Read The Battle of Britain Online
Authors: Richard Overy
The Battle of Britain (11 page)
The Battle of Britain mattered above all to the British people, who were saved the fate that overtook the rest of Europe. The result was one of the key moral moments of the war, when the uncertainties and divisions of the summer gave way to a greater sense of purpose and a more united people. This was a necessary battle, as Stalingrad was for the eastern front. In June Kenneth Clark reported to the Ministry of Information the effects of a recent morale campaign. He confessed that the campaign had not been a
success: ‘people do not know what to do… difficulty arose in satisfying the people that the war could be won’.
26
By November the mood was less desperate. A Gallup Poll showed 80 per cent of respondents confident that Britain would win in the end. Ministry informers reported a widespread desire to end the propaganda ‘Britain can take it’ and to substitute the slogan ‘Britain can give it!’
27
Even civilians enjoyed the sense that they, too, could contribute directly to the war effort through their own sacrifices and endeavours. There emerged an evident mood of exhilaration when the population found itself fighting at last after months of inactivity. Men flocked in thousands to join the Local Defence Volunteers, though they were poorly organized and scarcely armed by the time invasion was likely: many would have been treated, as the German side made clear at the time, as irregular militia, subject to summary execution. The Battle of Britain and the Blitz that followed contributed to the growing sense that this was a people’s war. There is more than a touch of irony that the battle was actually won by a tiny military elite, and at the cost of only 443 pilots in four months.
28
The heroic defences on the eastern front, of Moscow and Sevastopol and Stalingrad, cost the defender, soldier and civilian, millions of war dead. The efficiency of Britain’s defensive effort in 1940 was one of its most remarkable features. The ‘few’ did indeed save the many from a terrible ordeal.
The air battles were necessary to rouse the self-belief
and staying power of a people demoralized by the sudden collapse of democratic Europe in the summer of 1940. No one pretends that the Battle of Britain decided the war, or that it papered over all the cracks that appeared in British morale and outlook in 1940. With hindsight it might have been fought more effectively, though British air defences were manifestly better organized than most other areas of Britain’s war effort. The cost of losing the battle would have spelt national disaster. No appeasing peace with Hitler could have masked the reality of defeat. The Battle of Britain was the first point since 1931, when Japan occupied Manchuria, that the forces of violent revision in world affairs were halted. In a radio broadcast in 1942, George Orwell reminded his listeners that Trafalgar Day had just been celebrated. He suggested that Trafalgar played the same part in the Napoleonic wars ‘as the Battle of Britain in 1940 occupied in this one’. In both cases invasion and defeat would have meant a Europe ‘given over to military dictatorship’. After Trafalgar the invasion scare subsided ‘and though it took another ten years to win the war, it was at any rate certain that Britain could not be conquered at one blow’.
29
To the British people, then and now, that was sufficient.
The following abbreviations have been used throughout the Notes:
ADAP: | Akten zur deutschen ausäwrtigen Politik |
AHB: | Air Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence, London |
BA-MA: | Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg |
CAS: | Chief of Air Staff |
COS: | Chiefs of Staff |
FCNA: | Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939–1945 |
GAF: | German Air Force |
IWM: | Imperial War Museum, London |
OKW: | Supreme Command of the Armed Forces |
PRO: | Public Record Office, Kew, London |
RAF: | Royal Air Force |
RDF: | Radio Direction Finding |
1
PRO AIR 14/381, Plan W1, ‘Appreciation of the Employment of the British Air Striking Force’, April 1938, p.
1
.
2
R. Rhodes James (ed.),
‘Chips’: The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon
(London, 1993), p. 215; gas masks in PRO INF 1/264, Home Intelligence, summaries of daily reports, 28 March 1940.
3
K.-H. Völker,
Dokumente und Dokumentarfotos zur Geschichte der deutschen Luftwaffe
(Stuttgart, 1968), doc. 200, pp. 469–71.
4
PRO AIR 1/5251, report by the Brooke-Popham Committee, 16 July 1940, p. 3.
5
PRO AIR 14/181, Commander, Advanced Air Striking Force to Bomber Command HQ, 5 March 1940; AIR 9/117, Anglo-French staff conversations, ‘The Attack on German Railway Communications’, 26 April 1939.
6
AHB, ‘Battle of Britain: Despatch by Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, 20 August 1941’ (hereafter: AHB, Dowding ‘Despatch’), p. 8.
7
PRO CAB 120/294, Air Ministry report to War Cabinet, 24 June 1940; German losses in N. L. R. Franks,
The Air Battle of Dunkirk
(London, 1983), p. 194. British losses over Dunkirk totalled 177, including 106 fighters: see R. Jackson,
Air War Over France May
–
June 1940
(London, 1974), p. 121.
