The German Fifth Column in Poland
Read The German Fifth Column in Poland Online
Authors: Aleksandra Miesak Rohde
THE
GERMAN
FIFTH COLUMN
IN
POLAND
By
THE POLISH MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
Edited by Aleksandra Miesak Rohde
Printed in Great Britain
December 1940
Reprinted in the United States 2014 by
Home of America’s Dreams
Silver Spring, Maryland
Copyright © 2014 by Aleksandra M. Rohde
All rights reserved.
FOR many months after the German invasion of Poland public opinion in Western Europe and America was skeptical of the stories about the part played by the German minority in Poland in preparing and executing this invasion. These stories, which spoke of plots and subversion carried on for years, of espionage and sabotage practised on an enormous scale, of parachutists dressed in civilian clothes, or as priests and women, or even, against all international law, wearing the uniform of the invaded State, certainly far surpassed all experiences of previous wars.
Only when similar methods were used in Norway and Denmark, and later in Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, and France, were the eyes even of the most blind opened. It was proved beyond all doubt that the events in Poland were only the first manifestations of a great plan, thoroughly worked out by Berlin, embracing not only Europe, but other continents also. Everywhere the German minorities became a fit instrument in the hands of the political and military leaders of the Third Reich, everywhere we come up against these same methods of operation, characterized by deceit, hypocrisy, and the absence of all juridical and moral scruples.
Poland was the first to put up an active resistance to the German might, and also was the first to feel all the effects of this type of German operation. Her experiences have lost none of their relevance for the present day. On the contrary, closer acquaintance with them has become a necessity for all the countries who cherish the preservation of their essential independence.
Nazism, like its predecessor, Prussianism, has so great an attraction for the average German that its enormous influence on German minorities abroad is not in the least surprising.
The conception that Germanism is something which surpasses the bounds of political frontiers has been expressed by the well-known German writer, von Hintze, in the following words:
“
The painful lot which, since Versailles, has hung like a black cloud over the nation's horizon, has given rise to a new German ideal. In place of a nation of sixty millions which regarded its political frontiers as identical with its national frontiers (Volkstum) we have today a nation of ninety million Germans joining hearts and hands across the political frontiers in one common task for the good of the nation. For of what significance to a nation are the political frontiers, those lines inscribed by the hazards of history on maps of paper? We are everywhere: in Eastern Europe, in North and South America, in Asia, and in Africa. And this numerical power can and must be a force which as such should mean more than warships and cannon. The appreciation of this phenomenon constitutes a great success which we Germans have achieved in consequence of the last war.”
Therefore, if we are to believe this apostle of Pan-
Germanism, in 1939 there were some thirty million Germans scattered over the world and benefiting from the hospitality of other States. On the other hand, this new national doctrine proclaims the superiority of this idea of the nation (
Volksgedanke
) to the conception of the State (
Staatsgedanke
). Nevertheless, it is to the Reich that the Germans abroad and the German minorities are to owe at least a minimum of loyalty.
For the nations not menaced by German hegemony this state of things involves the abuses of German propaganda and espionage.
But for the States directly menaced by the Reich it involves being laid open to purely destructive factors, such as treason, sabotage, and subversion.
Today abundant proof is forthcoming that the German minority in Poland formed the vanguard of the armies of the Third Reich. This minority was acting under direct orders from the German authorities or by various organizations which carefully concealed their real character.
The
Verein für das Deutschtum im Auslande
, one of the most important organizations for the protection of Germans abroad, always openly aided and stimulated the subversive activities of the German minorities.
Again, the
Auslandsinstitut
of Stuttgart, a pseudoscientific organization, is in reality purely political in its character, and a representative of the Information Bureau of the German War Office (
Nachrichtenstelle des Reichswehrministeriums
) is an official member of its governing body. This Institute is an important centre of the Second Bureau (German Intelligence Service) which works in conjunction with Germans living abroad.
Subversive activities and conspiracy against the State were the programme and political conception
dominating the German minorities during the period preceding the war. The philosophical, juridical, scientific, or quasi-pacifist theories preached by German statesmen were only a facade, behind which this programme and conception were advanced.
The Reich exploited not only these theories, but also the minority clauses imposed upon several States in 1919 (which, however, were not made binding on the Reich), in order to undermine from within almost all the States of interest to Germany.
Again and again she charged them with oppressing and ill-treating the German minorities.
Thus, Poland was attacked on these grounds even in the days of the Weimar Republic. After the emergence of the Third Reich, but particularly during the two years preceding the premeditated German aggression of September, 1939, Berlin intensified its anti-Polish campaign. The more violent these attacks became, so the more flagrant grew the subversive activities of the Germans in Poland.
