Read The Battle of Britain Online
Authors: Richard Overy
21
Orwell, ‘War-time Diary: 1941’, p. 443, entry for 8 April 1941.
22
R. Churchill (ed.),
Into Battle: Speeches by the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill
(London, 1941), p. 234, speech broadcast 18 June 1940; Nicolson,
Diaries and Letters,
p. 132, diary 31 December 1940; PRO AIR 16/635, HQ 11 Group to HQ Fighter Command, November 1940, p. 4.
23
See S. Ritchie, ‘A Political Intrigue against the Chief of the Air Staff: The Downfall of Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall’,
War & Society,
16 (1998), pp. 83–104.
24
PRO AIR 19/258, letter from Air Ministry to Sinclair, 5 April 1941, for details on the pamphlet; on the Despatch see AIR 2/7771, circulation list for Dowding’s Despatch, 14 September 1941, CAB 120/311: Churchill to Sinclair, 15 June 1941; Churchill to Portal, 23 August 1942; Portal to Churchill, 27 August 1942.
25
PRO CAB 120/294, Churchill to Sinclair, 21 August 1940. See N. J. Cull,
Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign against American ‘Neutrality’ in World War II
(Oxford, 1995), ch. 3.
26
PRO INF 1/849, Ministry of Information Policy Committee, meeting of 21 June 1940, p. 1.
27
PRO INF 1/292, Home Intelligence weekly report, 18–24 December 1940, p. 1.
28
PRO AIR 22/100, ‘Fighter Command Daily Casualties’. According to the daily statistics reported to the Air Ministry, from 1 July until 1 November 1940 Fighter Command lost 284 pilots killed on operations and 159 killed in non-operational
situations. The discrepancy between the two figures is difficult to explain. Post-war calculations of total pilot casualties give a slightly higher figure of 458, most of whom died in combat. The number of genuinely accidental deaths has been calculated at somewhere between 30 and 50. The Air Ministry figures suggest that combat was defined more narrowly at the time, which may explain the difference between wartime and post-war statistics. In addition to the pilot deaths, more than 200 suffered serious injury.
29
W. J. West,
Orwell: The War Commentaries
(London, 1985), pp. 168–9, broadcast 24 October 1942.
THE HURRICANE AND THE SPITFIRE:
PRODUCTION, OPERATIONAL STRENGTH AND LOSSES
Table 1:
Production per week, June–November 1940
Date | Hurricanes | Spitfires |
1–7 June | 87 | 22 |
8–14 June | 79 | 22 |
15–21 June | 67 | 25 |
22–28 June | 75 | 21 |
29 June–5 July | 68 | 26 |
6–12 July | 65 | 32 |
13–19 July | 57 | 30 |
20–26 July | 67 | 41 |
27 July–2 August | 65 | 37 |
3–9 August | 58 | 41 |
10–16 August | 54 | 37 |
17–23 August | 43 | 31 |
24–30 August | 64 | 44 |
31 August–6 September | 54 | 37 |
7–13 September | 54 | 36 |
14–20 September | 56 | 38 |
21–27 September | 57 | 40 |
28 September–4 October | 58 | 34 |
5–11 October | 60 | 32 |
12–18 October | 55 | 31 |
19–25 October | 55 | 25 |
26 October–1 November | 69 | 42 |
Total | 1,367 | 724 |
Table 2:
Operational strength: number of squadrons, July–October 1940
Date | Hurricane squadrons | Spitfire squadrons |
14 July 1940 | ||
10 Group | 2 | 2 |
11 Group | 12 | 7 |
12 Group | 6 | 5 |
13 Group | 5 | 5 |
Total | 25 | 19 |
1 September 1940 | ||
10 Group | 4 | 4 |
11 Group | 14 | 6 |
12 Group | 6 | 6 |
13 Group | 9 | 2 |
Total | 33 | 18 |
30 September 1940 | ||
10 Group | 6 | 3 |
11 Group | 13 | 7 |
12 Group | 6 | 6 |
13 Group | 9 | 3 |
Total | 34 | 19 |
28 October 1940 | ||
10 Group | 6 | 3 |
11 Group | 13 | 8 |
12 Group | 7 | 6 |
13 Group | 7 | 3 |
Total | 33 | 20 |
Table 3:
Operational losses per week, July–November 1940 (aircraft totally destroyed)
Date | Hurricanes | Spitfires |
10 May–29 July | 173 | 110 |
30 July–5 August | 2 | 9 |
6–12 August | 47 | 25 |
13–19 August | 84 | 38 |
20–26 August | 39 | 33 |
27 August–2 September | 96 | 48 |
3–9 September | 86 | 53 |
10–16 September | 50 | 24 |
17–23 September | 21 | 19 |
24–30 September | 60 | 29 |
1–7 October | 17 | 19 |
8–14 October | 21 | 19 |
15–21 October | 18 | 14 |
22–28 October | 22 | 16 |
29 October–4 November | 17 | 11 |
Total | 753 | 467 |
(as percentage) | 61.7 | 38.3 |
Sources:
Table 1: PRO AIR 22/293, ‘Weekly Output of Fighters’.
Table 2: PRO AIR 16/365, ‘Fighter Command, Operational Strength of Squadrons and Order of Battle’.
Table 3: PRO AIR 22/262, ‘Daily Returns of Casualties to RAF Aircraft’, 25 June–29 September 1940.
SINGLE-ENGINED FIGHTER PILOT STRENGTH,
RAF AND GERMAN AIR FORCE
Table 1:
Fighter Command pilot strength
Week ending | Establishment | Operational strength |
30 June 1940 | 1,482 | 1,200 |
27 July 1940 | 1,456 | 1,377 |
17 August 1940 | 1,558 | 1,379 |
31 August 1940 | 1,558 | 1,422 |
14 September 1940 | 1,662 | 1,492 |
28 September 1940 | 1,662 | 1,581 |
19 October 1940 | 1,714 | 1,752 |
2 November 1940 | 1,727 | 1,796 |
Table 2:
German Air Force, single-engined fighter pilot strength
Date | Fully operational pilots |
1 June 1940 | 906 |
1 August 1940 | 869 |
1 September 1940 | 735 |
1 November 1940 | 673 |
Sources:
Table 1: PRO AIR 22/296, ‘Personnel: Casualties, Strength and Establishment of the RAF’.
Table 2: C. Webster and N. Frankland,
The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany
(4 vols, London, 1961), vol. 4, p. 501; W. Murray,
Luftwaffe: Strategy for Defeat
1933–1945 (London, 1985), p. 54. For September, Webster and Frankland give a figure of 688 operational pilots.
Adlertagy
57–8
Advanced Air Striking Force,
6–7
air fleets
see
German air fleets
air intelligence
American,
115
Air Ministry (British),
3
,
14
,
31–2
,
38
,
46
,
61
,
64
,
70
,
76
,
110
,
118–19