The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (98 page)

¹
sc
. in the sense of form.

²
viz. organized, or possessed potentially of life.

³
i. e. instrument.

⁴
Being an artificial, not a natural, body.

⁵
i. e. which states what it is to be an eye.

⁶
Though only potentially, i. e. they are at a further remove from actuality than the fully formed and organized body.

⁷
i. e. to the second grade of actuality.

⁸
i. e. to the first grade of actuality.

⁹
i. e. actuator.

¹⁰
i. e. it has nothing in it corresponding to a middle term.

¹¹
iii. 12, esp. 434
^a
22–30,
^b
10 ff.

¹²
iii. 12, 13.

¹³
412
^a
7.

¹⁴
413
^a
23–5,
^b
11–13, 21–4.

¹⁵
413
^b
32–414
^a
1.

¹⁶
c. 11. iii. 12. 434
^b
18–21.

¹⁷
iii. 3, 11. 433
^b
31–434
^a
7.

¹⁸
iii. 12, 13.

¹⁹
Cf. iii. 4–8.

²⁰
sc
. ‘which we shall see to be inseparable from nutrition’.

²¹
There is an unbroken current of the same specific life flowing through a discontinuous series of individual beings of the same species united by descent.

²²
i. e. of itself.

²³
i. e. the earliest and most indispensable kind of soul.

²⁴
415
^b
24, cf. 410
^a
25.

²⁵
De Gen. et Corr.
323
^b
18 ff.

²⁶
Phys
. 201
^b
31, 257
^b
8.

²⁷
416
^a
29–
^b
9.

²⁸
viz. from ignorance or error to knowledge or truth.

²⁹
iii. 4, 5.

³⁰
417
^a
12–20.

³¹
Really, it is enough if it is perceptible by more than one sense.

³²
422
^b
34 ff.

³³
421
^b
13–422
^a
6.

³⁴
i. e. it has air incorporated in its structure.

³⁵
419
^b
6, 13.

³⁶
i. e. when these bodies, e. g. the strings of a lyre, are actually sounding.

³⁷
De Resp.
478
^a
28;
P. A.
642
^a
31–
^b
4.

³⁸
Cf.
De Resp.
474
^b
25–9, 476
^a
6–15;
P. A.
669
^a
2–5.

³⁹
Because of the felt likeness between the respective smells and the really sweet or pungent tastes of the same herbs, &c.

⁴⁰
sc
. ‘and so, as we have seen, a being assimilated to’.

⁴¹
De Gen. et Corr.
ii. 2, 3.

⁴²
422
^a
20 ff.

⁴³
421
^b
3–6, 422
^a
29.

1
     That there is no sixth sense in addition to the five enumerated—sight,
(20)
hearing, smell, taste, touch—may be established by the following considerations:

If we have actually sensation of everything of which touch can give us sensation (for all the qualities of the tangible
qua
tangible are perceived by us through touch); and if absence of a sense necessarily involves absence of a sense-organ; and if (1) all objects that we perceive by immediate contact with them are perceptible by touch,
(25)
which sense we actually possess, and (2) all objects that we perceive through media, i. e. without immediate contact,
(30)
are perceptible by or through the simple elements, e. g. air and water (and this is so arranged that (
a
) if more than one kind of sensible object is perceivable through a single medium, the possessor of a sense-organ homogeneous with that medium has the power of perceiving both kinds of objects; for example, if the sense-organ is made of air, and air is a medium both for sound and for colour; and that (
b
) if more than one medium can transmit the same kind of sensible objects, as e. g. water as well as air can transmit colour, both being transparent, then the possessor of either alone will be able to perceive the kind of objects transmissible through both); and if of the simple elements two only, air and water, go to form sense-organs (for the pupil is made of water, the organ of hearing is made of air, and the organ of smell of one or other of these two, while fire is found either in none or in all—warmth being an essential condition of all sensibility—and earth either in none or,
(5)
if anywhere, specially mingled with the components
of the organ of touch; wherefore it would remain that there can be no sense-organ formed of anything except water and air); and if these sense-organs are actually found in certain animals;—then all the possible senses are possessed by those animals that are not imperfect or mutilated (for even the mole is observed to have eyes beneath its skin); so that,
(10)
if there is no fifth element and no property other than those which belong to the four elements of our world, no sense can be wanting to such animals.
[425a]