Methodical preparations for this situation can be traced back through all the past twenty years, from 1919 onwards. The German minority had been slowly and steadily won over to subversive ideas, and the dynamic quality of the Nazi movement only gave those ideas a new, realistic basis. By September, 1939, the 765,000 Germans who constituted the German minority in Poland formed the nucleus of an army of spies and conspirators who were only awaiting the Führer's order to march.
The present book provides a survey of these activities based upon a selection of depositions carefully assembled and classified in Paris during the six months from October, 1939, to March, 1940.
The purpose of publishing such a compilation is not only to serve historical truth, but also, after the tragic experiences of Poland, to provide a warning. Obviously, from this angle it will interest most of all those countries in which there is a more or less compact German minority. But it will also serve to place on their guard those States which in the present situation are directly menaced by espionage, sabotage, and by German-made “putsches.” Recent news from the continent of Europe provides further confirmation that the successes of the German army of aggression have been rendered possible only because of the direct collaboration of accomplices: of German residents, together with troops and marines disguised as tourists, commercial representatives, and merchant sailors.
London,
December 1940
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTORY SURVEY
Minority Problems in Polish-German Relations
The Position of the German Minority in Poland
The Varied Development of the National Life of the German Minority
Declarations of Loyalty Made by the Leaders of the German Minority in Poland
CHAPTER TWO - THE MINORITY GERMANS AS THE REICH'S SPIES AND DIVERSIONIST AGENTS
CHAPTER THREE - THE TRUTH ABOUT THE BYDGOSZCZ INCIDENTS
CHAPTER FOUR - PARACHUTISTS AND DIVERSIONISTS ATTACHED TO THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES
Pre-War Organization of Subversive Activities
Methods of Carrying Out Activity
Illustrations of Signals Made by Germans Living in Poland to Direct German Pilots to their Targets
Aims of the Subversive Activities
Organization of Fuel Depots in Poland
Illustration of Germans Living in Poland Rewarded for Aiding the Wehrmacht during the Invasion
CHAPTER SIX - SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
APPENDIX ONE – CONFIDENTIAL ORDER ISSUED BY THE WEHRMACHT
Illustration of Confidential Wehrmacht Order
inority Problems in Polish-German Relations
INSPIRED by the general principles of justice
and respect for the specific national cultures of all peoples, the authors of the Treaty of Versailles supplemented the treaties with a number of special regulations in the form of Minority Clauses. These clauses were to be binding primarily upon those countries which had regained their independent existence after the Great War of 1914-1918. They were not imposed upon Germany, which, so far as the national minorities issue was concerned,
[1]
was not bound under the Versailles Treaty by any legal or formal international obligations. On the one hand, Germany was free from all obligations in regard to minorities, despite the fact that within its frontiers, exclusive of Jews, there were some 2 million foreign nationals, of which approximately 1.5 million were Poles. On the other hand, the German minorities living in the “new States” had their rights to national culture guaranteed in the form of the Minority Clauses. But, instead of being in the nature of educative principles for the guidance of the “new States,” in the hands of Berlin these Clauses very quickly became a convenient instrument for the gradual disintegration of the political relations which were to have constituted the permanent basis of the Peace Treaty.
At once realizing the possibilities of this instrument, the Germans regarded the question of national minorities as of prime importance even during the peace negotiations. It is of interest to recall that the minorities issue was first raised in the Peace Conference by the Jews.
But the Germans made it their own. In its reply to the conditions of peace, the German delegation assured the Allies in its note of May 29, 1919, that the Germans were favourable to the idea of the protection of national minorities.
“
That protection,”
said the note,
“may perhaps be regulated in the most efficacious manner within the framework of the League of Nations. Nevertheless, Germany considers herself obliged to demand that the peace treaty should contain certain guarantees for those of the German minorities which, as a result of the modification of frontiers, have become subject to foreign sovereignty. These minorities must be given the right to develop their German individuality... In addition, it would be desirable to institute cultural autonomy on the basis of the national census. Germany, for her part, is determined to treat the foreign minorities within her territory in conformity with the same principles.”
In the same note (paragraph
headed: Guarantees for those Regions transferred in the East) the German delegation demanded special protection for the German minority in Poland, claiming that this was necessary because of the alleged massacres of Jews in Poland!
Exploiting the Minority Clauses, the Germans launched in the international field, and especially in the League of Nations, a methodical attack
upon Poland, accusing her of continually violating these clauses. These persistent attacks were a great hindrance to normal Polish-German relations.