8
Lloyd George in G. Eggleston,
Roosevelt, Churchill and the World War II Opposition
(Old Greenwich, Conn., 1979), p. 130; Churchill speech in M. Gilbert (ed.),
The Churchill War Papers,
vol. 2 (London, 1994), p. 368.
9
R. A. Callahan,
Churchill: Retreat from Empire
(Delaware, 1984),
p. 79; P. Addison, ‘Lloyd George and Compromise Peace in the Second World War’, in A. J. P. Taylor (ed.),
Lloyd George: Twelve Essays
(London, 1971), p. 381.
10
PRO ΡREM 7/2, letter from Foreign Office to Desmond Morton, 28 May 1940.
11
PRO INF 1/264, Home Intelligence daily reports: 28 May 1940, p. 1; 31 May 1940, p. 1.
12
Addison, ‘Lloyd George…’, pp. 365,378; A. Roberts,
The ‘Hοly Fox’: A Biography of Lord Halifax
(London, 1991), p. 243.
13
PRO INF 1/878, War Cabinet conclusions, 18 May 1940, p. 3.
14
PRO PREM 7/2, note from Morton to Churchill, 30 May 1940, enclosing note by Cadogan dated 25 May 1940.
15
PRO INF 1/264, Home Intelligence daily reports, 17 June 1940.
16
PRO INF 1/264, Home Intelligence daily reports, 17 June, 18 June, 20 July 1940.
17
PRO AIR 9/447: War Ministry, Plans Division, ‘Eire’, 31 May 1940, pp. 1–3; COS meeting on home defence, 7 July 1940.
18
PRO AIR 9/447, Air Ministry minute, 20 June 1940.
19
PRO INF 1/849, Ministry of Information, Policy Committee: meeting of 8 July 1940, p. 2; meeting of 23 July 1940; meeting of 24 July 1940; INF 1/264, Home Intelligence daily reports, 20 July 1940. See too D. Cooper,
Old Men Forget: The Autobiography of Duff Cooper
(London, 1953), pp. 286–7.
20
V. Cowles,
Looking for Trouble
(London, 1941), pp. 416–17.
21
W. Boelcke (ed.),
The Secret Conferences of Dr Goebbels
(London, 1970), p. 60, meeting of 3 June 1940.
22
H.-A. Jacobsen (ed.),
Generaloberst Halder: Kriegstagebuch
(3 vols, Stuttgart, 1963), vol. 2, pp. 30–31, entry for 22 July 1940.
23
FCNA,
pp. 110–11, ‘Conference with the Führer’, 20 June 1940; Jacobsen (ed.),
Kriegstagebuch,
p. 3, entry for 1 July 1940.
24
ADAP,
Serie D, Band X, p. 56, minute of state secretary, 30 June 1940.
25
IWM, EDS collection, OKW Aktennotiz, ‘Chefbesprechung’, 12 June 1940.
26
ADAP,
Serie D, Band X: p. 105, Schulenburg to German Foreign Office, 5 July 1940; pp. 202–3, Prince Max von Hohenlohe to German Foreign Office, 18 July 1940; p. 216, Dublin Embassy to German Foreign Office, 22 July 1940.
27
M. Muggeridge (ed.),
Ciano’s Diary, 1939
–
1943
(London, 1947), p. 275, entry for 7 July 1940.
28
FCNA,
pp. 116–17, Directive 16, ‘Preparations for the Invasion of England’.
29
M. Domarus,
Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen 1932
–
1945
(3 vols, Munich, 1963), vol. 2, pp. 115–18; W. Shirer,
Berlin Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent, 1934
–
1941
(London, 1941), PP. 355–8.
30
Shirer,
Berlin Diary,
pp. 355–6.
31
On Halifax see Roberts,
‘Holy Fox,’
p. 249; on Berlin see Shirer,
Berlin Diary,
p. 360.
32
See J. Förster, ‘Hitler Turns East – German War Policy in 1940 and 1941’, in B. Wegner (ed.),
From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia and the World, 1939
–
1941
(Oxford, 1997), pp. 117–24; E. M. Robertson, ‘Hitler Turns from the West to Russia, May – December 1940’, in R. Boyce (ed.),
Paths to War: New Essays on the Origins of the Second World War
(London, 1989), pp. 369–75.
1
PRO AIR 22/72, Air Ministry weekly intelligence summary, report for 18 July 1940, p. 4.
2
FCNA,
pp. 124–5, ‘Conference with the Führer’, 31 July 1940.
3
M. Dean,
The Royal Air Force and Two World Wars
(London, 1979), ΡΡ.100–101.