Further, there cannot be a special sense-organ for the common sensibles either,
(15)
i. e. the objects which we perceive incidentally through this or that special sense, e. g. movement, rest, figure, magnitude, number, unity; for all these we perceive by movement, e. g. magnitude by movement, and therefore also figure (for figure is a species of magnitude), what is at rest by the absence of movement: number is perceived by the negation of continuity, and by the special sensibles; for each sense perceives one class of sensible objects.
(20)
So that it is clearly impossible that there should be a special sense for any one of the common sensibles, e. g. movement; for, if that were so, our perception of it would be exactly parallel to our present perception of what is sweet by vision.
That
is so because we have a sense for each of the two qualities, in virtue of which when they happen to meet in one sensible object we are aware of both contemporaneously.
(25)
If it were not like this our perception of the common qualities would always be incidental, i. e. as is the perception of Cleon’s son, where we perceive him not as Cleon’s son but as white, and the white thing which we really perceive happens to be Cleon’s son.

But in the case of the common sensibles there is already in us a general sensibility which enables us to perceive them directly; there is therefore no special sense required for their perception: if there were, our perception of them would have been exactly like what has been above described.

The senses perceive each other’s special objects incidentally; not because the percipient sense is this or that special sense,
(30)
but because all form a unity: this incidental perception takes place whenever sense is directed at one and the same moment to two disparate qualities in one and the same object, e. g. to the bitterness and the yellowness of bile; the assertion of the identity of both cannot be the act of either of the senses; hence the illusion of sense, e. g. the belief that if a thing is yellow it is bile.
[425b]

It might be asked why we have more senses than one.
(5)
Is it to prevent a failure to apprehend the common sensibles, e. g. movement, magnitude, and number, which go along with the special sensibles?
Had we no sense but sight, and that sense no object but white, they would have tended to escape our notice and everything would have merged for us into an indistinguishable identity because of the concomitance of colour and magnitude. As it is, the fact that the common sensibles are given in the objects of more than one sense reveals their distinction from each and all of the special sensibles.
(10)

2
     Since it is through sense that we are aware that we are seeing or hearing, it must be either by sight that we are aware of seeing, or by some sense other than sight. But the sense that gives us this new sensation must perceive both sight and its object, viz. colour: so that either (1) there will be two senses both percipient of the same sensible object, or (2) the sense must be percipient of itself. Further,
(15)
even if the sense which perceives sight were different from sight, we must either fall into an infinite regress, or we must somewhere assume a sense which is aware of itself. If so, we ought to do this in the first case.

This presents a difficulty: if to perceive by sight is just to see, and what is seen is colour (or the coloured), then if we are to
see
that which sees, that which sees originally must be coloured. It is clear therefore that ‘to perceive by sight’ has more than one meaning; for even when we are not
seeing
,
(20)
it is by sight that we discriminate darkness from light, though not in the same way as we distinguish one colour from another. Further, in a sense even that which sees
is
coloured; for in each case the sense-organ is capable of receiving the sensible object without its matter. That is why even when the sensible objects are gone the sensings and imaginings continue to exist in the sense-organs.
(25)

The activity of the sensible object and that of the percipient sense is one and the same activity, and yet the distinction between their being remains. Take as illustration actual sound and actual hearing: a man may have hearing and yet not be hearing, and that which has a sound is not always sounding. But when that which can hear is actively hearing and that which can sound is sounding,
(30)
then the actual hearing and the actual sound are merged in one (these one might call respectively hearkening and sounding).
[426a]

If it is true that the movement, both the acting and the being acted upon, is to be found in that which is acted upon,
¹
both the sound and the hearing so far as it is actual must be found in that which has the faculty of hearing; for it is in the passive factor that the actuality of the active or motive factor is realized; that is why that which
causes movement may be at rest.
(5)
Now the actuality of that which can sound is just sound or sounding, and the actuality of that which can hear is hearing or hearkening; ‘sound’ and ‘hearing’ are both ambiguous. The same account applies to the other senses and their objects.
(10)
For as the-acting-and-being-acted-upon is to be found in the passive, not in the active factor, so also the actuality of the sensible object and that of the sensitive subject are both realized in the latter. But while in some cases each aspect of the total actuality has a distinct name, e. g. sounding and hearkening, in some one or other is nameless, e. g. the actuality of sight is called seeing, but the actuality of colour has no name: the actuality of the faculty of taste is called tasting,
(15)
but the actuality of flavour has no name. Since the actualities of the sensible object and of the sensitive faculty are
one
actuality in spite of the difference between their modes of being, actual hearing and actual sounding appear and disappear from existence at one and the same moment, and so actual savour and actual tasting, &c.,
(20)
while as potentialities one of them may exist without the other. The earlier students of nature were mistaken in their view that without sight there was no white or black, without taste no savour. This statement of theirs is partly true, partly false: ‘sense’ and ‘the sensible object’ are ambiguous terms, i. e. may denote either potentialities or actualities: the statement is true of the latter,
(25)
false of the former. This ambiguity they wholly failed to notice.