Efforts on Poland's part to improve these relations always met with deliberate opposition from Germany, which endeavoured to keep relations with its neighbour in a state of exacerbation. In the spring of 1933, however, it seemed that Poland's efforts might at last be successful. On January 26, 1934, a Polish-German Declaration was signed which stated,
inter alia
, that the moment had come “to introduce a new phase in the political relations between Germany and Poland by a direct understanding between State and State.” It continued: “In no circumstances will they (the two signatory States) proceed to the application of force for the purpose of reaching a decision in such disputes…” “Both Governments are convinced,” the text declares, “that the relations between their countries will in this manner develop fruitfully and will lead to the establishment of a neighbourly relationship which will contribute to the well-being not only of both their countries but of the other peoples of Europe as well.”
[2]
As we have pointed out, Poland made continual efforts from the year 1919 down to the signing of this agreement in 1934 to establish good neighbourly relations with the Reich. The best evidence of this is the fact that she did not even take full advantage of the rights granted her under the Treaty of Versailles with regard to the German minority in Poland. Article 297 (b) of the Treaty reads as follows:
“
Subject to any contrary stipulation which may be provided for in the present Treaty, the Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to retain and liquidate all property, rights and interests belonging, at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, to German nationals or the companies controlled by them, within their territories, colonies, possessions and protectorates, including territories ceded to them by the present Treaty.
“
The liquidation shall be carried out in accordance with the laws of the Allied or Associated State concerned, and the German owners shall not be able to dispose of such property, rights or interests, nor to subject them to any charge, without the consent of that State.
“
German nationals who ipso facto acquire the nationality of an Allied or Associated Power in accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty, will not be considered as German nationals within the meaning of this paragraph.”
The Treaty thus authorized Poland to liquidate all the properties which, at the date on which it came into force, belonged to the actual German individuals or groups situated within the territories ceded to Poland by the Reich. This liquidation was to take place in conformity with Polish laws, which, in the terms of par. (c) of Article 297, were also to fix the indemnities to be paid to the owners of the liquidated properties.
Nevertheless, during the succeeding twenty years the liquidation of German properties in Poland was carried out with great moderation and deliberation, in order to mitigate the effects as much as possible. The Polish-German Convention concluded at Vienna in 1924 also slowed up the rate of liquidation.
Later, to meet the expressed desire of the German
Government, negotiations were opened with a view to setting a time-limit for the liquidation of German properties in Poland. All liquidation operations were effectually suspended during the negotiations, which, after being broken off, finally resulted in the conclusion in 1929 of a Polish-German “Liquidation Convention.” By virtue of this agreement a large amount of real estate and numerous enterprises were left in German hands.
Thus, while other States took advantage of Article 297 of the Peace Treaty, Poland, on the contrary, applied the principle of tolerance to the German minority. In fact, on September 1, 1939, the date of the German aggression, many Germans who could have been expropriated still retained their property and enjoyed a privileged position in Poland.
A good proof, that, of Polish liberalism. But Poland went even farther in pursuance of a conciliatory policy towards the Reich. After the joint Declaration of 1934, Poland and the Reich signed a declaration definitely regulating the question of national minorities on both sides of the frontier. She did so in the hope not only of settling an issue which the Germans had exploited for attacks on her, but also of influencing the Reich to treat the Polish minority in Germany in accordance with the liberal principles adopted by the Polish State since 1919 towards its own citizens of German nationality.
On November 5, 1937, the German and Polish Governments issued an identic
“Declaration on the subject of the treatment of Minorities.” The characteristic preamble to this Declaration read:
“
In a friendly exchange of views, the German and Polish Governments have had an opportunity of discussing the position of the German minority in Poland, and the Polish minority in Germany. They are in complete agreement that the treatment of these minorities is a matter of great importance for the further development of friendly, neighbourly relations between Germany and Poland, and that in both countries the well-being of the minority is better protected when it is certain that the same principles will be observed in the other country.”
The Declaration proceeded to define these principles in the various spheres of culture, religion, economics, etc. But in conclusion it stated:
“The above principles can in no way affect the duty of the minorities to give complete loyalty to the State to which they belong”
[3]
This paragraph of the 1937 Declaration bore the unequivocal implication that if such loyalty were observed on both sides it would lead to the settlement of a problem which, owing to Germany's attitude, had been the cause of continual tension in the relations of the two States. But when Germany signed this Declaration she was not thinking of its observance. The Germans continued with utter ruthlessness to force a Germanization policy in relation to their 1.5 millions of Polish minority subjects. Poland, on the other hand, as was fully evident, never ceased to observe the agreement she had signed. The position of the Germans in Poland, which was already good in every respect, only improved still more. And in these circumstances the German minority became a powerful instrument of espionage and subversive activities, and was enabled to play the role of advance-guard of Hitler's army on September 1, 1939.