The German Fifth Column in Poland (8 page)

“
The captured Germans were to have been transported out of the town and into the interior of the country. But I don't know whether this was done, for, before three in the afternoon I left via Inowroclaw in the direction of Warsaw, where my regiment was stationed. On the way, outside Bydgoszcz, I met a detachment of police hastening towards the town. Much later, at Wilno, I met the engineer Z., who told me he had remained in Bydgoszcz until the early hours of September 4th. According to his story absolute calm prevailed until the night. At two o'clock, just before dawn, he heard shots. At daybreak he learned that a large band of German agents on bicycles had attempted to get to the centre of the town from the direction of the station, but they had been repulsed by the army and had left their bicycles and materials behind.”

Here is a priest's
deposition:
[13]

“The Germans talk a great deal about ‘Bloody Sunday’ at Bydgoszcz, and pretend that there were some 2000 German victims of the massacre. But they ignore the fact that they had themselves provoked the Poles to execute 150 Germans who fired from ambush upon Polish troops.

“
On Sunday, September 3rd, at ten in the morning the Germans opened fire from the tops of the towers of the Protestant churches, from hiding-places, and from the roofs of their houses at retreating Polish troops. Not at all numerous at Bydgoszcz, they none the less ventured upon this rising because they believed the Polish Army was being closely followed by the German Army, which was already at Nakło (some thirty kilometres from Bydgoszcz) on Friday, September 1st. Now, the German troops did not penetrate into Bydgoszcz until September 5th. The obvious provocation committed by the Bydgoszcz Germans could not go unpunished. The angry population denounced these Germans to the Polish soldiers. It is only just that they were shot. The Protestant church at Szwederowo (a suburb of Bydgoszcz) was burned down, a machine-gun having been fired from its tower. The pastor at Czyzkówek suburb, who allowed a machine-gun to be mounted on his church, was shot. Close on 150 rebels altogether perished at this time. (This figure was given by the men who took the bodies to the cemetery.)

“
The Germans’ vengeance after they had taken Bydgoszcz knew no bounds. It would be difficult to say how many Poles were shot. But it was over 5000.”

A cavalry officer states:
[14]

“On September 3rd about ten in the morning I had to conduct General Skotnicki to the command of the 15th Infantry Division at Bydgoszcz. We drove in two cars to Bydgoszcz, from our quarters at Myślęcinek. But we could not drive along the main street, namely, Danzig Street, for we were greeted with numerous single bursts of machine-gun fire. One machine-gun was mounted on the tower of the Protestant church,
on Liberty Square. Thence it dominated the centre of the town. It is necessary to state that that day our front line was at least fifty kilometres from Bydgoszcz, and that there was no garrison whatever at this town, beyond a small battalion of our National Guards.

“
Being unable to enter Bydgoszcz by Danzig Street, our cars made their way round the town close to Bielawka in order to enter by the road from Fordon. While we were making this detour we were greeted with isolated shots coming from a large German factory, of which I have forgotten the name.

“
I know from my non-commissioned officer, W., who had reached the centre of the town, having left before us to find petrol, that accounts were settled solely with Germans who had been taken in the act of firing or who had had weapons. I declare that returning in the afternoon of the same day, September 3rd, from the Divisional Command, situated at Foch Street, to our quarters, I went right along Danzig Street. This was after the suppression of the German rising, and I noticed only a few bodies in civilian clothes before the ‘Under the Eagle’ hotel.

“
As Danzig Street was the centre of the disturbances, stories which tell of the numerous executions of which the German population have been victims are pure invention, for I was on the spot immediately after these incidents, and the traces of what had occurred could not have been removed so quickly.”

A baker, F. A., a foreign citizen,
testifies:
[15]

“Anyone who witnessed the events which occurred in Poland after the outbreak of hostilities and afterwards followed the story of these events only in the German Press is able to realize all the extent of the misfortune which Poland has so cruelly suffered.

“
The German invasion not only caused the deaths of Poland's best sons, the physical torture of those who remained alive and the destruction of material goods. The Germans have not hesitated before the foulest of defamation to represent the Poles as such a barbarous nation
that they
have behaved with the utmost cruelty towards the unarmed German population. And Poland could only be silent in reply.

“
It is not long since I returned to my country (Jugoslavia), where I have been able to testify as an eye-witness to the incidents which occurred at Bydgoszcz on September 3rd, 1939, the day called ‘Bloody Sunday.’ In the Press here and also the European Press I have found only information on the subject of ‘Bloody Sunday’ which in no way corresponded to the truth. That is why I have decided to tell what I saw or what was seen by witnesses whom I know to be trustworthy.