If voice always implies a concord, and if the voice and the hearing of it are in one sense one and the same, and if concord always implies a ratio, hearing as well as what is heard must be a ratio.
(30)
That is why the excess of either the sharp or the flat destroys the hearing. (So also in the case of savours excess destroys the sense of taste, and in the case of colours excessive brightness or darkness destroys the sight, and in the case of smell excess of strength whether in the direction of sweetness or bitterness is destructive.)
[426b]
This shows that the sense is a ratio.

That is also why the objects of sense are (1) pleasant when the sensible extremes such as acid or sweet or salt being pure and unmixed are brought into the proper ratio;
²
then they are pleasant: and in general what is blended is more pleasant than the sharp or the flat alone; or,
(5)
to touch, that which is capable of being either warmed or chilled: the sense and the ratio are identical: while (2) in excess the sensible extremes are painful or destructive.

Each sense then is relative to its particular group of sensible
qualities: it is found in a sense-organ as such
³
and discriminates the differences which exist within that group; e. g. sight discriminates white and black, taste sweet and bitter, and so in all cases.
(10)
Since we also discriminate white from sweet, and indeed each sensible quality from every other, with what do we perceive that they are different? It must be by sense; for what is before us is sensible objects. (Hence it is also obvious that the flesh cannot be the ultimate sense-organ: if it were,
(15)
the discriminating power could not do its work without immediate contact with the object.)

Therefore (1) discrimination between white and sweet cannot be effected by two agencies which remain separate; both the qualities discriminated must be present to something that is one and single. On any other supposition even if I perceived sweet and you perceived white, the difference between them would be apparent.
(20)
What says that two things are different must be one; for sweet is different from white. Therefore what asserts this difference must be self-identical, and as what asserts, so also what thinks or perceives. That it is not possible by means of two agencies which remain separate to discriminate two objects which are separate is therefore obvious; and that (2) it is not possible to do this in separate moments of time may be seen if we look at it as follows. For as what asserts the difference between the good and the bad is one and the same, so also the time at which it asserts the one to be different and the other to be different is not accidental to the assertion (as it is for instance when I now assert a difference but do not assert that there is now a difference); it asserts thus—both now and that the objects are different now; the objects therefore must be present at one and the same moment.
(25)
Both the discriminating power and the time of its exercise must be one and undivided.

But, it may be objected, it is impossible that what is self-identical should be moved at one and the same time with contrary movements in so far as it is undivided,
(30)
and in an undivided moment of time. For if what is sweet be the quality perceived, it moves the sense or thought in this determinate way, while what is bitter moves it in a contrary way, and what is white in a different way.
[427a]
Is it the case then that what discriminates, though both numerically one and indivisible, is at the same time divided in its being? In one sense, it is what is divided that perceives two separate objects at once, but in another sense it does so
qua
undivided; for it is divisible in its being, but spatially and numerically undivided.

But is not this impossible? For while it is true that what is self-identical and undivided may be both contraries at once
potentially
,
(5)
it cannot be self-identical in its being—it must lose its unity by being put into activity. It is not possible to be at once white and black, and therefore it must also be impossible for a thing to be affected at one and the same moment by the forms of both, assuming it to be the case that sensation and thinking are properly so described.
⁴

The answer is that just as what is called a ‘point’ is,
(10)
as being at once one and two, properly said to be divisible, so here, that which discriminates is
qua
undivided one, and active in a single moment of time, while so far forth as it is divisible it twice over uses the same dot at one and the same time. So far forth then as it takes the limit as two, it discriminates two separate objects with what in a sense is divided: while so far as it takes it as one, it does so with what is one and occupies in its activity a single moment of time.

About the principle in virtue of which we say that animals are percipient,
(15)
let this discussion suffice.