4
Details in R. Wright,
Dowding and the Battle of Britain
(London,
1969),
PP. 73–6,138–44.
5
PRO PREM 3/29, summarized order of battle, 19 June 1940, 9 August 1940.
6
AHB, ‘The Battle of Britain: A Narrative Prepared in the Air Historical Branch’, n.d., p. 574.
7
PRO AIR 22/293, Cabinet Statistical Branch, ‘Statistics on Aircraft Production, Imports and Exports, Schedule D, Exports of Fighters’.
8
PRO AIR 22/493, Schedule C, weekly imports April–November 1940.
9
PRO AIR 8/372, War Cabinet conclusions, 22 May 1940; minute, Chief of Air Staff, 22 May 1940; Cripps to the War Cabinet, 26 June 1940.
10
PRO AIR 16/365, ‘Fighter Command, Operational Strength of Squadrons and Order of Battle’.
11
PRO AIR 22/262, ‘Daily Returns of Casualties to RAF Aircraft’, 25 June–29 September 1940.
12
AHB, Dowding ‘Despatch’: p. 27; on self-sealing tanks, Appendix F. See too PRO AIR 16/715, HQ no. 24 Training Camp to HQ
Fighter Command, 1 October 1940, ‘Notes of Conversations with Fighter Pilots’.
13
PRO AIR 22/296, Cabinet Statistical Branch, ‘Personnel: Casualties, Strength, Establishment of the RAF’; W. Murray,
Luftwaffe: Strategy for Defeat, 1933
–
1945
(London, 1985), p. 54; C. Webster and N. Frankland,
The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939
–
1945
(4 vols, London, 1961), vol. 4, p. 501, Appendix 49 (xxviii).
14
PRO AIR 8/463, Air Intelligence, ‘Present and Future Strength of the German Air Force’, November 1940.
15
PRO PREM 7/2, Churchill to General Hastings Ismay, 26 June 1940; War Cabinet Polish Forces Committee, meeting of 1 July 1940; ‘Minute, Position of the Polish Air Force in England’, 30 June 1940. On efforts to find pilots, see AIR 6/70, Air Council minutes, 23 July, 6 August, 22 August 1940; AIR 19/162, Churchill to Sinclair, 12 August 1940.
16
PRO AIR 22/296, ‘Casualties, Strength, Establishment of the RAF’; AIR 16/659: for Churchill’s comment see Churchill minute, 24 June 1940; for Ismay, Fighter Command to Ismay, 27 June 1940. It took only three minutes to refuel a fighter, but ten minutes to rearm it.
17
AHB, Dowding ‘Despatch’, pp. 11–12.
18
PRO CAB 120/309, ‘Notes of Meeting, 16 September 1940, on Inland Looking’; on the Observer Corps see D. Wood and D. Dempster,
The Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain and the Rise of Air Power, 1930
–
1940
(London, 1961), pp. 153–8.
19
S. Cox, ‘A Comparative Analysis of RAF and Luftwaffe Intelligence in the Battle of Britain, 1940’,
Intelligence and National Security,
5 (1990), pp. 432–4; F. H. Hinsley et al.,
British
Intelligence in the Second World War,
vol. 1 (London, 1979), pp. 177–82.
20
Details in AHB, Dowding ‘Despatch’, p. 10. A ‘Purple’ warning was later added at night to warn services such as stations and docks to extinguish all work-essential lighting as an attacking force approached. Cooper’s remark in PRO INF 1/849, Policy Committee meeting, 1 July 1940. On anti-aircraft defences see B. Collier,
The Defence of the United Kingdom
(London, 1957), pp. 153–4.
21
PRO AIR 9/136, Air Ministry, draft memorandum, ‘Measures to be Taken in the Event of a German Invasion of England’, 29 October 1939, pp. 1–8.
22
PRO AIR 16/212, Fighter Command operational instructions, 8 July 1940, pp. 1–8; operational instructions, 18 September 1940, pp. 2–4.
23
PRO AIR 9/136, ‘Measures to be Taken…’, p. 2.
24
PRO WO 199/22, report for GHQ Home Forces, 31 July 1940, prepared by Major-General B. Taylor; Commander, London area, to GHQ Home Forces, 24 August 1940. ‘Despatch’, p. 18.
25
PRO PREM 3/88 (3), War Cabinet, COS memorandum, ‘Plans for Employment of Gas from the Air in Retaliation for its Use against Us by the Enemy’, 8 October 1940; AIR 9/136, Air Ministry memorandum, ‘Bomber and Fighter Efforts Available to Counter an Attempted Invasion’, 5 March 1941.