“
In the night of Saturday to Sunday (2nd to 3rd September) the Polish troops fell back along Danzig Street, the main street of the town. The troops were followed by civil population fleeing from neighbouring villages. According to these people the German troops were some three kilometres to the north and west of the town. On Sunday morning all the main streets were crowded with people fleeing in the direction of Inowroclaw and Lekno, but only a very few troops were left.

“
The Polish civil population did not possess any arms. Suddenly about eleven o'clock in the morning innumerable rifle shots were fired at the civil population and the rest of the troops, from house roofs, from the towers of the Protestant church, those of the Jesuits’ church, from the old market, and the Protestant cemetery.

“
Machine-guns were mounted on the tower of th
e
Protestant church, on Liberty Square, on the roof of the large shop at the corner of Dworcowa Street and Danzig Street, and on the tower of the Jesuits’ church and that of the Protestant church on Koscielecki Square. Bydgoszcz Germans as well as others from neighbouring villages, all of them equipped with arms, were in ambush on the roofs of private houses. As Germans captured on Sunday afternoon and Monday avowed, the Germans were to enter Bydgoszcz on Sunday afternoon. So they had begun to fire to provoke a panic, to disorganize the Polish troops and to spread terror among the civil population. But during Saturday night Polish troops advanced towards Bydgoszcz from the south-east. Swinging round to the south of Bydgoszcz, the Polish troops succeeded in attacking the German troops in the west of the town on their flank. They managed to drive the Germans back westward and to the south of
Koronowo some forty kilometres to the south-west of Bydgoszcz. The Germans failed to enter Bydgoszcz on the Sunday, and it was the Polish Army which returned. But the Bydgoszcz Germans did not stop shooting. They were invested by the Polish troops, who cleared the houses and roofs of the armed Germans.

“
The Germans who did not perish on the spot were tried by courts martial and shot. And that was the ‘bloody Sunday’ of Bydgoszcz, September 3rd, 1939. It was not the Poles who organized a pogrom of the Germans, for the Polish civil population did not possess weapons. On the contrary, it was the German minority which, taking up arms and occupying positions dominating the town, fired on the Polish troops.

“
So it is quite understandable that when the Polish soldiers returned more than one German perished.

“
The fact that the Poles committed no atrocity against the Germans captured with weapons in their hands has been testified to by a German doctor. He reported that he had examined the bodies and had found no trace of ill-treatment.”

CHAPTER FOUR - PARACHUTISTS AND DIVERSIONISTS ATTACHED TO THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES

THE German diversionist activities in all their multifarious forms and considerable dimensions constitute a unique feature in the history of war. They played a primary role in the success of the German Army's offensive, and were meticulously prepared long before the war.

Parachute descents were only one of the methods by means of which diversionist agents were deposited behind the Polish lines. In any case, there is nothing to indicate that the number dropped in this way exceeded fifteen persons at any given point.

The activities carried out by the agents as part of the German Army's methods of fighting consisted
of:

1. The utilization everywhere of the German minority, which was thoroughly acquainted with the given region and terrain.
   
2. The descent of parachutists in small groups at a large number of spots situated in the front line, as well as behind the lines often at a great distance from the actual fighting.
   

It must be especially emphasized that the Germans
’ subversive activities were particularly favoured by the fact that the Polish authorities were too slow in arresting elements suspected of conduct injurious to the State.  It is now known that this attitude arose from a fear that Germany might exploit any such preventive measures as a proof of Poland’s bellicose intentions. It is very probable that Germany's charges of alleged persecution of the German minority in Poland were provoked by the fear that the Polish authorities might discover that minority’s subversive activity, prepared with such detailed care by the German aggressors.

T
he diversionist activities reached such great proportions primarily because when hostilities broke out the Polish mobilization was not completed, and in consequence the various defence units, civil and military, were still in a state of reorganization. The higher commands did not have sufficiently organized supporting troops at their disposal in the rear, as their mobilization had been planned to take place during the days following. Finally, the general mobilization itself was hindered by the work of the enemy air force, which started to bomb all over the country, even as Hitler was making solemn promises to abstain from such bombings. And this facilitated the Germans' diversionist activities.

A document which fell into Polish hands the day after hostilities began, i.e. on September 2,
[16]
provided definite proof that these activities were very carefully planned before the war, and of the leading role assigned to the German minority. Members of the minority serving in the Polish Army as well as civilian elements were utilized.

E
xamination of the diversionist agents taken prisoner provided the following details of the organization of their activities:

1. T
   he agents were recruited mainly from the youth group known as the
   Hitler Jugend
   and from men and women, chiefly of German nationality, enrolled from Poland.
   
2. S
   pecial courses lasting from two weeks to three months were organized for these agents on the territory of the Reich.
   
