from abroad.

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The number of divisions available for offensive oversea
action is therefore small.

10. Apart from the twenty-five British and Imperial
divisions proposed to be built up in the Middle East
during 1942, an expeditionary force of six or seven
divisions, including two armoured divisions, is the
maximum that can be conceived. This is being prepared. Even if more were available the shipping does
not exist to carry larger forces and maintain them
overseas. All ideas of twenty or thirty divisions being
launched by Great Britain against the western shores of
the Continent or sent round by sea for service in Russia
have no foundation of reality on which to rest. This
should be made clear.

11. We have every intention of intervening on land
next spring, if it can be done. All the possibilities are
being studied, including action on the northern and
southern flanks of the Russian front. In the North an
expedition into Norway would raise a serious revolt,
and might, if it succeeded, win the Swedish Government, with its good army, to our cause. This has been
studied in detail. It is not however seen how the
Russian forces could help; in fact, their intervention
would antagonise Sweden beyond all hope. The
hostility of Finland is already declared.

12. At any moment we may be called upon to face
the hostility of Spain and the penetration of the Germans into Morocco, Algeria, and West Africa. Should
the French resist in Africa our available force might be
sent to help them there. In both these cases the sea
routes are short and not comparable with the vast
distances round the Cape.

13. In the Middle East, on the southern flank of
Russia, we shall deploy the strong forces mentioned
above. Once the Western Desert and Cyrenaica have
been cleared of the German and Italian armies now
active there, our Middle Eastern forces would have a
choice of action. If they increasingly give their right
hand to the Russians, either in the Caucasus or east of
the Caspian, it must be realised that their supply will
choke the rail and road connection from the Persian
Gulf. On the other hand, Turkey, if she could be gained,
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is the great prize. Not only would the German road to
Syria and Egypt be barred by powerful Turkish armies,
but the Black Sea naval defence could be maintained
with great advantages, thus helping the defence of the
Caucasus. The action of Turkey one way or the other
may be determined in the near future by the promises,
should she become involved, of help in troops and
modern equipment, including especially aerodromes,
tanks, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, etc. It should
be made clear to the Russians that much of this equipment and the greater part of the troops would of course
be withdrawn from the contributions available for
Russia, which are all we can give. In order however to
induce Turkey to come in on our side, especially in the
near future, it would be well worth Great Britain and
Russia revising their arrangements.

14. We are much interested in the development of
the Polish and Czech armies in Russia, the latter being
only small, and we should be glad to help in their
equipment. It should be pointed out that the Poles and
Czechs have influential communities in the United
States. If a proportion of our equipment could be
earmarked for the Poles and Czechs it would have a
good effect.

15. The Russians will no doubt ask how you
propose to win the war, to which our answer should be,

“By going on fighting till the Nazi system breaks up, as
the Kaiser’s system broke up last time.” For this
purpose we shall fight the enemy wherever we can
meet them on favourable terms. We shall undermine
them by propaganda, depress them with the blockade,
and, above all, bomb their homelands ceaselessly,
ruthlessly, and with ever-increasing weight of bombs.

We could not tell last time how and when we should
win the war, but by not giving in and not wearying we
came through all right. We did not hesitate to face
Germany and Italy alone all last year, and the determination of the British masses to destroy the Nazi power
is inflexible. The phrases “Nazi tyranny” and “Prussian
militarism” are used by us as targets rather than as any
implacable general condemnation of the German
peoples. We agree with the Russian Government in
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hoping to split the Germans and to isolate the criminal
Nazi régime.

16. Of course we cannot predict what action the
United States will take. The measures already sanctioned by President Roosevelt and his Government
may at any time in the near future involve the United
States in full war, whether declared or undeclared. In
that case we might look forward to a general offensive
upon Germany in 1943. If German morale and unity
were seriously weakened and their hold upon the
conquered European countries relaxed, it might be
possible to land large numbers of armoured forces
simultaneously on the shores of several of the conquered countries and raise widespread revolts. Plans
for this are now being studied by the British Staffs.

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Appendix E, Book Two

FLEET DISPOSITIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Prime Minister to First Lord

25.VIII.42

and First Sea Lord

It should be possible in the near future to place a
deterrent squadron in the Indian Ocean. Such a force
should consist of the smallest number of the best ships.

We have only to remember all the preoccupations
which are caused us by the Tirpitz – the only capital
ship left to Germany against our fifteen or sixteen
battleships and battle-cruisers – to see what an effect
would be produced upon the Japanese Admiralty by
the presence of a small but very powerful and fast force
in Eastern waters. It may be taken as virtually certain
that Tirpitz will not sally forth from the Baltic while the
Russian Fleet is in being, as she is the only unit which
prevents Russian superiority there. Nevertheless, in
making dispositions which take some time to alter we
must provide for two K.G.V’s [King George V’s] and one
Nelson with the C.-in-C. This allows for accidents, refits,
and leave. One aircraft-carrier, preferably [one of the]

unarmoured, should also be provided for the broad
waters.

2. The most economical disposition would be to
send Duke of York, as soon as she is clear of constructional defects, via Trinidad and Simons-town to the
East. She could be joined by Repulse or Renown and
one aircraft-carrier of high speed. This powerful force
might show itself in the triangle Aden-Singapore-Simonstown. It would exert a paralysing effect upon
Japanese naval action. The Duke of York could work
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up on her long, safe voyage to the East, leaving the C.-

in-C. Home Fleet with two K.G.V’s,which are thoroughly
efficient. It would be, in my opinion, a more thrifty and
fruitful use of our resources than to send Prince of
Wales from regions where she might, though it is
unlikely, meet Tirpitz.

3. I do not like the idea of sending at this stage the
old “R” class battleships to the East. The manning
problem is greatly increased by maintaining numerically
large fleets in remote waters, owing to the greater
number of men in transit. Besides this, the old ships are
easy prey to the modern Japanese vessels, and can
neither fight nor run. They might however be useful for
convoy should we reach that stage, which is not yet by
any means certain, or even, in my opinion, probable.

4. I am however in principle in favour of placing a
formidable, fast, high-class squadron in the aforesaid
triangle by the end of October, and telling both the
Americans and Australians that we will do so. It seems
probable that the American negotiations with Japan will
linger on for some time. The Americans talk now of
ninety days, and the Japanese may find it convenient to
wait and see how things go in Russia.

5. It would always be an advantage, if possible, to
change the armoured [aircraft-carrier] Victorious for the
Ark Royal for service in the narrow waters of the
Mediterranean, and I suppose you will wish to strengthen “Force H” with one of the Nelsons as well as either
Repulse or Renown.

6. Naturally, C.-in-C. Home Fleet will require a first
call upon an aircraft-carrier, preferably Ark Royal.