3. Those
   who took these courses were divided into two categories. The first, consisting of persons with a thorough knowledge of the Polish language, was charged with special missions to be carried out in the rear of the Polish Army. The second category consisted of persons who were to mingle with the crowds of Polish civilian refugees fleeing from the war and the bombing attacks.
   
4. A
   short time before the war the students at these courses underwent a supplementary training in special camps, where they were assigned to “districts of diversionist activity.”
   

Besides the agents recruited from the youth and intended to collaborate with the German civilian population, there was a group of directors and instructors composed of officers who arrived in Poland, provided with passports, a little before the war, and of local agents transported by car or aeroplane to the rear of the Polish armies during the first days of the war.

Depositions and Statements

One of the German diversionist agents, a lad aged 18, captured near W
łódźimierz in Wolhynia, Eastern Poland, made the following statement:
[17]

“In December, 1938, members of the Hitler Jugend were summoned to attend a three months’ course. They received training in the use of parachutes, as well as in liaison work with the Reich air force. The students were told that in the event of war they would be assigned to espionage activities. For this purpose they would be transported into the enemy country, where they would have to identify the positions of the enemy armies, etc., and to supply the German airmen with details by means of agreed signals.

“
This activity was obligatory upon the members of the Hitler-Jugend who participated in the course; at the time of mobilization they were to receive notices similar to those of ordinary mobilization.

“
The subversive agents were divided into two categories. The first was composed of persons possessing a thorough knowledge of Polish. They were supplied with Polish officers’ and non-commissioned officers’ uniforms, or those of Polish police or railroad officials. In these uniforms
they were dropped by parachutes on Polish territory. The second category was composed of those who knew Polish only imperfectly. They were dropped in civilian clothes, and were allotted the task of mingling with the Polish refugees who streamed towards the centre of the country.

“
Towards the middle of August, about fifteen days before the opening of hostilities, the students were assembled and sent to special camps, where they remained until the war started. Here they had a refresher course in the plans of activity, and were assigned to various localities of Poland. (Desantenbezirke.)”

The agent in question knew only the Kaszuban dialect, and had been classed in the second
category and was to pass as a “refugee from Gdynia.”

H
e was dropped from an aeroplane in the district of Toruń, and had orders to mingle with the refugees and to proceed to the region of Zamość, Hrubieszów, and still farther east to Włódźimierz in Wolhynia. A number of German agents were directed to this region, unknown to one another.

E
ach agent received a list of Germans living in Poland, to whom he was to turn for aid and assistance. The author of this statement went to one named Zielke, a member of the German minority in Hrubieszów. He succeeded in fulfilling his task, furnishing the German airmen with information as to the positions of the Polish commands, their depots, stores, etc.

A
greed signals were made in the following ways:

• I
  n the daytime, by means of tent canvas or by setting fire to stacks of hay or straw.
  
• A
  t night, by means of electric torches and by setting fire to various objects.
  

N
.B.—This statement gives no details of the way in which information obtained by agents was transmitted to the German airmen. But from other depositions it is clear that the information was transmitted by wireless as well as by light signals, which the German minority had every facility for making.

The following deposition was made by a Polish
Major:
[18]

“German diversionist activity in Poznań, and especially in Pomorze, was organized and prepared long before the outbreak of the war, which fact confirms that the Germans systematically prepared for the war on Poland.

“
The main element used in German subversive activities was the youth, who were devoted to National Socialism. The young generation of Germans had perfect freedom to organize and to receive instruction in the German schools, and were almost entirely under the influence of the competent elements from the Reich. The technique of instruction to groups intended for diversionist activities was as follows: the candidate clandestinely left Poland in order to receive the necessary training in Germany. The first stage of the journey made by the future agents was Danzig. Here the German Consul-General took over their documents for safe custody, registered them, and sent them on to special points where the diversionist courses were being held.
These centres were situated in Danzig, Piła (Schneidemühl), Koenigsberg, and Stettin.

“
The German preparation of these agents reached wholesale proportions as soon as the Reich had solved the Czech problem. Plans for subversive action in Poland were not limited to training the cadres, but were extended to other fields of operation. Always, however, they were based on the German element, which often, irrespective of the social class to which it belonged, was engaged in employment which favoured Germany’s plans. After the Czech conflict one characteristic detail could be observed. The large German landed estates definitely stopped selling their grain, especially oats and hay, though there was no economic motive for holding up sales. They were preparing provisioning bases for when the German troops should march into Poland. At a time when German propaganda was harping on the theme of ‘the persecutions of the German minority in Poland’ there were instances of German landed proprietors burning agricultural plant, as happened in Szubin and Wyrzysk, in order to furnish arguments for this propaganda.

“
Those destined to carry out diversionist activities were even equipped to some extent, and wore brassards of an agreed colour with a yellow circle on a red or blue ground on their arms under their coats, or on their shirts. Their activity everywhere conformed to the same military instructions, to the same regulations, and everywhere they used agreed passwords.

“
They terrorized even the peaceable elements of the German population, and in any case provoked disturbances and committed terroristic acts.

“
On September 2nd I examined some twenty of these diversionist agents taken in the act. There could be no doubt about them, as they all wore the brassards already mentioned on their arms under their raincoats. They admitted that they had crossed the frontier during the night, close to Nakło, and that they had been charged with impeding the evacuation of the Polish Army, carrying out diversionist work and destroying means of communication. They had all been through the appropriate course in Germany. And the fact that it was possible to capture a relatively large number of them in so short a time indicates their numerical importance. Many of them penetrated into the Poznań and Pomorze areas.

“
According to my information the Germans responsible for the action in Bydgoszcz on September 3rd were directed by Dr. Gersdorff, who played an important part in the organization of the Deutsche Vereinigung. It is also very clear that all the family of the owners of Café Grey and also of one Dietman participated actively. The revolt was crushed, but in consequence of its repression, which was in the nature of a spontaneous reaction, there were bound to be victims. I am sure, none the less, that the number was not large.”

The following depositions add in various ways to the foregoing
information:

From an aide-de-camp to a Polish Army commander:
[19]

“So far as diversionist activities in south-eastern Poland were concerned, they were prepared in advance, and only carried to completion by agents dropped by parachutes.
German espionage was organized by special emissaries who, disguised as Wanderlehrer (itinerant teachers), trained spies and diversionist agents. Every year several young Germans left each German colony to go to the Reich. There they received special instruction and, on their return to Poland, made the amende honorable. They went to the starosta, the administrative head of the county, and talked of the cruelties of the Nazis, and expressed their joy at returning to their ‘dear country.’ But these same Germans remained in constant touch with and supplied information to their agents in Germany, either by post or through the Wanderlehrer. The espionage network was excellently organized and there were several such specially trained agents in every German colony.

“
On September 9th a baker named Daum was arrested at Stryj and was found to have a secret wireless transmitter in his house. The deputy mayor of the German colony at Kalsdorff, or Kazalin, in Stryj district, situated on the frontier between Poland and Hungary, enjoyed general esteem and had been awarded the Cross for Merit. He was captured by the frontier-guard in the very act of handing a detailed plan of Polish troop dispositions at Tuchola, Klimace, and Ławoczne, as well as plans of projected demolitions, to an emissary of the enemy. This German and the emissary were shot on September 10th.”

From
a Polish Lieutenant:
[20]

“
There was a section of assault Storm Troops for the town and district of Bielsko. It was in action on September 1st. Information concerning the detachment had been collected ever since July, I939. It was recruited among the German civilian population of the area.

“
They fought courageously and desperately. They fired mainly from houses and various fortified positions. They were armed with carbines, revolvers, and automatics. Generally speaking their fire was not very effective. They had been trained as reserve officers and non-commissioned officers in the Polish Army, and some had been trained in Germany. They were of great diversity of age, and had a mixed collection of weapons:
revolvers of various types, hand machine-guns, and hand-grenades. In all the villages inhabited by German colonists there were skirmishes between the Germans and Polish troops making a fighting retreat.”

From a Polish Magistrate:
[21]

“As an examining magistrate at Cracow I dealt with espionage cases, and I was able to determine that as the war drew closer their number increased. The Germans recruited a large number of agents from among elements of German origin inhabiting Upper Silesia and working in German Silesia.”

From an officer of the Polish Army General Staff:
[22]

“From intercepted documents as well as the depositions of airmen brought down and diversionist agents arrested, it is clear that the Germans made men and women whom they had brought from Poland take part in courses for parachutists, saboteurs, and agents to report on troop movements.”

From a Polish Second Lieutenant:
[23]

“The task of the German armies was greatly facilitated by the subversive activity of German agents who were dropped on Polish territory before the outbreak of war and during its course. For instance, the descent carried out at night in the Miechów district. These agents were recruited mainly from Germans living in Silesia who had deserted from the Polish Army. One of the minority agents killed at Tarnówskie Gory had served in the 11th Polish Infantry Regiment and had deserted to Germany a week before the war.”

From a Polish
Lieutenant Colonel on the Staff of an Army Corps:
[24]

“Some days before the war, a vast organization of German espionage was discovered in the district of Łódź. Among other things found were explosives concealed in tins of food.”

From a Polish Lieutenant:
[25]

“On August 28th, 1939, that is, four days before the German aggression, a leather document case containing tins of foodstuffs, complete with the commercial labels, was discovered on the edge of a military training ground at Kalisz. The tins were filled with explosive materials and were provided with an opening for the insertion of fuses. I was informed at the staff of the Army Corps to which I was attached that tins of this kind had also been found in other localities.”